
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EUROPE
Since
1914

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THE RENUNCIATION OF WAR

The signing of the Pact of Paris, August 27, 1928

B-13

EUROPE
Since
1914

by

F. LEE BENNS
Indiana University

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PREFACE

This volume aims to provide the general reader and student of history with a brief, clearly-written, well-organized introduction to the significant events and changes which have occurred in Europe since 1914. It makes no claim to be a final and complete history of the period. The writing of such a volume must remain the task of future historians who, doubtless, will rank the period alongside that of the French Revolution for dramatic events and for rapid and far-reaching institutional changes. The desire of the present generation to obtain as clear an understanding as possible of the recent but profound developments which have taken place in the political, economic and social life of Europe, is the justification for this work.

In addition to documentary material, the writings of many who have made intensive studies of special topics in the history of Europe since 1914 have been largely drawn upon, the appended bibliography furnishing some indication of the extent of this debt. Further grateful acknowledgment is due to Professor Bernadotte E. Schmitt, of the University of Chicago, who read and criticized the manuscript; to Miss Alice C. Bartlett, assistant librarian of the League of Nations, who extended innumerable courtesies over a period of several months; and to Mr. Russell T. McNutt, of Indiana University, who gave valuable assistance in the gathering of material for several of the chapters.

F. Lee Benns

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EUROPE
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CHAPTER I

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD WAR

THAT the crack of an assassin's pistol in the streets of Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, should actually be the opening gun in a great world war was not due primarily to the fact that the Austrian archduke and his wife had been foully murdered by Jugoslav conspirators. Great international conflicts involving the leading powers of the world arise not from single isolated incidents but from causes deeper-lying and more profound. Although there are differences of opinion regarding their relative importance, there is general agreement on at least four fundamental causes of the World War.

Underlying Causes

Probably most important among these underlying causes was the development among the States of Europe, in the years following the Franco-Prussian War, of a series of entangling alliances. As a result of Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, the German chancellor, Bismarck, feared lest French desire for revenge might lead to the creation of an alliance of States hostile to Germany and an ultimate attack upon her. To safeguard the peace of the newly established German Empire, therefore, he himself began the building of a succession of alliances which should center about Germany and leave France isolated in Europe. In consequence of Bismarck's endeavors, Germany became linked in a dual alliance with Austria-Hungary (1879) and in a triple alliance with Italy and Austria-Hungary (1882). Since these two alliances were still effective in 1914, their terms merit consideration. In the Dual

Alliance it was agreed that if either Germany or Austria-Hungary were attacked by Russia or a third power backed by Russia, the other would aid; and that if either were at war with any power except Russia, the other would maintain benevolent neutrality. The Triple Alliance stipulated that (1) if Germany were attacked by France, Italy would aid Germany; (2) if Italy were attacked by France, both Austria-Hungary and Germany would aid Italy; and (3) if any member of the alliance were attacked and at war with two or more powers, the other two members would aid.

These alliances Bismarck supplemented with others. A treaty between Germany and Austria-Hungary on the one side and Rumania on the other (1883) provided that if either Austria-Hungary or Rumania were attacked by Russia, the other would aid. A few years later a reinsurance treaty with Russia (1887) provided, on the other hand, that if either were at war with a third power, the other would remain neutral, except in case Russia attacked Austria-Hungary or Germany attacked France. By these treaties Bismarck provided Germany with protection against both France and Russia, and completely isolated France.

But with Bismarck's dismissal from office (1890) and William II's subsequent policy came a change in the international situation. The new Kaiser refused to renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia when it expired (1890), so that Russia was cast adrift and, like France, stood isolated in Europe. The inevitable consequence was that these two States, both fearful of the increasing power of the German Empire, came together in an entente (1891), culminating two years later in a military convention which created the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894. In this convention it was provided that if France were attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia would aid France; and that if Russia were attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France would aid Russia.

Meanwhile Germany's rapid strides in industry and commerce, her adoption of a policy of vigorous naval expansion, and her increasing demand for a "place in the sun," began to alarm Great Britain, especially after the latter's proffer of an alliance with Ger-

many had been declined and Germany's apparent unfriendliness had been revealed during the Boer War. These circumstances led Great Britain to abandon her previously unfriendly attitude toward France, and resulted in the establishment of the Entente Cordiale (1904) between these two powers. Although a number of questions which had disturbed Anglo-French relations were adjusted in the treaty signed at this time, perhaps the most important agreement was that Great Britain should have a free hand in Egypt and France a free hand in Morocco. No definite alliance nor military convention was entered into, but an era of good feeling began which led Great Britain and France into closer and closer coöperation in international affairs.

France, united with Russia in the Alliance of 1894 and with Great Britain in the Entente Cordiale, naturally desired to bring about more friendly relations between these two States. The possibility of doing this, however, seemed at first to be rather remote, for Great Britain had long been the traditional enemy of Russia. The latter's southward expansion and her intrigues in the Near East, in Persia, and in Afghanistan had seemed to threaten the security of India and Great Britain's most direct route thereto, while her increasing activity in the Far East had constituted a challenge to Great Britain's commercial position in that part of the world.

Nevertheless, in her endeavors to bring about a friendly understanding between Russia and Great Britain, France was assisted by several circumstances. In the first place, Russia's disastrous defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) considerably lessened Great Britain's fear of the former's menace to India, while at the same time it disturbed the military balance of power in Europe to the decided advantage of the Triple Alliance. In the second place, Germany's gradual acquisition of a preponderating influence in Turkey, coupled with her project for a railway from Constantinople to Bagdad, led Great Britain to believe that a German menace to British interests in the Near and Middle East had been substituted for the previous Russian threat. These facts, especially in view of Germany's apparent determination to enter into naval competition with Great Britain, convinced the statesmen of the latter country that

British interests demanded a shift in foreign policy. Such a shift was finally made when Great Britain and Russia signed a convention (1907) adjusting their differences in the Middle East and dividing Persia between them. Again, no binding alliance was consummated between the two powers, but the good feeling and close understanding which followed led to the designation of France, Russia, and Great Britain as the powers of the Triple Entente. Thus by 1907 the great powers of Europe had come to be pretty definitely divided into two groups, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente.

Italy's alignment with Austria-Hungary, however, was unnatural. *Italia Irredenta*—territory in Europe inhabited by Italian-speaking people but not included in the Italian Kingdom—lay chiefly within Austria-Hungary's political boundaries, and the interests of the two powers conflicted in the Balkans and in the Adriatic. In the closing years of the nineteenth century, Italy's ill will toward France subsided and she began to gravitate toward the Triple Entente. In 1900 she agreed to give France a free hand in Morocco in return for which the latter gave her a free hand in Tripoli and Cyrenaica. Two years later the two powers further agreed that should either be the object of a direct or indirect aggression on the part of one or more powers, or should either, as a result of a direct provocation, find itself compelled in defense of its honor or its security to take the initiative of a declaration of war, the other would maintain a strict neutrality. In other words, should Germany attack France or should France "in defense of her honor or her security" declare war upon Germany, Italy would remain neutral. A few years later Italy moved still nearer the position of the Triple Entente. At Racconigi (1909) she agreed with Russia to attempt to maintain the status quo in the Balkans to the exclusion of all foreign domination, and in return for Russia's favorable attitude toward Italian interests in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, she further agreed to consider favorably Russian interests in the question of the Straits at Constantinople. It is apparent therefore that, although on paper the Triple Alliance seemed more closely and more definitely knit together than the Triple Entente, such was not the case.

These ententes, alliances, and counter alliances, though defensive in their original character, eventually created an atmosphere favorable to war. Naturally the number of "danger spots" which might embroil all Europe in a serious international conflict was increased as States became more and more entangled in the plans and aspirations of their allies. At the same time, believing that if attacked they would have the active assistance of their allies, States became less willing to make concessions in times of diplomatic clashes. Finally, as the international situation became more tense, members of each alliance became reluctant to concede anything to members of the other lest their action be interpreted as weakness and their group suffer a loss of prestige.

Accompanying the growth of entangling alliances in the period after 1871 came a great increase in national armaments. After the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars, the system of conscription which seemed to have enabled Prussia to gain an easy victory in each case was rapidly adopted by the other States of Europe. One after another the national armies were reorganized on the Prussian model. Year by year the number of young men called to serve in the various national armies was increased until Europe came to be a veritable armed camp. By 1914 the five major Continental powers counted in their peace-time standing armies over 3,500,000 men, to say nothing of the added millions trained and organized in the reserves.

Again, such a situation did much to create an atmosphere favorable to war. In the first place, it engendered international fear and suspicion. Although each power professed to be preparing merely to defend itself against aggression, each in turn suspected the others of preparing *for* aggression. In the second place, the knowledge that great military establishments were back of them undoubtedly increased the reluctance of statesmen to make concessions which might appear in the nature of national diplomatic defeats and, conversely, increased their determination to press for some advantage which might appear to be a national diplomatic triumph. In the third place, in all countries to some extent, but more particularly in Germany,

the growth of armaments contributed to the development of a state of mind usually summed up in the one word, militarism.[1] Finally, with the growth of great military machines there developed in each country general staffs of military leaders and experts, one of whose chief concerns was to prevent the military leaders of another power from "getting the jump" on them in time of international crisis. With much truth it has been said that "the terrible time-table of the European General Staffs had far more to do with the actual outbreak of the World War than the deliberate decision of any man or Government."

The period which witnessed the development of entangling alliances and the great increase in national armaments saw likewise the growth of a vigorous imperialistic impulse among European powers. The latter half of the nineteenth century was a period of intense nationalism in Europe. This resulted not only in the creation of new States like the Italian Kingdom and the German Empire, but in the desire of States which had completed their national consolidation to gratify still further their "possessing instinct." Patriots in landlocked countries sought expansion of their national control over territories which lay between them and the high seas so that they might not be cut off from free communication with other parts of the world in time of international crisis. They sought the comfort which came from the belief that oversea colonies provided added reservoirs of man power as well as naval bases for use in future wars in defense of the homeland. They sought, too, the satisfaction derived from their ability to point with pride, on the map of the world, to the various territories which were controlled by their country.

But more important than these in causing the revival of im-

[1] "Militarism is an attitude of approval of war as an elevating, ennobling occupation, as the purifying salt in the otherwise nauseous human compound; . . . usually, the approval rises to a desire for national glory as the product of military success, welcoming quarrel in order that war's beneficent influence may have full operation; and . . . the approval and desire have, as result, the endowment of the military profession with a rank and worthiness higher and more meritorious than attaches to avocations of civil character." J. S. Ewart, *The Roots and Causes of the Wars (1914–1918)*, I, pp. 479–80.

perialism was the rapid rise and spread of the industrial revolution during this period. Whereas until about 1870 Great Britain had been the predominant industrial and commercial power of the world, other countries now embarked upon an industrial expansion and began to enter into competition with her. With the spread of the industrial revolution and the consequent beginning of a keener economic competition among the powers, the demand for colonies again began to be heard. Colonies were now desired in order (1) that raw materials might be easily and surely obtained for manufacture into finished products in the homeland, (2) that monopolistic markets might be at hand to absorb the surplus of manufactured goods produced in the homeland, (3) that fruitful avenues might be provided for the investment of the surplus funds accumulated by the capitalists of the homeland, and (4) that added food supplies might be obtained for the sustenance of the increased millions at home who were devoting themselves no longer directly to the raising of foodstuffs but to the production of manufactured products.

In consequence, there followed a spirited contest among the powers of the world, more especially among the great powers, for possession of the unclaimed areas of the earth's surface. By 1914 no habitable portion of the globe remained unclaimed by some State. But, unfortunately, in 1914 many national imperialistic aspirations remained unfulfilled to threaten the peaceful course of international relations. Russian imperialists sought to accomplish Russia's "historic mission" by acquiring Constantinople and the Straits, together with domination of the Balkans. Austro-Hungarian imperialists demanded an outlet on the Ægean and likewise sought to gain control in the Balkans in order to safeguard a route thereto. German imperialists desired to secure the economic exploitation of the rich resources of Asia Minor and for that purpose needed a railway route through the Balkans and predominance in Constantinople. Italian imperialists not only hoped for territorial expansion in Africa and Asia Minor but desired control of the eastern coast of the Adriatic in order that they might transform that sea into an Italian lake. On the other hand, British and French imperialists, realizing that their countries already controlled the first and second largest oversea

empires respectively, were disturbed chiefly by the fear that some other power might seek to obtain a "place in the sun" at their expense. Imperialism thus produced conflicting national aspirations, bred mutual fears and suspicions, and created an atmosphere which made a great war possible.

A fourth influence which contributed to the forces leading toward war was the growth and spread of the desire for national unity; that is, the desire of groups of people of the same race, speaking the same language or kindred dialects, having in general the same customs and traditions, and inhabiting contiguous territory, to unite into one State independent of foreign domination. The nineteenth century witnessed a considerable advance toward this nationalist ideal in the creation of the German Empire, and the Italian, Greek, Belgian, Serbian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian kingdoms. Nevertheless, the twentieth century opened with national statehood as yet unattained or only partially attained in various parts of Europe. In general, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey constituted the chief obstacles to its consummation.

Although the desire for national unity was a force in Italy, which since her consolidation had cast longing eyes upon the Trieste and Trentino territories of Austria-Hungary wherein dwelt "unredeemed Italians," it constituted a more active factor in the Balkans. Here, though considerable advance toward national statehood had been made, each State was possessed of nationalist dreams as yet in 1914 unfulfilled. Greece desired to annex southern Albania, Thrace, Constantinople, the Ægean Islands, and parts of Asia Minor as steps in the reconstruction of the ancient Byzantine Empire. Rumania longed to unite within her boundaries the more than 2,000,000 "unredeemed" Rumanians dwelling in Transylvania, Bukowina, and part of Bessarabia. Bulgaria hoped ultimately to absorb territory in Rumania, Turkey, and Serbia which had been previously wrested from her. And Serbia aspired to liberate the millions of her kinsmen who dwelt within the Austro-Hungarian Empire in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and Dalmatia. The people in each of these States felt that their right to liberate and unite their kinsmen with them was as justifiable as had been the unifica-

tion of Italy and Germany a few decades earlier, or the consolidation of France and Great Britain some centuries before.

Naturally this unrest in the Balkans constituted a standing menace to the peace of Europe, the more so since States like Russia and Austria-Hungary sought to turn the Balkan aspirations to their own advantage. Russia, for example, in order to block the plans of the central powers and at the same time strengthen her own position in the Balkans as a step toward the attainment of her "historic mission," was engaged, in the years just preceding the World War, in an attempt to create a Balkan league. In 1909 she proposed to Bulgaria a military convention designed to protect each against the central powers and Turkey. Although the convention seems never to have been actually signed, Russia's attitude is disclosed in one article which stipulated "that the realization of the high ideals of the Slavic peoples in the Balkan peninsula . . . is possible only after a favorable outcome of Russia's struggle with Germany and Austria-Hungary." In 1912 the Russo-Bulgarian understanding was expanded into something resembling a Balkan league when, under Russia's guidance, alliances were entered into between Bulgaria and Serbia and between Bulgaria and Greece. Apparently at the same time by verbal agreements Montenegro was also added. Thus the Balkan States, with the exception of Rumania, were brought together in an organization over which, the Russian foreign minister, Sazonov, believed, Russia would "be able to exercise a right of veto."

The International Situation, 1912–14

Late in 1912 a grave international crisis was precipitated when, despite the opposition of the great powers, the so-called Balkan League made a concerted attack upon Turkey. Although Russian and British sympathy was with the Balkan States almost from the beginning, the central powers were greatly disturbed by Serbia's advance to the Adriatic and Bulgaria's threat to Constantinople. In fact, the chief crisis had to do with Serbia's seizure of northern Albania and her determination to secure a foothold on the Adriatic. Russia, France, and Great Britain were at first ready to support

Serbia's claim, but both Austria-Hungary and Italy were resolved to prevent a new rival from appearing on the Adriatic. In the face of their joint opposition, the Entente powers conceded that a railway connection through Albania without the territorial access itself must satisfy Serbia, and the latter eventually agreed to yield to the decision of a Conference of Ambassadors which sat in London.

The London Conference was not without its critical moments. Both Austria-Hungary and Russia carried out a kind of mobilization, the former being particularly restless. Throughout the crisis, however, Germany and Great Britain worked in perfect accord in the interests of peace. The Treaty of London which was signed on May 30, 1913, restricted European Turkey to Constantinople and a mere foothold in eastern Thrace. The status of Albania and the Ægean Islands was left to a later decision of the great powers. The rest of the territory previously included in European Turkey was ceded to the Balkan Allies.

The victors almost immediately proceeded to quarrel over the spoils. On June 29, the Bulgarians suddenly attacked the Serbian forces in Macedonia and at the same time advanced against the Greeks in Saloniki. In order to prevent Bulgarian hegemor in the Balkans, Rumania now joined Serbia and Greece; and Turk y seized the occasion to reoccupy Adrianople. Austria-Hungary, e more alarmed, urged Germany and Italy to join her in an attack upon Serbia, but failed to secure their support or approval. The Second Balkan War was soon over and a new treaty was signed at Bucharest (August 10). As a result of the wars Serbia gained central and part of southern Macedonia and half of the Sanjak of Novibazar; Montenegro got the other half of the Sanjak; Greece secured Crete and most of southern Macedonia, including Saloniki; Bulgaria obtained a strip of Macedonia and western Thrace, but was obliged to return eastern Thrace including Adrianople to Turkey and to cede a strip of the southern Dobrudja to Rumania. Albania was eventually organized as an independent principality with William of Wied, a German prince, as ruler.

The Balkan wars had far-reaching effects on the general Euro-

ARCTIC
ICELAND
FAROE IS.
SHETLAND IS.
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
NORWEGIAN SEA
Christiania
SCOTLAND
Edinburgh
IRELAND
Liverpool
ENGLAND
NORTH SEA
DENMARK
Copenhagen
BALTIC
Hamburg
Amsterdam
NETHERLANDS
London
Berlin
EMPIRE
Brussels
BELGIUM
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Elbe R.
GERMAN
Paris
LUXEMBURG
Loire R.
Rhine R.
Munich
Danube
FRANCE
Bern
SWITZERLAND
Vienna
AUSTRIA
Bordeaux
Milan
Oporto
PYRENEES
ANDORRA
Marseilles
ADRIATIC
Lisbon
Madrid
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
CORSICA
Rome
BALEARIC IS.
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SARDINIA
Tangier
Gibraltar
MEDITERRANEAN
SICILY
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
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1914

OCEAN
Archangel
Helsingfors
St. Petersburg
Volga R.
Moscow
RUSSIA
Don R.
Dnieper R.
Volga R.
URAL MOUNTAINS
Obi R.
SIBERIA
Ural R.
CASPIAN SEA
CAUCASUS MTS.
Tiflis
PERSIA
EMPIRE
Pruth R.
RUMANIA
Bucharest
Danube
BLACK SEA
Sofia
BULGARIA
Constantinople
OTTOMAN
Smyrna
Athens
CRETE
CYPRUS
SEA
Scale of Miles
0 100 200 300 400 500

pean situation. They practically doubled the area and population of Serbia, greatly increased her self-confidence, and strongly stimulated her hope of a speedy realization of her "Greater Serbia" dream which envisaged the transfer from Austria-Hungary to herself of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They turned over to Greece and Serbia former Turkish territory through which Austria-Hungary had planned to secure railway connection with the Ægean, at the same time placing in more powerful hands her existing railway route to Constantinople. They obviously made more difficult of realization the proposed Berlin-Bagdad Railway under German influence. They revealed that Rumania was no longer a trusty satellite of the central powers, and at the same time smashed Russia's recently created Balkan League. The net result seemed unfavorable to the central powers.

During the months that ensued the governments and peoples of Europe displayed an "excessive nervosity." Existing alliances and ententes were tightened up, and new ones projected. The Triple Alliance was renewed by anticipation in December, 1912, and discussions looking toward joint naval action were initiated between Great Britain and Russia in 1914. Russia sought to reconstruct her Balkan League, substituting Rumania for Bulgaria; while Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, contemplated the formation of an anti-Serbian league to be composed of Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. The great powers looked to the strengthening of their military establishments. On the ground that the balance of power had been displaced by the Balkan wars, the German army in 1913 was increased by 170,000 men; in the same year France, because of her smaller population, extended the term of military service from two to three years, despite the protests of the Socialists; and Russia inaugurated a scheme for increasing her recruits to the extent of 135,000 a year.

Military plans were being outlined for the future. In December, 1912, a secret memorandum of the German general staff asserted that in the coming war with France it "would be necessary to violate the neutrality of Belgium. It is only by an advance across Belgium that we can hope to defeat the French army." Some

months later (February, 1914) the Russian crown council met secretly to consider what could and should be done to prepare for action against the Straits, and the chief of staff pointed out that the struggle for Constantinople was impossible without a European war.

Gradually the international situation became more tense. In Austria-Hungary "the feeling that the nations are moving towards a conflict, urged by an irresistible force," grew from day to day. In Russia the military began to realize that "we are preparing for a war in the West. Not only troops but the whole nation must accustom itself to the idea that we arm ourselves for a war of annihilation against the Germans, and the German Empires must be annihilated." In France the "atmosphere of hate and defiance has become heavier owing to the discussions on the Three Years' Law." "Russia is ready. France must be ready too," proclaimed the headlines of an article in the St. Petersburg *Bourse Gazette* in June, 1914, whereupon the Kaiser wrote: "Any German who still disbelieves that Russia and France are working full steam for an early war against us . . . is fit for the madhouse." "The whole of Germany is charged with electricity," wrote Colonel House, after visiting Berlin in May, 1914. "Everybody's nerves are tense. It only needs a spark to set the whole thing off." "Peace," the German ambassador in Paris reported, "remains at the mercy of an accident."

The July Crisis

Such was the atmosphere in Europe when Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the Habsburg emperor and heir to the Austrian and Hungarian thrones, set out for his visit to the capital of Bosnia. In going to Sarajevo at this time the archduke took his life in his hands, for Bosnia was honeycombed with propaganda of two Serbian societies, "National Defense" and "Union or Death," and men were not lacking to undertake his assassination in the interest of the "Greater Serbia" movement.[2] Even before the announcement of the

[2] Many Serbs feared that the archduke's scheme for transforming the Dual Monarchy into a Trial (triple) Monarchy with autonomy for the Slavs, might wean their kinsmen in the empire away from the "Greater Serbia" movement.

proposed visit of the archduke, the latter of these societies had marked him for assassination. His presence in Sarajevo provided the sought-for occasion, and plans were laid under the direction of Colonel Dimitrijevitch, a member of the society and chief of the intelligence division of the Serbian general staff. Three Bosnian young men who volunteered to carry out the plot were furnished with the necessary pistols, ammunition, and bombs in Belgrade, and smuggled back across the frontier into Bosnia. Apparently still others were in Sarajevo on that fateful day as "reserves" in case the attempts of these three should fail.

On the morning of June 28, 1914, the archduke's train arrived in Sarajevo shortly before ten o'clock. A few minutes later, when the party was on the way to the town hall to be welcomed by the mayor, a bomb was hurled by one of the trio of conspirators. It missed its mark, however, and exploded under the car behind the one in which Francis Ferdinand and his wife were riding. Later, when the archduke was returning from the town hall, a second conspirator suddenly jumped on the running-board of the car and assassinated both the archduke and his wife. Thus was removed the man whom "at that time almost all public opinion among the Serbs regarded . . . as the greatest enemy of the Serb people."

Once more events in the Balkans precipitated a European crisis. Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, determined to use this occasion for that final reckoning with Serbia which had been desired but postponed in 1913. The Austro-Hungarian government held that Serbian propaganda, seeking to unite all Jugoslavs under the Serbian flag, must encourage such crimes and endanger the Habsburg dynasty and empire if not stopped. Austria-Hungary's efforts must now "be directed to isolating Serbia and reducing her size." Austria-Hungary consulted her ally and learned that Germany would fully support her in whatever action she might decide to take. Germany, naturally, was anxious to have her one dependable ally maintain her strength undiminished, and concurred in her belief that this necessitated action against Serbia. Austria-Hungary desired only a local war between herself and Serbia, and Germany in the beginning urged rapidity of action in order to forestall inter-

vention. Both recognized, however, the possibility that Russia would intervene in Serbia's behalf.

Berchtold proceeded to prepare the way for military action by presenting to Serbia on July 23 an ultimatum purposely designed to be so severe that the latter could not accept it. It asserted that Serbia had broken her promise "to live on good neighborly terms" with Austria-Hungary by encouraging propaganda aimed against the Dual Monarchy, and declared that the latter was thus compelled to abandon its attitude of benevolent and patient forbearance in order to put an end "to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy." The ultimatum then made several peremptory demands, the most important of which were: (1) that the Serbian government officially condemn the anti-Austrian propaganda by its citizens; (2) that it suppress all publications and societies which incited hatred and contempt of the Dual Monarchy; (3) that all anti-Austrian teachers and books be eliminated from the public schools; (4) that the public officials implicated in the anti-Austrian propaganda be dismissed; (5) that two Serbian officers, named in the ultimatum, be arrested at once; (6) that Serbia accept the collaboration of Austrian officials in the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda within her borders; and (7) that Serbia accept the help of Austrian officials in the investigation of those implicated in the Sarajevo crime. A forty-eight-hour limit was attached to the ultimatum.

The Entente powers' request that Austria-Hungary extend the time limit beyond the stipulated forty-eight hours was bluntly refused by the latter. Serbia consequently submitted her reply within the designated period. She offered to accede to all the demands of the ultimatum except the ones referring to the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in the suppression of anti-Austrian propaganda and in the investigation of the Sarajevo crime. These, she asserted, would be a violation of her rights as a sovereign State. Serbia offered, however, to refer the whole matter to The Hague International Tribunal or to a decision of the great powers, if Austria considered the reply unsatisfactory. The reply was conciliatory and most of the powers considered that it laid the basis for negotiation. The

Kaiser himself believed that it removed "every reason for war." Nevertheless, Austria-Hungary asserted that the reply was unsatisfactory and forthwith severed diplomatic relations with Belgrade. "Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning."

In this crisis, however, Russia was determined to support Serbia, and asserted that she would agree to a settlement only in so far as it involved no humiliation of the latter as an independent State. She believed that her own position in the Balkans demanded a strong and independent Serbia to block the way of her rival, Austria-Hungary; nor were men lacking in St. Petersburg who felt that war was inevitable and that now was Russia's chance for a final reckoning with Germany and the acquisition of Constantinople and the Straits. Sazonov characterized the Austrian ultimatum as highly provocative and expressed the hope that Great Britain would proclaim her solidarity with Russia and France.

As in 1913, so now, however, Sir Edward Grey, British foreign secretary, was chiefly interested in mediation in the interests of peace. He believed that France, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain—the powers which had no direct interest in Serbia—might act jointly in Vienna and St. Petersburg. On July 26, therefore, he proposed that these governments instruct their ambassadors in London to meet in conference with him for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications. He contemplated a procedure similar to that followed during the Balkan crisis of the preceding year. France and Italy promptly accepted the proposal, but Germany declared that she could take part in mediation only at Austria-Hungary's express wish. The latter had no such wish. On the contrary, for the specific purpose of evading further proposals for mediation, Berchtold persuaded Emperor Francis Joseph to declare war against Serbia on July 28, and the bombardment of Belgrade, an unfortified city, commenced on the next day.

On July 26, on the suggestion of the German ambassador in St. Petersburg, "direct conversations" had been initiated between Sazonov and the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in St. Petersburg.

Sazonov requested that the latter be authorized to discuss a redrafting of certain points in the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum in such a way as to satisfy Austria-Hungary's chief demands and at the same time be acceptable to Serbia. Berchtold, who was resolved not to enter into negotiations regarding issues between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, had at first evaded Sazonov's request and later rejected it on the ground that war had already been declared against Serbia. This action on the part of Austria-Hungary furnished further basis for Russian belief that the former was planning "to gobble up Serbia."

At the same time it gave Russian military officers an opportunity to exercise pressure for war preparation. The latter felt that a war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was necessarily a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia, and therefore between Germany and Russia; while Sazonov believed that Germany was supporting Austria-Hungary and would continue to do so unless Russia made it clear that she would threaten Austria-Hungary with force in order to protect Serbia. On July 29 Russia declared mobilization against the Dual Monarchy. France approved the Russian policy and telegraphed the promise of full French aid. Information of Russia's action together with Great Britain's attitude now caused Germany to address sharp warnings to Austria-Hungary, pointing out that the latter's refusal "to exchange views with St. Petersburg would be a grave mistake." Berchtold thereupon permitted the renewal of conversations at St. Petersburg the next day, but limited them to an explanation of the ultimatum and to a discussion of Austro-Russian—not Austro-Serbian—relations.

On the same day on which Russia ordered mobilization against Austria-Hungary she requested Great Britain again to press for mediation with a view to the suspension of military operations. The latter then suggested to Germany as a good basis for mediation that Austria should occupy Belgrade or other towns as pledges, while mediation should seek "to procure for Austria all possible satisfaction." Germany forwarded to Austria this suggestion, adding:

If Austria refuses any intervention we are thus faced with a conflagration, in which England would go against us, and, according to all indica-

tions, Italy and Rumania not with us, and we two would have to face four Great Powers. . . . Austria's political prestige, the honor of her arms as well as her legitimate demands on Serbia, could be amply preserved by the occupation of Belgrade or other places. . . . Under these circumstances we most urgently and earnestly submit to the considerations of the Vienna Cabinet that it should accept mediation under the honorable terms specified. The responsibility for the consequences which will otherwise result would be uncommonly serious for Austria and for ourselves.

Berchtold, however, believed that warlike operations against Serbia must continue, that Austria-Hungary could not negotiate concerning the British offer so long as Russian mobilization had not been stopped, and that Austria-Hungary's demands must be accepted integrally without negotiation. The Austro-Hungarian council of ministers on July 31 adopted Berchtold's views, and practically repudiated the mediation proposals, as Francis Joseph clearly realized when he wrote to the Kaiser: "I am aware of the implication of my decisions, and have made them with entire confidence in the justice of God and with the certainty that your armed forces will range themselves with unalterable fidelity in favor of my Empire and the Triple Alliance." On that day Austria proclaimed mobilization against Russia.

Meanwhile, as early as July 26 Russia had begun to take far-reaching measures preparatory to general mobilization. Three days later, after news of the bombardment of Belgrade, mobilization had been ordered against Austria-Hungary. Finally, in the afternoon of July 30, the consent of the Tsar to general mobilization was obtained, and on the following morning public announcement of the mobilization was made. According to Russian army orders of 1912, mobilization was not the signal for beginning hostilities. Nevertheless, it was generally understood between the French and Russian experts that mobilization was equivalent to a declaration of war, and Great Britain had warned Russia as early as July 25 "that if Russia mobilized, Germany would not be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once." On July 30, France, her ally, had urged Russia to "take no immediate steps that may give Germany any

pretext for the total or partial mobilization of her forces." Germany herself had warned Russia that mobilization was a highly dangerous form of diplomatic pressure since "the purely military consideration of the questions by the general staffs would find expression, and if that button were once touched in Germany, the situation would get out of control." Yet, despite all these warnings, and at a time when Germany was at length endeavoring to restrain her ally, and when the Kaiser and the Tsar were in telegraphic communication, Russia proclaimed general mobilization.

Apparently Germany had at first decided to remain quiescent unless Russia actually attacked Austria-Hungary, or actually commenced war preparations against herself. But Germany's chances for success in war depended upon rapidity of action, while Russia, because of her area and her deficient transportation facilities, needed time for mobilization and concentration of her troops. In the words of Jagow, German secretary for foreign affairs, Germany "had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions." The German military leaders naturally failed to see the wisdom of the Tsar's suggestion that both Russia and Germany carry out their mobilizations without recourse to war, while the diplomats continued "to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts." Upon receiving news of Russia's general mobilization, therefore, Germany immediately proclaimed a "threatening state of war"; and later the same day, upon the demand of Moltke, chief of staff, presented an ultimatum demanding that Russia stop every measure of war against Germany and against Austria-Hungary within twelve hours, or German mobilization would follow. No answer was forthcoming, and at five P.M. on August 1 Germany declared war upon Russia.

The system of entangling alliances now began to operate, for Germany well understood that France was bound to come to the aid of Russia in just such a contingency as now existed. The Ger-

man general staff had years before planned that in case of a war against Russia and France, Germany's first thrust must be against France because the latter could mobilize much more rapidly than Russia. With France defeated by an overwhelming attack, German forces could then turn against more slowly moving Russia. It was the essence of the German military plan, therefore, that attack on France should not be delayed. Germany could not wait for France to decide to attack in accordance with the latter's treaty obligations. As early as July 31 she inquired from France what course the latter would pursue in the event of war between Germany and Russia. It is now known that she was prepared to demand the handing over for the duration of the war of Toul and Verdun in case France promised neutrality. On August 1 France replied that she would consult her own interests, and began to mobilize. On August 3 Germany declared war on France.

As early as July 31 Great Britain had asked France and Germany whether, in case of war, they would engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and France had given the desired assurance. Germany, however, had declined to state her attitude on the ground that to do so would reveal her plan of campaign. Both France and Germany had signed treaties to respect the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg but, as pointed out above, German military leaders years before had decided that, in order to crush France quickly, it would be better to violate the neutrality of Belgium than to make a frontal attack on the French fortified eastern frontier. On August 2 German troops occupied Luxemburg despite the protests of that little State. On the same day Germany presented an ultimatum to Belgium demanding within twelve hours the grant of permission to move her troops across that country into France. She promised, if permission were granted, to guarantee Belgian independence and integrity and to pay an indemnity. On the other hand, she threatened that if any resistance were encountered she would treat Belgium as an enemy and the "decision of arms" would determine her subsequent fate. Belgium refused to grant Germany's request and appealed at once to Great Britain to

aid in upholding her neutrality.[3] On August 4 German troops crossed the Belgian frontier.

The invasion of Belgium had its immediate effect in Great Britain where, up to this time, public opinion had strongly opposed entrance into the war. Although Sir Edward Grey himself believed that Great Britain's interests demanded that she should range herself beside France and Russia if war came, the British cabinet was divided on the question. Until August 2, therefore, Great Britain kept her hands free and refused to commit herself regarding future action. On that day, however, in view of Germany's declaration of war on Russia and her anticipated attack on France, Great Britain assured the latter that the British fleet would undertake to protect French coasts and shipping, should the German fleet come into the Channel or through the North Sea to attack them. As a result of agreements reached between France and Great Britain some years before, the French fleet was in the Mediterranean, and the northern and western coasts of France were undefended. Great Britain felt in honor bound to protect the latter, though the offer brought the resignation of two members of the cabinet.

On the following day came news of the German ultimatum to Belgium. This action threatened a cardinal principle of British foreign policy, namely, that the little countries across the narrow seas should not be absorbed by any great imperial system which might be hostile to Great Britain. In part because of this determination, Great Britain had fought against Louis XIV and Napoleon I, and had insisted during the Franco-Prussian War that both sides respect Belgian neutrality. When, therefore, on August 4 news reached London that German troops had actually crossed the frontier into Belgium, Great Britain dispatched an ultimatum to Germany demanding assurance by midnight that Germany would respect Belgian neutrality. Germany, while admitting that Belgium's protest was just and that a wrong was being committed, refused on the ground that "necessity

[3] The Treaty of 1839 stated: "Belgium . . . shall form an Independent and perpetually Neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such Neutrality towards all other States." The rulers of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia at that time placed this article "under the guarantee of their said Majesties."

knows no law," and accused Great Britain of making war "just for a scrap of paper." The next day Great Britain announced that a state of war existed between herself and Germany.

On August 6 Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia. On the following day Montenegro joined Serbia against Austria in another struggle to fulfill their common political aspirations, and two days later a state of war was further proclaimed between these two Jugo-slav powers and Germany. During the next three days France and Great Britain declared war on Austria. In accordance with general expectations, both Italy and Rumania proclaimed their neutrality, on the ground that their obligations to the central powers held only in case of a defensive war. On September 4 Russia, France, and Great Britain transformed their entente into a war-time alliance by signing the Pact of London, in which each agreed not to conclude peace separately nor to demand peace terms without a previous agreement with the others. The two conflicting groups soon came to be generally called the "Central Powers" and the "Allies."

Before the year was over, each side was reinforced by one more power. Early in August Great Britain asked Japan for assistance under the terms of an alliance concluded in 1902 and renewed in 1905 and 1911. Germany was already busy with warlike preparations in Kiaochow, her naval base in the Shantung peninsula, and her warships in the Far East constituted a serious menace to British commerce. One of the objects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was the defense of the special interests of the contracting parties in eastern Asia, and Japan decided to comply with the British request and, if necessary, declare war upon Germany. Doubtless in reaching this decision Japan was more especially actuated by the desire to lessen by one the number of powers competing with her in the exploitation of China. On August 15, therefore, Japan sent an ultimatum to Germany demanding that the latter should withdraw all warships from Chinese and Japanese waters and deliver up the entire leased territory of Kiaochow before September 15 "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." When Germany refused to comply with the demands of the ultimatum, Japan declared war on August 23.

In the years just preceding the World War, German influence —political, military, commercial, and financial—had steadily increased in Turkey so that it was almost inevitable that the latter should join the Central Powers as an ally. This was particularly likely in view of the fact that Russia, Turkey's traditional foe, was one of the Allies. Upon the outbreak of the war two German cruisers in the Mediterranean took refuge in the harbor at Constantinople. When their officers refused either to put to sea or to be interned the Allies protested, but to no avail. Later in the year Turkey closed the Dardanelles to commerce, thereby cutting Russia's communication with the Mediterranean, and again the Allies' protests had no effect. On October 29 one of the German cruisers, masquerading as a Turkish ship, shelled Russian towns on the Black Sea, and three Turkish torpedo boats raided the port of Odessa. In consequence Russia, on November 3, declared war on Turkey and was followed in this action two days later by both France and Great Britain. At the close of the year, therefore, the military alignment stood: Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey against Russia, France, Great Britain, Japan, Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro.

CHAPTER II

THE PERIOD OF TEUTONIC ASCENDANCY

THE World War differed from previous conflicts not only in the gigantic size of the armies directly engaged and the appalling numbers of casualties suffered, but in the tremendous mobilization of men and resources behind the lines for war purposes. The struggle was not confined to the battle fields alone, but was waged in factories, laboratories, and banks, on farms, railroads, and merchant ships. In the World War nations fought nations, and strained every nerve, utilized every resource for victory.

Mobilization of Men and Resources

Even before the declarations of war were issued, mobilization of the various national armies was begun. In the belligerent countries on the Continent millions of men were under arms in time of peace, but they were scattered about the countryside and at the outbreak of the war had to be rushed to protect threatened frontiers or concentrated for the purpose of opening projected offensives. Other millions in the reserve armies had to be called to the colors. From the farm, the factory, the store, from every walk of life men were summoned for military service. The problem of transportation was tremendous; non-military service on the railroads was temporarily set aside as thousands of trains hurried men and supplies to the fronts.

Of the principal belligerents, Great Britain alone had no system of conscription and had available for immediate dispatch to the front an expeditionary force of less than 200,000 men. Although relatively few in numbers, these troops constituted a highly professional and perfectly equipped army, and were at once rushed across the Channel to coöperate with the French. Lord Kitchener, veteran of

many wars, was appointed head of the war office, and immediately laid plans for creating an army of seventy divisions.[1] To obtain recruits for this new army Great Britain relied upon the volunteer system of enlistment, and during the early months of the war thousands of young men hastened to enroll. The chief difficulty at first was to provide qualified officers, but later the problem became one of obtaining enough new volunteers to maintain the army units at their stipulated strength.

In a war where more ammunition was used in two weeks on some of the sectors than in the whole Boer War, the men at the front required scores of thousands of field guns, hundreds of thousands of machine guns, millions of rifles, billions of shells, hundreds of billions of rounds of ammunition for small arms, besides high explosives, gases, airplanes, and tanks. Existing armament firms were not equipped for the tremendous demands made upon them. Old factories had to be extended, new ones built, and others converted into war work.[2] In Great Britain, especially, new factories had to be erected, new machine tools made and set up, material assembled, and labor gathered and instructed.

But the mobilization of resources was not limited to men and munitions. The millions at the front had also to be fed and clothed. Gradually agriculture, manufacture, transportation, and commerce became sub-military activities. As the military needs became more pressing, national boards were established, section after section of industry and transportation was brought under the direction of the governments, and standardization of products was introduced. In order to supply war requirements, production was diverted into new channels, new processes were initiated, wages and prices were fixed, strikes and lockouts were forbidden, and millions of women were mobilized for war work in factories.

[1] In the World War British divisions consisted of about 15,000 men; French and German, of about 12,000 each.

[2] A neutral observer, describing the situation in Berlin in December, 1914, wrote: "A talking machine factory is busy trimming shrapnel shells to prepare them for explosive filling; a piano factory makes cartridges; a bicycle factory turns out iron bedsteads for military hospitals; a wood-working establishment makes barracks to set up where wanted to accommodate prisoners of war; and a sewing machine factory is producing shrapnel."

The financing of the war was a task in itself and required sums far greater than any ever before raised. Eighty per cent of the total war expenditures was met by borrowing, the belligerent powers repeatedly resorting to great bond issues. National bonds were offered in amounts in some cases as low as ten dollars, and millions of people in each of the principal belligerent countries participated in the loans. Single issues were brought out and successfully floated which a few years earlier would have been considered impossible by even the best informed financiers. Single loans of different governments ranged from $3,500,000,000 to nearly $7,000,000,000.

For waging war each side had certain distinct advantages. To begin with, the Central Powers possessed a much closer unity of command than did the Allies. Almost from the opening gun, and certainly after 1916, Germany overshadowed her allies, whose plans she came to direct, whose armies her officers frequently came to command. Among the Allies, on the other hand, until the very closing months of the war, lack of unity existed and diversity of plans and lack of coördination resulted. The Central Powers, too, possessed a distinctly strategic advantage in their geographical position. Its compactness and the splendid network of railways made possible the prompt and efficient transfer of troops from one military front to another. Without interference from the Allies, troops could readily be shifted from the German front in France to the Austrian front in Galicia or, after 1915, even to the Turkish front in Mesopotamia. The Allies, on the other hand, were widely separated geographically. From the beginning, Russia was almost completely isolated from her allies in the west. The resources of Great Britain's far-flung empire could be utilized only after they had been gathered from the seven seas and transported through the perils of the sea to the front where they were needed. Japan was thousands of miles from the main theaters of the war and confined her activities chiefly to the Far East.

Nevertheless, the Allies possessed several very important advantages, especially in case of a long war. They greatly outnumbered the Central Powers in man power and economic resources. If the war dragged on long enough to enable the Allies to tap their un-

limited human reservoirs, the Central Powers might be overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers. Especially was this true since the wealth of the Allies greatly exceeded the total wealth of the Central Powers. Moreover, the Allies possessed a naval supremacy which enabled them not only to marshal their own resources but to trade with neutral countries oversea. Thus they were able to utilize the food-producing and munition-producing facilities existing in extensive regions outside their own frontiers. At the same time Allied naval supremacy brought with it the power to blockade the coast lines of the Central Powers and, to a large extent, force them to depend on their own resources for the sinews of war. Throughout the conflict the Allies cheered themselves with the thought that time was on their side.

The Breakdown of German Plans for 1914

But Germany did not intend that the war should be of long duration. She aimed to strike a decisive blow at France immediately, then to wheel upon the slower-moving Russians and to defeat them in more leisurely fashion. With this end in view the "Schlieffen Plan," which had been mapped out years before, called for the delivery of the blow not on the Franco-German frontier, which was lined with impregnable fortresses and defended by the Vosges Mountains, but through the neutral buffer States of Luxemburg and Belgium. The best railways and roads from Berlin to Paris ran through Belgium, and the French fortifications on this frontier were feeble compared with those at Belfort, Toul, and Verdun. The plan, therefore, held out the promising possibility of rolling up the French left by a wide encircling movement.

On August 5 German troops attacked the Belgian fortified city of Liége; and, though temporarily halted by the stubborn defense of the Belgian army, they entered the city two days later. For a week longer some of the outlying forts held out, but on August 15 the last of them was captured and German troops poured into the country in overwhelming numbers. On August 23 the Germans won the first resounding success of the war when they captured the reputedly impregnable fortress of Namur after a three days' bom-

bardment by heavy howitzers. The way was at length cleared for a German invasion of France but, because of Belgian resistance, eighteen days had been required for the march to the French frontier.

Meanwhile the French and British prepared to meet the German advance. France had failed to concentrate her forces on the Belgian frontier and so was now faced with the necessity of shifting some of her armies to that front. The British Expeditionary Force, which had been ordered mobilized on August 3, crossed the Channel without mishap and on August 22 took up positions on the French left in accordance with prearranged plans. But the hinge upon which depended the defense of the northern frontier of France, Namur, was already broken, and the French attempted offensive in southeastern Belgium broke down completely. French fighting at Charleroi and British at Mons failed to stop the German advance and the Allied armies began a general strategic retreat. The Germans disregarded the Channel ports, which might easily have been seized at this time, and rushed on toward Paris, their goal. In the face of their threat, the British base was temporarily transferred to the mouth of the Loire, and the French government offices were hastily removed from Paris to Bordeaux.

Not until September 5, at the very gates of Paris, did Joffre give up his Fabian policy of retreat. On the next day came his order "to attack and repel the enemy. Any troops which can no longer advance will at all costs hold the ground they have won, and allow themselves to be slain where they stand rather than give way." For seven days (September 6–12) the first battle of the Marne raged over a front extending from Paris to Belfort, engaging more than two millions of men. But now, at length, Germany's overambitious scheme broke down under the burden of overworked troops and the impossible task of coördination and control which was placed on general headquarters. In the end—thanks to Joffre's strategy and the heroic efforts of Gallieni, Foch, Castelnau, and others—Paris was saved, the first German plan of campaign was wrecked, and the forces which were to have crushed France in a month were hurled back. "The First Battle of the Marne ranks by common

consent as the greatest, because the most significant, contest of the war."

The main German army now fell back to a strong position on

THE WEST FRONT IN 1914



the river Aisne where they had prepared trenches for their infantry and concrete foundations for their big guns. From this position the Allies were unable to dislodge them in the first battle of the Aisne. Meanwhile the lines of both armies were extended westward and northward, the French in an effort to outflank the Ger-

mans, the latter in an effort to protect themselves and to seize the Channel ports. On October 10 Antwerp fell after a two weeks' bombardment, and the Germans were enabled to occupy Ghent, Bruges, and the coast towns of Zeebrugge and Ostend. But their attempt to push on to Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne was thwarted by the determined resistance of the Allies, especially the British in the terrible first battle of Ypres. Thereafter the conflict in the west ceased to be a war of movement and maneuver, and settled down to trench warfare over a line extending some six hundred miles from the Channel to the Alps.

Although the Germans had failed to carry through their plans in the west, they had made conquests which were later of tremendous assistance to them in carrying on the war. They were in complete possession of most of Belgium and of a fairly large strip of northern France. These regions of Europe were highly developed industrially and were now added to the resources of the Central Powers. Especially valuable to Germany were the coal fields of Belgium and northern France and the iron mines of French Lorraine. In proportion as the Central Powers were strengthened by these conquests, France and the Allies were weakened. In fact, had the paths of commerce not been kept open for France by the British navy, it is difficult to see how the French could long have waged an effective war.

Meanwhile in the east, the Russian armies were mobilized much more rapidly than Germany had expected. Even before German troops had reached the French frontier through Belgium, Russian soldiers were pouring into East Prussia and threatening Königsberg. Russia was jubilant. In St. Petersburg the sum of $100,000 was raised to be given to the first Russian soldier to enter Berlin. In alarm, the German government summoned from retirement General Paul von Hindenburg, a specialist in the strategy and geography of a war with Russia, and appointed General Ludendorff, chief quartermaster of the Second Army in the west, as chief of the general staff of the Eighth Army in the east, with Hindenburg in command. The battle of Tannenberg which followed (August 26–31) put an end to Russian plans in East Prussia even more

completely than the Marne did to German plans in the west. The bulk of the Russian army in this area was captured or destroyed; less than a third escaped. And even more disastrous to Russia than the loss of men was the tremendous loss of guns. The German victory on this occasion was the most decisive of the whole war, and Hindenburg became the popular idol of the Central Powers.

But one defeat, no matter how decisive, did not mean that Russia was out of the war. She had begun hostilities with a peace-strength army of over a million men and a war-strength of four millions, and had planned to press her attack on more than one front. Simultaneously with her advance into East Prussia came her drive against the Austrians in Galicia. By the end of August the Russians had captured the Austrian outposts at Tarnopol and Halicz and were pressing on toward Lemberg, the capital of Galicia. Three days the struggle for this stronghold raged, but on September 3 the Austrians evacuated the city, leaving huge quantities of stores behind. The Russians promptly followed up their victory by driving the Austrians back into Jaroslav and Przemysl. To the latter, a strongly fortified city, the Russians laid siege; the former they captured on September 23. Hindenburg attempted to relieve the Austrians by a German advance against Poland, but its effect was only temporarily felt in Galicia, where Russian troops advanced nearly to Cracow, a key to both Berlin and Vienna. By the end of the year Russia was in complete occupation of nearly all of Galicia.

Russian successes in Galicia interfered disastrously with the Habsburg plan to punish Serbia in 1914. Austria opened the war by bombarding Belgrade on July 29, and thrice attempted a conquest of the kingdom. Although in their third attempt the Austrians succeeded in capturing Belgrade (December 2), they had held it less than two weeks when a crushing defeat at the hands of the Serbs and Montenegrins drove them out of the country. The year ended with not a single Austrian soldier on Serbian soil. But on the other hand, Serbia's attempts to "liberate" her kinsmen in Bosnia-Herzegovina from Habsburg control had likewise met disaster. For the

next few months the Austro-Serbian front was comparatively inactive.

But fighting was not restricted to Europe. Great Britain was not in a position in 1914 to be of great assistance to her Allies with her armies, but she played a vital rôle with her fleets. Almost immediately her naval superiority swept Germany's merchant marine from the seas, and thus largely prevented the latter from importing foodstuffs and munitions of war and from marketing her products. Furthermore, the British navy, by hunting down and destroying isolated German warships, by forcing others into neutral ports where they were interned, and by blockading the German battle squadron in its own home waters, gradually cleared the seas of these threats to Allied shipping, and made possible the gathering of Allied troops and supplies from the uttermost parts of the earth. All this was not done without some losses, however. At least ten British warships were sunk in 1914 by German submarines and mines. A number of minor naval engagements also occurred. Off the coast of Chile near Coronel (November 1, 1914), a superior German fleet defeated a British squadron, sinking two ships; but a few weeks later (December 8) a more powerful British squadron sighted the same German fleet off the Falkland Islands and destroyed every ship but one. Again, off Dogger Bank in the North Sea on January 24, 1915, a British fleet encountered a German battle-cruiser squadron raiding the coast of England and drove it back to its home base with some losses.

Not only on the seas but oversea events went against Germany, owing largely to the fact that the British navy made it impossible for her to send assistance to her colonies. Immediately after her declaration of war on Germany, Japan had begun a blockade of Kiaochow; a few days later troops were landed and a siege was begun. By November 6, 1914, the forts had been silenced, and on the 10th the German base was surrendered to Japan. By this time, too, Germany's various island possessions in the Pacific had been captured by Japanese or British colonial forces. In Africa, where the chief German colonies were located, operations were begun by

Allied forces, and Togoland was soon conquered by Anglo-French armies. The other colonies held out longer, but it was only a question of time until they too would be captured.[3]

German Successes of 1915

In 1914 it had been Germany that had taken the offensive against France; in 1915 Great Britain and France decided to undertake an offensive of their own, and chose as their point of attack the Dardanelles. A successful outcome here would be especially advantageous for the Allies. In the first place, it would open a much desired communication with Russia from the Mediterranean and would relieve her from Turkish pressure on the Caucasian front. It would diminish the danger of attack on the Suez Canal and Egypt. Obviously, it would isolate Turkey from her allies, and at the same time cut Germany's proposed Berlin-Bagdad railway. Finally, a decisive Allied victory here might have considerable influence in converting Greece, Rumania, or Bulgaria to the Allied cause.

There were many in Great Britain and France who felt that an attack on the Dardanelles was too ambitious an undertaking for the Allies in 1915 because of the lack of sufficient troops, munitions, and ships for such a distant venture. Most people thought that the war would be won in the West. Nevertheless, it was decided to make a naval attack in the hope of forcing the heavily fortified Strait. For this purpose a powerful fleet of British and French battleships was gathered, and on February 19, 1915, they began a heavy bombardment of the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles. These forts were more or less in the nature of outposts and were soon silenced. But when, on March 18, the Allied fleet attempted to force the Narrows, powerful Krupp guns on shore and floating mines in the Strait wrought havoc among the ships. The Allies were forced to retire with a loss of three battleships and two thousand men.

[3] German Southwest Africa was conquered in 1915, Kamerun in 1916, and German East Africa finally on November 14, 1918, after the signing of the armistice.

It was now decided that the Strait must be opened by troops rather than ships. Unable to persuade any of the Balkan States to espouse the Entente cause, the Allies were forced to provide an army of their own. At length a force made up chiefly of inexperienced Australian, New Zealand, Indian, and French colonial troops was gathered together for the purpose. On April 25 the Allied troops began their Gallipoli campaign, forcing a landing on the peninsula at terrible cost. But the Turks had used the interval since the naval failure at the Dardanelles to strengthen the fortifications on the hills, so that the Allied soldiers were called upon to drive from almost impregnable positions a much stronger Turkish army under the command of a skillful German general. The Allies had expected that Russia would help divide the Turkish forces by landing 100,000 men from the Black Sea and seizing the northern outlet of the Bosporus, but this she was prevented from doing by a terrific Austro-German attack near Gorlice.[4] Three costly attempts to capture the peninsula netted the Allies nothing but the loss of some 55,000 men. The Strait remained closed until the end of the war.

While the Dardanelles and Gallipoli campaigns were being waged it had been hoped that Italy might be persuaded to join the Allies and not only relieve Russia by engaging Austrian troops in the south but also contribute some forces for use against Turkey. At the time of the outbreak of the war in 1914 Italy, as already pointed out, proclaimed her neutrality on the ground that the Central Powers were waging an offensive war which released her from her obligations to them. Moreover, the secret Franco-Italian Treaty of 1902 [5] provided that, in just such a contingency as existed in August, 1914, Italy should remain neutral. Her neutrality at that time had contributed very materially, if indirectly, to the Allied victory on the Marne by releasing French troops from the southeast for use against Germany. Undoubtedly Italy was guided in her action, however, not so much by treaty obligations as by what one of her statesmen called "sacred egoism," in which, after all, she differed little from the other powers. She had always feared to lay

[4] See p. 38.
[5] See p. 6.

her coasts open to attack by the British navy; her own army and navy had not yet recovered from the exhausting struggle in Tripoli; and *Italia Irredenta*, which she longed to incorporate within her own frontiers, lay within the territory of the Central Powers.

Even as early as the crisis of 1914 Italy had sought to obtain part of *Italia Irredenta* by demanding compensation of Austria, in accordance with Article VII of the Triple Alliance.[6] Austria at that time had refused to discuss the question and, in spite of all the urging of Germany, had continued to refuse compensation throughout the rest of the year. On February 21, 1915, Italy forbade further Austrian operations in the Balkans until an agreement had been reached; and Austria, frightened by Russia's advance in Galicia, on March 9 finally announced that she was willing to discuss the cession of territory. Then followed a period of more or less frank bargaining, for, late in February, the Allies also began to offer Italy inducements to join them against the Central Powers. Naturally the advantage in the bidding lay with the Allies, for they could generously offer Italy larger slices of Austrian territory than Austria herself was disposed to concede.

But Austria was willing to bid high for Italian neutrality, and finally sacrificed herself to the extent of offering Italy the southern part of the Tirol, a rectification of the frontier along the Isonzo, sovereignty over Avlona and a free hand in Albania, special privileges for Italian-speaking subjects of Austria, and the conversion of Trieste into an imperial free city with local self-government and an Italian university. But the Allies, by betraying the interests of the Serbs, could easily outbid this; and on April 26, 1915, Great Britain, France, and Russia signed with Italy the secret Treaty of London. In this treaty the Allies promised Italy Trentino and southern Tirol up to the Brenner Pass, Gorizia and Gradisca,

[6] This provided that should Austria or Italy be obliged to change the status quo in the Balkans "by a temporary or a permanent occupation, such occupation would take place only after previous agreement between the two Powers, which would have to be based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for all territorial or other advantages that either of them might acquire over and above the existing status quo, and would have to satisfy the interests and rightful claims of both parties."

Trieste and the Istrian peninsula, North Dalmatia and the islands facing it, Avlona and a military zone about it, the Dodecanese in the Ægean, rights to the province of Adalia in case Turkey should be partitioned or divided into spheres of influence, and the extension of her possessions in Eritrea, Somaliland, and Libya in case Great Britain and France should gain colonial territory in Africa at the expense of Germany. These extensive concessions were certainly alluring to Italian nationalists and imperialists, but they later bobbed up to plague both Italy and the Allies. The latter further promised Italy a loan, a share in the war indemnity, and their support in preventing the Pope from taking any diplomatic steps for the conclusion of peace or the regulation of questions arising from the war.

On May 3 Italy denounced the Triple Alliance. Two weeks later the government decided on war against Austria, and on May 23 the declaration was issued. Not until fifteen months later, however, did Italy declare war on Austria's more powerful ally. On September 5, 1915, she signed the Pact of London, further binding herself not to make peace except in concert with the Allies. But the military hopes of the latter, based on Italy's entrance into the war, were sadly disappointed in 1915. Italy sent no troops to aid in the Gallipoli campaign, asserting, like France, that they could not be spared from the home front. Furthermore, in spite of her field army of a million and her reserve force of two million, Italy's attacks along the Isonzo and in Trentino made little headway because of the difficult terrain, and apparently contributed not at all to relieving the increasing Teutonic pressure on Russia.

And Russia, by this time, was in need of all the assistance she could get. At the opening of the year her prospects had, indeed, looked bright. During the preceding months she had occupied nearly all of Galicia and, though failing in her drive into East Prussia, had succeeded in staving off the German advance on Warsaw. On March 22, 1915, she had finally captured the powerful Austrian fortress of Przemysl, besieged since the preceding November, and it was believed in Allied countries that the year would see Russian troops pouring over the Carpathians on to the Hungarian plains.

But conditions in 1915 were altogether different from those of the year before. Russia's supply of munitions was already getting low, and the possibilities of adequate replenishment were scant. Russia was primarily a peasant country; her factories for the manufacture of munitions were few; and her means of importing and transporting war material to the front were insufficient. Corruption, too, had already begun to undermine the armies and to sap their strength.

On the other hand, the Central Powers were generously supplied with heavy guns, shells, rifles, and other war material. This year, trusting the trench system to hold with fewer men in the west, they transferred thousands of seasoned German troops to the east until, by April, 1915, they had a combined Austro-German army of at least two million men, with heavy batteries numbering at least 1,500 guns. This force, which was probably the strongest that had ever been placed under one German commander, they entrusted to General Mackensen. From the numerous spots in Russia's nine-hundred-mile front which were vulnerable for a resolute enemy, the Central Powers chose western Galicia as their point of concentration. Here the Russians had advanced farthest into Teutonic territory; here the Austrian armies could be most effectively used; here a successful Austro-German advance would endanger the Russian armies in Poland.

Suddenly on May 1 the tables were turned on the eastern front; Russia ceased to be the attacker and became the attacked. The heavy Teutonic batteries were loosed against the Russian lines near Gorlice. Some 700,000 shells were hurled into the Russian trenches, which were simply blown out of existence. The Russians, equipped with nothing bigger than half the caliber of the powerful German twelve-inch guns, could not check the attack. Gorlice fell on the 2nd, and the Russian defense collapsed. On June 3 Austro-German forces recaptured Przemysl, and about three weeks later the Austrians reëntered Lemberg. In less than two months nearly all of Galicia, with its oil wells, mines, and other resources, was regained for the Central Powers. With it, too, came the temporary abandonment by Rumania of her thought of joining the Allies.

But the reconquest of Galicia was only one phase of the projected Austro-German campaign to put the Russian armies out of action. Success in this phase, however, rendered the next step more

THE EAST FRONT IN 1915

easy, for the Russian armies in Poland were now open to attack from both the north and the south. The Russian lines here were in the general shape of a wedge: one line running northeast from Warsaw, protecting Bialystok, Grodno, and Kovno; the other running southeast from the Polish capital, protecting Ivangorod,

Lublin, and Cholm. Pressure was now brought to bear against both of these lines by the Central Powers, whose consistent successes led, on August 4, to the Russian evacuation of Warsaw and Ivangorod. Not content with the capture of these strongholds, the Teutonic troops pushed on, taking Kovno (August 17), Brest-Litovsk (August 25), Grodno (September 2), Pinsk (September 16), and Vilna (September 18), finally driving the Russians behind the Pripet Marshes. With winter coming on, the Central Powers had no desire to court the fate of Napoleon, so they now halted their advance. At the close of the campaign, therefore, the Russian line extended roughly from Riga on the Baltic southeastward along the Düna River to Dvinsk, and then almost directly south to Tarnopol which was still held in eastern Galicia. The Central Powers, in a little less than five months, had driven the Russians out of most of Galicia, all of Poland and Courland, and part of Lithuania. Thanks largely to the masterly retreat conducted by Grand Duke Nicholas, the Teutonic forces had neither captured nor destroyed the Russian armies; but they had rolled them back a safe distance and had undoubtedly put them temporarily out of action.

By September 1, 1915, the Central Powers were free to look for other fields to conquer. As a result of their campaigns against Russia they had shortened and straightened their eastern front so that they could now hold that advanced position with fewer men than the old line required. The developments on the western front during the year had proved that the German intrenched positions there could not be broken by the Allies with the men and munitions which they then had at their disposal. Italy's efforts along the Isonzo and in Trentino were being defeated largely by the terrain. In these circumstances, the Central Powers determined to administer to Serbia her long-delayed chastisement. Much was hoped from a decisive success in this part of Europe. It was expected to remove the Jugoslav danger and the threat to Austria's flank, to insure the safety of the Dardanelles and the final isolation of Russia, to open new possibilities of operations in Asiatic Turkey, to affect the attitude of Rumania, and finally to increase the supply of foodstuffs and copper for the Central Powers. Before the end of August the

Central Powers had begun to shift troops from the Russian to the Serbian front.

Meanwhile, under pressure from Teutonic general headquarters, negotiations were being pushed with Bulgaria looking toward her joining the Central Powers in the contemplated attack upon Serbia. Bulgaria's position was strategic. If she joined the Central Powers, the Turkish alliance could be used to greater advantage, and Serbia could be attacked on her flank. On the other hand, if she joined the Allies, Turkey would be completely isolated, communication could be opened with Russia from the Mediterranean, Serbia's flank would be secured, and Rumania and Greece might likewise be tempted to join the Allies. During August both sides negotiated with Bulgaria but the Central Powers had the advantage, for they seemed to be the winning combination in the war and the territory which Bulgaria desired to annex in Macedonia lay chiefly within the Serbian frontiers.

At length on September 6 a military convention was signed, according to which the Central Powers were to have their troops on the Serbian frontier ready for operations within thirty days, Bulgaria was to reach the same stage within thirty-five days, and General Mackensen, who had been largely responsible for the German success at Gorlice, was to take supreme charge of all troops. Bulgaria promised to allow absolutely unrestricted transport of Teutonic troops and material to and from Turkey as soon as the way through Serbia should be open; while Germany, on the other hand, agreed to grant Bulgaria a loan and to supply her with munitions to the extent that her own needs would permit. Bulgaria was to receive Serbian Macedonia; Saloniki and Epirus, in case Greece joined the Allies; and a large portion of the Dobrudja, if Rumania attacked her. Furthermore, in order to meet possible offers of the Allies, Germany forced Turkey to promise Bulgaria eastern Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line, including Adrianople and both banks of the Maritza River.

On October 7 the forces of the Central Powers crossed the Danube into Serbia. Four days later, according to prearranged plans, the Bulgarians crossed the eastern frontier, striking the Serbians on

THE WAR AREA IN THE BALKANS

the flank. The latter were overwhelmingly outnumbered in men and material. Belgrade was captured on October 9, and within the next two months Nish, Novibazar, Prisrend, and Monastir suffered a like fate. The Serbian army, reduced to scattered bands of retreating refugees, fled into Montenegro and Albania. But even here they found no safety, for the Austrians pushed on into the former and completely conquered it by the middle of January, 1916. By the end of February Austrian and Bulgarian forces, continuing operations, had expelled the Serbs and Montenegrins from northern Albania, capturing Tirana, the capital, and Durazzo, one of the chief Adriatic ports. Only on the Greek island of Corfu, where they were protected by Allied naval batteries, did the Jugoslavs eventually find a safe refuge from the Central Powers.

The Allied attempt to come to the aid of Serbia had been an inglorious failure. Trusting until too late that Bulgaria would not join the Central Powers or that, if she did, Greece would carry out her part of the Greco-Serbian Alliance,[7] the Allies had made no preparations to aid Serbia before September, 1915. As soon as Bulgaria actually mobilized, Greece did likewise and the Greek premier, Venizelos, asked the Allies to send a force of 150,000 men to coöperate with Greece in support of Serbia. But King Constantine later decided that the interests of Greece could best be served by neutrality, dismissed Venizelos, and refused to enter the war. The Allied force which landed at Saloniki on October 5 turned out to be, instead of 150,000, only two divisions. They were not only too few to render effective aid to Serbia; they were so few that their own position soon became precarious in view of the successes of the Central Powers. After repeated and loud appeals for help from General Sarrail at Saloniki, the Allies eventually permitted the forces at Gallipoli to be transferred from that disastrous venture to one which, till that moment, had been only a little less disastrous.

[7] In 1913 Greece and Serbia signed a treaty and military convention in which it was provided that "in case of a sudden attack by . . . the Bulgarian army against the Hellenic or Serbian army, the two States . . . promise to each other mutual military support, Greece with all her land and sea forces, and Serbia with all her land forces." Constantine maintained that this applied only to a Balkan war, not to a great European war.

Meanwhile, the year 1915 saw the beginning of Germany's counter offensive on the seas. German naval leaders, during the early part of the war, held the view that an offensive by the German battle fleet was advisable only under extraordinarily favorable circumstances because the risk of a decisive action against the infinitely superior naval forces of the Allies was too great. An offensive with a view to forcing a decision by this means was therefore not undertaken. The Allies, however, were using their naval superiority to prevent the importation of war materials by the Central Powers, whose merchant ships had been swept from the seas. Great Britain not only seized and searched neutral vessels which might be carrying contraband, but gradually extended the definition of contraband. The United States, the chief neutral country of the world, was concerned with preserving open routes to the neutral countries of Europe and an open market in Europe for non-contraband goods, and accordingly demanded that the Declaration of London (1909) regarding contraband be generally accepted. This declaration had left such articles as copper and rubber on the non-contraband list, and would have permitted the importation of foodstuffs by the Central Powers. But Great Britain had never ratified this declaration, and refused the American demand.

Early in 1915, therefore, Germany decided upon the unrestricted use of submarines against all vessels, excepting only neutral ships "when they were recognizable." The naval staff believed that the submarines would prevent Great Britain from bringing her military forces to play on the Continent to the same extent as hitherto, and that this would have the effect of breaking the fighting spirit of the other members of the Entente. Germany further justified her contemplated action on the ground of self-preservation, and as a justifiable counter measure against "the war of starvation which had been initiated against the noncombatant population of Germany" by Great Britain's classifying as contraband all foodstuffs intended for consumption in Germany.

Accordingly, on February 4, 1915, Germany designated the waters about the British Isles as a "war zone" in which enemy merchantmen would be sunk, and in which even neutral merchant-

men might suffer a like fate. In response to an American note on the subject, Germany asserted that if Great Britain would permit the import of food and raw materials in accordance with the Declaration of London, Germany would abandon her unrestricted submarine campaign. Great Britain, while willing to permit the importation of food in case Germany lifted the submarine blockade, refused to allow the importation of raw materials, and announced on March 1 that she intended to intercept all oversea trade with Germany, to detain all goods, and to bring neutrals into British ports for search. The situation for neutrals came to resemble that at the time of the British and Napoleonic decrees in the early years of the nineteenth century. Anti-British feeling which was rising in the United States subsided, however, when a German submarine sank without warning the great British liner *Lusitania*, with a loss of some twelve hundred lives, of which over one hundred were American. The fact that the ship was carrying munitions for the Allies (denied at the time) in no way lessened the horror which the deed evoked, and a wave of anti-German sentiment swept over the United States.

An American note to Germany, stating that another occurrence like the sinking of the *Lusitania* would be regarded as an unfriendly act, was considered by German officials to amount to a veiled threat of war. Germany had no desire to bring the United States into the conflict, for fear of its effect on the recently resumed negotiations with Bulgaria; and Falkenhayn, who had succeeded Moltke as chief of staff in 1914, believed that unless Germany gained the support of Bulgaria, it would be impossible permanently to keep the Dardanelles closed and Russia cut off. Furthermore, Allied counter measures and the scarcity of submarines had made it impossible for the campaign to exert any perceptible influence on Great Britain's warlike operations.

Germany therefore decided that the slight results did not warrant a policy which might bring the United States into the war, and ordered her submarine commanders to cease attacking liners. No public announcement of this decision was made at the time, however; and it was only in response to a virtual ultimatum from the

United States, after the sinking of the *Sussex*, that Germany promised (May, 1916) to abandon the sinking of merchant ships without warning and rescue of the crew. Up to the end of 1915 nearly a thousand Allied and neutral ships were put out of use by the submarine campaign, and British maritime freight rates jumped over eight hundred per cent. Nevertheless, Germany's counter offensive on the seas during this year was a failure and was so recognized by German headquarters.

Teutonic achievements in 1914 and 1915, however, had done much to realize the German dream of a *Mittel-Europa* and a *Drang nach Osten*. The industrial regions of Belgium and northern France, Poland, parts of Lithuania and the Baltic Provinces, Serbia, Montenegro, and northern Albania had all been successively conquered and held. Bulgaria and Turkey had become subsidiary allies, and the latter's repulse and final capture (Kut-el-Amara, April 29, 1916) of the British force which, under General Townshend, had attempted to conquer Bagdad, augured well for the future. All that seemed to remain to be done was to defeat decisively the Allied forces in the west, and then dictate a peace commensurate with Teutonic achievements. German headquarters clearly realized that Germany could not be content to stand on the defensive, because the Allies, thanks to their superiority in men and material, were increasing their resources much more than the Central Powers. If this situation continued, the time would come when the balance of numbers itself would deprive Germany of all remaining hope. The German people, too, were growing impatient of victories which brought no decision in the war. A decisive blow must therefore be struck in 1916.

German Failure to End the War in 1916

During the winter of 1915–16 the Teutonic powers considered which of the principal Allies should be their victim. Austria pressed for an overwhelming Austro-German attack upon Italy, but German headquarters vetoed this proposal, pointing out that victory on this front would aid only Austria and not influence the war as a whole, that it would have no effect on the attitude of France

and Great Britain. Besides, it was argued, domestic conditions in Italy would soon make her further active participation in the war impossible. The same argument held good for Russia, whose rapidly multiplying domestic difficulties were expected to force her to give in within a relatively short time. The western front was therefore chosen as the area of attack, but one more decision remained to be made. Should the German forces be hurled against British or French sectors? A drive against the British was finally discountenanced because there was no good objective within reasonable reach. The German goal would have to be nothing less than the complete expulsion of the British from the Continent, and unless that were attained the attack would have been useless. Furthermore, Germany felt quite sure that even this achievement would not put Great Britain out of the war.

The French lines in the west, therefore, were finally chosen for the decisive campaign of 1916, and Verdun was selected as the object of attack. France, it was felt, had already strained herself almost to the breaking point; the breaking point might be reached if Germany could convince the French people that in a military sense they had no further ground for hope. Verdun was an objective for the retention of which the French would be compelled to throw in every man they had. If they did so, Germany argued, the forces of France would bleed to death; if they did not do so, and Germany captured the city, the moral effect on France would be enormous. Finally, French lines at Verdun were only about ten miles from the German railway communications. An Allied drive here might conceivably render the whole German front in France and Belgium untenable.

As early as Christmas, 1915, the decision to undertake the Verdun offensive was reached, and in the following weeks a gigantic concentration of men and artillery was completed in a twenty-mile sector opposite the city. Falkenhayn believed that no first-class artillery effort had yet been made against the system of trenches in the west and that an adequate concentration of guns would bring victory. On February 21 the attack was opened by a bombardment even more terrific than that which had preceded the campaign

against Russia in the spring of 1915. "For twelve and a half hours guns of every calibre poured 100,000 shells per hour on a front of six miles. History had never seen so furious a fire. It blotted out the French first lines, it shattered the communication trenches, it tore the woods into splinters, and altered the very shape of the hills." [8] Then, after scouts had ascertained that the bombardment had accomplished its work of destruction, after the German guns had changed their range and placed a "curtain of fire" behind the French trenches, the German infantry at a quarter to five in the evening moved forward and occupied the French first line with comparative safety. The Germans expected to be in Verdun in four days.

But the Germans had miscalculated the date of their entrance into Paris in 1914; they soon discovered that they had again erred in 1916. Although Fort Douaumont, one of the keys of the defenses of the fortress, was captured within four days, the stronghold itself still stood. Pétain, who had been successful in conducting French offensives at Arras and in Champagne in 1915, was immediately put in command, and reinforcements were rushed to the scene. Responding to the battle cry, "They shall not pass," the French held on while the conflict raged back and forth about the city. With only a slight slackening of effort on either side, the struggle continued through March, April, and May. The snows of February melted into the sunlight of April and the blossoms of May, but in the Verdun sector only "the dull unceasing rattle of the guns, the fleecy puffs of shrapnel on the ridges, and at times mushrooms of dark smoke told of the struggle." With a determination little less than the French the German troops fought doggedly on toward their objective. In June even Joffre doubted whether Verdun could be held, when the Germans got within four miles of the city. But the French struck back, and on June 30 recovered ground and neutralized the German advantage. On the following day the British launched a drive on the Somme, and the center of activity shifted farther to the west where the Germans, in turn, were now forced to stand on the defensive. Intermittent fighting continued in

[8] J. Buchan, *A History of the Great War*, II, pp. 547–48.

the Verdun sector during the summer and fall, but for all practical purposes, the battle of Verdun, until then "the longest continuous battle in history," was ended.

The result was a distinct victory for the French. The Germans had failed to achieve any of the results which they had expected from their attack. They had not broken the French front, nor entered the city of Verdun, nor bled France to death. They had not even lured the British into a premature offensive, as they had hoped. They had won a few square miles of territory, but the price they had paid in the irreparable loss of troops was out of all proportion to the gain which they had made. Fighting against the French in the west, they discovered, was quite different from fighting against an ill-equipped foe in the east. Falkenhayn was dismissed, and Hindenburg was elevated to the supreme command of the German armies, with Ludendorff as his assistant.

While the struggle for Verdun was in progress, the most important naval engagement of the war was fought in the North Sea. As already pointed out, German naval policy was not to risk a decisive action until, by the process of attrition, British forces had been so weakened as to give the German fleet good prospects of victory. With a view to destroying part of the British fleet, Vice Admiral Hipper with scouting forces was ordered to demonstrate off the southwest coast of Norway in the hope of luring a British squadron out. The German battle fleet, under Vice Admiral Scheer, was to remain out of sight until the British squadron appeared, when it would rush in to annihilate it. Early in the morning of May 31 the German fleet sailed forth.

Unknown to the Germans, however, the British battle fleet on May 30 was ordered to concentrate in the North Sea. Early in the afternoon of the 31st the British scouting squadron under Vice Admiral Beatty and the German squadron under Hipper made contact. The latter, hoping to draw the British on, fell back toward the German battle fleet some fifty miles distant. A running engagement occurred until Beatty discovered that he had encountered the more powerful German battle fleet, whereupon the British light squadron turned and attempted to draw the Germans toward the

British high-seas fleet. Late in the afternoon the latter came in sight and succeeded in placing itself between the German fleet and its home base. The scene seemed to be set for a gigantic naval engagement, more than 250 ships being present in the two fleets.

But the German fleet maneuvered with the sole object of avoiding an engagement and returning to its base. This the British prevented so long as it was light, and planned on a decisive engagement on the following day. During the night, however, the German fleet managed to cut its way through a weaker section of the British battle line, and returned to Heligoland. The question of victory was a matter of dispute at the time, and the battle of Jutland is still being fought by experts. Nevertheless, although the British lost fourteen ships to the Germans' eleven, and suffered more than twice as many casualties, they were left in control of the sea. Only once afterward did the German high-seas fleet venture forth from its base and then, upon being warned of the approach of the British battle fleet, it at once returned.

Meanwhile, although German headquarters had vetoed the Austrian suggestion of a combined Austro-German attack upon Italy when the proposal had been made during the preceding winter, the Austrian general staff determined to carry out the plan with its own resources. Despite German protests, it chose as its point of attack the salient of Trentino which ran down to the Lombard plain threatening the Italian left flank. The Austrian objective was to be the Venetian plain through which ran the two railway lines which were the main communications with the Isonzo front. If they could cut one, the Isonzo army would be crippled and compelled to retreat; if both, it might be pocketed and disastrously defeated. For the projected drive a force of about 400,000 men was gathered in Trentino and placed under the command of Archduke Charles, heir apparent to the Habsburg thrones.

On May 14 the preliminary bombardment began with over two thousand guns on a thirty-mile front. The Italians fell back, suffering heavy casualties. Cadorna, commander-in-chief of the Italian armies, immediately summoned his reserves to assemble around Vicenza, a stronghold protecting the northern railway line to the

east, but the transfer of a new army of nearly half a million from the reserve lines of the Isonzo required time. The Italian brigades strove heroically to hold back the Austrians in the ensuing days, in some places sacrificing more than half of their strength. Nevertheless, on June 1 the Austrian troops were informed that only one mountain remained between them and the Venetian plain, and three days later they were only eighteen miles from Vicenza. But by this time Cadorna had received his reinforcements, and on June 3 he announced that the Austrian offensive had been checked. Two weeks later Italian troops repulsed what proved to be the last of the great Austrian attacks, and within a few days Cadorna began to move forward in a counter stroke. The Austrian plan to force the retirement or capture of the Italian army on the Isonzo front had failed.

One of the chief reasons why the Austrians were forced to relax their efforts against the Italians in Trentino was the unexpected launching of a Russian attack on the eastern front on June 4. The Austrian lines in the east had been weakened not only by the withdrawal of troops for use in the Trentino offensive but by the withdrawal of artillery as well. When, therefore, the Russians suddenly attacked along almost the entire front from the Pripet Marshes southward to Rumania, they met relatively little resistance. Near Lutsk they broke through the Austrian lines and within two days opened a gap fully thirty miles wide. By June 16, as a result of twelve days of fighting in this vicinity, they had taken Lutsk and Dubno, had advanced some fifty miles from their original lines, and had reached the Galician frontier. Thousands of men had been captured, together with numerous guns and great quantities of war material. Meanwhile, in Bukowina, Czernowitz was taken on June 10; and a week later the Russians were in possession of most of the province.

By this time one of the most rapid and spectacular advances of the whole war had been made. But the Russian headquarters had not anticipated such a sweeping success and failed to have at hand adequate reserves to take advantage of their opportunity. Additional Teutonic forces were rushed to the threatened area from

the French, the Italian, and the Balkan fronts, and Austrian operations were put more completely under the control of German headquarters. Opposed by German and more trustworthy Austrian divisions, the Russian advance slackened. Some Russian gains were made during July and August but, by the middle of the latter month, the drive had spent itself, and came to an end principally for lack of war materials with which to carry it on. Nevertheless, the gains of the Russians during this period amounted to some 350,000 prisoners and 400 guns; and the effect of their drive had been favorably felt by Allied armies before Verdun, on the Somme, in Trentino, and along the Isonzo.

Just before the conclusion of the Russian offensive, the Italians succeeded in pushing back the Austrians a safe distance in Trentino, and then transferred their heavy guns to the Isonzo front where they launched an attack on August 4. Five days later, in spite of stubborn resistance by the Austrians on the heights beyond the river, Gorizia fell and the immediate Italian objective was attained. Because of the difficult terrain in which they operated, however, they were still a long way from capturing the coveted port of Trieste.

By now the west front was once more ablaze, this time the Allies taking the offensive. One of the prime purposes of Germany's Verdun campaign had been to lure the Allies into a counter stroke. German headquarters realized that the Allies were preparing to make simultaneous advances on all fronts in 1916, and greatly feared the consequences. They confidently expected that the terrific German drive on Verdun would frustrate this plan by provoking the Allies into a premature counter offensive. This in turn would wreck the scheme for a great simultaneous advance and enable the Central Powers to defeat it piecemeal. But the British had learned by this time not to strike until ample reserves of troops and munitions had been accumulated for a prolonged effort. In the first months of the Verdun drive, therefore, no great counter blow was delivered on the west front, much to the consternation of German headquarters. But when, at length, Italy had checked the Austrians in Trentino, the Russians had put nearly half a million Austrians out of action by their unexpected drive in the east, and the British forces were

well equipped with all the materials of war and thousands of reserve troops,[9] then, finally, the Allies determined to make a supreme effort in the west, and chose as their field of operations the valley of the Somme.

The aims of the Allies were threefold: to relieve the pressure on Verdun which in June had become terrific; to prevent the transfer of large bodies of troops from the western front to meet the Russian advance in the east; to exercise a steady and continuous pressure for a long period of time on one definite section of the German lines for the purpose of depleting the Teutonic forces. The Allies had created a military machine which they believed at last to be superior to that of the enemy. During all the last week of June they subjected the German lines in the Somme valley to a terrific bombardment in an effort to wipe out the opposing trenches. In that week more munitions were used by the big guns each day than the total amount manufactured in Great Britain during the first eleven months of the war. Then, on July 1, along a twenty-five-mile front the Allied infantry leaped to the attack. From then until November 18, when the weather finally rang down the curtain on the drama in the west, the battle raged with only one intermission in September. "Before July 1 Verdun had been the greatest continuous battle fought in the world's history; but the Somme surpassed it in numbers of men engaged, in the tactical difficulty of the objectives, and in its importance in the strategical scheme of the campaign."

To the general public the Allied drive on the Somme seemed a failure, for it wrested only about 120 square miles of territory from the enemy. Nevertheless, it did succeed in doing three things. It relieved Verdun, and transferred the offensive in the west from Germany to the Allies. It held the bulk of the German army in the west front. In June Germany had fourteen divisions in the Somme sector; in November over forty were in the line or just out of it. In November there were 127 divisions in the west and only 75 in the east. Finally, it wore down the German forces tre-

[9] Dissatisfied with the results of the system of voluntary enlistment, Great Britain in January, 1916, had adopted a system of conscription.

mendously. Although German casualties were considerably fewer than those of the Allies, the situation was such that the latter could better afford to suffer such losses than the Central Powers. The major purpose of the campaign, the acute attrition of German forces, was attained. Still more tangible evidence of the success of the drive was to be given in the spring of 1917.

The German failure at Verdun and the Austrian failure in Trentino, followed by the Russian advance into Galicia and Bukowina, the Allied drive on the Somme, and the Italian capture of Gorizia, all had their effect on Rumania which, up to this time, had remained a restless and uneasy neutral. In 1914 King Carol had urged Rumania's intervention on the side of Austria in accordance with the Treaty of 1883,[10] but the Rumanian crown council had overruled him in favor of neutrality. Germany's suggestion that Francis Joseph should offer Rumania territorial compensations was vetoed by the Hungarian premier, Tisza. On the other hand, Russia's offer of Transylvania and a guarantee of the territory in the Dobrudja which Rumania had recently taken from Bulgaria likewise failed to bring about her intervention. On September 23, 1914, Rumania and Italy signed a treaty for common action, and shortly afterward Russia recognized Rumania's claim to territory inhabited by Rumanians. When Italy entered the war in May, 1915, Rumania failed to follow, however, because Russia refused to accept the new Rumanian demands for territory which seemed to conflict with Serbia's rightful claims. Russia's disastrous defeat in 1915, followed by the intervention of Bulgaria and the Teutonic conquest of Serbia, soon drove from the minds of Rumanian statesmen any thought of immediate entrance into the war on the side of the Allies.

But with Russia's spectacular drive against the Austrians in June, 1916, came another change in Rumania. With every advance of the Russians, Falkenhayn complained, the Rumanian attitude toward the Central Powers became less favorable. During the summer Allied statesmen negotiated with Rumania in the attempt to gain her support. The chief difficulty was the inability of Rumania to secure the promise of Russia, Serbia's guardian, of all the Habs-

[10] See p. 4.

burg territory which Rumania desired. In the end, however, Russia gave way and a secret treaty was signed between Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, and Rumania promising to the latter the Banat of Temesvar, Transylvania, and Bukowina. In addition the Allies promised the simultaneous assistance of both the Russian forces in Bukowina and the Allied forces at Saloniki. On August 27 Rumania declared war on Austria, asserting that "Rumania, governed by the necessity of safeguarding her racial interests, finds herself forced to enter into line by the side of those who are able to assure her the realization of her national unity."

Apparently the entry of Rumania gave the Allies a powerful recruit. It lengthened the battle line of the Central Powers in the east by several hundred miles; it added some 250,000 trained soldiers to the Allied armies; it cut off from the Central Powers the grain, petroleum, and other economic resources which were so much needed to resist the British blockade. But all this was more apparent than real. Rumania's entry into the war was not unexpected to Germany, and perhaps not altogether unwelcome. German headquarters guessed that she would advance immediately into Transylvania to liberate her kinsmen, and prepared to make her pay dearly for this military blunder.

On August 28 Rumanian troops, in an effort to close in on the Austrians from the north and the south, crossed the frontier into Transylvania at eighteen different points. That they advanced not to victory but to defeat was due to several causes. In the first place, they were fatally short of heavy guns, airplanes, machine guns, and even rifles, and they had no great reserve of ammunition. Russia had guaranteed an ample supply of munitions but the promise was not fulfilled. In the second place, they failed to receive the promised coöperation of the Allied armies. Russia's progress in the Carpathians was counted upon to divert the Austrian left wing in Transylvania, and Sarrail's advance from Saloniki was expected to engage the attention of Bulgaria; but neither of these developments occurred. Exhaustion of men and munitions, after a four months' campaign against Teutonic troops, prevented the Russian armies from carrying out their part of the bargain; and Sarrail, with a

large but heterogeneous and poorly equipped army at Saloniki, hesitated to strike northward in a vigorous offensive lest a hostile Greek army attack him suddenly from the rear.

During the first three weeks of her campaign Rumania conquered about a quarter of Transylvania. But Mackensen was immediately dispatched to command a Bulgar-Teutonic army on the southern frontier of Rumania, while Falkenhayn took charge of the Austro-German forces facing the Rumanians in Transylvania. Heavy guns and immense supplies of munitions were rushed to the east. A simultaneous advance on the Transylvania and Dobrudja fronts then followed, and the Rumanian armies were soon in flight for safety. By the middle of October Transylvania had been cleared of Rumanian troops, and the invasion of Rumania itself began. Constanza fell on October 22, Bucharest on December 6. By the middle of the following month, the Central Powers had occupied all the Dobrudja, all Wallachia, and a portion of southern Moldavia, and had driven the Rumanian government to Jassy.

The net result of Rumania's entry into the war thus seemed favorable to the Central Powers. The fertile grain fields and rich oil wells of that unfortunate country were added to *Mittel-Europa's* economic resources. The menace of Rumania's long-delayed intervention was removed and the Central Powers now held their lines in the east with actually fewer men than had formerly been required. Teutonic prestige, which had been badly shaken by earlier events of the year, was once more restored. The Central Powers determined to capitalize this latest achievement, and to seize the favorable position created by the fall of Bucharest to make a peace offer.

Peace Proposals of the Central Powers

For some months Germany had been hoping that the President of the United States would propose mediation. Almost from the beginning of the war President Wilson had considered mediation, and in January, 1915, he had sent Colonel E. M. House to Europe as his private and personal representative to discover, by conversations with persons of high authority in the belligerent countries, the pos-

sible attitude toward mediation. In 1915 Colonel House had found, however, that, although everybody seemed to want peace, nobody was willing to concede enough to get it; that none of the belligerents was willing to yield an iota of its aspirations; that France and Germany especially wanted annexations; and that both the Allies and the Central Powers expected to win the war and to impose their own terms. "Mothers and wives, fathers and brothers," he had discovered, desired peace, but not the governing groups.

A year later, in February, 1916, Colonel House made another move toward possible mediation when he informed the British government in confidence that President Wilson was ready, on hearing from France and Great Britain that the moment was opportune, to propose that a conference should be summoned to put an end to the war; and that, should the Allies accept this proposal, and should Germany refuse it, the United States would probably enter the war against Germany. And, since the United States was not offering assistance merely for the sake of enabling the Allies to satisfy their national aspirations and to destroy Germany politically and economically, Colonel House outlined what he considered reasonable terms of peace.[11] But the Allies were determined to fight until the utter collapse of Germany, were confident of ultimate victory, and stated that the time was premature for mediation.

But, although the Allies were not interested in President Wilson's proposed mediation, the Central Powers had reached the place where they were favorably disposed toward peace proposals. When, for various reasons, President Wilson delayed making any open proposal of mediation, therefore, the Central Powers at length decided to make one themselves. They believed that, in view of their decisive defeat of Rumania, they would run no risk of damaging their prestige or showing signs of weakness, and that if the Allies rejected their offer, the odium of continuing the war would fall upon them.

[11] These included: (1) complete restoration of Belgium and Serbia; (2) return of Alsace-Lorraine to France; (3) cession of Constantinople to Russia; (4) surrender of *Italia Irredenta* to Italy; (5) creation of an independent Poland; (6) compensation for Germany outside Europe; (7) abolition of competitive armaments; (8) guarantees against military aggression.

Accordingly, on December 12, less than a week after the fall of Bucharest, Germany transmitted a note to France, Great Britain, Russia, Japan, Serbia, and Rumania. Animated "by the desire to stem the flood of blood and to bring the horrors of war to an end," the Central Powers proposed peace negotiations. Although the latest events had demonstrated that the war could not break their resisting power, they professed to have no desire to crush or annihilate their adversaries. They felt sure that the propositions which they would bring forward in the negotiations would be such as to serve as a basis for the restoration of lasting peace. But if, in spite of this offer of peace and conciliation, the struggle should continue, the four Central Powers were resolved to carry it on to the end, "while solemnly disclaiming any responsibility before mankind and history." As to the final outcome in the latter case, there could be little doubt, for Germany and her allies had already given proof of their indestructible strength in winning successes at war.

The weak feature of the German note was the absence of any definite terms of peace. In respect to this matter Germany was in an embarrassing position. If she proposed terms which would be moderate enough to invite serious discussion by the Allies, the German people would question the much-advertised success of the Central Powers, and their morale might be weakened or destroyed. On the other hand, if she formulated terms in accordance with popular expectations and the demands of her military leaders, the Allies could assert that peace with victorious Germany would mean a Germanized world, and Allied morale would be enormously strengthened.[12] The Allied attitude toward Germany's proposal

[12] The terms upon which the Central Powers would have been prepared to take part in peace negotiations were later transmitted in confidence to President Wilson in a telegram of January 29, 1917, and are quoted by Count Bernstorff in *My Three Years in America*, p. 377. They were:

"The restitution to France of that part of Upper Alsace occupied by her. The acquisition of a strategical and economic safety-frontier-zone, separating Germany and Poland from Russia.

"Colonial restitution in the form of an understanding which would secure Germany colonial possessions compatible with the size of her population and the importance of her economic interests.

"Restoration of those parts of France occupied by Germany, on condition that certain strategic and economic modifications of the frontier be allowed, as also financial compensation.

was fairly represented by Lloyd George, who had just become prime minister in Great Britain, when he declared:

> To enter, on the invitation of Germany proclaiming herself victorious, without any knowledge of the proposals she has to make, into a conference is to put our heads into a noose. Before we can consider such an invitation we ought to know that she is prepared to accede to the only terms on which it is possible for peace to be proclaimed—complete restitution, full reparation, effectual guarantee.

These sentiments were embodied in an official reply to Germany which was presented on December 30 in the collective name of Russia, France, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, Serbia, Belgium, Montenegro, Portugal, and Rumania. The mere suggestion, without statement of terms, that negotiations should be opened, was not, they asserted, an offer of peace but a war maneuver, a calculated attempt to influence the future course of the war, and to end it by imposing a German peace. The object of Germany's overtures, they declared, was to create dissension in public opinion in Allied countries, and to stiffen public opinion in the Central Powers, "already severely tried by their losses, worn out by economic pressure and crushed by the supreme effort which has been imposed upon their inhabitants." They denied that the Central Powers had won the victory; the "War Map" of Europe represented nothing more than "a superficial and passing phase of the situation, and not the real strength of the belligerents." The Allied governments, therefore, fully conscious of the gravity of the moment, but equally conscious of its requirements, refused to consider a proposal which was "empty and insincere."

The rejection of the German proposal was followed by a new

"Restitution of Belgium under definite guaranties for the safety of Germany, which would have to be determined by means of negotiations with the Belgian Government.

"Economic and financial settlement, on the basis of exchange, of the territory invaded by both sides, and to be restituted by the conclusion of peace.

"Compensation for German undertakings and private persons who have suffered damage through the war.

"Renunciation of all economic arrangements and measures, which after the peace would constitute an obstacle in the way of normal commerce and trade, with the conclusion of corresponding commercial treaties.

"The Freedom of the Seas to be placed on a secure basis."

German note to the neutral governments, stating that the Central Powers had made an honest attempt to terminate the war and pave the way for an understanding among the belligerents; that it had depended solely on the decision of the Allies whether the road to peace should be taken or not; that the latter had refused to take this road, and on them fell the full responsibility for the continuation of bloodshed. As for the Central Powers, they would prosecute the fight with calm trust and confidence in their good cause until a peace had been gained. "In your just anger at the boundless frivolity of our foes," the Kaiser proclaimed to his troops, "in your firm will to defend our holiest possessions, your hearts will turn to steel. Our enemies have not desired the hand of understanding I have offered them. With God's help our arms will compel them to accept it." And events in Russia during 1917, it appeared, would assist them in this task.

CHAPTER III

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONS OF 1917

FOR centuries the Russian people, like a huge giant, had been bound by the harsh laws of their Lilliputian monarchs, princes, and bureaucrats. For centuries they had submitted to despotism and oppression, to ruthlessness and exploitation. But during the World War the bonds which held them became frayed and weak, the realization of their own might became strong. By 1917 their patience and endurance were exhausted. They burst their fetters, destroyed their captors, and stepped forth into what they believed was to be liberty and peace.

The Long Struggle for Freedom

The long, arduous struggle of the Russian people to gain political freedom had achieved what has been called the first phase of the Russian Revolution in 1905. At that time Nicholas II had promised to institute a Duma, or national parliament, composed of representatives elected by practically universal suffrage of the Russian people. On October 30, 1905, he had proclaimed the "immutable rule" that no law would be considered binding without the consent of the Duma, that to the people would be given "the power to exercise an effective supervision over the acts of the officials." But the moment of fear which had impelled the Tsar to issue this decree passed away, and then had come a systematic attempt on the part of the governmental clique to annul the October Manifesto. In March, 1906, the Tsar had instituted an upper house of two hundred members, one-half appointed by himself and the rest chosen by various institutional organizations, which was to have coördinate legislative power with the Duma. At the same time he had announced that the fundamental laws of the empire were not to be

within the power of the Duma, and that foreign affairs, the army, and the navy belonged exclusively to his own jurisdiction. Finally, after having arbitrarily dissolved two Dumas because they had been "a cruel disappointment" to him, he had promulgated, in defiance of his October Manifesto, a new electoral law violently altering the franchise so that control passed to the conservative and the wealthy classes.

The Tsar's attempts to evade the performance of his promise of 1905 reinvigorated the liberal and revolutionary elements of the Russian people, and in the short period which intervened before the outbreak of the World War these elements crystallized into several groups. The most moderate were the Octobrists, so called because they demanded and would be content with the full execution of the Tsar's Manifesto of October, 1905. They consisted chiefly of liberal nobles who favored a government in which the Duma, though more powerful, should play a subordinate rôle somewhat like the Landtag in Prussia. More definitely liberal were the Constitutional Democrats or "Cadets," who were drawn chiefly from the professional classes, university men, capitalists, and more progressive nobles. They demanded a wider franchise, increased power for the Duma, ministerial responsibility—in short, a democratic, parliamentary monarchy like the British. These two groups desired to take progressive steps toward constitutional rule, but preferred to do this peaceably by means of the existing representative system which, although imperfect, nevertheless provided a legislative body. They still believed that the "unifying influence of Tsardom" was essential for the preservation of Russian national unity.

More radical in their aims for Russia were the Social Democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries. The former consisted for the most part of urban workingmen who, deprived of any real voice in the government and oppressed by an industrial system which forbade the organization of trade unions, were a fertile field for socialist propaganda. In consequence, they came to dream of the time when political power might be theirs, when factories might be seized, the capitalists turned out, and a millennium of shorter hours, increased wages, and better conditions ushered in. They therefore

sought to overthrow the empire in order to erect in its stead a socialist republic. Back in 1903 this party had split into two wings, the *Bolsheviki* or "majority" and the *Mensheviki* or "minority." Originally they had differed only in matters of party organization, but in the course of years they came to differ fundamentally on the question of party tactics as well. The Bolsheviks were the extremists, opposed to any coöperation with bourgeois parties, opposed to the policy of gradual reform, in favor of a cataclysmic upheaval which should establish the régime of the proletariat. The Mensheviks, on the other hand, were the moderates, willing, if necessary, to bring in the socialist régime gradually through the slow education of the masses, even with the coöperation of the moderately liberal groups. In other words, the Bolsheviks were more "revolutionary," the Mensheviks more "evolutionary." Because of the repressive measures of the government, however, most of the leaders of the Bolsheviks were dispersed in foreign countries before 1914.

The Socialist Revolutionaries comprised the mass of the peasants under the leadership of a few radical intellectuals. They were chiefly interested in the land problem, and sought to transform the land from private property into "the property of the whole people." The lands which the peasants had been permitted to buy at the time of their emancipation were in 1861 inadequate to support them. And although in 1914 about 75 per cent of the Russian land was in peasant occupancy, the steady increase in population [1] and consequent subdivision of estates left the peasants by 1917 with only about half the land per capita which they had obtained at the time of their emancipation. Millions of land-hungry peasants gazed enviously upon the remaining estates of the crown, the church, and the aristocracy and longed for the time when they might be seized and parceled out. The Socialist Revolutionary platform, therefore, sought the destruction of both the existent political and social régimes in Russia for the benefit of the peasant masses.

[1] The mean annual increase of population between 1897 and 1910 was more than four times as great as that during the preceding 175 years. During the later period "the population of the Russian Empire increased by a figure almost equal to that of the population of England at the close of that period." J. Mavor, *The Russian Revolution*, pp. 40–41.

Influences Leading to the March Revolution

Thus at the outbreak of the World War various forces were at work in Russia preparing to bring about a change in the institutions of that country. The more moderate sought merely to liberalize or democratize the government; the more radical had in mind the overthrow of the empire, the downfall of the dynasty, and the more or less complete subversion of the social order. Alexander Kerensky, a Socialist Revolutionary member of the Duma in 1917 and later head of the provisional government, is "convinced that but for the War the Revolution would have come not later than the spring of 1915, perhaps even at the end of 1914." In the early summer of that year the working people of St. Petersburg were filled with revolutionary ideas; the capital was convulsed by revolutionary strikes and even open street fighting. "Demonstrations and meetings were held, tramway cars were overturned, telephone and telegraph poles were cut down, and barricades were built."

But the outbreak of the war temporarily unified the Russian people. A wave of patriotic loyalty to the Tsar swept over the empire, and in the Duma party opposition seemed to disappear. The mobilization of the army was effected without difficulty, 96 per cent of those summoned responding to the call. But the unanimity was not for long. When in the following year the Russian armies were driven back out of Galicia and Poland, patriots began to denounce the incompetence of the military leaders and the inefficiency and corruption of the government. And as defeat succeeded defeat, as the number of killed and wounded mounted into the millions, as the vast crowds of homeless refugees poured eastward before the retreating armies, denunciations became louder and angrier. From all quarters came the insistent demand for a meeting of the Duma.

In August, 1915, the Tsar so far gave way to popular opinion as finally to convene the Duma, and the aged Premier Goremykin announced that he would give representatives of the Duma and of Russian industry a greater share in the task of providing munitions and food. This announcement failed to satisfy the liberals, however. As a result the Octobrists and Constitutional Democrats organized

a bloc under the presidency of Paul N. Miliukov, leader of the latter group in the Duma. When this bloc proceeded to demand not only the vigorous prosecution of the war and the punishment of criminally inefficient commanders and officials, but ministerial responsibility and the reform of local administration as well, the Duma was prorogued. Serious riots in the cities and strikes in the munition factories ensued.

In the face of vigorous protests the Tsar continued his reactionary policy, culminating in February, 1916, in the elevation to the premiership of Boris Stürmer, an ultraconservative landed aristocrat, a man of German descent and of suspected pro-German sympathies, later accused of deliberately planning the Rumanian defeat as part of his scheme for a separate Russo-German peace. Patriotic sentiment was still further outraged when Protopopov, a renegade Octobrist and "at that time the most hated man in Russia," was made minister of the interior. Meanwhile the imperial family had fallen beneath the spell of the long-haired, illiterate scoundrel, charlatan, and reputed monk, Gregory Rasputin, who was thought by many to be in close contact with a pro-German organization in Petrograd.[2] Gradually the conviction gained ground among men of widely different classes that certain "dark forces" were attempting to paralyze the country, that if the German staff itself were in control of Russia, it could not have brought to pass conditions more to its advantage than those created by the Russian government. And in the Duma in November, 1916, Miliukov, while enumerating instances of the incompetence of Stürmer's government, courageously reiterated, "Is that treason or stupidity?"

During 1916 both conservative and liberal groups in Russia gradually came to the conclusion that victory in war was impossible so long as the methods of autocracy prevailed. In the fall of that year preparations for a *coup d'état* were begun in various circles which included military men of both Petrograd and Moscow, and Duma members of as high standing as Rodzianko, the president. Most of the plans envisaged the abdication of Nicholas II. Little

[2] In September, 1914, the name of the capital was changed from St. Petersburg to Petrograd.

headway seemed to be made, however. Although by denunciations patriots were able to force the resignation of Stürmer and his successor, Trepov, although by conspiracy and assassination they contrived to remove Rasputin, those who took their places at the head of the government or in the counsels of the Tsar were of the same type. Others like Golitzin and Protopopov continued to break up public gatherings, suppress newspapers, and fill prisons with political offenders and suspects. And always there was evident the inefficiency, corruption, and reactionary tendencies of the government.

At the same time, the army with its millions of peasants from every part of Russia was discouraged, discontented, and weary of the futile struggle which seemed to be waged not only against the Central Powers at the front, but against the forces of inefficiency, corruption, and even treason in the rear. The great bulk of Russian troops—perhaps as many as ten million—never reached the front lines but were for the most part concentrated in the large towns and cities.[3] Here enforced idleness gave them plenty of time to brood over their privations and wrongs and become fertile ground for revolutionary propaganda. Miliukov states that the army was already in process of dissolution by the winter of 1916–17. "Unwillingness to fight, decline of discipline, distrust and suspicion of officers, desertion in the rear" were present. Kerensky puts the number of desertions by January, 1917, at 1,200,000, and states that the number was still increasing. One of the essentials for successful revolution—a discontented and disloyal army—was thus present in Russia by the spring of 1917.

Among the masses, meanwhile, discontent and unrest were greatly accentuated by the economic conditions. The relative cost of living increased during the war by leaps and bounds. In 1915 the price of commodities of prime necessity rose 50 per cent, while wages increased barely 20 per cent. During the winter of 1916–17 a coal shortage developed which made itself felt in the progressive closing down of industries in which its use was essential. The transportation system, none too efficient at best, collapsed under the strain of

[3] The Petrograd garrison numbered 160,000.

the war. According to Kerensky, passenger traffic had to be stopped for weeks at a time to enable military and supply trains to go through to the front. Finally, the shift of millions of peasants from the farms into the armies,[4] the tremendous demand for food to feed these armies, the peasants' unwillingness to part with food for depreciating paper currency, and the collapse of the transportation system, all conspired to produce an acute food shortage in the larger towns and cities. Short rations and bread lines became more and more frequent. In a winter which was bitterly cold, many Russians were hungry. "Bread!" became the dominant cry.

Collapse of Autocracy

On March 8, 1917, spontaneous riots occurred in Petrograd when crowds of people from widely separated parts of the city poured into the streets, shouting "Bread!" On the same day between eighty and ninety thousand workmen went on strike and joined the demonstrating masses in the streets. The more revolutionary elements at once sought to turn the situation to their advantage and soon red flags and revolutionary placards began to appear. For the most part throughout the day order was maintained by the 28,000 Petrograd police, but in the evening bakers' shops were looted by workmen unable to get bread. During the next day some fraternization began between the crowds and the troops of the Petrograd garrison, who gave assurance that the soldiers would not fire on the people.

On Sunday March 11, incidents of considerable significance occurred. One of the companies of the Petrograd garrison mutinied when ordered to fire upon the people, and had to be disarmed by the Preobrashensky regiment, the flower of the Household troops. Rodzianko, president of the Duma, telegraphed to the Tsar who was at general headquarters:

> Situation serious. Anarchy reigns in the capital. Government is paralyzed. Transport, food and fuel supplies are utterly disorganized. General discontent is growing. Disorderly firing is going on in the streets. Various

[4] It has been estimated that 14,000,000 soldiers were under arms in 1917, in Russia alone.

companies of soldiers are shooting at each other. It is absolutely necessary to invest some one who enjoys the confidence of the people with powers to form a new government. No time must be lost. And delay may be fatal. I pray God that at this hour responsibility may not fall on the wearer of the Crown.

During the day the military governor of Petrograd posted notices ordering the strikers to return to their work; and Premier Golitzin, using a decree which had been signed but left undated by the Tsar before he left Petrograd, sent Rodzianko an order proroguing the Duma, which had been in session only since February 27.

Now at length the autocratic edifice began to crumble. Despite the Tsar's decree, the Duma continued to sit in "unofficial" sessions and selected a temporary committee which it invested with unlimited powers. The strikers, instead of returning passively to work, organized the Soviet (Council) of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, secured quarters in the Taurida Palace in which the Duma met, and set to work organizing the masses and converting the soldiers to their cause. Even the Preobrashensky regiment now mutinied and shot some of its officers. Other regiments followed suit until by noon 25,000 soldiers had thrown themselves on the side of the workmen. By evening of the 12th revolutionary workers and soldiers were in control of the capital, and former dreaded Tsarist officials—among them, Protopopov, minister of the interior, Sukhomlinov, minister of war, Scheglovitov, president of the Imperial Council, Goremykin and Golitzin, former premiers —were either surrendering themselves or being arrested by the Revolutionary forces. Rodzianko's Sunday telegram had received no acknowledgment from the Tsar, nor had a second and stronger one on Monday. The only apparent reaction was a telegram from Nicholas II to the minister of war, stating that the Tsar himself was returning to Petrograd and was bringing troops from the front to quell the uprising.

Meanwhile, on March 13, the temporary committee of the Duma, headed by Rodzianko, assumed the functions of executive authority, and began issuing orders to the Petrograd garrison. At the same time the Petrograd Soviet, representing the "revolutionary democ-

racy" of the factory workers and soldiers of the city, elected a temporary executive committee, with Tcheidze as president and Kerensky and Skobelev as vice presidents, and began doing the same thing. Thus there were, almost from the beginning of the Revolution, two centers of authority: the temporary committee of the Duma, and the temporary executive committee of the Soviet. From the very first, therefore, a division of authority existed to embarrass the Revolution. An attempt was made to amalgamate the two groups in a provisional government which was projected on the 14th, when the temporary committee of the Duma proposed a government consisting for the most part of bourgeois ministers, but with two places reserved for representatives of the Soviet. It was suggested that these might be given to Tcheidze and Kerensky as ministers of labor and justice respectively. The executive committee of the Soviet, however, declared that representatives of the Soviet could not take office in the provisional government because the government and the whole Revolution were "bourgeois." But, thanks to Kerensky's influence, the executive committee was overruled by the Soviet delegates. Kerensky was permitted to become a member of the new provisional government, which was composed, however, primarily of members of the Octobrist and Constitutional Democratic parties. Although Kerensky was the only member drawn from the Left group, the Petrograd Soviet approved the government by a vote of 1,000 to 15.

On the 14th the Tsar attempted to reach Petrograd, but his train was compelled to stop because workmen had pulled up the tracks. He thereupon returned to Pskov. Meanwhile, he had dispatched an army under General Ivanov, the hero of the first Galician campaign, to take Petrograd, but upon the latter's arrival at Tsarskoye Selo on the morning of the 14th, most of his troops went over to the Revolution. Early the following morning the Tsar decided to give way and grant a responsible ministry, but it was too late. The demand was now for his abdication. As to what should follow his abdication, there were differing views; but the majority of the temporary committee favored the regency of Grand Duke Michael during the minority of the Tsar's son, Alexis. Con-

fronted with the information that his troops had deserted him, advised by his generals that abdication was his only possible course, Nicholas II at length surrendered his throne, requesting only that it go directly to his brother Michael rather than to his young son, Alexis.

But by this time the Petrograd Soviet was demanding a republic, so that the arrangement made in the royal train at Pskov was unacceptable. A delegation of the Duma thereupon visited Grand Duke Michael, and informed him that the popular demand was for his renunciation of the regency and his surrender of all powers to the provisional government until a constituent assembly could decide upon the future. The grand duke in turn bowed to the Revolution, and announced his intention to accept the supreme power only if it should be conferred upon him by a constituent assembly "elected on a basis of equal, universal, and secret suffrage." He closed his declaration by requesting all Russians to obey the provisional government until the meeting of a constituent assembly. The provisional government at once announced that it assumed all the financial and treaty obligations of the State incurred by the old régime.

With the appointment of the first provisional government of Russia the bourgeois stage of the Revolution began. The ministry represented a coalition of the moderate parties. The new premier was Prince George Lvov, creator and president of the Union of Zemstvos. Associated with him as foreign minister was Paul N. Miliukov, eminent historian and leader of the Constitutional Democrats. The new war minister was A. S. Guchkov, leader of the Octobrists and formerly chairman of the military commission of the Duma. Kerensky, a Socialist Revolutionary, became minister of justice. The ministry was chiefly representative of the landowning, capitalist, manufacturing, and professional classes—obviously a bourgeois group. And the aims of the first provisional government were distinctly bourgeois aims: the establishment of constitutional, democratic, parliamentary government, perhaps even a monarchy; the active prosecution of the war in close coöperation with the Allies; the protection of the rights of private property; the settle-

ment of the land question by a constituent assembly, but no alienation of land without compensation; the accomplishment of all changes in Russian institutions only through a legally elected constituent assembly.

Nevertheless there was universal approval of the preliminary steps of the provisional government. A general pardon for all political crimes resulted in the beginning of the return of some eighty thousand exiles. Arbitrary arrest was made illegal, a speedy trial for all accused persons was guaranteed, and capital punishment was abolished. The right to organize labor unions and to strike was recognized. Freedom of speech, of the press, and of religion was proclaimed, and all legal discriminations against Jews were removed. Local government was reorganized. The constitution of Finland was reëstablished and the independence of Poland, at that time under German control, was definitely promised. Even the attempt to impose the Russian language by force on the non-Russian people of the empire was abandoned. To the onlooker, Russia had at length apparently become one of the liberal democratic States of the world. Formal recognition of the new régime was soon forthcoming from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan.

But when the provisional government assumed the authority of the former Tsarist government, even with Allied approval, it inherited likewise "a terrible war, an acute food shortage, a paralyzed transportation system, an empty treasury, and a population in a state of furious discontent and anarchic disintegration." The Russian masses were inexperienced in political affairs, and full of Utopian ideals. They naïvely expected miracles from the new order of things,[5] and meanwhile proceeded in many places to seize and

[5] The naïveté of the masses of the proletariat is revealed by an incident which occurred in a Petrograd factory where "the men, whose wages had been increased threefold, summoned a meeting of the directors. Their delegate explained that they were now getting eight roubles a head more than formerly, and that they considered that they were entitled to this increase for the whole period since the beginning of the war. Eight roubles for 5,000 men made 40,000 roubles a day, and 36,000,000 since August, 1914. They requested the directors to put this sum in the sacks they had brought within twenty-four

divide up the estates of their landlords and wealthy neighbors. To handle this critical situation, the provisional government had a disorganized and broken political machine and an almost leaderless army, for the authority of superior officers in the central and local administrations and in the army soon vanished into thin air.

The Soviets

Gradually the Russian masses began to organize and to make themselves articulate. Following the example of the workmen of Petrograd, they established throughout the country extralegal soviets, chosen in the towns by the factory workers, in the rural districts by the peasant communes, in the army by military units. These soviets were controlled largely by the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Menshevik Social Democrats, groups which were practically unrepresented in the provisional government.

The aims of the groups which found representation in the soviets were radically different from those of the provisional government. Both the urban proletariat and the peasants desired a thoroughgoing social revolution in addition to political change. Both sought the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. Specifically, the peasants wanted the great estates seized and divided up without compensation to the owners, while the proletariat hoped for the expulsion of the capitalists and the introduction of a socialistic scheme of workers' control in the factories. All were war-weary and discouraged; while not at once demanding the immediate cessation of the war, they did desire a revision of its aims and a final peace "without annexations and indemnities." They were eager for the early convocation of a constituent assembly, which they expected to provide the panacea for all their wrongs.

But the masses, as the weeks passed by, found little in the policies of the provisional government to arouse their enthusiasm or to gain their confidence. Apparently the new leaders were content merely to change from bureaucratic autocracy to middle-class political de-

hours, or they would deposit the directors in the said sacks and throw them into the Neva. The Ministry of Labor managed to persuade the men that their demands were unfair, upon which they withdrew them and apologized." J. Buchan, *A History of the Great War*, III, pp. 508–9.

mocracy. Apparently they believed in the sacred rights of property, and had no intention of handing the factories over to the workers or even permitting the peasants to divide up the great estates. They announced that the final disposition of the land question should be left to a constituent assembly, but apparently they were in no hurry to summon an assembly, for they neglected to appoint either time or place and made no move to prepare the machinery for the elections.[6] Finally, the provisional government was apparently still zealously imperialistic, desirous of prosecuting the war until final victory should bring Armenia, Constantinople and the Straits, eastern Galicia, and the other spoils agreed upon in secret treaties in 1915.

The masses had an opportunity to express their views on something like a national scale for the first time when, on the initiative of the Petrograd Soviet, an "All-Russian Congress of Soviets" was summoned. Early in April, 1917, nearly five hundred delegates representing one hundred and thirty-eight local soviets, thirteen divisions in the rear, and twenty-six divisions and seven armies at the front gathered together. Menshevik Social Democrats and moderate Socialist Revolutionaries constituted the great majority of the delegates. The chief influence in directing the work and policy of the congress was exerted by the Social Democrats, whose most outstanding leader, perhaps, was Tseretelli, a member of the disbanded second Duma, an exile to Siberia under the Tsarist government, released by the amnesty of the provisional government, and now leader of the Social Democrats of Georgia. It was almost inevitable that a clash in policies should occur between a congress thus representing the Russian masses, and the provisional government, representative of the bourgeoisie.

This All-Russian Congress demanded the abandonment of imperialism, the acceptance of the principle of self-determination, and the conclusion of peace without annexations and indemnities. It

[6] The provisional government did appoint a special commission to draft a suitable electoral law. But the summoning of a constituent assembly was delayed because of (1) the desire to democratize the local government first, (2) the desire not to deprive the soldiers of their votes, (3) the difficulty of holding elections in the midst of war activities.

voted to continue the war and to support the provisional government, but only provided it adopted the views of the congress. And the government's proclamation of April 9, stating that "Russia does not aim at dominating other nations, at depriving them of their national patrimony, or at occupying by force foreign territories," that "its object is to establish a durable peace on the basis of the rights of nations to decide their own destiny," seemed to be in perfect accord with the views of the soviets.

On May 1, however, Foreign Minister Miliukov sent a note to the Allied governments stating Russia's resolve to conclude no separate peace, but to carry the war to a "decisive victory" in conformity with her past agreements with the Allies.[7] This note evoked the disapproval of the Petrograd Soviet, which apparently suspected it of imperialistic connotations, since it said nothing about omitting annexations and indemnities. Meetings of protest were held in Petrograd and Moscow. Workmen, on leaving the factories in the evening, marched in processions through the principal streets bearing red flags with inscriptions hostile to the government, and "Down with Miliukov!" was the cry. A number of regiments paraded with banners demanding the resignation of Guchkov, minister of war, together with Miliukov. The government hastened to explain to the Petrograd Soviet that "decisive victory" did not preclude Russia's renunciation of territorial conquests, and that the proclamation of April 9 contained its real aims. Nevertheless, as a result of the crisis, both Guchkov and Miliukov resigned.

Up until this time the Menshevik leaders in the Petrograd Soviet had declined to assume any responsibility for policies of the provisional government, had refused to coöperate with it, and had sought merely to exercise upon it the pressure of an opposition. They had permitted Kerensky to enter the government, but only as a member of the Duma, not as a representative of the Soviet. Now, however, the provisional government demanded that the soviets should be officially represented in order that they might be compelled to share the responsibility of formulating policies. On May

[7] Professor Miliukov later admitted that this was the weakest point in the provisional government's program.

15 the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet by a vote of 41 to 19 finally decided to participate in the government, with the understanding that Russia's foreign policy should be that of "reaching as soon as possible a general peace without annexations and without indemnities."

A new provisional government was now organized in which the Mensheviks and moderate Socialist Revolutionaries each had three representatives. Lvov remained as prime minister and Kerensky succeeded Guchkov as minister of war. Prominent among the members of the soviets who were added were Tchernov, leader of the Peasants' party, Tseretelli, and Skobelev. The immediate result of the change in the government was a reversal of Miliukov's earlier announced war policy. Imperialism was definitely repudiated in a manifesto of the provisional government (May 19) which adopted as its aim "the reëstablishment of a general peace which shall not tend towards domination over other nations or the seizure of their national possessions or the violent usurpation of their territories—a peace without annexations or indemnities and based on the right of nations to decide their own affairs." Quite apparently the voice of the soviets had been heard in Russia. Nevertheless, the result of the reorganization of the government was probably to weaken it, for it now lost the confidence of many conservatives, while failing to win the support of many radicals who wished a ministry of socialists only.

Lenin and the Rise of the Bolsheviks

One explanation of the Petrograd Soviet's decision to enter the government and to give active support to its policies, was the alarm with which Menshevik and moderate Socialist Revolutionary leaders viewed the increasing activity of the Bolsheviks. Although the outbreak of the Revolution had found the latter's organization practically broken up, although they had taken no serious part in the overthrow of the Tsar or in the constructive work of the Revolution, although during the first weeks of the Revolution they seem to have had no clear-cut policy in regard to the Revolution, or the war, or their own actual seizure of power, they had finally

been galvanized into action by the arrival of Nicholas Lenin on the evening of April 16, and his dramatic speech at the Finnish railway station demanding a second revolution.

The real name of this "plump little man, with a high bulbous forehead, a snub nose, and bald head," whose tremendous will power and boundless energy so dominated the Bolsheviks that he might well have said, "*Le parti c'est moi*," was Vladimir Ilyitch Ulianov. He was born in Simbirsk (now called Leninsk) in 1870, the son of a district inspector of schools whose family descended from a stock of impoverished nobles. His elder brother, Alexander, was executed for his part in the attempted assassination of Alexander III in 1887, and doubtless Lenin was in sympathy with his views, for he himself was soon expelled from the University of Kazan because of revolutionary agitation. Later he passed the bar examinations in Petrograd, but soon gave up the practice of law, joined a secret organization of professional revolutionists, became a Social Democrat, and was even exiled for a time to Siberia because of revolutionary activities among the working classes of the capital. The split in the Social Democratic party which occurred in 1903 was largely due to Lenin, who repudiated coöperation with the liberals and sought a violent outbreak of class war. To a certain extent, therefore, Lenin may be considered the father of Bolshevism. During the revolution of 1905 he was again in Petrograd, but his rôle was rather unimportant, his chief endeavor being to incite violence and hostility against the Duma and the Constitutional Democrats. At the conclusion of the revolution he left the country, and from 1906 to 1917 lived abroad as a professional revolutionary, giving himself exclusively to the work of revolutionary organization and secret propaganda.

The Revolution of 1917 found Lenin in Zurich, Switzerland, but the general pardon of political offenders proclaimed by the provisional government opened the way for his return to Russia. Refused the right to pass through territory of the Allies, he at length secured permission to cross Germany from the Kaiser's government, which hoped to weaken Russia by sowing dissension behind the lines. Upon his return to Petrograd, Lenin immediately began his

attack. "There must be no support of the Provisional Government," he wrote. The food difficulties, the protracted war, the delay in summoning a constituent assembly, all these he exploited for his own ends. Upon the provisional government he placed the blame for all that went wrong.

Gradually Lenin gathered about him a group of followers: doctrinaire fanatics, masters of intrigue and propaganda, ambitious opportunists, sentimental visionaries, crazy degenerates, sincere idealists—yet withal many extremely energetic and capable men whose names, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Tchicherin, Kamenev, Rykov, Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, have since been prominent in Russian affairs. While Lenin unquestionably held first place in the Bolshevik party, second place soon went to a new recruit, Leon Trotsky, who did not finally join the Bolsheviks until after the March Revolution. Trotsky, whose real name was Leon Davidovich Bronstein, was a Russian middle-class Jew who had early become imbued with revolutionary ideas. Twice he had been exiled to Siberia, and twice he had escaped. The Revolution found him in New York City, where he had recently gone after having lived in exile for several years in Vienna and Paris. When he attempted to return to Russia he was arrested in Halifax, but on the application of Kerensky, upon whom the Petrograd Soviet brought pressure to bear, he was released and permitted to sail for Russia.

The program which these Bolshevik leaders offered was bound to make a tremendous appeal to the masses who, with the sole exception of the announced change in war aims, could see little difference between the policies of the old and those of the new provisional government. No order for the confiscation and subdivision of the great landed estates was forthcoming. No step toward the overthrow of the capitalistic system of industry was taken. Not even a call for the early meeting of a constituent assembly was sent out. Instead of these, what they saw were vigorous efforts to prepare for a renewed military effort at the front. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks drafted a program which called for what the mass of the people wanted: (1) immediate conclusion of a general peace; (2) immediate confiscation of landed estates without compensation and without delay for legal

forms; (3) possession and operation of factories by the workmen; (4) national control of production and distribution; (5) the substitution of soviets of workmen, peasants, and soldiers for all existing agencies of government; (6) the exclusion of the propertied classes from political rights.

As the first step toward their ultimate control of the government, the Bolsheviks began proclaiming and demanding, "All power to the soviets!" As the second step, they set out to win control of the soviets, in which they were at first only a small minority. After the formation of the provisional government in May, they continually denounced the "reactionary" or "counter-revolutionary" crimes of the soviet ministers in the government; they accused them of "conspiracy with the capitalists" against the proletariat, and of "treason to the Revolution." Here and there they gained control of a local soviet, but they failed in their attempt to dominate the All-Russian Congress of Soviets which met in Petrograd in June. In spite of Lenin's furious attack on Kerensky and the provisional government, the Mensheviks under the leadership of Tseretelli retained control, and the Congress passed a vote of confidence in the government.

Meanwhile War Minister Kerensky was bending every effort to prepare for a successful offensive against the Central Powers, believing that a Russian victory would strengthen the provisional government and raise the morale of both soldiers and civilians. Discipline was so well restored, at least in the southern divisions on the Austrian front, that an offensive was projected for July. The plan called for local attacks to hold the German troops in the north while the main blow was delivered against the weaker Austrian lines. But Russian deserters betrayed the plan to the enemy, so that German reinforcements were sent to the Austrian rather than to the German front. After weeks of feverish activity on the part of Kerensky and his assistants, the Russian advance began at the very close of June. For a few days all went well. Thousands of prisoners and vast quantities of war material were captured, and an advance of some twenty miles was made. Wherever the Austrian lines were not stiffened by Germans, they gave way. But on July 19 a heavy concentration of Ger-

man troops began a drive in the direction of Tarnopol. Not yet recovered from the exhaustion of their own attack, the Russians fell back under German pressure. Discipline and organization again broke down; entire regiments shot their officers and refused to fight. The whole Russian line in Galicia precipitately took to flight, and the Russian gains of 1916 were completely wiped out.

And behind the lines things were going no better. On July 16 the Bolsheviks made their first serious attempt at an armed uprising in Petrograd. Part of the Petrograd garrison, honeycombed with Bolshevik propaganda, revolted. In company with armed workmen they paraded through the city with banners inscribed, "Down with the capitalist ministers," "Down with the war," "All power to the soviets." Red flags appeared among the crowds before the Taurida Palace, and speeches by Trotsky and Zinoviev were greeted with thunderous applause. From the front, Kerensky telegraphed demanding that the government take active steps to suppress the Bolsheviks, and dispatched sixty thousand loyal soldiers to assist in this task. After two days of desultory fighting in the streets, both the disloyal troops and the Bolsheviks were defeated. While their support in Petrograd was strong, the Bolsheviks were still weak in the country and in the army as a whole. After this "reconnoiter" of Bolshevik and government strength, Lenin abandoned his cry for the immediate overthrow of the provisional government, and decided that special efforts must now be made to win not only the Petrograd garrison but the whole army to the Bolshevik program.

In the midst of defeat at the front and uprising in the capital, the provisional government itself passed through a crisis. Prime Minister Lvov and two other Cadet ministers resigned, ostensibly because of unjustified concessions granted by the government to the Ukrainians, but apparently more because the situation was getting out of hand and the soviets were attaining too much influence. Kerensky was immediately invited to form a cabinet. The Socialists desired to fill the vacancies without resort to the Cadets, but Kerensky was determined that the latter must be represented. In the end a "nonpartisan national" government was created, including members of the

Constitutional Democratic party. Aside from Kerensky, only two members of the original provisional government still remained in the cabinet.

Kerensky immediately took vigorous steps to strengthen the government. Capital punishment was restored, and courts-martial were ordered reëstablished at the front. Military censorship was revived, and the minister of the interior was granted the right to suppress newspapers, prohibit meetings, make arrests without court warrants, and even expel from Russia by executive order persons considered dangerous to the safety of the nation. Orders were issued for the arrest of Lenin, Trotsky, and other Bolshevik leaders. Lenin, disguised sometimes as a sailor, sometimes as a soldier, a peasant, or a factory worker, was forced to hide in the suburbs of Petrograd or in Finland. Bolshevik representation in the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet and in the All-Russian executive committee was reduced almost to the vanishing point. Kerensky hoped that a breach had been made in "the Lenin front."

But the Revolution was now threatened from another direction. The July rising of the Bolsheviks gave a great impetus to the activities of the extreme Right. "Pale and trembling with indignation, the respectable citizen now called for the strong man," and the forces of reaction and militant monarchism raised their heads. The Bolsheviks had sought the "dictatorship of the proletariat"; the conservatives now sought the dictatorship of the military. Whether Kerensky himself was temporarily won over to the plan has never been conclusively proved; certain it is that in the end he repudiated the whole affair. However that may be, early in September, under orders from General Kornilov, troops advanced from the front upon Petrograd, believing that it was in the hands of the Bolsheviks. At the same time Kornilov dispatched an ultimatum to Kerensky demanding the proclamation of martial law in Petrograd, the resignation of the provisional government, and Kerensky's immediate surrender to general headquarters. The latter refused to carry out the ultimatum, was given dictatorial power by the cabinet, dispatched emissaries to disillusion Kornilov's troops as to their mission, and in the end arrested Kornilov himself.

The Kornilov affair brought a distinct reaction toward the Bolsheviks. The mass of the people—peasants, proletariat, soldiers—were in deadly fear lest "Tsarist generals" might immediately bring about the restoration of the repressive system of the old régime. It was rumored that Kerensky had been in sympathy with the plot and had turned against it only under pressure from the soviet. Whether or not this was true, the Bolsheviks seized upon the rumor and used it so effectively that within a few days the confidence of the bulk of the people in the provisional government was completely destroyed. The soviets became more revolutionary. Within a week after the crushing of the Kornilov rebellion, the Bolsheviks gained control of the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet for the first time. The Mensheviks thereupon transferred the seat of authority to the All-Russian executive committee, where the provincial groups, which were more moderate than the masses of Petrograd, were represented; and the All-Russian executive committee sought to push the Petrograd Soviet more and more into the background and to take all matters into its own hands.

But the moderates were waging a losing fight. The odds against them were too great. Russia was falling into chaos. The military situation became more and more desperate. Desertions were on the increase, and the mass of soldiers threatened to leave the trenches, whole regiments at a time. The Germans continued to advance, captured Riga, and threatened Petrograd. Kerensky's government prepared to move to Moscow. In the villages, where a general seizure of land was going on, martial law was in many cases proclaimed. Russia's finances and industries were sinking into a state of collapse. Food riots in the cities were frequent. Reactionary propaganda, Bolshevik propaganda, German propaganda, separatist propaganda were everywhere present, and flourished in proportion as the domestic situation became more chaotic.

Then Kerensky made the fatal blunder of postponing the elections to the constituent assembly from September 30 to November 25—fatal because it still further weakened the confidence of the masses in him and played directly into the hands of the Bolshevik leaders, who claimed that the provisional government did not really wish to in-

troduce the long-sought popular reforms. With redoubled energy the Bolsheviks sounded their slogan: "Peace to the army, land to the peasants, control of the factories to the workmen!" The provisional government also promised peace, land, and control of factories, but the difference was that in the program of the latter, the army must wait for the Allied decision to make peace, the peasants must wait for a constituent assembly's decision in respect to the land, and the workmen must share their control with the State authorities. The Bolsheviks said, openly and bluntly, "Take it now!"

The inevitable result was that the Bolsheviks rapidly increased in numbers and strength. The failure of the July uprising in Petrograd had taught their leaders that the final decision rested with the army, and they therefore paid special attention to the Petrograd troops. In September Trotsky formed a military-revolutionary committee and began to prepare the garrison for another uprising. Throughout the country land-hungry peasants, who cared not so much for victory over Germany as for the overthrow of the landlords, began to approve the Bolshevik program. In the cities the workers, so long at the mercy of their government-protected employers, became enamored of the Bolshevik promise of complete control of industry. And the active soldiers, maltreated, betrayed, defeated in the war, compelled to endure untold hardships, and at the same time yearning for the war to end in order that they might return to claim their share of the confiscated lands, gladly enlisted under the Bolshevik banner of peace. Regiment after regiment declared it would recognize only the Petrograd Soviet's commissioners.

On October 8 Trotsky was elected president of the Petrograd Soviet; two weeks later the Soviet passed a vote of no confidence in the provisional government; and on October 25 it authorized the formation of a war-revolutionary committee. Trotsky became chairman of this committee, and its membership was arranged in such a way that it was in a position to maintain contact with the navy, the army at the front, and every military or semi-military unit—"in short, with every force which might in any way be used when the opportune moment should arrive for the overthrow of the Provisional Government." The Bolsheviks thus gained control of the artillery,

machine guns, and other war material in the Petrograd military district. At the same time the Petrograd Soviet under Bolshevik control was able successfully to countermand and prevent Kerensky's removal from the city of a great part of the disaffected Petrograd garrison. The Mensheviks recognized these as probable steps toward the Bolsheviks' seizure of power, but were apparently powerless to prevent them.

The November Revolution

Lenin now made up his mind that the time to strike was at hand. Late in October he returned to Petrograd and held a "conspiratory meeting" of the central committee of the Bolshevik party. By an almost unanimous vote an armed insurrection against the government was decided upon. The occasion was to be the assembling of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which was set for November 7. A large majority of those who had been elected to this congress were Bolsheviks and there was thought to be little doubt that the congress would declare itself in favor of power being handed over to the soviets. But the Bolsheviks felt that such a resolution must be backed by force. Furthermore, it was argued, an insurrection under the cry of protecting the rights of the Congress of Soviets would have a much more effective appeal than one under the mere cry of seizing power for the Bolsheviks.

With everything ready for the coup, therefore, the Bolsheviks proclaimed to the masses on the evening of November 6: "The counter revolution has raised its criminal head. The Kornilovists are mobilizing forces in order to annihilate the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and the Constituent Assembly." During the night the public buildings of Petrograd were occupied by Bolshevik troops under orders from the war-revolutionary committee. Railway stations, telegraph and telephone offices, bridges, power plants, and even the Bank of Russia came into their control. At ten o'clock in the morning of the 7th another proclamation announced that the provisional government had been overthrown, and that the authority of the State had been transferred to the war-revolutionary committee. "Long live the Revolution of the workers, soldiers, and peasants!"

At the same time a broadcast by radio announced the news, and asked "the front and the rear not to give way to provocation, but to support the Petrograd Soviet and the new Revolutionary authority, which is going at once to offer a just peace, to transfer the land to the peasants and to summon the Constituent Assembly." Late in the day the members of the provisional government, with the exception of Kerensky who escaped, were arrested and imprisoned. That same night the All-Russian Congress of Soviets approved the *coup d'état*, and passed a resolution formally taking over the government, which thereupon became the Soviet government. On the 8th the All-Russian Congress established a new provisional government, called "Soviet of the People's Commissars," of which Lenin was chairman and Trotsky commissar for foreign affairs.

Petrograd was soon cleared of counter-revolutionary centers. Publications which preached revolt against Bolshevik authority were promptly suppressed. Former soviet leaders who opposed the new régime were arrested. An attempted revolt of college students in Petrograd was ruthlessly put down, the captured students being "beaten, bayoneted, raised on bayonets, and shot." Forces dispatched by Kerensky to overthrow the Bolsheviks and recapture Petrograd were met at Tsarskoye Selo, and those that did not desert to the Bolsheviks were defeated and compelled to retire. With the exception of a few days' fighting in Moscow and some opposition from the Don Cossacks, the *coup d'état* met little resistance outside Petrograd. As in the various French revolutions, so here the old centralized system of administration made it comparatively easy for the capital to assume the direction of affairs throughout the country. Besides, according to Miliukov, the "situation was so bad that, in everybody's opinion, it could not be made worse by any new change. On the contrary, a change was looked for by the population as a chance for improvement." Most of the army leaders, perhaps through fear of being killed by their soldiers, eventually declared in favor of the Soviet government.

Immediate steps were taken by the Bolsheviks to consolidate their position with the masses. In the same session in which the Soviet of the People's Commissars was created, decrees on peace and on

the land question were introduced by Lenin and unanimously adopted. They were then printed in huge quantities and broadcast through the country. The great landed estates were to be handed over immediately to local committees "pending the decision of the Constituent Assembly." About two weeks later Trotsky sent to the foreign diplomats in Petrograd a note stating that the Soviet government intended "to propose to all peoples and their respective governments an immediate armistice on all fronts, with the purpose of immediately opening *pourparlers* for the conclusion of a democratic peace," and December 2 was later announced as the date for the opening of negotiations. The municipal council of Petrograd, which repudiated the idea of a separate peace, was first dissolved by decree and then dispersed by sailors and the "Red Guard."

The Constituent Assembly next suffered a similar fate. Elections were held according to schedule on November 25, the vote being based on equal, direct, universal, and secret adult suffrage. The assembly, therefore, was more representative of the Russian people than any other body which had ever been called together in that country. The Bolsheviks had hoped to control a majority of the delegates, but the elections revealed that they actually represented a small minority of the Russian people. A large majority of the total membership was composed of moderate Socialist Revolutionaries. From a parliamentary point of view the Bolsheviks should now have turned the administration of the government over to the Socialist Revolutionaries.

But the Bolsheviks had no such idea. They intended either to control or to destroy the assembly, and managed to postpone its first meeting from December to January. Finally, however, the Constituent Assembly, "the object of the struggles and hopes, the symbol of the people's sovereignty for so many generations of Russian Revolutionaries," convened in Petrograd on January 18, 1918. Although many of the conservative members absented themselves through fear for their personal safety, although the assembly met under the menace of "Red Guards", the Socialist Revolutionaries were numerous enough and courageous enough to block the plans of the Bolsheviks. Instead of the Bolshevik nominee, the Socialist Revo-

lutionaries elected their own leader, Tchernov, president of the assembly. In the same spirit they voted down the Bolshevik resolution that the working classes should be armed and all other classes disarmed. In consequence, the Bolsheviks left the assembly, and early the next morning dissolved it by force, charging that it was a counter-revolutionary bourgeois body.

Meanwhile the disintegration of Russia had begun. The March Revolution had resulted in a movement for autonomy among the subject nationalities of the empire; the Bolshevik *coup d'état* caused it to become out-and-out separatism. In the Baltic area Finland, Esthonia, and Lithuania declared their independence; in southern Russia the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Moldavian (Bessarabian) Republic were proclaimed; at Tiflis the Transcaucasian Federal Republic first declared for autonomy but later decided upon complete independence; at Tomsk a Siberian Confederation was constituted. Although on November 24 Lenin issued a proclamation authorizing the various nationalities of Russia to organize themselves into independent States, the Bolshevik government was loath to grant recognition unless they were controlled by the Bolshevik elements within them.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

By this time the Bolsheviks had begun to redeem their promise to the soldiers. Although the Allies refused to have anything to do with the Bolshevik peace proposal, the Central Powers, which were naturally eager to have Russia withdraw from the war, responded with alacrity. Negotiations for an armistice were begun at Brest-Litovsk on December 3, and twelve days later a definite truce was signed between representatives of Russia on the one hand and of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey on the other.

On December 22 the first peace conference of the war was formally opened at the same place. The task of the Russian delegates was not an easy one. They realized well enough that military force was on the side of the Central Powers. They doubtless clearly saw that if they resisted a peace dictated by the Central Powers, Russia would again be invaded, and the Bolsheviks themselves might be

confronted by a rebellion at home on the part of those who had been promised an immediate peace. On the other hand, if they yielded too much or too easily, they might prevent further German invasion, to be sure, but they might also bring upon themselves the wrath of Russian patriots for having betrayed the national interests. Faced by this dilemma, they played for time. They first secured a suspension of the peace conference on the pretext of enabling the Allies to participate, and then in the meantime they attempted by propaganda to incite the German people to revolt against their "imperialistic" government. But the Allies did not participate nor did the Germans revolt, so that the Bolsheviks failed to benefit by their procrastination.

The Bolsheviks next desired to transfer the negotiations to Stockholm, where they would be less under the domination of the Central Powers; but the Germans objected and the conference was at length resumed on January 10, 1918, at Brest-Litovsk. The chief obstacle to an agreement was the treatment of the Russian territory occupied by troops of the Central Powers. The Bolsheviks demanded that the forces of the Central Powers should evacuate Poland, Courland, and Lithuania and permit plebiscites to determine the fate of these regions. This the Central Powers refused to do, the Kaiser ordering the German delegates to demand without plebiscites not only Courland and Lithuania but Livonia and Esthonia as well. As a result of the consequent impasse the conference broke up again four days later and adjourned *sine die*, the only positive achievement being the extension of the armistice to February 12.

Two days before the expiration of the armistice, Trotsky handed the Germans a note which is considered unique among war documents: "We are going out of the war; but we feel ourselves compelled to refuse to sign the peace treaty." But Germany was determined to have a signed peace. On February 18, therefore, German armies on the eastern front once more began to advance into Russia. The following day Lenin and Trotsky capitulated and agreed to sign. The German government now made a new offer of peace, more drastic than the first, and attached a forty-eight-hour time

limit for its acceptance. Although some of the more fiery Bolsheviks counseled armed resistance, Lenin advised acceptance in order that Bolshevism might have time to organize and strengthen itself within Russia.

Peace negotiations were, accordingly, once more resumed and resulted in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed on March 3, 1918. Russia agreed: (1) to give up Poland, Courland, and Lithuania, and to let Germany and Austria determine the future status of these territories in agreement with their populations; (2) to evacuate Livonia, Esthonia, Finland, and the Åland Islands;[8] (3) to evacuate Ukrainia and to recognize the treaty signed between the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Central Powers; (4) to surrender to Turkey the districts of Ardahan, Kars, and Batum; (5) to discontinue all Bolshevik propaganda in the territory of the Central Powers and in the territories ceded by the treaty. By supplementary treaties signed in August, 1918, Russia was further forced to agree (1) to pay six billion gold marks "as compensation for the loss to Germany caused by Russian measures," (2) to grant Germany the most-favored-nation treatment in Russian markets, (3) not to prohibit the export of rough and hewn timber nor to levy an export duty upon it.

Thus the Bolsheviks gained peace for Russia, but for a Russia reduced to an area less than that which Peter the Great had inherited back in the seventeenth century. Profoundly altered both politically and territorially by the Revolution, Russia was finally "at peace" with the world; and the Bolsheviks were now free to try their great experiment—the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

[8] These regions were soon brought within the orbit of the Central Powers. In April, 1918, German troops landed in Finland and not long afterward the throne was offered to Prince Charles of Hesse, brother-in-law of the Kaiser. On April 21 the Kaiser himself "accepted" the invitation of Esthonian Balts to be the ruler of that country. In March Germany recognized the independence of Lithuania, which in July received Prince William of Urach, a younger member of the ruling house of Württemberg, as king. In April German and Austrian troops, entering Ukrainia as allies, occupied the whole country and established a military dictatorship under the pro-German General Skoropadski.

CHAPTER IV

THE TRIUMPH OF THE ALLIES

WHILE, toward the close of 1917, the Russian Revolution ultimately operated to relieve the military situation for the Central Powers and to give them renewed hope of victory, the Teutonic powers entered the year with no such rosy prospects. Although they had presented a bold front in their proposal for peace negotiations in December, 1916, the Central Powers realized that time was running against them. They had hoped by a tremendous blow to capture Verdun in 1916 and to force the Allies to consent to a peace. But their blow had been parried, and they in turn had been forced to take the defensive on the Somme, on the Isonzo, and on the Sereth. Their attempted submarine campaign had failed and had had to be abandoned; their high-seas fleet had met the British at Jutland and been forced to flee for safety to the protective guns of Heligoland. The Allied blockade had already created such an alarming food situation within their territories that riots had begun to break out and a practical food dictatorship had been established. In the face of all these developments the Central Powers realized that their spectacular triumph over Rumania counted for but little; hence their desire for immediate peace negotiations at the close of 1916.

Intervention of the United States

The Allied reception of their peace proposal had brought little comfort to the Central Powers, and still less did the subsequent announcement of the Allied war aims. On December 20, 1916, President Wilson invited the various belligerents to state "their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded." While the Central Powers in their reply to the President

did no more than "propose an immediate meeting of the delegates of the belligerent States at some neutral place," the Allied Powers went into greater detail. Their war aims, they said, implied: (1) the restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro, with the compensations due them; (2) the evacuation of the invaded territories in France, Russia, and Rumania, with just reparation; (3) the restitution of provinces formerly torn from the Allies by force or against the wish of their inhabitants; (4) the liberation of the Italians, the Slavs, the Rumanians, and the Czechoslovaks from foreign domination; (5) the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turk; (6) the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to western civilization. The prospect of such terms drove the German government to a new decision.

For some time both Hindenburg and Ludendorff had been urging the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. They had come finally to the conclusion that only by this means could Germany force the Allies to accept peace. But Bethmann-Hollweg had wished to try first his peace proposal, and general headquarters had consented. Toward the close of December, however, Hindenburg again insisted that Germany's dangerous economic and military position made the unrestricted submarine campaign absolutely essential. The chancellor at length gave way, and on January 9 a German crown council decided that unrestricted submarine warfare should be resumed on February 1, 1917. That this move on the part of Germany would force the United States to join the Allies, they had little doubt; but they believed that the war would be ended long before the United States could raise, train, equip, and place in Europe any great number of troops. Furthermore, in an attempt to embarrass the United States in case of war, Zimmermann, undersecretary for foreign affairs, instructed the German minister in Mexico to propose an alliance with that country as soon as an outbreak of war appeared certain. He was to propose that Germany should give general financial support, and Mexico should "reconquer the lost territory of New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona."

On January 31, 1917, Germany announced that beginning the

next day all sea traffic within certain zones adjoining Great Britain, France, and Italy, and in the eastern Mediterranean would, "without further notice, be prevented by all weapons." All vessels, neutral or belligerent, were to be sunk by German submarines. Special per-

THE ZONE OF UNRESTRICTED SUBMARINE WARFARE
February, 1917

mission was granted for one regular American passenger steamship to sail in each direction between the United States and Great Britain each week, provided that a number of hard and fast rules were observed. Germany was confident that this measure would "result in a speedy termination of the war and in the restoration of peace which the Government of the United States has so much at heart."

American exasperation with the Central Powers had been increasing for some months. Both groups of belligerents had been eager to influence public opinion in the United States and had carried on an active propaganda by means of subsidized newspapers and public speakers. But the Central Powers had not been content with propaganda; their diplomatic representatives had further proceeded to organize and support a staff of conspirators. Passport frauds had been committed, strikes had been instigated in munition plants, and bombs had been manufactured for the destruction of factories and ships. Late in 1915 the United States had demanded the recall of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador and two military and naval attachés of the German embassy because of their improper activities. Now, on February 3, the German ambassador was handed his passports, and President Wilson announced to Congress the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany.

President Wilson did not believe that Germany would actually do with her submarines what she had announced, and preferred to await "overt acts" before taking further steps. Nevertheless, the immediate result of the German decree was a practical embargo on American shipping, since most shipowners refused to risk the loss of their vessels. During the first week following the break in diplomatic relations, not a single American ship left New York for the war zone. On February 26 the President pointed out to Congress this practical embargo on American shipping, and asked for authority to maintain armed neutrality "to protect our ships and our people in their legitimate and peaceful pursuits on the sea." Although the House of Representatives immediately granted this authority by an overwhelming vote, the measure was defeated in the Senate by the obstructionist tactics of a few members.

Meanwhile, the British steamship *Laconia* was sunk without warning on February 26 with the loss of eight American lives. Three days later the "Zimmermann Note" to Mexico, which had been intercepted and deciphered by the British government, was published in the United States. The German submarine campaign had already made a vivid impression upon Americans in the eastern States; the disclosure of a proposed alliance between Germany and

Mexico now aroused deep resentment against Germany in the west. The President was therefore accorded popular support when, on March 12, the government issued an order for arming American merchant ships by executive authority. Then followed within a week the sinking (March 16–17) of three homeward-bound American ships with the loss of American lives; and by the first of April thirty-five more Americans had been drowned. These attacks undoubtedly constituted "overt acts," and anti-German sentiment rose to a high pitch in the United States.

On April 2 President Wilson came before a joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and advised that "Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense, but to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war." During the next two days Congress adopted a declaration of war by large majorities, and on April 6, 1917, President Wilson issued a proclamation declaring that "a state of war exists between the United States and the Imperial German Government."

The United States now began the task of preparing to aid the Allies and to defeat Germany. French and British missions to America pointed out that the United States could best assist by contributing (1) money, (2) food and ships to convey food, (3) help against the submarines, (4) men. In respect to the first, Congress on April 24 passed a War Finance Act authorizing the raising of seven billion dollars, and the lending to the Allies of two billion. These funds were raised by "Liberty Loans." By the end of June over one billion dollars had been advanced to the Allies—chiefly for the purpose of purchasing food, cotton, metals, and other war materials—at a rate 1½ to 2 per cent less than Great Britain had been paying for previous loans in the United States. By October the amount appropriated to cover loans to the Allies had risen to the immense sum of seven billion dollars. America's entry into the

war saved the Allies serious financial difficulties during the early part of 1917.

Every effort was made to increase the quantity of foodstuffs and war materials which could be shipped to the relief of the Allies, and to expedite their transportation to Europe. In July the President made Herbert Hoover "food controller"; in August Congress passed food control and shipping acts. To counteract the menace of the submarine, the United States immediately seized all enemy merchant ships in American waters and inaugurated, under the direction of the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, a tremendous shipbuilding program which called for the rapid construction of great numbers of standardized steel ships. In addition, a considerable flotilla of American destroyers was soon dispatched to coöperate with the British fleet against the German submarines in British waters.

At the time of the declaration of war upon Germany, the United States regular army consisted of only slightly more than 165,000 men, of whom more than 25,000 were scattered in outlying possessions and oversea posts. In consequence, something less than five full divisions [1] were available for dispatch to the front in Europe, where divisions were numbered by the hundreds. To remedy this situation a Selective Service Act was passed in May, authorizing the President (1) to increase the regular army by voluntary enlistment to the maximum war strength, (2) to draft into Federal service the national guard, and (3) to raise by conscription a force of 500,000 men, with 500,000 more if deemed necessary. On June 5 some nine and one-half million men between the ages of twenty-one and thirty years were registered, and on July 15 the drawing of 625,000 men to form the first selective army took place at Washington. During the summer the national guard was mobilized, but not until September was the mobilization of the new national army begun. Germany was correct in her calculation that it would be months after the resumption of the unrestricted submarine campaign before the military forces of the United States could play an effective rôle in Europe.

[1] A division in the United States army consisted of 28,000 men.

Military Campaigns of 1917

Meanwhile, on the western front the year opened with the voluntary relinquishment of about one thousand square miles of French territory by the German armies. As early as November of the preceding year the retreat had been decided upon, and for various reasons. The Allied drive on the Somme, although a disappointment to the Allies, had struck a deadly blow at Teutonic strength and had badly dented the German line. Further Allied gains at this point might endanger the whole Teutonic western front. Allied superiority in troops in the west had risen to thirty or forty divisions, and retirement to a shorter and more defensible line would enable the Central Powers to meet this situation more readily. Finally, a strategic retreat to a stronger line might nullify the extensive preparations which the Allies were making for a gigantic offensive in 1917. During the winter, therefore, a fresh system of trenches was constructed in front of Cambrai and St. Quentin, and the new bulwark of defense was christened the "Siegfried Line." The Allies, however, persisted in calling it the "Hindenburg Line." In March the Germans began to withdraw to their new position, devastating the surrendered territory as they went. By April the salients between Arras and Saillisel and between Saillisel and the Aisne had been evacuated, and Teutonic troops were firmly intrenched on the famous Hindenburg Line.

But the Germans were not left long undisturbed in their new positions. On April 9 the British opened a drive against the north end of the new line along a forty-five-mile front in the vicinity of Arras; one week later the French, in the second battle of the Aisne, inaugurated their drive against the southern pivot of the line with Laon as the objective. During the first three days of the battle of Arras the British advanced rapidly, capturing one of the most cherished German observation posts, Vimy Ridge, and part of the new Hindenburg Line itself. Thereafter the advance slowed down, but at the end of a month the British had taken more than 20,000 prisoners and hundreds of heavy guns, trench mortars, and machine guns. In respect to the attrition of the German forces and the de-

cline of their morale, it had been even more successful. The boasted new defenses had proved to be no more impregnable than the old. In an attempt to hold them, Germany had been obliged to throw in large numbers of her best troops. Of the 104 German divisions in action, 74 by the end of May had to be withdrawn to refit. The Central Powers were thus sustaining heavy losses and using up their reserves.

While the battle of Arras was in progress a new experiment was tried by the French in the second battle of the Aisne. Certain groups in France had become impatient with the slow, costly tactics used by Joffre, and clamored for a change in leadership. As a result, Joffre on December 16 had been succeeded as generalissimo by Nivelle, hero of the Verdun counter offensive of 1916. He represented "the first crude revolt against the Somme tactics, the tactics of attrition." He believed that new methods might be discovered and that the enemy's strength might be broken by some other means than slow sapping. He envisaged "limitless objectives, the end of trench fighting, victory within two days." The capture of Laon he looked for as a result of the first day's fighting. Although his plan appeared doubtful to Painlevé, minister of war, and to Foch and Pétain, he was finally authorized to try it.

But certain circumstances rendered success almost impossible. In the first place, the terrain was difficult and practically everywhere the Germans held the dominating positions. In the second place, the enemy through the capture of prisoners with documents was fully forewarned. In the third place, Nivelle's scheme demanded fresh, enthusiastic, loyal troops, but "the French armies were weary, dispirited, out of temper, doubtful of their leader, and in the mood to listen to treasonable tales . . . Many had had no leave for two years, and the small comforts which keep troops in good humor had been neglected." Finally, Nivelle's purpose was to break through a strong enemy defense, but his methods differed little from those already used for less ambitious objectives.

The first day's battle, April 16, ended in driving sleet; the second day's began in a hurricane of wind and snow. By the close of the fifth, the French had taken all the banks of the Aisne from

Soissons to Berry-au-Bac, and all the spurs of the Aisne heights. They had captured 21,000 prisoners and 183 guns. All but sixteen of the fifty-two German reserve divisions had been thrown in to meet the attack. But the French themselves had suffered 75,000 casualties, of whom 15,000 were dead. And they were still very far from Laon. An abrupt reversion of feeling in favor of the cautious tactics of Pétain and Foch resulted. Nivelle's tactics had failed and he fell from command as suddenly as he had risen. On April 29, Pétain was made chief of the general staff at the ministry of war, and two weeks later he was appointed to succeed Nivelle as commander-in-chief of the French forces in France, Foch becoming chief of the general staff.

The needless sacrifice of men provoked a near-crisis in the French army. No adequate preparation had been made for the care of the wounded, who were sent to various parts of France where they spread despondency by the tale of their needless sufferings. The depression which resulted found vent in mutiny which, beginning about May 20, broke out in ten divisions. Pétain immediately set to work to remedy this menacing situation. Flagrant abuses were reformed; more extensive leaves were granted; the comfort of the fighting men was enormously increased with the help of the recently arrived American Red Cross; penal measures were few; and Pétain himself in the succeeding two months created a better atmosphere by visiting and addressing the officers and men of over one hundred divisions.

For the remainder of the year, however, the French limited themselves on the western front chiefly to the policy of attrition, seeking to wear the Germans down in man power, war materials, and morale. In May the French captured both ends of the Chemin des Dames, a strategic road on the Aisne front. In August and September they made an advance at Verdun, recapturing part of the territory taken by the Germans in their great drive of the previous year. In October they struck again near Soissons and drove the Germans from their last remaining positions on the Chemin des Dames.

Throughout most of the summer and fall the British carried on

operations in Flanders and eventually they succeeded in capturing the important German observation point, Passchendaele Ridge. Late in November, with scarcely any artillery preparation but aided by a large number of huge tanks, they started a drive toward Cambrai. Several villages were captured and German occupation of Cambrai was rendered most precarious. But before the British had consolidated their newly won position, they were compelled to meet a German counter offensive which forced them to surrender about two-thirds of the territory they had gained. The battle of Cambrai closed the campaign of 1917 on the west front. While all these offensives brought the Allies comparatively few miles of new territory, they did strengthen the Allied lines and, more important than all, they inflicted serious losses upon the Teutonic armies, which, for almost the entire year, were compelled to stand on the defensive in France.

Allied disappointments in the West were to some extent balanced by successes in Mesopotamia and the Near East. To retrieve the British disaster at Kut-el-Amara early in 1916, the British forces at the head of the Persian Gulf were strengthened by reinforcements from India and Great Britain and put under the command of General Sir Stanley Maude. The latter part of the year was spent in preparing for an advance up the Tigris, and in December the march began. On February 24 Maude recaptured the city of Kut-el-Amara, where a British army had been forced to surrender to the Turks only ten months before. The British pursued the retreating Turkish army and on March 11 entered the coveted city of Bagdad. By so doing they restored British prestige in the East, deprived the Central Powers of one of the famous goals of their *Drang nach Osten*, raised the morale and enthusiasm of the Allies, and correspondingly depressed the spirits of the Turks.

Events elsewhere were similarly depressive for Germany's ally in the East. Another step in the ultimate disintegration of the Ottoman Empire occurred when, on November 16, 1916, the Sherif of Mecca proclaimed the independence of the Arab kingdom of Hedjaz and received the prompt recognition of the Allied Powers. The moving spirit in the negotiations leading to the Arab revolt was

THE WAR AREA IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

T. E. Lawrence, a young Oxford University graduate who had learned colloquial Arabic while working in excavations in Syria and Mesopotamia before the war. Late in 1916 Lawrence had joined the Arabs, had won their confidence, had helped them organize their armies, and had persuaded them to coöperate with the British against the Turks. Beginning in 1917, the Turks were compelled to fight not only against the invading Allies, but against the revolting Arabs as well.

The latter were of considerable indirect assistance to General Murray in his efforts to protect the Suez Canal and to build a railway across the Sinai peninsula, preparatory to an advance into Palestine. The railway from Kantara on the Suez Canal to Rafa on the southwestern edge of Palestine was at length completed, but attempts to capture the strongly intrenched Turkish position at Gaza were repulsed in April and May. During the summer Murray was succeeded by General Allenby, who renewed the offensive in October. On November 1, Beersheba was taken by a surprise attack, and five days later Gaza fell. The British continued to push northward, took Jaffa, the port of Jerusalem, on November 16, and on December 11 occupied the Holy City itself. The year closed with the British holding a line running from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea, north of Jaffa and Jerusalem, while in Mesopotamia they had advanced to within a hundred miles of Mosul. Turkey was beginning to crumble and, in response to the urgent pleas of the distressed Turks, Teutonic headquarters rushed to their assistance a German "Asia corps" under the command of Falkenhayn.

For a year and a half the Allied forces at Saloniki had been practically impotent to advance against the Central Powers largely because of their fear of the possible action of Greece in their rear. The year 1917 saw the Greek situation finally clarified and the Saloniki army freed from this handicap. In 1916 Greece became divided in allegiance as a result of Venizelos' action in repudiating King Constantine, establishing a provisional government in Saloniki, and declaring war against Bulgaria (November 28). In the closing months of that year she had been further subjected to various coercive acts of the Allies. Her navy had been seized, her

coasts had been blockaded, and Constantine had been compelled to transfer most of his military forces to the Peloponnesus.

Early in June, 1917, Charles Jonnart came to Greece in a French warship as high commissioner of the Allied Powers. Immediately following his arrival, Allied forces occupied strategic points in Thessaly to safeguard the rear of the Saloniki forces, and French troops seized the Isthmus of Corinth. On June 11 Jonnart informed the Greek premier that the Allies were compelled to seek more effective guarantees for the safety of their forces in Saloniki, and that these could be found only in a restoration of the unity of Greece and the revival of a true constitutional government. He therefore demanded both the abdication of King Constantine and the renunciation of the Crown Prince's right of succession. Constantine bowed to the inevitable, and on the following day abdicated the throne in favor of his second son, Alexander. Within the next two weeks Venizelos was recalled as premier, Greece was reunited, and early in July joined the countries at war with the Central Powers. The Allied forces at Saloniki were at last freed from the menace of attack from the rear.

War Weariness and War Aims

Meanwhile, three long years of fierce and bloody fighting had called into the trenches tens of millions of men. Over four million had already been compelled to lay down their lives, and other millions had been wounded or crippled for life.[2] National bankruptcy plainly stared each country squarely in the face, and future burdens of taxation loomed up so large as to demand the entire surplus of peace-time production.[3] And to the masses it all seemed futile and empty. Although the Central Powers had spectacularly defeated Russia, Serbia, and Rumania, and now held territories which produced an impressive "war map," Allied control of the seas and the world's chief sources of raw materials made that war map of little real significance. And although the Allies in 1916 had finally

[2] The loss of life in the first two years of the war was greater than the total death toll of all the important wars from 1790 to 1914. See Appendix I.

[3] The total cost of the war for the first three years was about $90,000,000,000.

succeeded in gaining superiority in man power and war materials, had been able to wrest the offensive from the hands of the Central Powers, and were seriously smashing their military machine, victory now seemed to be slipping from their grasp because of the collapse of Russia. In all the belligerent countries the spring and summer of 1917 saw the masses war-weary and yearning for peace.

The effect of this war weariness in Russia has already been discussed. In the Austrian Empire it was reflected in the report of the foreign minister, Count Czernin, to Emperor Charles [4] (April, 1917), pointing out that "the burden laid upon the population has assumed proportions that are unbearable," that the "dull despair of the population increases day by day," that "our military strength is coming to an end," that "another winter campaign would be absolutely out of the question," that "in the late summer or in the autumn an end must be put to the war at all costs," and that it "will be most important to begin peace negotiations at a moment when the enemy has not yet grasped the fact of our waning strength." It was seen in the unrest and nationalistic demands of the Poles, Czechs, and Jugoslavs, in the downfall of the ministry, in the weakening of the Dual Monarchy's loyalty to Germany, and finally in Emperor Charles's secret overtures to France (March-May) looking toward a separate peace, even at the expense of granting Serbia access to the sea.

Within the German Empire the same feeling was revealed by the increase in the number of Socialists who opposed the war, by the Bavarian Prince Rupprecht's desire for peace, by the conversion of the Center party's leader, Erzberger, from a peace of conquest to a peace without annexations, by unofficial statements in London and Paris that the Kaiser was disposed to peace, and finally by the Reichstag's resolution (July 19) that it strove "for a peace of understanding and the permanent reconciliation of the peoples," and that with such a peace "forced acquisitions of territory and political, economic, or financial oppressions are inconsistent." But the Pan-Germanists and the general staff disagreed with the Reichstag resolution and refused to accept it as coming from the entire coun-

[4] Who had succeeded Francis Joseph in November, 1916.

try. And since Germany, in the words of Bethmann-Hollweg, whose resignation had only recently been forced by the army leaders, had now come to be governed by a military dictatorship, no definite steps were taken to give the resolution substance.

War weariness in the Allied countries was manifested during 1917 in what has been called the "defeatist movement," the essence of which was that peace could not be won through victory, but must be attained through negotiations—a "peace without victory." Anti-imperialist Socialists, bankers and capitalists who feared the effect of endless war on the world's financial structure, religious leaders, pacifists, and even some aristocrats were won over to the movement, which naturally had a tremendous appeal to the suffering, heartsick masses. In France and Italy the tendency was especially strong. The mutiny in the French army in 1917 has already been mentioned. But behind the lines newspaper proprietors, financiers, senators, and deputies became interested, and ex-Premier Joseph Caillaux was extremely active in spreading the doctrines. But the reaction ultimately came, valiantly led by the aged veteran, Georges Clemenceau, who insisted upon a "peace through victory." Two ministries fell as a result of his fierce attacks, and he himself finally became premier and minister of war on November 16, 1917. Not many weeks later Clemenceau, in order to crush defeatism in France, took the drastic step of ordering Caillaux's arrest on the charge of having endangered the security of the State.

In Italy the defeatist movement was encouraged by secret agents of the Central Powers and by representatives of the Russian Bolsheviks. Both the ignorant peasants and the radical proletariat Socialists became imbued with the doctrines. Even the army became infected. In August rioting occurred in Turin, one of the chief munition centers, and mutiny broke out among the troops sent to quell the disorder. In consequence, Turin was placed within the "war zone" so that martial law might be used if necessary, and exemption from military service was canceled for many of the munition workers, who were organized into battalions and sent to the Italian front. By chance they were placed in the very sector where the Central Powers had decided to strike.

During the summer of 1917 the German general staff took over the direction of operations on the Italian front. A German general, Below, was put in command of an Austro-German army which was sent to the sector opposite the Italian line in the Julian Alps. Ludendorff, who was the genius behind the plan, decided to strike here because (1) the unpromising nature of the sector would enable him to catch the Italians off their guard, (2) the Italian front here was organized in a dangerous arc, and (3) a decisive blow, enabling the Austro-German troops to reach Cividale and Udine, might cut off the bulk of the Italian Second Army on the Isonzo north of Gorizia and all of the Third which held the line from Gorizia to the Adriatic.

On October 24 the Central Powers struck on the Julian front. A breach was made in the Italian lines at Caporetto and Teutonic troops rushed through. Cadorna was forced to move his headquarters from Udine to Padua. By the 28th the Austro-German troops had reached the Friulian plain, had taken Cividale, and were menacing Udine. The Italian Second Army, weakened by the discontent and treason of its recently acquired Turin battalions, and broken by the impact of new Teutonic tactics, became "a fugitive rabble." Already the enemy had taken 100,000 prisoners from it, and 700 of its guns. That day, too, saw the Italian Third Army beginning its desperate effort to escape capture by retreat, and that evening the Austrians reëntered Gorizia. "Such was the rout of Caporetto, the greatest disaster suffered in so short a time by any combatant in the campaign."

The plight of the Italian Third Army was most serious. The Tagliamento River was the first halting-place for Cadorna's retreat, and on Sunday the Third Army was as far from that river as were the advance forces of the enemy. For a time it seemed doomed. "A million of men were retreating along the western highways, encumbered with batteries and hospitals and transport, while by every choked route peasants and townsmen fled for refuge from the Austrian cavalry. Units lost discipline, orders miscarried, roads were blocked for hours, and all the while down from the north came the menace of Below, swooping southward to cut off

all retreat." But the Third Army did not fail; with heavy losses and by the narrowest margin it won the race. On November 1 it was in position on the western bank of the Tagliamento with the river between it and the enemy. Its successful retreat made an Italian stand possible and deprived the Teutonic forces of their expected triumph. As it was, they claimed 200,000 prisoners and 1,800 guns. But on November 3 a division of Below's army crossed the river

THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN WAR AREA



and began to move west along the edge of the hills. On the 7th the Italians abandoned the Tagliamento, halted temporarily on the Livenza, and by the 10th were back on the Piave. Here the retreat ended.

Meanwhile French and British reinforcements were dispatched from the western front. Diaz supplanted Cadorna as commander-in-chief. Italian boys of seventeen and eighteen, many with little military training, were rushed to the battle line. Italian monitors off the coast contributed their constant shelling to the defense. Dur-

ing November and December desperate fighting continued, but the Teutonic advance was finally checked. The disaster had cost Italy some 800,000 effectives in addition to great quantities of war materials. Yet in the end it aroused Italy's fighting spirit, brought reforms in her commands, and forced the government to give more attention to the "civil front." The aid of the British and French troops and the work of the American Red Cross impressed the Italians with the extent and good will of the alliance of which they were a part. Finally, out of it came the movement for a unified western command. Early in November the premiers of France, Great Britain, and Italy met at Rapallo, and from their conference developed the Supreme War Council of Versailles. "Henceforth, in theory at any rate, there was but one front between the North Sea and the Adriatic, a single exchequer, and a single granary."

During the fourth winter of the war Allied war aims were still further clarified and formulated as a result of two notable addresses —that of Premier Lloyd George before the British Trade Unions on January 5, 1918, and that of President Wilson before the United States Congress three days later. The two statesmen were in general agreement, and their aims may be discussed in the order of President Wilson's famous "Fourteen Points," destined to play such an important part in the final settlement. They were:

1. "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at."
2. "Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war."
3. "The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations."
4. Reduction of national armaments "to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety."
5. "A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the population concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined."
6. "The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest coöperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and

unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy."

7. The evacuation and restoration of Belgium without any limit to her sovereignty.

8. The evacuation and restoration of French territory, and the righting of "the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine."

9. A readjustment of Italian frontiers "along clearly recognizable lines of nationality."

10. "The freest opportunity of autonomous development" for the peoples of Austria-Hungary.

11. The evacuation and restoration of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, with "free and secure access to the sea" for Serbia.

12. Secure sovereignty for the "Turkish portions" of the Ottoman Empire; security and autonomous development for "the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule"; the permanent opening of the Dardanelles "as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees."

13. The erection of an independent Polish State including "the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations" with "a free and secure access to the sea," and with an international guarantee of her "political and economic independence and territorial integrity."

14. The formation of "a general association of nations . . . for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike."

The British premier, in his address, did not include within his war aims anything covering the first three of President Wilson's points. Neither did he take a stand in behalf of Russia such as President Wilson did in his sixth point. Here Lloyd George apparently let disappointment and vindictiveness dominate his statement that "if the present rulers of Russia take action which is independent of their Allies we have no means of intervening to arrest the catastrophe which is assuredly befalling their country." On all the other points of President Wilson's program, however, he held a practical identity of views, and concluded by laying down "three conditions" for a permanent peace:

First, the sanctity of treaties must be reëstablished. Secondly, a territorial settlement must be secured, based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed. Lastly, we must seek by the creation of

some international organization to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war.

These announcements of Allied war aims evoked no enthusiasm among the leaders of the Central Powers, whose views were set forth on January 24 in addresses by Count Hertling, the German chancellor, and by Count Czernin, the Austrian foreign minister. On the first four points they admitted that "an understanding might be reached without difficulty." The fourteenth point Czernin accepted much more whole-heartedly than did Hertling, the former stating his belief that it would "nowhere meet with opposition in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy," the latter only grudgingly conceding that "the Imperial German Government is gladly ready, after all other pending questions have been settled, to approach the examination of the basis of such an association of nations."

But not even a grudging acceptance was vouchsafed the remaining points. The fifth would have to be discussed "at the reconstitution of the world's colonial possessions, which we . . . absolutely demand." Great Britain must "come to terms with this proposal" of President Wilson. The question of Russia was one which concerned the Central Powers and Russia alone, and Germany declined all interference. She also refused to agree in advance in regard to the treatment of Belgium; this question belonged "to the complex of questions . . . which will have to be settled by the war and peace negotiations." Under no circumstances would Germany countenance the cession of Alsace-Lorraine, and even the evacuation of France "must take into account Germany's vital interests." The future of Poland was a question for the decision of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Poland. In regard to the remaining points Germany was prepared to "do everything for the attainment of peace by Austria-Hungary, which takes into account her just claims," and to give her energetic support to her "loyal, brave, and powerful Ally, Turkey." The Allied war aims, Count Hertling asserted, reflected the Allies' belief that they were the victors and that it was the Central Powers who were the vanquished.

The leaders of the Entente must therefore free themselves from this point of view and this self-deception. And in order to facilitate this aim I would like to recall what the position really is. They may take it from me that our military position has never been so favorable as it is at the present time. Our brilliant military leaders face the future with undiminished confidence in victory. Unbroken joy of battle inspires the entire army—officers and men. . . . God is with us, and will continue to be with us.

Germany's Final Effort

The tone of Hertling's address reflected the new optimism which was felt in Germany at the opening of 1918. During the summer and autumn of the previous year the Central Powers had passed through a critical period of discouragement and war weariness. They had even talked of a peace "without annexations and indemnities." But that had been at a time when they were losing their superiority in man power and war materials on the western front, when they were being compelled to stand on the defensive on nearly all fronts, when it was beginning to be apparent that their unrestricted submarine campaign was not going to bring Great Britain to her knees in a few months, if ever.

For the submarine campaign had proved to be a bitter disappointment to the Central Powers. In the early months of 1917 Allied shipping losses were tremendous, and the Teutonic threat to the sustenance of the British people and to the munitioning of the Allied armies was extremely grave. But gradually in two ways the menacing blow was countered. In the first place, shipping losses were ultimately cut down. This was accomplished by weapons of offense against the submarine itself—the submarine chaser, the destroyer, the decoy ship, the submarine, the airplane, the bomb, and the depth charge; and by methods of defense—the camouflaged ship, the convoy system, and the barrage. In the second place, Allied shipping losses were made good by the rapid construction of new tonnage, particularly in the United States where the construction of standardized steel ships reached such a degree of efficiency that a completed vessel could be turned out in seventy days. In the end,

German submarines were being destroyed about as rapidly as they could be built, and Allied shipping was being constructed faster than submarines could sink it.

Nevertheless, the Italian disaster in the fall of 1917 and Russia's withdrawal from the war during the winter restored the German hope of ultimate victory in 1918. The disappearance of the eastern front nullified the Allied campaign of attrition, and the Central Powers could once more confront the Allies in the west with a numerical superiority. The defection of Russia, furthermore, had completely isolated Rumania, which was finally compelled to sign a peace treaty with the Central Powers on March 7, 1918. This left Austria-Hungary free to concentrate practically her whole army for what should be a decisive blow against the recently defeated Italians, while German troops should finally smash the Allied line in the west and compel exhausted France to sue for peace.

The Allies, it appeared, would be unable to duplicate the sudden increase of Teutonic man power in the west. France was so nearly exhausted that she could not even keep her units at full strength. The gaps in the British armies occasioned by the late offensives of 1917 had not been adequately filled; in fact, British infantry strength in March, 1918, was 180,000 less than in the same month of the previous year. American forces, since the landing of the first contingent in France on June 25, 1917, had increased slowly; but at the rate of approximately 25,000 men a month it would be many months before they could offset the sudden increase of Teutonic effectives in the west. It was upon these facts that Hindenburg and Ludendorff based their expectation of victory in 1918. In February they explained their plan to a secret session of the Reichstag which approved the undertaking even though it called for German loss of a million and a half men. By March Hindenburg was on the west front with the "whole German manhood for the first time united in a single theater of war, ready to strike with the strongest army that the world has ever known."

The German aim was to obtain a decision in the field in four months, before the United States could bring her tremendous re-

sources and man power fully to bear. As the first step in his campaign, Ludendorff proposed to isolate the British army by rolling it up from its right and then driving it into the sea or holding it in an intrenched camp between the Somme and the Channel. His first drive, therefore, was to be directed against that point in the line where the British and French forces met, on the supposition that the lack of unified command among the Allies would lead to confusion here at the moment of attack. German divisions were withdrawn from the Italian and Balkan fronts, half of the 1920 class of recruits was prepared for service, and some half-million men were transferred from the east. In addition to superiority of forces, he counted further upon new tactics the effectiveness of which had been proved at Riga and Caporetto in 1917. The essence of these new tactics was the absence of preliminary massing of troops near the front and of long artillery preparations, the use of highly specialized shock troops, and the assault in open order by a method called "infiltration."

After preliminary threats on the Champagne and Ypres fronts, the Germans on March 21, 1918, suddenly hurled a force of over half a million men against a fifty-mile sector between Arras and La Fère. The British, outnumbered three or four to one,[5] gave way and on the second day lost contact with the French on their right. It appeared that the Germans would succeed in breaking through the line as they had planned. But on the 26th the gap was again bridged and although the British continued to retreat, their line was neither broken nor pushed back into the sea. Nevertheless, when the battle finally ended in the latter part of April, the British had retreated some thirty-five miles and had suffered over 300,000 casualties.

One reason for the extent of the British disaster on the Somme was Pétain's reluctance to shift immediately sufficient troops from the French lines to the British sector. One result of the defeat was the realization of the absolute necessity for a unified command of all Allied forces. In the midst of the retreat British and French

[5] At Verdun between February 21 and March 21, 1916, the French had to face 20½ German divisions; between March 21 and April 17, 1918, the British were attacked by 102 German divisions.

statesmen met and unanimously decided, on March 26, to entrust at once the control of all forces in the west to General Foch, by universal consent the master mind among the Allied generals. Four weeks later he was given added authority by being made "Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies."

At the same time strenuous efforts were made to overcome the Allied inferiority in man power. Great Britain passed a more drastic

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVES OF 1918



From *The War With Germany:* U. S. General Staff Bulletin.

conscription act, subjecting every British man between the ages of eighteen and fifty-five to military service; and within a month sent across the Channel 355,000 British troops which had been kept in England to meet a possible invasion. By Herculean efforts, during May, June, and July over 675,000 American soldiers were rushed across the Atlantic to France—more than twice the number sent in the whole preceding year. On April 28 the first American regular army division, after long training in quiet sectors, began active fighting on the Picardy front.

Meanwhile, on April 9, shortly after the first offensive died down, the Germans struck their second blow against the depleted British left wing between La Bassée and Armentières, where there seemed to be a possibility of breaking through to the Channel ports. During April the Germans employed on this sector forty-four divisions of the cream of their army. But the British troops responded to General Haig's plea that "there must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall . . . each one of us must fight on to the end." And, although in some places they retreated from fifteen to twenty miles, the British stemmed the German flood, kept their lines intact, and held the enemy far back from the coveted Channel ports.

These two tremendous drives with their spectacular results temporarily encouraged the German people to make still further sacrifices, although the German armies had already incurred something over half a million casualties. Ludendorff's attempts to rebuild his forces with men returned from hospitals and with boys of the 1920 class were suffered in silent anguish in the hope that a "German peace" would be won before autumn. By the last week of May Ludendorff had succeeded in replacing more than seventy per cent of his losses. On the 27th he struck his third terrific blow, this time against the French between Soissons and Rheims. Within two days the Germans captured Soissons, and on the 31st they reached the Marne valley, down which they hoped to advance toward Paris. Now at length the American forces began to play a decisive rôle. The second division and parts of the third and twenty-eighth divisions were thrown into the line, and helped to bring the German drive to an end. Not only did they halt the Germans; they recaptured from them some of the positions which they had already taken.

But again the Germans had made a tremendous advance of over thirty miles in three days. They had seized the Marne bank for ten miles and had taken between 30,000 and 40,000 prisoners. But their position was such that it offered no safe resting place. They must continue the battle or relinquish their gains. So far they had established two salients threatening Paris; they now sought to convert them into one by a fourth attack (June 9–15) on a front of twenty-two miles between Montdidier and Noyon. But this time the

French army, expectant and reinforced, resisted firmly and stopped the drive after an advance of only six miles. In this they were assisted by the American first division, which had proved its metal earlier (May 28) by capturing and holding Cantigny.

No sooner had this offensive subsided in the west than the Austrians launched what they hoped would be a decisive drive against the Italians on the Piave. But General Diaz learned of the Austrian plans, and knew even the hour set for the attack, which was to begin at three in the morning of June 15. He therefore anticipated the assault by an Italian bombardment of the Austrian troops and succeeded in seriously upsetting their assembly. Nevertheless, promptly at the designated hour the assault began, the Austrians attempting to use the tactics which had been so successfully employed by the Germans in France. They had succeeded in crossing the river with nearly 100,000 men when suddenly, on the afternoon of the 17th, the flooding of the Piave turned that broad, shallow stream into a raging torrent which swept away ten of the fourteen bridges upon which they depended. On the next day Diaz with reinforcements began the counter attack. Within a week the whole of the west bank of the Piave was once more in Italian hands. Austria, instead of putting Italy out of the war, had lost 20,000 prisoners and had suffered at least 150,000 casualties. It was Austria's last great effort. "A moral and economic anemia was sapping her strength." She was broken in spirit and great numbers of her people were starving. Mutinies and desertions menaced her armies, and disruptive nationalist aspirations threatened the empire. Germany must now continue the struggle practically alone.

But in the west the Germans were preparing to do this. They planned a great *Friedensturm*, or "Peace Offensive," which was to strike the French line to the east and west of Rheims, capture that city, split the French front, cut the vital railway from Paris to Nancy, and enable German troops to sweep down the Marne valley to Paris. At midnight on Sunday, July 14, the sound of great guns to the east told Paris that the final struggle for her capture had begun. Four hours later, at dawn, the Germans began an advance, the importance of which was recognized by both sides. "If my

offensive at Rheims succeeds, we have won the war," said Ludendorff. "If the German attack at Rheims succeeds, we have lost the war," admitted Foch. The Germans succeeded in crossing the Marne between Château-Thierry and Dormans, but they got little farther. On the southeast an Italian corps blocked their way, while on the southwest they encountered American troops who not only stopped them but pushed them back across the Marne. East of Rheims French and American troops held back the German rush, and prevented the capture of the city. In the three days' battle the Germans advanced barely six miles at the farthest point. The day of their terrific, sledge-hammer blows was past. Paris was again saved, and from now on the offensive rested in Allied hands.

Collapse of the Central Powers

For Foch was now in a position to undertake a general advance. Thanks to American reinforcements, the Allies once more had superiority in rifle strength, a superiority which continued to increase during the rest of the war. In the second battle of the Marne 85,000 American troops participated. In the next few months their active forces increased to over a million. The decisive turning point in the war had come. Henceforth the collapse of the Central Powers was speedy and sure. A series of Allied offensives now began which rolled back the German armies without cessation until their final surrender in November. Château-Thierry fell on July 21; in August, Soissons, Fismes, Montdidier, Bapaume, and Noyon were recaptured and the Allies crossed the Somme. In six weeks they captured 130,000 German prisoners, 2,000 heavy guns, and 14,000 machine guns.

On August 8 a terrific Allied attack, which in three days forced the Germans back an average of ten miles along the whole southern side of their salient toward Amiens, convinced Ludendorff that the war could not be won, and at a conference at general headquarters at Spa five days later he advised the initiation of "peace feelers." The German chancellor was given a free hand to act at his discretion. On August 30 Austria informed Germany that she proposed to take independent action looking to a conference of all the bellig-

erents. Nine days later the German army chiefs informed Chancellor Hertling that they must have peace as soon as possible. On September 15 Austria issued an appeal "to all belligerents to send delegates to a confidential and non-binding discussion on basic principles," an appeal which was declined by President Wilson on the ground that his terms had already been stated.

On the very day of the Austrian proposal, the Allied forces on the Saloniki front began their oft-delayed advance. In the battle of the Vardar, Serbian, French, British, and Greek troops attacked the Bulgarians, who were soon routed and forced to retreat. On the 25th Bulgarian territory was invaded, and the Bulgarian government immediately sued for an armistice which was signed four days later. On September 30 the first of the Central Powers went out of the war. Her means of transportation, now placed at the disposal of the Allies, opened the way for an attack upon Turkey from the west. But Turkey did not wait for any such eventuality. Cut off from the Central Powers, driven back three hundred miles by a rapid Allied advance which captured Damascus, Beirut, Tripoli, and Aleppo in the single month of October, fearful for the safety of Mosul in Mesopotamia and Adrianople in Thrace, the Turks likewise appealed for an armistice, and went out of the war on October 31.

Meanwhile the Dual Monarchy was in dire straits. The defection of Bulgaria threw the burden of maintaining the Balkan front on weakened Austro-German forces which could offer but feeble resistance. On October 12 they lost Nish, and two days later Durazzo and Novibazar. By the 19th their line near the Rumanian frontier was back on the Danube. On the 24th the Allies launched an attack in Trentino and on the Piave, which resulted a week later in the complete routing of the Austrian forces on these fronts. Already independence had been proclaimed by the Hungarians, the Czechoslovaks, the German-Austrians, the Jugoslavs, and the Poles. On November 1 the Serbians recaptured Belgrade; two days later the Italians made their triumphal entry into Trieste. On that same day (November 3) the Habsburgs, beset behind and before,

capitulated and signed an armistice with the Allied Powers. Of *Mittel-Europa*, Germany alone remained a belligerent.

In September the Germans were back on the Hindenburg Line, having suffered a million and a half casualties since they had left it less than six months earlier. The Allies continued their attacks unceasingly. The American first army, which had been organized and placed under the personal command of General Pershing, in September undertook its first major operation. Between the 12th and the 16th something over half a million American soldiers wiped out the long-standing St. Mihiel salient. Farther west the Allied troops smashed through the Hindenburg Line, and drove the Germans back out of Péronne, Lens, and Dixmude.

By September 28 Ludendorff concluded that all was lost, and so informed the Kaiser at a conference at Spa the next day.[6] On the 30th Hertling resigned as chancellor and the Kaiser announced that "the German people shall coöperate more effectively than hitherto in deciding the fate of the Fatherland." On October 1 Hindenburg insisted that a peace offer should be made at once, and two days later made his demand more peremptory. The Kaiser now appointed Prince Max of Baden German chancellor, with a coalition ministry admitting two Socialists into the government for the first time in the history of the empire. On the following day the new government sent a note to President Wilson appealing for a cessation of hostilities, and announcing Germany's readiness to accept the President's "Fourteen Points" together with his later pronouncements as a basis for the discussion of peace terms.[7]

While in October a series of diplomatic notes was being exchanged between President Wilson and the German government, the Allied troops completed their smashing of the Hindenburg Line by an "arpeggio" of attacks which resulted in the capture of St.

[6] "For me he remained, up to 29th September, a great general and a great man. That day brought his tragical collapse—collapse of his confidence in the army, of his judgment, of his nerves." *The Memoirs of Prince Max of Baden*, II, p. 201.

[7] On July 4 and September 27 President Wilson had restated the purposes of the war and in the latter address had laid down five principles for the foundation of a league of nations.

Quentin, Armentières, Cambrai, Laon, La Fère, Ostend, Douai, Lille, Bruges, Zeebrugge, Tournai, and Valenciennes. The Germans were thus forced almost completely out of France, and compelled to surrender the Channel ports and a considerable portion of Belgium.

THE FINAL ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST

From *The War With Germany:* U. S. General Staff Bulletin.

Meanwhile, farther east a disastrous blow had been struck by the American forces. A few days after the conclusion of their St. Mihiel drive the Americans began the Meuse-Argonne offensive, "beyond compare the greatest ever fought by American troops." [8] For nearly seven weeks the battle raged, with 1,200,000 American soldiers advancing through tangled woods and underbrush toward the Sedan-Mézières railroad. This was the principal line of supply for most of the German forces in the west, and if it were cut

[8] "The actual weight of the ammunition fired was greater than that used by the Union forces during the entire Civil War."

a German retirement on the whole front must result. Slowly American troops pushed back the best of the German divisions until, on November 6, they reached the outskirts of Sedan, cut the Sedan-Mézières railroad, and made the German line untenable. At the cost of 120,000 casualties, the American troops thus succeeded in doing the task assigned them.

The day before the Americans entered Sedan, President Wilson finally informed Germany that she might apply for an armistice to Marshal Foch. On the following day a delegation headed by Mathias Erzberger was dispatched to receive the terms which on November 8 were laid down by Foch, subject to rejection or acceptance without amendment within seventy-two hours. The position of the delegates was most difficult. Ludendorff had been dismissed from his post in the army, mutiny had broken out in the navy, Bavaria had been proclaimed a republic. Even while they considered the armistice terms, the government of Prince Max was forced to give way to a Socialist ministry headed by Friedrich Ebert, and the Kaiser fled precipitately from general headquarters to Holland. Behind them was Germany in chaos; before them, a document most severe.

According to the thirty-five clauses of the terms, Germany was to evacuate Belgium, Luxemburg, France, and Alsace-Lorraine within two weeks, and all the territory on the left bank of the Rhine within one month. Allied troops were to take over all of this territory and were to occupy the bridgeheads of the Rhine at Mainz, Coblenz, and Cologne to a depth of thirty kilometers on the right bank. A neutral zone ten kilometers wide was to extend along the right bank of the Rhine from Holland to the Swiss frontier. The treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk were to be renounced, and all German troops in Russia, Rumania, and Turkey were to be withdrawn. Within two weeks 5,000 locomotives, 150,000 railway cars, and 5,000 motor lorries in good working order were to be delivered to the Allies. A specified number of submarines and warships were to be surrendered and the rest, together with the naval aircraft, were to be disarmed. There was to be an immediate repatriation, without reciprocity, of all Allied prisoners.

Finally, the existing blockade of the Allies was to continue unchanged, and all German merchant ships found at sea were to remain liable to capture. These terms were in no sense peace terms. They were designed merely to bring about a cessation of fighting, and to render it utterly impossible for Germany successfully to resume hostilities. At five o'clock on the morning of November 11 the news was flashed to an anxious and expectant world that in a little clearing in the former royal forest of Compiègne these armistice terms had been accepted and signed by the German delegates, to take effect at eleven A. M.

Undoubtedly the World War was the bloodiest that has ever been fought. The conflict, which lasted 1,564 days, mobilized the tremendous total of 64,683,810 men.[9] Of these millions of the most able-bodied of the nations, 8,361,595 (or one in eight) lost their lives and 21,139,993 (or one in three) were wounded in battle. In addition, it is conservatively estimated that the loss of civilian life due directly to war or to causes induced by war equaled or perhaps exceeded that suffered by the armies in the field. Nor does this take into account the terrible effects of war, famine, pestilence, and disease on the sufferers who did not die.

The World War was also unquestionably the costliest that has ever been fought. The total direct war costs for the principal belligerents amounted to about $186,000,000,000,[10] and when to this are added the indirect costs due to destruction of property, depreciation of capital, loss of production, interruption of trade, and the like, the real economic cost is raised to the stupendous sum of $270,000,000,000. If to this is further added the estimated capitalized value of the human lives lost in the war ($67,000,000,000), the astronomical figure of some $337,000,000,000 is reached.[11]

[9] See statistical tables in Appendix I.

[10] The direct cost of the World War to the United States was nearly enough to pay the entire cost of running the United States Government from 1791 up to the outbreak of the World War.—U. S. General Staff, *The War with Germany: A Statistical Summary*, p. 135.

[11] As distinct from the money cost or actual expenditures of the belligerent governments for war purposes, the British economist and statistical authority, Mr. Edgar Crammond, estimated that the war actually decreased the national wealth of Great Britain 12.7 per cent, France 25 per cent, Italy 20 per cent, and Germany 26 per cent.—*The Economic World*, July 3, 1920, p. 19.

The statesmen of Europe might well stand aghast at the cataclysm which they had brought upon Europe, and at the stupendous task of reconstruction and reorganization which confronted them when, at eleven o'clock on the morning of November 11, 1918, firing finally ceased on the battle fields of the World War.

CHAPTER V

THE DISINTEGRATION OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

LIKE the foolish man in the parable, the Habsburgs built their imperial edifice not on the solid rock of nationalism but on the shifting sands of racial heterogeneity. Over a period of centuries this "proudest ruling house of Europe" pieced together—sometimes by conquest, sometimes by inheritance or marriage, sometimes by election to vacant thrones—an empire which has been well characterized as a "museum of political curiosities." Included within its bounds were: Czechs and Slovaks in Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia; Poles and Ruthenians in Galicia; Italians in the Alps and along the Adriatic; Rumanians in Transylvania and Bukowina; Jugoslavs in various districts of the south; and the two dominant peoples, the Germans in Austria and the Magyars in Hungary. And when, in the World War, "the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house," it fell, "and great was the fall of it."

Disruptive Activities of the Subject Nationalities

The disintegration of the Habsburg Empire may be ascribed primarily to three developments during the World War: (1) the disruptive activities of its subject peoples; (2) the gradual conversion of the Allies to the idea of its destruction; and (3) the collapse of the imperial army, the "coercive instrument of the ruling classes."

To a State like the Habsburg Empire the growth of nationalism as a dynamic influence in the affairs of Europe during the nineteenth century could not but constitute a threatening menace, for it was necessarily bound to be a disruptive, a disintegrating force. This the Habsburgs clearly realized, and therefore they persistently sought to prevent it from gaining a foothold in their realm. Yet, despite their efforts, the various racial groups over which they ruled awoke

to national consciousness, and in the decades preceding the war most of them were demanding either autonomy or independence. The Austrian Reichsrat from 1907 on plainly revealed the existence of these nationalistic movements in the fact that its membership was organized very distinctly into German, Czech, Polish, Jugoslav, Italian, and Ruthenian groups.

Possibly the Habsburgs might have won the loyalty of their subject nationalities by granting democratic and reasonably liberal rights to them. By such a policy, too, they might have averted the danger from the "Greater Serbia" and the "Greater Rumania" irredentist agitation. Instead, however, the rulers of the Dual Monarchy at first adopted the old policy, *divide et impera*, in order to weaken the nationalistic forces by playing one group off against another; and then finally chose to seek their salvation in a war against Serbia, the chief center of irredentist propaganda.

The outbreak of the war brought increased activity among the subject peoples, particularly the Czechs. But the Habsburgs, having refused to recognize the nationalistic demands of their various peoples before the war, were not moved to do so during the war when the policy of the government was to a great extent dictated by the military authorities. In the first years of the conflict the Austrian constitution was practically suspended, the press muzzled, and the meeting of the Reichsrat postponed in an effort to prevent the popular expression of nationalistic desires. Under the Austrian premier, Count Stürgkh, a system of repression was built up that recalled the old days of the Metternich era. By shooting, by hanging, or by imprisoning tens of thousands of people, the government sought to suppress all manifestations of nationalism, wherever they appeared. Though such measures as these undoubtedly retarded the open expression of national consciousness, secret agitation, organization, and sabotage flourished, directed by men like Benesh and Kramarsch. For a time the masses, dominated by fear of the Russian invasion, meekly submitted; but the assassination of Count Stürgkh in October, 1916, revealed the fact that long delay in reform was bound to produce revolution.

In May, 1917, the nationalist groups seized the opportunity to

voice their demands when, for various reasons, the new Emperor Charles felt called upon to summon the Austrian Reichsrat for the first time since the opening of the war. Immediately "the long pent-up national feelings of the various racial elements exploded in the form of national manifestoes." The Jugoslavs demanded that all territories of the empire inhabited by Slovenes, Croats, or Serbs should be united into one democratic State, independent of all foreign control; but they were willing—at least so they then stated—to accept a Habsburg monarch. The Czechs insisted upon "the union of all branches of the Czechoslovak people into a democratic State—a union which cannot leave out of account the Czechoslovak branch which lives in proximity to the historic frontiers of our Bohemian fatherland." They further asserted that they were "entirely convinced that the present dualist form of the Monarchy has divided it into dominating and oppressed nationalities," and demanded that the empire should be transformed "into a Federal State, composed of free national States with equal rights." Similar demands were presented also by the Ruthenians.

Even the Poles, who of the various subject nationalities had been the least active in plans for the disintegration of the empire, now became more aggressive. In the early years of the war they had hoped that Russian Poland might be united with Galicia to form an autonomous Polish State under the Habsburgs. With this end in view General Haller, a Galician Pole, and General Pilsudski, a Russian Pole, had organized legions to fight in behalf of the Dual Monarchy against Russia; and a supreme national committee had been established in Cracow and in Vienna to advocate this program. Nevertheless, in May, 1917, the Poles also began to be more outspoken. Their original plan was now announced as only a minimum program; their maximum program called for the creation of a reunited and independent Poland with free access to the sea.

While the Austrian government might conceivably have granted fuller autonomy to the various provinces in the Austrian half of the empire, it had no authority to modify the frontiers of Hungary. The Czechoslovaks and Jugoslavs, in calling for the complete

union of their peoples, were in effect demanding the dismemberment of Hungary and therefore challenging the dualistic structure of the Habsburg empire. In fact, it was not long before they were openly demanding the abolition of the *Ausgleich* of 1867, the political foundation upon which the Dual Monarchy rested.

The Emperor endeavored to meet the deluge of manifestoes by announcing a general amnesty for all political prisoners, and by issuing a proclamation admitting in an indefinite way that the

> fruitful growth of constitutional life, after the barrenness of past years and the exceptional political conditions of the war, would not be possible without a broadening out of the constitutional and administrative bases of the whole of public life, both in the Empire and in the several kingdoms and domains, especially Bohemia.

But nationalist agitation only increased. Men like Kramarsch were once more free to take up their work of agitation and preparation. Among the Croats and Slovenes a Jugoslav club was formed under the inspiration and guidance of released leaders to demand the union of all Jugoslav territories in an independent State. On the other hand, the Polish Supreme National Committee finally gave up its attempt to coöperate with the government, and dissolved in October.

In January, 1918, a "Nationality Program of the Left" was drawn up by a few German-Austrian Reichsrat deputies of the Left in conjunction with Czechs, Poles, and Slovenes. This program demanded

> the establishment of a sovereign constituent Assembly for every local area in which a specific language was spoken, the settlement of boundary disputes by means of a plebiscite, and the right of each nation to form whatever political ties it desired.

Renewed agitation broke out among the Czechs, who once more denounced the oppression of the Germans and Magyars and, "in the name of the Czech nation and of its enslaved and politically disfranchised Slovak branch in Hungary," demanded the creation of a completely independent Czechoslovak State with full sovereignty.

The government's only immediate reply was that such demands "must be indignantly rejected by every Austrian and resisted by every Austrian Government with all the means in its power." Not many weeks later, however, the prime minister announced that within the empire the government would adopt "the principle of national self-determination, according to which no nationality must oppress any other nationality," but appealed to all parties to conclude an inner political truce so that an external peace might be speedily won.

On April 13, 1918, a great public meeting of Czechs and Jugoslavs was held in Prague at which representatives of these peoples arose and took a solemn oath that they would "persist in the struggle for independence in all circumstances and unto the end." When the Austrian government tried to work out a makeshift scheme for national federalization, Czech and Jugoslav deputies denounced the measure and declared their determination to "persist in their common struggle against absolutism and racial predominance" until they had obtained "democracy, liberty, self-determination, and political independence." The nationalist leaders were enthusiastically supported by the bulk of their kinsmen. Demonstrations, strikes, and sabotage were followed by the sacking of German newspapers, the hoisting of the Bohemian flag, and the trampling underfoot of the Austrian. The determination of the subject races to throw off the Habsburg yoke was clearly evident. "What is happening today in Bohemia," asserted the Vienna *Arbeiter Zeitung*, "resembles the Lombardy and Venetian uprisings of 1848."

The Campaign to Win Allied Recognition

Meanwhile abroad energetic steps were being taken to present the claims of the various subject nationalities. The aim was twofold: to gain the sympathy of the people in the Allied countries, and to secure from the Entente governments official recognition of the justice of their cause. Before the war was a year old, national leaders of the Czechoslovaks, Jugoslavs, and Poles were busily at work.

In December, 1914, Thomas G. Masaryk, professor of philosophy in the Czech University of Prague and long the leading ex-

ponent of the Czech nationalist movement, left Bohemia to organize the Czechoslovak campaign against Austria. Edward Benesh, one of his young colleagues at the University, and Milan Štefánik, the Slovak scientist, later joined him, and under their leadership was organized in Paris "The Czech Committee Abroad." This committee on November 14, 1915, issued a proclamation, signed by Masaryk and other notable representatives of Czechs throughout the world, declaring their adhesion to the Allied cause, and demanding the complete independence of the Czech race and the reunion of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Slovakia under a single government in a completely independent Czechoslovak State. In January, 1916, the Czech Committee was transformed into the "Czechoslovak National Council" with Masaryk as president and Benesh as secretary-general; and in the course of the following two years this council received the recognition of the various Czech colonies abroad. During the early years of the war the council devoted itself to the creation of a sentiment favorable to Czechoslovak national aspirations, through the establishment of "bureaus" in France, England, Italy, and the United States, and through the publication of periodicals, the organization of societies, and even the use of window displays.

Steps similar to these were taken likewise by representatives of the Jugoslavs. On the eve of the war Ante Trumbitch, former mayor of Spalato and a deputy in the Austrian Reichsrat, and Frano Supilo, one of the plaintiffs in the notorious Friedjung trial in 1909, both left Austria to engage in activities abroad in behalf of the Jugoslavs of the empire. A Croatian committee was established in Rome under their leadership, but in May, 1915, because of the unfriendly attitude of the Italian government, the committee was transferred to London and became known as the "Jugoslav Committee," of which Trumbitch became president.[1]

The aim of these leaders was the union of all Jugoslavs into one State, for, according to the committee's announcement, "the Jugoslav peoples, known in history as the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,

[1] A Jugoslav national council was also subsequently established in Washington.

are all members of one and the same nation, with all the necessary conditions for the formation of an independent state." An important step looking toward this ultimate union was taken in the summer of 1917 when Pashitch, veteran premier of Serbia, invited Trumbitch to a conference at Corfu, the seat of the exiled Serbian government. Out of this meeting came, on July 20, the famous Declaration of Corfu which forecast "the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes." These three peoples, according to the Declaration, constituted a single nation, and it was definitely agreed that they should become united under the Karageorgevich dynasty in a constitutional, democratic, and parliamentary monarchy, the constitution for which should be drafted, after peace had been attained, by a constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage.

In the early years of the war somewhat less vigorous steps were taken abroad in behalf of the Poles. In 1914 a "General Committee of Assistance for the Victims of the War in Poland" was organized in Switzerland under the leadership of Paderewski, world-renowned pianist, and Sienkiewicz, the famous Polish novelist. Branches were established by the former in Paris and London, and a Polish national department was organized under his honorary presidency in Chicago. Through the latter the four million Poles in the United States were enabled to voice their increasing demand for the resurrection of a free and united Poland. Finally, in August, 1917, there was organized at Lausanne a Polish national committee, which shortly afterward located its headquarters in Paris along with national committees of the other subject peoples, and appointed Paderewski to represent it in Washington.

The great goal of the Czechoslovak, Jugoslav, and Polish leaders abroad was the definite official recognition of the independence of their national States or national councils by the Allied governments. For months very little headway seemed to be made toward overcoming the general indifference in France, Italy, England, and the United States. Time and effort were required to popularize the idea of dismembering the Habsburg Empire and liberating the subject races, but the national leaders and others like Wickham Steed and R. W. Seton-Watson contributed both.

By the close of 1916 some progress appeared to have been made, for the Allies, in stating their war aims, spoke of the recognition of the "principle of nationality" (December 30, 1916), and of "the liberation of the Italians, as also of the Slavs, Rumanians, and Czechoslovaks from foreign domination" (January 10, 1917). Nevertheless, as late as January 5, 1918, Lloyd George declared that the break-up of the Austrian Empire was no part of the Entente war aims, and both he and President Wilson apparently agreed that the most that could be expected was the gaining of autonomy for the various races. One reason for this Allied reluctance to adopt the program of the nationalist committees was their cherished hope of detaching Austria-Hungary from the German alliance, and their consequent unwillingness to commit themselves to any movement which involved the disruption of the Habsburg empire.

Developments of another type were working meanwhile to hasten recognition. Early in the war arrangements were made to facilitate the desertion of Czechoslovak soldiers from the Austrian armies, and by the close of 1915 nearly 100,000 Czechoslovaks were within the Allied lines. These, and others later, voluntarily placed themselves at the service of the Allies, and during 1916 and 1917 Czechoslovak regiments were organized to fight against the Central Powers on the Russian and western fronts, and labor contingents were formed in Italy. Similarly, Jugoslav legions, organized in Russia, fought in the Rumanian campaign of 1916 and later on the Saloniki front; while Polish legions, organized by General Haller, who had renounced his allegiance to Austria, fought against Germans in France.

Toward the close of 1917, thanks to the efforts of the various national councils and their bureaus and thanks also to the splendid fighting of the foreign legions on the different fronts, the Allied attitude began to change. With Czechoslovak, Jugoslav, and Polish troops fighting for the Entente cause, recognition of their aspirations could not finally be denied. On December 16, 1917, the French government decreed that the Czechoslovak troops, while recognizing in military affairs the French high command, should fight under their own flag and in political affairs should be under the

direction of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris. In this step has been seen the beginning of the juridical recognition of the Czechoslovak nation.[2] Early in the following month President Wilson announced the creation of an independent Polish State as one of his Fourteen Points.

In April, 1918, a "Congress of the Oppressed Nationalities" of Austria-Hungary, held in Rome, was attended by representatives of the Italians, Poles, Jugoslavs, Rumanians, and Czechoslovaks included within the Austrian Empire, as well as by official representatives of the Allied countries. At that time these subject peoples put aside their ancient quarrels and divergent interests and declared their solidarity in the program of revolt against German and Magyar imperialism. During the congress, also, announcement was made of an Italian-Jugoslav pact in which each nation declared its interest in the completion of the other's national unity and in the liberation of the Adriatic, and agreed to settle all territorial questions between them amicably after the war on the basis of nationality and self-determination. The pact seemed to indicate that Italy, possibly as a result of Caporetto, had become partially reconciled to the idea of sharing the control of the Adriatic with a Jugoslavia instead of completely dominating it herself.

The other Allies soon followed the French action in respect to Czechoslovak troops. On May 24 the Italian premier presented the Czechoslovak flag to a regiment organized in Italy, and characterized the event as "the birth of a people worthy of a place beside ourselves." A few days later the British foreign minister recognized the Czechoslovak army as an organized unit to which a British liaison officer would be attached, and further announced that the British government was ready to accord the Czechoslovak National Council the same political rights that it had previously granted the Polish National Council. Early in June, also, the French, British, Italian, and United States governments proclaimed their "earnest sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations toward freedom of the Czechoslovak and Jugoslav peoples" as expressed in the Rome Congress of Oppressed Nationalities. And, lest this somewhat vague

[2] M. Mercier, *La Formation de l'État Tchécoslovaque*, p. 90.

declaration be misunderstood, the United States later announced that it signified "that all the members of the Slav race should be completely freed from the Austro-Hungarian yoke." Quite apparently, therefore, the subject nationalities had at length succeeded in winning from the Allied governments official recognition of the justice of their cause.

The Entente powers were doubtless still further strengthened in their recently adopted policy by a statement published in Austria in July, 1918. Following a meeting of the Kaiser and the Austrian Emperor, a declaration was issued announcing the intention "to tighten the bonds between the two empires in the sense of a durable fellowship in time of peace." If this meant the formation of a post-war Central European bloc with a population of 120,000,000 and a correspondingly large army, Germany would have doubled her power and really won the war, even though she surrendered all the territory which she had occupied. On the other hand the disruption of Austria-Hungary and the formation of a series of national States friendly to the Entente along the eastern frontier of Germany would effectively check this Pan-Germanist plan, and the idea came to have an ever greater appeal to the Allied statesmen. During the weeks that followed, therefore, the Allied Powers one by one recognized the belligerency of the Czechoslovaks.

Organization of the New National States

The military collapse of the Dual Monarchy was a necessary prerequisite of the final independence of the subject races, however, for the Habsburg government steadily refused to consider any such eventuality. To this collapse the subject nationalities contributed both directly and indirectly. On the one hand, they offered their regiments to swell the Allied forces; on the other, they persistently sought to undermine and weaken the Teutonic forces from within. Munition plants were blown up, mutinies became frequent both in the army and in the navy, and desertions by the thousands continued unchecked. Leaflets bearing the Allied assent to the freedom of the subject nationalities, which were scattered by airplanes over the Austrian armies in 1918, undoubtedly contributed to the

destruction of the morale of the troops. Weeks before the armistice the Austrian armies ceased to be an effective military machine.

The final disintegration of the empire was not now long delayed. Early in October, 1918, the German-Austrian Social Democratic deputies adopted the earlier-announced "Nationality Program of the Left," according to which the national groups in the Reichsrat were to constitute separate national assemblies to draw up their own constitutions. On the basis of an agreement between the various parties, the whole of the German-Austrian deputies constituted themselves a provisional national assembly and proclaimed the establishment of the Austrian State. The German-Austrians were thus the first to withdraw from the Reichsrat and discard the empire.

But the other national groups were not slow to follow. On October 5 representatives from all Jugoslav territories of the empire met at Zagreb, and elected a Jugoslav national council to defend their interests. Two days later at Warsaw Polish representatives issued a manifesto promising a national government and a freely elected diet for a reunited Poland, while the Ruthenians met at Lemberg and opened the way to future trouble by electing a Ruthenian national council. On October 14 Benesh informed the Allied governments that the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris had been transformed into a provisional government with Masaryk as President, Benesh as foreign minister, and Štefánik as secretary for war; and France recognized the provisional government on the next day.

Faced by the prospect of certain defeat at the front, alarmed by the measures taken both within and without the country looking to the destruction of his empire, Emperor Charles tardily decided to take the step which had so long been delayed by his predecessors. In a last desperate effort to save his realm from complete disintegration he issued a manifesto on October 16, 1918, announcing the policy of federalization. Austrian Poland might freely unite with the independent Polish State, but the rest of Austria was to be transformed into a federal State in which every race should "create its own constitutional status" in the territory in which it

ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY SHOWING THE SUCCESSION STATES

dwelt. The various peoples of Austria were called upon to organize national councils from the Reichsrat deputies of each nationality in order to facilitate the process of federalization. In taking this step the Emperor was obviously merely giving legal sanction to a process which was already under way. But even now the Emperor could not drive himself to more than halfway measures. The lands of the Hungarian crown were in no way to be affected by this manifesto, nor was the *Ausgleich* to be altered. In Hungary, nevertheless, the issuing of the imperial manifesto was regarded as the destruction of the *Ausgleich*, and the Hungarian government at once declared that the Dual Monarchy was dissolved. This resulted, in turn, in the immediate assertion of the right of self-determination by the Rumanians and Slovaks of the Hungarian Kingdom. The Emperor's program was scornfully rejected by the various Slav peoples, for the day when federalization would satisfy the subject nationalities had passed. Their aim was now complete independence. During the succeeding ten days the empire went completely to pieces, and the various districts came under the political control and administration of different national councils—Ruthenian, Jugoslav, Czech, German, Magyar, and Rumanian. National popular governments supplanted the Habsburg dynasty.

On the day following the federalization manifesto the German deputies of the Reichsrat called a meeting for October 21, and on that day constituted themselves a provisional national assembly, and declared the independence of German Austria. An executive committee was elected and given the task of drafting proposals for a constitution. The bourgeois parties favored the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, but the Social Democrats, backed by the working classes, demanded a republic and prepared to fight, if necessary, to get it. The effect of their determination was seen on November 12, now a national public holiday, when the Provisional National Assembly adopted a temporary constitution which provided that Austria should be "a democratic republic." At the same time the assembly announced that Austria was "an integral part" of the recently proclaimed German Republic, it being the fond hope of the Austrian leaders that an actual union with Germany might be

effected at once and the peace conference later confronted with a *fait accompli.*

It has already been pointed out that the Hungarians considered the Emperor's manifesto as the end of the Dual Monarchy. The Hungarian ministry, therefore, at once announced Hungary's independence of Austria. It was the fervent hope of the Magyar leaders that the territorial integrity of the monarchy might be preserved under the rule of the Habsburg King Charles, and that the Kingdom of Hungary might yet play an important rôle in European affairs. This hope was soon blasted. On President Wilson's recognition of the independence of the Czechoslovaks and Jugoslavs (October 18), the movement toward disintegration began with a Croatian revolt against continued inclusion within the Hungarian realm. The discredited, aristocratic Magyar ministry thereupon fell from power.

Out of the political crisis which ensued there finally rose to power one of the very few liberal aristocrats of the country, Count Michael Karolyi, a man possessing not only great wealth, but an aristocratic pedigree reaching back through some nine centuries. Despite his aristocratic position, however, he had for years, even before the war, advocated such liberal measures as the division of the great landed estates and the granting of universal suffrage. He had later opposed the war, denounced German policies, repudiated the idea of conquest, and demanded a definition of peace terms. He had pointed out that the war was bound to end disastrously for Hungary, for, even if the Central Powers won, victory would bring only the future domination of Hungary by Prussia.

Realizing that the collapse of Hungary was impending, Karolyi, in October, 1918, pronounced in favor of peace and a federalized, moderately socialized republic. He openly negotiated with leaders of the non-Magyar and Social Democratic groups and finally, in the latter part of October, succeeded in creating a Hungarian national council which became essentially a revolutionary body. This council, backed by the Budapest garrison, demanded Karolyi's appointment as prime minister, and, after revolutionary troops on October 31 had actually seized the government buildings, the King gave way and called upon Karolyi to head a ministry.

The new government at once ordered the withdrawal of Hungarian troops from the front and their demobilization. Karolyi hoped by a policy of westward orientation to secure better terms for Hungary than those of the armistice concluded by General Diaz with the Austro-Hungarian armies (November 3). He therefore initiated negotiations with General Franchet d'Esperey looking toward a separate Hungarian armistice, and on November 13 finally signed a new armistice agreement. Unfortunately for the popularity of the Karolyi government, the new terms were less favorable than those earlier granted by General Diaz, Hungary being deprived of a number of territorial and other rights to which she had been previously entitled.

On the same day upon which the Karolyi government signed its separate armistice agreement, King Charles issued a document—never countersigned—in which he renounced all participation in Hungarian affairs and recognized in advance future decisions regarding the form of the Hungarian State. With the way thus cleared, the National Council, perhaps hoping thus to obtain more lenient treatment from the victorious Allies, on November 16 proclaimed the Hungarian People's Republic.

Meanwhile, on October 18 the Czechoslovak Provisional Government in Paris had issued the formal declaration of Czechoslovak independence, a step taken by Kramarsch in Prague on the next day. On October 28 a bloodless revolution took place in Prague as the result of which the administration of Bohemia and Moravia passed without opposition into Czech hands. On the following day the territory of the new State was enlarged when the Slovak National Council declared for the union of Czechs and Slovaks into a single State. Fifty-five Slovak members were thereupon added to the National Council in Prague, which now constituted itself the Provisional National Assembly of Czechoslovakia. The two provisional governments, the one in Paris and the other in Prague, coöperated in plans for the meeting of the first National Assembly, which, on November 14, unanimously proclaimed the republic and elected Masaryk President, Kramarsch premier, and Benesh foreign minister.

On October 15 the Polish deputies in the Reichsrat declared themselves "subjects and citizens of a free and reunited Polish State," a declaration whose translation into fact was facilitated when Emperor Charles announced on the next day that no obstacle would be placed in the way of their incorporation into such a State. On the 15th, also, the Polish Regency Council at Warsaw, political remnant of the truncated Polish monarchy which the Central Powers had attempted to establish in Russian Poland during the war,[3] summoned the Galician Poles to coöperate in the formation of a new Polish government. Actual unity, however, seemed very remote. A commission of Polish deputies of the Austrian Reichsrat took over the administrative machinery of western Galicia, but in eastern Galicia the Ruthenians seized control. In Warsaw a Polish republic was proclaimed on November 3; four days later at Lublin a Socialist government declared for a republic and demanded the resignation of the Regency Council in Warsaw. None of these improvised governments was recognized by the Allies, while in Paris a Polish national committee, actually controlling no territory, enjoyed Allied recognition.

Fortunately, on November 10, there arrived in Warsaw perhaps the most outstanding Polish patriot of the day—Joseph Pilsudski. A veteran of the Russian Revolution of 1905, he had suffered exile for his activities at that time. A determined opponent of the Tsarist régime, he had left Russia on the very day that war was declared and had organized Polish legions to fight for the Central Powers in the World War. Becoming convinced in 1917 that the latter did not intend to permit the establishment of a completely united and independent Poland, he had refused to fight longer against Russia and, in consequence, had been thrown into a Prussian prison in

[3] By a manifesto of the two kaisers on November 5, 1916, an independent Polish constitutional monarchy was proclaimed, to comprise the territory of former Russian Poland. Even this was subsequently decreased in area by the transfer of the province of Cholm to the new Ukrainian Republic. Only half-hearted steps were taken by the Central Powers to establish a Polish government. A Polish council of state, at first nominated by the Central Powers, took office in January, 1917, but was soon discredited because of its subserviency to Germany. A new scheme was then introduced which provided for a regency council of three members which in turn appointed the prime minister and the Council of State subject to the approval of the Central Powers.

Magdeburg. From here he had been released by the outbreak of the German Revolution.

Upon his arrival in Warsaw Pilsudski disarmed the Teutonic troops in Poland and expelled them from the country. The Regency Council, deprived of its military support, thereupon resigned in favor of Pilsudski, who was proclaimed head of the national provisional government, which in turn immediately received the support of the Socialist régime in Lublin. For a time, however, it appeared that friction would develop between the provisional government in Warsaw and the Polish National Council in Paris. The latter, headed by Dmowski, represented and had the support of the conservative bourgeoisie and peasants, and controlled the Polish army in France commanded by General Haller. The Warsaw government, on the other hand, was backed by the Socialists and radical peasants, and had at its head Pilsudski with his rapidly growing Polish legions. It was most imperative that this schism among the Poles should be healed.

At this point Ignace Paderewski did an inestimable service for his countrymen. He had been in the United States at the time of the signing of the armistice, but immediately afterward he set out for Europe with the aim of reconciling and unifying the various political groups. After a conference with Allied representatives and the Polish National Council in Paris, Paderewski betook himself to Warsaw, there to confer with Pilsudski. Out of his efforts came a compromise, on January 16, 1919, when Pilsudski was made temporary chief of state, Paderewski premier and foreign minister, and Dmowski one of Poland's representatives at the Paris Peace Conference. The Poles, after having been submerged under foreign domination for a century and a quarter, once more stood forth as a united and independent State.

Of the other subject nationalities in the Habsburg Empire, the Croatians on October 29 declared their independence and established a national council at Zagreb. The latter, becoming alarmed at the aggressive attitude of Italy and the somewhat indifferent attitude of the Allies, on November 23 proclaimed the union of Croatia with Serbia and Montenegro and invited Alexander of

Serbia to assume the regency over these sister provinces. Late in November the Rumanians of Bukowina proclaimed their union with the kingdom of Rumania, and those of Transylvania took the same step on December 1. By this time every important racial group in the empire had established its own independent State or united itself to one of its choice.

A ministry of liquidation had been appointed in Austria to facilitate and direct the process of disintegration, but before it could map out its program, the liquidation had taken place. On November 11, the last of the Habsburgs formally surrendered his Austrian throne. "Now as always," so his proclamation ran, "filled with unchanging love for my peoples, I will not place my person in the way of their free development. The people through their representatives have taken over the government. I renounce any further share in the business of the State." On the next day a few members of the Austrian Reichsrat met in their last session. On the ground that their body had no further duties to perform, since "Austria" had ceased to exist, the Reichsrat adjourned *sine die*.

CHAPTER VI

THE GERMAN REVOLUTION

PROBABLY the most surprising of the revolutions which occurred as a result of the World War was that which overthrew the German imperial government and erected in its stead the present German Republic. Overburdened, downtrodden Russia might have been expected to strike out wildly for freedom if the occasion presented itself. Conglomerate Austria-Hungary was practically doomed to fall to pieces at the first stroke of military disaster. But that the powerful, prosperous Hohenzollern Empire, the pride of all patriotic Germans, should be so easily toppled over at the close of the war was most unexpected.

Autocratic Character of the Old Régime

To be sure, even before the war there were those in Germany who were not entirely satisfied with the semi-autocratic political system of the empire. A number of undemocratic features of the government invited criticism. In the first place, the German Empire was not a true parliamentary State; it did not possess ministerial government. The chancellor was responsible, not to the parliamentary majority, but to the Kaiser personally. Quite conceivably, if the chancellor's policies aroused too great opposition from the Reichstag, the Kaiser might dismiss him; but usually, in spite of votes of censure, he remained in office. The German Empire was a federal State comprising twenty-two monarchies ranging from kingdoms down to petty principalities, together with three free cities. The members of the Bundesrat, the upper house of the legislature, were appointed and removed by the ruling princes of these various member States, and they were in no way responsible to the people directly. Moreover, this non-elective body was by far the more

powerful of the two houses; in it, as a matter of fact, the sovereignty of the German Empire resided. Furthermore, representation in the Bundesrat was so distributed that the Kaiser, through the Prussian delegates whom he appointed, could usually block important measures if he so desired. The Bundesrat was therefore thoroughly undemocratic.

The Reichstag, the lower house of the legislature and the only popular organ of the federal government, possessed "all the attributes of a modern parliament except actual political power." It was usually dominated by the chancellor and the Bundesrat. Though elected by universal manhood suffrage, in 1914 it had even ceased to be truly representative, for the electoral districts had never been changed since the establishment of the empire. Urban communities were, therefore, grossly under-represented while rural regions were tremendously over-represented. Such a condition, of course, constituted a very serious handicap to the parties representing the proletariat.

Finally, in Prussia, the State which constituted approximately two-thirds of the empire, a most undemocratic type of suffrage existed—the notorious three-class system. Voters in each district were divided into three classes according to the amount of direct taxes which each paid. By this ingenious system 1,358,240 of the wealthier citizens in 1908 were able to defeat without difficulty the 6,324,079 voters who comprised the third class. This type of suffrage put a premium upon wealth and was a second very serious handicap to the proletariat.

Several of the German political parties before the war were interested in democratizing the government. Most conspicuous in this respect was the Social Democratic party, which represented the political views and the economic interests of organized labor. By 1912 this had grown to be the largest single party in the empire, marshaling in the election of that year more than four million votes. Among other things, it demanded woman suffrage, secret ballot, ministerial responsibility, and the abolition of the Prussian three-class system of voting. Despite their numerical strength in the Reichstag, however, the Social Democrats were steadily denied any place

in the government. The National Liberal party, representative of big business, favored the reapportionment of seats in the Reichstag, and the abolition of the three-class system of voting, as did likewise the Progressive party, representative of the commercial and industrial middle classes. The latter demanded, in addition, the introduction of real parliamentary government and the subordination of the military to the civil authority. Finally, the Center or Clerical party, one of the largest, was on many issues inclined to be liberal, representing as it did the democratic tendencies of southern and western Germany. It favored social reform, and championed the rights of the Reichstag as against the Bundesrat.

Nevertheless, those fateful summer days of 1914 saw little indication of any impending catastrophe to the German Empire from within. Firm in the belief that the Fatherland was being maliciously attacked by an overwhelming coalition of opponents, the German people of all parties sprang forward as a nation to repel the foes. Even the Social Democrats, who had long denounced all war as in the interest of capitalists alone, recognized the duty of defending the homeland "against freedom-slaying Tsarism," whose triumph their leader, Haase, declared, "would be the end of the German people." As a bloc therefore the Social Democrats voted in favor of the first war credits, and the Kaiser graciously proclaimed that he no longer knew parties but only Germans.

Undermining Influences of the War

To the German people, however, the war brought ever increasing hardships, privations, and sorrow. These in turn led to disappointment, disillusionment, and a loss of faith in the government which was held responsible for their condition. In consequence, the succeeding years witnessed the gradual disintegration of the all-party bloc in support of the war. In proportion as this occurred, the demand for political reform increased, culminating finally in the outbreak of revolution and the collapse of the imperial régime.

The disintegration of the war bloc began first among the Social Democrats. Although the latter voted in the Reichstag as a unit in favor of the first war credits, on the ground that the war was de-

fensive, their party caucus revealed that as early as August, 1914, fourteen deputies were opposed to this policy. In the course of the succeeding months this fissure widened until it split the party. In December Karl Liebknecht, whose father before him had opposed the Franco-Prussian War, defied the party discipline by publicly voting in the Reichstag against war credits. Four months later he was joined in active opposition by a colleague, while thirty other Social Democrats showed their feelings by leaving the chamber, refusing to vote. By December, 1915, the number of deputies who dared to vote openly against war credits had risen to twenty, while again twenty-two others left the chamber without voting.

A definite split in the Social Democratic party finally occurred early in 1916 when, in the view of some, the war had ceased to be one of defense and had become an attempt to secure annexations according to the program of the Pan-Germanists. At that time Haase denounced the continuance of the war, with the result that the Social Democratic party elected Ebert to succeed him as leader of the Reichstag group, declared that he and his followers had forfeited their rights of membership, and read them out of the party. In January, 1917, this opposition organized itself into a "working union," and later in the spring it constituted itself the Independent Social Democratic party.

The Independents asserted that the Majority Socialists, as orthodox members of the Social Democratic party came to be called, had become converted to nationalism and imperialism, and accused them of being willing to adapt their policy to the needs of bourgeois society and the capitalistic state. As a matter of fact, the Majority Socialists, while continuing to demand democratic reform and a peace without annexations, sought to reach these goals by participating in parliamentary life so as ultimately to control the Reichstag. On the other hand, the Independents openly denounced the war as a crime, and attempted to reveal to the masses its true character and to incite them to acts of protest. Soon they even began to work definitely and deliberately for the overthrow of the empire, an offense with which they were publicly charged by Chancellor Michaelis in 1917. The growth of the Independent Socialist party,

therefore, was one of the important influences which undermined the German government.

Even more destructive in their activities than the Independents were the Spartacists, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, both of whom spent a considerable part of the war period in prison. This group developed on the left wing of the Independents and took its name from the so-called "Spartacus Letters," the first of which appeared in 1916 on the Kaiser's fifty-seventh birthday. These letters denounced the war as one of imperialistic aggression and summoned Germans to employ all possible obstructive tactics against it.

For the revolutionary agitators in Germany during the closing years of the war, a fertile field for propaganda was created by the dire distress of the urban masses, caused largely by the Allied blockade. Millions lived on the verge of starvation, while the death rate steadily climbed. Bread, butter, milk, sugar, meat, eggs, and potatoes were rationed out in very limited quantities, while pork, bacon, ham, fresh fish, cheese, coffee, tea, and spices gradually disappeared altogether. For weeks during the "turnip winter" of 1916–17 potatoes were not to be had and coarse fodder turnips had to be substituted. The discontent with such conditions was greatly magnified by frequent breakdowns in the government's rationing system, which resulted in profiteering and in an inequitable distribution of the foodstuffs which actually were available. In consequence of this, the wealthy could usually obtain most of the necessaries and some of the luxuries of life, while the poorer people were forced to suffer privation. "To be continually hungry, to rise from the table hungry, to go to bed hungry, was the universal experience of all but the very well-to-do." Cold, miserable, dispirited, many recalled the pre-war Socialist doctrine that all wars are the work of the capitalist classes, that existing governments everywhere are obstacles to the coming of a true universal brotherhood of men.

In 1917 two events outside Germany helped still further to break down German morale and to awaken widespread dissatisfaction with the German political system; namely, the Russian Revolution and the United States' entry into the war. Few diseases are more

infectious than revolution, and from Russia almost immediately revolutionary propaganda entered Germany, began to influence the laboring classes there, and especially caused unrest among the Socialists. Simultaneously, a reconsideration of the meaning of true democracy followed when President Wilson began his scathing denunciation of Hohenzollern autocracy.

The effect of all these influences upon war-weary Germany became evident by the middle of 1917 when there was organized in the Reichstag an anti-government bloc which constituted a large majority of the total membership and was composed of the Socialists, Progressives, Centrists, and a few National Liberals. They demanded the abolition of the Prussian three-class system of voting and other democratic reforms in that State, real parliamentary government in the empire, and a peace without annexations or indemnities. The attitude of the bloc resulted in the resignation of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg. The new chancellor, Dr. George Michaelis, although announcing his intention to take the Reichstag demands under consideration, actually did nothing to translate them into fact. A second political crisis, three months later, then forced Michaelis to give way to the Bavarian university professor, Count Hertling. The latter, in turn, promised to make far-reaching electoral reforms in Prussia and to direct peace negotiations in accordance with the Reichstag resolution, but again nothing was actually done. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the Teutonic victory against Italy temporarily increased the confidence of the government, and lessened somewhat the popular unrest. The vocal demand for political reform in Germany seemed to fluctuate in indirect proportion to the success of Teutonic arms.

But if the Russian Bolshevik Revolution and subsequent Peace of Brest-Litovsk assisted the German government by creating a war enthusiasm which temporarily lessened the demand for reform, its effect in the end was most disastrous to that government, for the "poison gas of Leninism" was soon wafted back upon Germany. Even before the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, emissaries of the Bolsheviks, well supplied with money, entered the empire by secret routes and worked with Germans in sympathy with their cause. After the

establishment of a Bolshevik embassy in Berlin, the leaders of the Spartacists and Independent Socialists were supplied with money, arms, and literature, and from the Russian embassy a staff of men worked to overthrow the very government to which it was accredited. The Spartacists now became definitely imbued with communistic doctrine and began to advocate the immediate socialization of industry and a world revolution of the proletariat. In preparation for the latter, they sought to transplant into Germany the methods of Russian Bolshevism, and set out to establish revolutionary workmen's and soldiers' councils throughout Germany and even at the front.

By the beginning of 1918 the influence of these revolutionary groups had reached such proportions in the capital and in the industrial sections of Westphalia that they decided to call a great political strike in Berlin and Essen. Although sporadic strikes had occurred in German factories during 1916 and 1917, this one in January, 1918, was the first great strike with definite political aims. For over a week a half-million men refused to work. In Berlin they presented an ultimatum to the government, demanding a speedy peace without annexations or indemnities, the participation of workingmen's delegates of all countries in the peace negotiations, the release of all political prisoners, freedom of assembly and the press, democratization of state institutions, and woman suffrage.

The government's ruthless suppression of this pacific strike convinced the Independent Socialists that only an armed revolt of the proletariat could free the nation from the menace of imperialism and capitalism. They therefore made the definite decision to overthrow the government. Their revolutionary committee in Berlin redoubled its efforts to establish connections with comrades at the front and with industrial workmen in the capital, and aimed to seize the moment when military defeat should discredit the Hohenzollerns to establish a socialistic republic.

A further disastrous result of this January strike came from the punitive measures adopted by the government. Many of the strikers were men subject to military duty who had been kept in indispensable industries at home, but thousands were now promptly drafted

into the army in punishment for their activity during the strike. This practice of "using the army as a prison establishment, and the trenches as cells," however, proved most unwise, for the men thus punished became ardent propagandists of socialism and peace, and carried to the front lines not only rifles but germs of revolution as well.

In the army too, during 1918, revolutionary propaganda found a fertile field among men who were beginning to be hungry and ill-clad,[1] and who were dispirited by complaints from home folks of increasing privations and suffering. The doctrines of Bolshevism, which the troops transferred from the east brought with them, found ready listeners in men who, subject to the discomforts of mud, vermin, and crowded quarters of the front-line trenches, had come to resent the arbitrary orders and arrogance of the officers—especially the newer, youthful ones during the closing period—who lived in comparative luxury and ease miles in the rear of the battle lines. This discontent was immeasurably increased when the tremendous wastage of men during the first half of 1918 brought only military defeat. Even in the highly disciplined German army desertions by the thousands occurred in the closing three months of the war.

The German defeat in the second battle of the Marne and the fearful collapse of the entire west front during the following months had an effect not only in the army itself, but behind the lines as well. Everywhere was the belief that the nation had been duped and deceived, and that there was but one road to salvation—the overthrow of the régime which had brought this immense misery upon the people. The destruction of the military dictatorship of

[1] "With the coming of the fourth year conditions began to grow bad even at the front, and the winter of 1917–18 brought a marked decrease of rations, both in quantity and quality. Cavalrymen and soldiers belonging to munition or work columns ate the potatoes issued for their horses. They ground in their coffee-mills their horses' scant rations of barley and made pancakes . . . Not only were the soldiers hungry by this time, but they were insufficiently clad. Their boots were without soles, and they had neither socks nor the *Fusslappen* (bandages) which most of them preferred to wear instead of socks. A shirt issued from the military stores in the summer of 1918 to a German soldier-friend of the writer was a woman's ribbed shirt, cut low in the neck and gathered with a ribbon."—S. M. Bouton, *And the Kaiser Abdicates*, pp. 72–73.

general headquarters and the democratization and parliamentarization of the empire again became the program, late in September, of the National Liberals and Centrists, who signified their desire to work toward this end in coöperation with the Majority Socialists.

The government now went desperately to work to avert revolution by transforming the former quasi-autocratic State into a parliamentary monarchy. In this attempt to win back the confidence of the people the Kaiser called to the chancellorship Prince Max of Baden, a man long known for his liberalism. On October 2, 1918, with the support of the National Liberals, Centrists, and Majority Socialists, Prince Max formed a coalition cabinet, admitting to the government for the first time in the history of the empire, two Majority Socialists, Scheidemann and Bauer. The new chancellor assumed office with the hope that, by rapidly democratizing the constitution and the government, he might save the Kaiser and the Hohenzollern dynasty.

Reform was now the order of the day. At a speed, according to Prince Max, "which was hardly compatible with the Constitution, and certainly not with our dignity," ministerial responsibility was established, the sanction of war and peace was placed in the hands of the Reichstag, the military was brought under the control of the civil authority, amnesty was granted to political prisoners, and freedom of press and assembly was established. Prince Max thus ended the personal régime of the Hohenzollerns, and gave the German Empire its first parliamentary government. These changes constituted, in fact, a veritable political revolution, and the chancellor felt justified in saying, "The new German Government is a government of the people in whose hands rests both actually and constitutionally the authority to make decisions." The Kaiser remained merely as the symbol of German unity.

Downfall of Monarchy

But by this time William II was doomed. The Kaiser's position, already undermined by Socialist and enemy propaganda, became altogether untenable when President Wilson demanded, as the prerequisite of peace negotiations "the destruction or reduction to

virtual impotency of the arbitrary power which has hitherto controlled the German nation." When the German people learned "that the nations of the world do not and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy," that if the United States "must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender," a revulsion of popular feeling set in against generals, emperors, and kings, and even against the monarchy itself.[2]

Early in October the question of the Kaiser's abdication began to be discussed among the people, but it was not until the twenty-third that the demand was openly voiced in the Reichstag itself. On that day the Independent Socialist, Haase, exclaimed: "All around us republics are being set up. Crowns are rolling about the floor, . . . and shall Germany alone, surrounded by republics, still keep up a crowned head, or rather a whole lot of heads all wearing their little crowns and coronets?" On the following day Noske, a Majority Socialist, joined the attack on the Kaiser when he pointed out that "it only needed a single generous gesture on the part of the person who wears the imperial crown" to relieve the sufferings of millions. On the twenty-fifth the bourgeois *Frankfurter Zeitung* openly demanded the Kaiser's abdication and the Crown Prince's renunciation of the throne as a means of satisfying President Wilson. By the end of the month the demand had apparently gained the support of the bulk of the nation as the only means to assure a cessation of hostilities and bearable terms of peace. Driven by public opinion, the Majority Socialist, Scheidemann, on the evening of October 29 demanded that the chancellor advise the Kaiser to renounce the throne. On the same evening, in spite of the protests of Prince Max, the Kaiser, feeling insecure in Berlin, fled from the capital to general headquarters at Spa.

[2] When, early in October, Prince Max asked Scheidemann what the people would say if President Wilson were to demand the Kaiser's abdication as a *sine qua non* of peace, the latter replied: "If the question were to be put: War or desertion of the Hohenzollerns, the people would be for peace, even at this price."—*The Memoirs of Prince Max of Baden*, II, p. 50.

It was not the army, however, but the navy which touched off the revolutionary bomb. Indications had for some time pointed to an approaching storm in this branch of the service, where inactivity and the increasing hardships and losses and terror connected with the submarine campaign had engendered profound discontent. The dockyard workers of Kiel had long been energetic members of the Socialist proletariat, and the Independents had been prompt to take advantage of this fact. As early as 1917 their propaganda had produced a miniature mutiny in the fleet which had resulted in the imprisonment or execution of the ringleaders. Again, in January, 1918, the spirit had been such that the government had imprisoned a number of leaders to prevent the navy from uniting with the dockyard workers in the great strike of that month.

The final crisis was precipitated when, on October 28, the Admiralty, realizing that the armistice terms would undoubtedly demand the surrender of the German fleet anyway, ordered the fleet to steam out to engage the British in a final decisive battle. When the men realized that, with armistice negotiations actually under way, the lives of 80,000 subordinates were to be recklessly sacrificed, their bitter opposition was aroused. "If the English attack us," they declared, "we will defend our coasts to the last, but we will not ourselves attack. Farther than Heligoland we will not go." This of course constituted only mutiny, not revolution.

But it soon became revolution. On November 4 the sailors' revolt became general. Soldiers' councils were elected, and the red flag was hoisted. At the conclusion of a great mass meeting addressed by the government's representative, Noske, the cry, "Long live the Republic!" was raised. On the next day the workers of Kiel joined the revolt and formed workmen's councils. What had originally been but a naval mutiny, lacking a political program, now became a great revolutionary movement. Demands were made for the abdication of the Hohenzollerns, the abolition of the state of siege, the liberation of the victims of the mutiny of 1917, and the introduction of universal, equal, and secret suffrage. The movement spread rapidly through the coast towns, where the proletariat united with the sailors. Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, Wilhelmshaven, and Hanover

soon joined the revolt, and by the close of the first week in November the revolution had triumphed along the German coasts. In spite of the government's attempt to isolate the area of contagion by cutting the arteries of communication, the success of these uprisings became known in the interior, and town after town raised the revolutionary standard. Thus in North Germany sailors delivered the first disastrous blow to imperial rule.

A second and even more telling blow at the imperial system was delivered by the proletariat of Munich under the leadership of the Independent Socialist writer and former editor of *Vorwärts*, Kurt Eisner. Imprisoned because of his part in the revolutionary strike of January, 1918, he had been released in October by the government's general amnesty. Convinced of Prussian responsibility for the prolongation of the war, he had immediately begun to advocate the overthrow of the imperial régime by force. When the news of the successful mutiny in Kiel reached Munich, Eisner summoned the people to a great demonstration in the Theresienwiese on November 7.

To the accompaniment of cries of "Down with the Kaiser! Long live the Republic!" a tremendous gathering of more than 100,000 people that day demanded the resignation of William II, and the removal of all obstacles to the democratization of Germany. This was very definitely political revolution. The garrison in Munich deposed its officers and joined the revolution. A provisional workers', soldiers', and peasants' council, with Eisner as chairman, announced to the world on the eighth that Bavaria was a "democratic and social Republic" in which a "government of the people" would at once be installed. The revolutionary contagion swept through the empire, claiming Frankfort, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Leipzig, Stuttgart, Magdeburg, and Brunswick by the close of that day.

The government had carefully isolated Berlin in an attempt to keep it from learning of the revolutionary events occurring in the empire outside. Nevertheless, as early as November 2 the Revolutionary Committee of the Independent Socialists and Spartacists, without knowing of events at Kiel, had contemplated launching the revolution on the fourth, but had decided to postpone it in order to

perfect their preparations. By this time the mass of the Majority Socialists were also becoming restless. When it was rumored that the Kaiser had said, "I yield only to force," when they learned that meetings of the Independents had been forbidden, they threatened to desert their moderate leaders and go over to the Independents in a body. Fearful of losing their hold upon the masses, and desirous of doing something to conciliate them, the Majority Socialist leaders on the seventh presented an ultimatum to the government demanding (1) immediate permission for the forbidden meetings of the Independents to be held, (2) renunciation of the throne by the Kaiser and the Crown Prince by noon the next day, (3) increase of the influence of the Social Democrats in the government, and (4) the reorganization of the Prussian government. Scheidemann and Ebert, in presenting the ultimatum to Prince Max, explained that unless the Kaiser abdicated at once, revolution would follow; and announced that unless a satisfactory reply was forthcoming by noon the next day, the Majority Socialists would resign from the government.

Prince Max had already come to the conclusion that the only way to save the monarchy and to preserve the Hohenzollern dynasty was to have both the Kaiser and the Crown Prince abdicate in favor of the Kaiser's infant grandson. That night, therefore, he sent word to the Kaiser of the Majority Socialists' demand, and on the following morning advised that he should "at once declare his firm determination to abdicate as soon as armistice negotiations have reached a point which permits of the issue of writs for the election of a Constituent National Assembly." The chancellor hoped that in the ensuing elections for a constituent assembly the monarchical cause would have an advantage over the republican because the initiative would be taken by the Crown. Back came the answer from general headquarters: "His Majesty has flatly refused to consider Your Grand Ducal Highness' proposals on the question of the Throne and considers it as much as ever his duty to remain at His post." While the wires between Berlin and Spa were kept busy all through the eighth in an attempt to force the Kaiser to see the light, Ebert extended the time limit of the Majority Socialists' ultimatum to the

morning of Saturday, the ninth, and appealed to the workers to be patient for a few hours more.

Again on the evening of the eighth the chancellor talked with the Kaiser over the telephone and, "as a relative," informed him that his abdication was "necessary to save Germany from civil war," that the "great majority of the people believes you to be responsible for the present situation," that this "is the last possible moment." Furious, the Kaiser rejected all proposals, announced that his intention not to give way was unshaken, that at the head of his army he would reduce his country to order. When Prince Max asked to be relieved of the chancellorship, the Kaiser refused with the words: "You sent out the armistice offer, you will have to put your name to the conditions." Even in the face of this rebuff, the chancellor later that same night telegraphed the Kaiser that the rulers of Bavaria, Brunswick, and Mecklenburg-Schwerin had abdicated, and that the imperial cabinet overwhelmingly regarded his abdication "as the only possible means of saving Germany from a bloody civil war." But all in vain!

That night the Majority Socialist leaders instructed the workers that if the Kaiser's abdication was not announced in the early morning papers of the ninth, they were to leave their work and hold big demonstrations as already arranged. The Independent Socialists, likewise, finally decided to begin their previously postponed revolution on the same morning, announcing, "We do not demand one person's abdication, we demand the Republic." By ten o'clock on Saturday morning, therefore, thousands of unarmed workmen, preceded by women and children, were marching toward the center of the city, carrying placards inscribed, "Brothers, no shooting!" But the appeal was hardly necessary, for the troops in Berlin were already mutinying and forming workers' and soldiers' councils.

All these facts were passed on to Spa by telephone, together with the insistent demand for immediate abdication. Shortly after eleven o'clock came the message that the Kaiser had resolved on abdication in principle, that he was now simply engaged in the formulation of the statement which would be received in half an hour. The half-hour passed without the promised announcement. The Majority

Socialists resigned from the government, and talk of deposition was in the air. In order to forestall the latter, the chancellor now took the decisive step of notifying the press:

> The Kaiser and King has resolved to renounce the throne. The Chancellor remains in office until the questions connected with the abdication of the Kaiser, the renunciation of the Crown Prince of the German Empire and of Prussia, and the setting-up of the Regency have been regulated. He intends to propose to the Regent the appointment of Herr Ebert to the Chancellorship and the bringing in a Bill . . . for a German Constituent National Assembly.

At noon this announcement was known on the streets of Berlin.

About this same time a deputation of Majority Socialists, headed by Ebert and Scheidemann, called on the chancellor and demanded that the government be now intrusted to men who had the full confidence of the people. Upon learning that the Majority Socialists were prepared to preserve order and would agree to a national assembly, Prince Max surrendered the chancellorship to Ebert. At two o'clock that afternoon Scheidemann, from the steps of the Reichstag building, proclaimed the Republic. The victory of the Berlin proletariat was complete; "the bourgeoisie looked on too stunned either to hinder or to help."

At general headquarters, in the meantime, the Kaiser learned from the army heads that the troops would no longer fight either abroad or at home, that they would not defend the Kaiser's life against German republicans, and that there was little chance, therefore, of his being able to reconquer Germany with their help. Confronted with these facts, the Kaiser at length agreed to a conditional abdication. In the afternoon came the message that "His Majesty is ready to abdicate as German Kaiser, but not as King of Prussia." That night in a special train he fled to the Dutch frontier, but not until November 28 did he finally bring himself to write his formal renunciation of the throne. By this time the score of kings and princes in Germany had lost their crowns, and every State had proclaimed a republican form of government.

Thus within a few months after the Russian Revolutions of 1917 Europe experienced tremendous political changes. Three ancient dynasties—the Romanov, the Habsburg, and the Hohenzollern—were driven from their thrones. Two powerful empires were transformed into republics, while a third was violently torn asunder and disappeared altogether. Three former monarchies—Bohemia, Lithuania, and Poland—long submerged, now reappeared and joined five other States—Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Austria, and Hungary—to swell the growing number of democratic republics [3] in Europe. Once again the Continent had been swept by a mighty wave of revolution, perhaps the greatest single step in Europe's long struggle toward nationalism and democracy.

[3] With the defeat of the Central Powers and the overthrow of the German Empire, Teutonic influence in the Baltic States collapsed and with it came a reaction against the monarchical régimes which the Germans had encouraged. Within a short time a republic was definitely proclaimed in each of these States.

CHAPTER VII

THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

THE signing of the armistice was not followed immediately by the drafting of the peace treaties. For various reasons, two full months elapsed between the cessation of fighting and the first preliminary meeting of the peace conference. In the first place, even with modern means of travel it required several weeks for the duly appointed representatives to gather from all the belligerent powers, for this had been a world war. In the second place, the heads of the delegations of two of the most important States were unable to come to the conference immediately. President Wilson decided to lead personally the peace delegation from the United States, and it was impossible for him to arrive in Europe before the middle of December. Premier Lloyd George decided that his government ought to appeal to the British people for a vote of confidence before it represented them at the conference, and so called an election for December 14. This and the subsequent reorganization of the government prevented him from attending until four weeks later.

Preliminaries

In the meantime, however, attempts were made to gather up and organize the great mass of information—historic, geographic, ethnographic, economic, and the like—which had been prepared by the various elaborate research agencies of the chief Allied States for use at the inevitable peace conference. Great numbers of distinguished scholars, lawyers, diplomats, journalists, and business men had been working for months gathering facts which might have a bearing on the solution of the many intricate and complex problems which would have to be met. For the tasks which confronted the Allied statesmen at the close of the World War were incomparably

greater than those of any previous peace conference, and the aim of most of the Allied statesmen was an "enduring peace," based in so far as possible upon justice and an adequate knowledge of the necessary facts.

Paris was fittingly designated as the seat of the peace conference, and early in 1919 the national delegations began to arrive. In some cases their members numbered into the hundreds—"trained diplomats, soldiers, sailors, airmen, civil administrators, jurists, financial and economic experts, captains of industry and spokesmen of labor, members of cabinets and parliaments, journalists and publicists of all sorts and kinds"—together with their clerks and typists. Whole hotels—sometimes several—were needed to accommodate the various groups. At the head of each delegation were the plenipotentiaries, of whom there were seventy representing the thirty-two Allied and Associated States. Although there was a noticeable absence of crowns and gold lace, the plenipotentiaries constituted a distinguished assemblage of the responsible statesmen of the world, including besides the President of the United States at least eleven prime ministers and twelve foreign ministers. Among them were such outstanding men as Clemenceau, Pichon, Tardieu, and Cambon of France; Lansing and House of the United States; Lloyd George, Balfour, and Bonar Law of Great Britain; Orlando and Sonnino of Italy; Hymans of Belgium; Dmowski and Paderewski of Poland; Pashitch and Trumbitch of Jugoslavia; Bratianu of Rumania; Kramarsch and Benesh of Czechoslovakia; Venizelos of Greece; and Smuts and Botha of South Africa. No delegations from the defeated powers were present during the drafting of the peace terms, for theirs was a rôle which called merely for the signing of the completed documents. This was to be a dictated, not a negotiated peace.

The Working Organization

On January 12, 1919, the two ranking delegates of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy held an informal meeting at which the first organization of the conference was mapped out. It was decided that those States which had declared war on, or

had broken off relations with, Germany should be represented at the conference, and that the number of plenipotentiaries of each State should vary from one to five, the five great powers to have the latter number.[1] A plenary session of the conference was to consist of the plenipotentiaries of all the powers, but the main organ was to be the Council of Ten, in a sense an outgrowth of the Supreme Inter-Allied War Council which had acted on matters of military policy during the last year of the war. This council should consist of two representatives of each of the five great powers, and should have the right to decide what questions were to be referred to the general conference, and to reserve to itself all questions which it considered needed preliminary treatment. It was further decided that the great powers should be represented on all committees or commissions, the others being represented only when questions directly affecting them were being discussed. It is thus obvious that the work of the conference was to be almost entirely in the hands of the great powers.[2]

The first plenary session of the peace conference was opened by President Poincaré in the French ministry of foreign affairs on January 18, 1919, the anniversary of the day when the German Empire had been proclaimed in the Palace of Versailles forty-eight years before. On the motion of President Wilson, Clemenceau was elected president of the conference. At that time the above arrangements made by the Council of Ten were approved with a few protests. At the second session, one week later, an attempt of the small powers to assert their rights was nipped in the bud, when Clemenceau let it be known that the great powers, backed by 12,000,000 soldiers, must control the conference. The second ses-

[1] Belgium, Brazil, and Serbia had three each; Australia, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hedjaz, India, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Siam, and South Africa, two each; Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay, one each.

[2] At the peace conference, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan were designated as the "Principal Allied and Associated Powers," the rest being designated merely as the "Allied and Associated Powers." For the sake of brevity, the former will be referred to as the "principal Allies" or the "great powers," the latter as the "small powers."

sion then formally ratified the appointment of the various commissions already decided upon by the Council of Ten. Although in theory all decisions of the conference required the approval of a plenary session, as a matter of fact only six plenary sessions were held before the treaty with Germany was signed. The full text of the treaty was not presented to the plenary session until the day before it was presented to the Germans, and then no formal vote was taken. For all practical purposes, therefore, the Council of Ten constituted the peace conference during the first two months. Its meetings were secret, but representatives of the other powers were given an opportunity to appear before the council in order to present their claims.

The intricate facts that underlay most of the problems which it was called upon to solve, facts which were constantly being made more difficult to ascertain because of the steady stream of propagandist pamphlets, treatises, ethnographic maps, and petitions which flooded the conference, soon convinced the Council of Ten that it must be assisted in its investigations. The result was the appointment of special commissions, varying greatly in size, to which difficult questions were referred for preliminary study and report. The four great powers always had representatives on each commission and other powers had seats on some of the larger ones. Before the treaty with Germany was completed, fifty-two of these commissions had been appointed to consider various problems. Although their reports were in no sense binding upon the council, many of the articles in the final treaties were taken bodily from the reports of commissions.

By the middle of March, two months after the opening of the conference, the only parts of the treaty with Germany which had been finally agreed upon were the military, naval, and air terms. None of the important and complex territorial questions had yet been decided, and commissions were still considering the financial and economic settlement. It must not be forgotten, of course, that the necessity for dealing with a great many of what may be called executive matters, in connection with bringing order out of chaos

in central and eastern Europe, prevented the Council of Ten from devoting its whole attention to treaty-making.

Nevertheless, the alarming conditions in Europe urgently demanded greater speed on the part of the conference. Several of the emancipated national groups were waging minor wars in order to seize debatable territory and confront the peace conference with *faits accomplis*. Famine and revolution were raging in a great part of the Continent. The menace of Bolshevism threatened central Europe; by April Hungary had already succumbed and Germany and Austria seemed to be on the verge. If central and eastern Europe fell into chaos while the Allied statesmen debated, the work of the conference would be of little avail, for there must be stable responsible governments with which peace could be signed. The resultant demand for an early peace and a definite ending of the war was most insistent.

The desire for greater speed in the drafting of the treaty together with the need for secrecy during the period of compromise between the great powers led to a change in the organization of the conference. On March 25 it was announced that informal conferences of the chief plenipotentiaries would take the place of the former meetings of the Council of Ten. The "Big Four"—Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando—ceased to attend the sessions of the Council of Ten, which, as the Council of Five, now sank to the position of a sort of superior commission. As such it considered the reports of the commissions already appointed, and transmitted them with its findings to the "Big Four." The latter, beginning with purely personal and informal conversations, finally constituted themselves the supreme Council of Four which made almost all the important decisions of the conference in respect to the treaty with Germany.

It was an interesting personnel which composed this council: Clemenceau, the dauntless Tiger, stolidly silent save when some remark disclosed his dry humor or stinging sarcasm, inclined to be cynical and dogmatic, inflexibly and courageously fighting for one object, the security of his beloved France; Lloyd George, the nimble-minded, responsive politician, shrewd, alert, dynamic, ingenious,

Wide World

THE BIG FOUR AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE
Orlando, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Wilson

more and more inclined to be lenient with the defeated powers, seeking by compromise and adjustment to bring speedily a peace which would facilitate Britain's much-needed revival of trade; Wilson, idealistic spokesman of the moral and spiritual forces of the world, clear-minded and resolute, tirelessly working to construct the League of Nations which he firmly believed would be the salvation of mankind; Orlando, learned, warm-hearted, eloquent, destined to play a relatively subordinate part in the general settlement, nevertheless struggling to satisfy the ambitions of his enthusiastic compatriots.

Almost inevitably conflict arose among these four statesmen when the time came for the various personal and national programs to be pressed, for the secret agreements based upon war alliances to be presented for fulfillment, for the abstract "Fourteen Points" to be transformed into definite treaty provisions. In the latter case, the very elasticity and vagueness which had made it easy for the powers to accept the "Points" made it likewise easy for differences in interpretation to arise when the latter came to be examined from the conflicting nationalistic points of view. The chief problem of the statesmen at Paris was to draft terms which would reconcile the opposing viewpoints of the Allied powers. No one man could dominate a group like the "Big Four." Agreement was possible only through compromise, though frequently affairs had to reach an actual crisis before a compromise or settlement was finally effected.

Problems and Crises

One of the earliest problems with which the peace conference wrestled was the proposed League of Nations. Even before the war much thought had been given to the possible prevention of international wars, and various societies had been organized both in Europe and in America to work toward that ultimate goal. The World War with its terrible bloodshed and suffering gave a great impetus to the movement, and during the final year of the conflict the idea of creating an international organization to prevent war made a tremendous appeal. By the time the peace conference assembled in Paris there was a general demand that this great in-

ternational assembly should create some common agency for the prevention of war. Perhaps the bulk of mankind in the western world hoped fervently that there might be drafted a "Maxima Charta of mankind securing to the nations their rights and liberties and uniting them for the preservation of universal peace." The spokesman of world opinion on this subject was President Wilson, who had asserted early in 1918 that for a just and stable peace a "general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small nations alike."

At the conference the question was immediately raised as to whether the Covenant of the League should be in the peace treaty or in a separate document. Wilson maintained that it should be an integral part of the treaty. Others, however, in view of the serious European situation, desired the speedy conclusion of a preliminary treaty of peace, which need not wait for the drafting of the Covenant. This treaty could settle such important questions as the boundaries and military establishment of Germany, could definitely end the war, and make possible the raising of the blockade of the Central Powers. Wilson, on the other hand, felt that the preliminary treaty would in reality be the main treaty and to leave the Covenant out would be to weaken the League, if not to postpone its creation indefinitely. Only by making it necessary for the nations to adopt the Covenant of the League in order to gain the benefits of the peace treaty was it possible to secure their immediate and unanimous approval of the various provisions of the Covenant.

The second plenary session of the conference, on January 25, 1919, voted that the Covenant of the League should be an integral part of the peace treaty, and entrusted the drafting of it to a special commission of which Wilson was chairman and upon which sat ultimately the representatives of fourteen States. This commission considered a number of drafts, among which the most important was undoubtedly that of General Smuts of the Union of South Africa, and at another plenary session of the conference on February 14, Wilson, in an eloquent speech, presented the report.

The draft Covenant of the League at once encountered considerable criticism. From the United States, especially, came an insistent demand that the Monroe Doctrine be safeguarded. In order to satisfy this demand Wilson brought forward an amendment to the Covenant, which he so worded as to avoid placing the United States in the position of asking a special favor. He proposed that

> Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.

The French, desiring a more exact definition of the Monroe Doctrine, objected to this amendment. The British and Italians, however, gave it their support, and Wilson, after an impassioned "speech of witching eloquence," delivered about twelve o'clock on the night of April 10, secured its adoption by the commission. The amendment became Article 21 of the Covenant of the League, and for the first time in history the European powers gave their official diplomatic recognition to the Monroe Doctrine.

At the final meeting of the commission on the next night the Japanese made an effort to have the preamble of the Covenant amended to indorse explicitly "the principle of the equality of Nations and the just treatment of their nationals." Wilson was at first inclined to favor the Japanese amendment, but Great Britain and Australia opposed it, and Wilson finally stood with the British. The chief objection to it was that it might be interpreted to mean the right of unrestricted Oriental immigration. Although a majority of the commission actually voted for the amendment, Wilson because of the lack of unanimity declared it not adopted. The Covenant in its final form was definitely approved at a plenary session of the conference on April 28.

While the problem of the League Covenant was still before the conference, a conflict arose over the question of French security.[3]

[3] The original French program of security as presented at the peace conference has been summarized as follows:

"(1) French military control of the Rhine; (2) a permanent alliance of the Great Powers to help France hold it; (3) a group of smaller allies to

Clemenceau asserted that Germany, because of the loss of her colonies, her navy, and her merchant marine by the treaty, was bound to feel bitter, and that this bitterness was most apt to be turned against France, her neighbor. Although the peace treaty would probably provide for the disarming of Germany, he demanded that in the further interest of French security Germany's western frontier should be fixed at the Rhine, a demand which was strongly reminiscent of the earlier policies of Richelieu and Napoleon I. The ten thousand square miles of territory lying on the left bank of the Rhine between Alsace and Holland should be detached from Germany and erected into an autonomous and neutral State. A secret treaty of 1917 with Russia had, in fact, stipulated that such a State should be created, and that it should be occupied by French troops until all the terms of the final treaty of peace had been fulfilled by Germany.

Even before the opening of the peace conference such a plan had been approved by the committee on foreign affairs of the French Chamber of Deputies, and it was well known that it was strongly advocated by Marshal Foch, who desired also that French troops should occupy the Rhine bridges until the full execution of the peace treaty. Although it was admitted that the inhabitants of the territory were thoroughly German in speech and life, it was argued that the Rhine constituted the one advanced line which could not be turned and which guaranteed France against invasion. The Rhine frontier, on purely military and strategic grounds, had much to commend it; but on the grounds of history and self-determination it could not be supported.

From the time the question was first raised, Lloyd George opposed the creation of a separate buffer State out of this territory. Indeed, the British government had refused to approve the Franco-Russian treaty of 1917, and in the following months Lloyd George had repeatedly insisted that "another Alsace-Lorraine" must not

menace Germany from the east; (4) territorial reduction of the German Empire; (5) crippling of the German political organization; (6) disarmament of Germany but not of the Allies; (7) a crushing indemnity; (8) deprivation of economic resources; (9) a set of commercial agreements preferential to France, prejudicial to Germany."—R. S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, II, p. 20.

be created. The French plan for a buffer State was also consistently opposed by President Wilson. The result was a crisis which was not solved for weeks. Both sides were determined, and debate

THE RHINELAND



among the "Big Four" was long and heated before a compromise was finally reached.

Clemenceau surrendered his demand for the creation of a separate State on the left bank of the Rhine. In return, however, he secured the occupation of this territory by an Inter-Allied force for at least fifteen years as a guarantee of Germany's execution of the

peace treaty. Furthermore, it was provided that the left bank together with a strip of territory fifty kilometers wide on the right bank should be demilitarized; that is, Germany should never maintain fortifications nor assemble armed forces within this zone. "*Die Wacht am Rhein*" was to be ended. Finally, and in addition, Lloyd George and Wilson promised France a guarantee treaty of security which provided that their two countries would come to the aid of France in case of an unprovoked attack by Germany.

Regarding one small section of the left bank a separate dispute developed. This was the Saar Basin, a highly industrialized area of about seven hundred square miles with 650,000 inhabitants, the extreme western part of which had become French under Louis XIV and another section during the French Revolution in 1792. In the first Treaty of Paris in 1814 these two regions had been left to France by the Quadruple Alliance, but after the "Hundred Days" the second Treaty of Paris had taken the whole district from France and given it to Prussia and Bavaria.

The basin was of great economic value because it included one of the richest and most concentrated coal beds on the Continent. It was estimated in 1913 that this district contained seventeen billion tons of coal, more than the whole known supply of France and equal to about twenty-two per cent of the total German reserve. Furthermore, the Saar mines lay on the outer edge of Germany, they were within a dozen miles of the new French frontier, they were already linked with the industries of Lorraine which were to become French, and with two exceptions they were the state property of Prussia and Bavaria. Clemenceau demanded the political annexation of the territory which had been French by the Treaty of 1814, and the full ownership of the mines but not the political sovereignty of the rest of the basin.

In view of the deliberate destruction of French coal mines by the Germans in 1918, and in view of the fact that pre-war Germany had a large surplus of coal, the Allied statesmen looked with favor upon French acquisition of the Saar coal mines. By the transfer Germany would lose only about six per cent of her total pre-war output of coal, while France's pre-war output would be increased

about forty per cent. The acquisition of these mines might justly balance the destruction of the French mines, and any excess value might be credited to Germany's reparation account. But neither Lloyd George nor Wilson favored the political annexation of the district by France. The problem, therefore, was to transfer the coal without the people, and the solution of the problem was achieved only after acute differences of opinion and long disagreement.

Again the final result was a compromise. France failed to secure the frontier of 1814. Germany for the time was to retain the political sovereignty of the region, but was to hand over the government of the district to a commission under the League of Nations for fifteen years. The coal mines were to be ceded to France, and the district was to be within the French customs boundary. After fifteen years the people of the basin should vote as to their future political status—reunion with Germany, union with France, or continuance under the League of Nations; but only those should vote who were resident in the territory at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Versailles. If the popular vote favored permanent union with Germany, the latter was to repurchase the mines of the basin at a price fixed by three experts, a Frenchman, a German, and a representative of the League of Nations.

The general problem of reparation, as distinct from its relation to the status of the left bank of the Rhine and the Saar Basin, likewise produced endless discussion and much friction. Although the Allies' demand in their pre-armistice Note of November 5, 1918, that compensation should "be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and to their property by the aggression of Germans, by land, by sea, and from the air," was so definite that it would seem to have precluded any serious difference of opinion at the peace conference, such was not the case.

In the opening weeks of discussion before the reparation commission of the peace conference, the British and French delegates contended for the inclusion of all war costs in the amount which Germany should pay, arguing that only thus would the settlement

really be based on justice. The American delegates, on the other hand, maintained that the demands which might be made upon Germany were limited by pre-armistice agreements and that, consequently, only reparation of damage should be collected, and not the costs of the war. Eventually this question was taken out of the hands of the commission and referred for settlement directly to the "Big Four." After Wilson had vigorously asserted that the inclusion of war costs was "clearly inconsistent with what we deliberately led the enemy to expect," the other three members gave way and agreed that Germany's reparation obligations should be limited to what might be called actual damage, the costs of the war being excluded. A single exception was made in the case of Belgium; Germany was to pay all of her war costs down to the signing of the armistice.

With this point definitely settled, the next difficulty arose over the meaning of the term "damage" as distinct from "war costs." At first thirty-one different categories of damages were considered, but the number was gradually reduced to ten upon which there was general agreement except as to pensions and separation allowances. The Allied statesmen vigorously urged the inclusion of these items,[4] and argued that there should be compensation for damage to the homes and families behind the front as well as for damage to the houses at the front. "Payment for a destroyed chimney was not to be placed above compensation for a lost life or a pension for a blinded or wounded soldier." The unanimous approval of the "Big Four" for the inclusion of war pensions and separation allowances was finally gained by a memorandum submitted by General Smuts.[5]

The next phase of the reparation problem concerned the question of the amounts, periods, and method of payment to be required of Germany. The committee which dealt with this subject was one of the first to be appointed and among the last to make its report. Throughout the discussion the American delegates contended for a

[4] It was roughly estimated at the conference that these items would equal a capital sum of $15,000,000,000.

[5] The memorandum will be found in H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference*, V, pp. 372–74.

fixed and reasonable sum. They argued that it would be well for the Allies to know exactly what they could depend upon to aid them in the rehabilitation of their own economic and financial situation and equally advantageous for the defeated powers to know exactly what they had to pay so that they could set about paying it. But the Allies could not agree on the amount which Germany could pay, and they felt that she should pay all that she could. Their estimates ran from $10,000,000,000 to $120,000,000,000. Furthermore, there was an unwillingness on the part of some of the delegations to present official estimates of the amount of the damage which they had sustained. Although eventually Great Britain did file a provisional estimate of British losses, the French steadily refused.[6] The American representatives, however, declared that they would not consent to any fixed sum unless they were satisfied of the damage to at least that amount.

The discussions dragged on interminably in the attempt first to reach some compromise agreement on a fixed sum, then to work out some settlement on the basis of maximum and minimum fixed sums. In the end it was decided that it would be unwise politically to fix any definite total in the peace treaty. Clemenceau asserted that whatever amount might be agreed upon would fall far short of the expectations of the French people and would bring the downfall of the government which accepted it. Lloyd George, recalling the campaign arguments of the election of 1918, readily fell in with this argument.[7] In view of the popular demand in many of the Allied countries that Germany should pay to the limit, it was finally decided to postpone the decision on the total amount.

A provisional solution was therefore eventually agreed upon. Germany, by May, 1921, should pay in gold or its equivalent a total of $5,000,000,000, an amount which the experts in general asserted she could pay from her quick, realizable surplus assets. The

[6] American engineering experts calculated that the actual material damage caused by Germany's aggression amounted to about $15,000,000,000.

[7] One British minister in that election had promised in regard to Germany: "We will get out of her all you can squeeze out of a lemon and a bit more. We will squeeze her until you can hear the pips squeak."—Sir A. Willert, *Aspects of British Foreign Policy*, p. 25.

question of further payments was left unsettled but was to be determined by that date, and the power to fix the final sum was to be vested in a reparation commission.

Another problem which long occupied the attention of the "Big Four" was the Polish question, which, although not actually threatening to disrupt the conference as at Vienna a century earlier, nevertheless did produce wide differences of opinion. Before the conference, the Allies had committed themselves to the restoration of a "united and independent Poland." This occasioned no disagreement. But Poland was "a ghost, roaming around in the Sarmatian plain, somewhere between Germany and Russia," and "what this disembodied spirit would look like if clothed again in flesh and blood," none of the Four actually knew. The only thing that was definitely known in the beginning was the Allied statement that the new Poland should include the territory inhabited by a population indisputably Polish, and "should be assured a free and secure access to the sea." It was these latter commitments which plagued the conference. To provide Poland with adequate access to the sea and at the same time not conflict with the idea of nationality was the problem.

A commission was appointed to study the Polish question and it is said to have held more meetings than almost any other commission of the conference. The difficulty of its problem arose from the extraordinary intermixture of Poles and Germans in West Prussia, where the population, originally almost entirely Polish, had been altered in the course of centuries by the infiltration of German immigrants. The problem was further complicated because the only available statistics regarding the numbers and distribution of Poles and Germans in West Prussia were those issued by the Prussian government.

Investigation revealed the fact that West Prussia fell racially into three zones. That along the western boundary was predominantly German, as was that also in the northeast on the right bank of the Vistula. But in the center and southeast there existed an unbroken corridor, extending through to the Baltic, in which the inhabitants were Polish-speaking. In its first report, late in March, therefore,

the commission on Polish affairs unanimously recommended that the central and southeastern zones of the province of West Prussia, including both banks of the lower Vistula and the city of Danzig, should be given to Poland. This would provide Poland with access to the sea and a satisfactory seaport at the mouth of the Vistula.

DANZIG AND THE POLISH CORRIDOR



But this recommendation was vigorously attacked, especially by Lloyd George. It was argued that such an arrangement would dismember Prussia, that it would separate East Prussia from the rest of Germany and turn it into "a German island floating in a Slavic sea." It would compel a German going by land from Berlin

to East Prussia to cross Polish territory. Furthermore, it was pointed out, this solution was not in accord with the ethnographic situation. The population of the city and district of Danzig, which exceeded 300,000, was overwhelmingly German, as was also the population in the narrow belt of territory around Marienwerder on the east bank of the Vistula.

On the other hand, Polish statesmen, backed by Clemenceau, maintained that either Germans must cross Polish territory to go by land to East Prussia or Poles must cross German territory in order to carry their commerce to the Baltic. They pointed out that East Prussia's most important item in trade had always been the export of timber by ship, and that Germans could easily carry on their commerce with the former by sea. Furthermore, they asserted, the rights and needs of 20,000,000 people in Poland ought to take precedence over those of the 1,500,000 in East Prussia. It was freely admitted that the population of Danzig and the Marienwerder district was predominantly German, but Wilson was quoted to the effect that every State had the right to conditions that would assure its economic life. Danzig was the natural port of Poland and of the Vistula river basin, and had been for many centuries outside the political frontiers of Germany. The possession of the Marienwerder district was necessary in order that Poland might control the lower Vistula and the one direct railroad between Danzig and the Polish capital, Warsaw.

Chiefly because of the opposition of Lloyd George, who felt that the number of Germans to be incorporated into Poland was dangerously large, several modifications of the report were finally made by the "Big Four." It was agreed that the Marienwerder district should not be transferred to Poland outright, but should be subject to a plebiscite. In regard to Danzig a novel scheme was evolved in order to insure Poland's economic interests in the port without actually annexing it to that republic. A district of about seven hundred square miles around the city of Danzig was to be established as a free city under the protection of the League of Nations. The Allies undertook to negotiate a treaty between Danzig and Poland which should bring Danzig within the Polish customs lines, should insure

to Poland free use of all waterways and docks necessary for Polish commerce together with the control and administration of the means of communication between Poland and Danzig, and should give to Poland the conduct of the foreign relations of the Free City. The executive of Danzig was to be a high commissioner appointed by the League of Nations. Finally, in order to provide for communication, Germany and Poland were to conclude a treaty giving Germany adequate railroad, telegraphic, and telephonic facilities across the Polish Corridor, and giving Poland the same facilities across the German territory lying between Warsaw and Danzig.

The crisis which gained the greatest notoriety and which probably took up more time than any other one problem at the conference was the question of Fiume and the Adriatic. On April 26, 1915, Italy had signed the secret Treaty of London with the Allied Powers and in this treaty had been promised, in return for her entry into the war, the acquisition of certain territories around the head of the Adriatic and down the east shore, including the two ports of Trieste and Pola. On the other hand, the same treaty had stipulated that the Croatian coast, including the Hungarian port of Fiume, and the Dalmatian coast from about Cape Planka southward, including the ports of Spalato and Ragusa, should go to Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro. This made everything very definite and should have simplified the work of the peace conference.

Unfortunately, after the war the Italians were not content with the gains stipulated in the Treaty of London. They demanded in addition the city of Fiume and territories of strategic and economic value which lay beyond the Treaty of London line. A strong public sentiment was aroused in Italy to demand especially the annexation of Fiume, the population of which was declared to be for the most part of Italian blood. By many Italians it was believed that the acquisition of Fiume was necessary to complete, with Trieste and Avlona, the "triple bridgehead for expansion in the Danubian and Balkan system" which was contemplated by Italy.

Furthermore, Italy had long aspired to the complete control of the Adriatic. It was partly to obtain the ascendancy in this sea that she had entered the war against Austria, and the boundary laid down

for Italy by the secret Treaty of London was essentially a strategic line. Although Italy's former rival in the Adriatic had now disappeared, to many Italians it seemed that a new competitor for the control of that sea was being raised by the creation of Jugoslavia. Italy had no desire for another strong commercial or naval rival. And if she could secure the port of Fiume in addition to Trieste, Pola, and Avlona, she would obtain practically a monopoly of the maritime trade of the Dalmatian coast and would greatly handicap the commercial expansion of Jugoslavia, whose only practicable port was Fiume. Consequently, Orlando and Sonnino put forward the Italian claims to that city.

But Italy's plan was temporarily "wrecked on the rock of President Wilson's firm determination that the Jugoslavs should have a seaport on the Adriatic sufficient for their needs." Wilson not only opposed Italy's annexation of Fiume; he even opposed the complete execution of the Adriatic terms of the Treaty of London which he claimed was not in harmony with the "Fourteen Points." Italy, however, had never bound herself to make peace on the basis of these "Points." Furthermore, the French and British delegates, though questioning the wisdom of Italy's adhering strictly to the terms of the Treaty of London, in view of post-war conditions, were willing to carry out the promises which had been made in that treaty. An impasse therefore was created.

For weeks the debate over the Adriatic settlement continued. The Jugoslav statesmen based their claim to Fiume and the Dalmatian coast in the first place on nationality. In 1910 the province of Dalmatia had a population of about 635,000, of which by the most extreme Italian claims only some 60,000 were Italians. By the same census, Fiume was shown to have a native population of about 24,000 Italians and about 16,000 Jugoslavs, but the latter asserted that this Italian majority had been built up in recent years by the deliberate policy of the Hungarian government, and that if the suburb of Šušak and adjacent rural district were counted in, the Fiume district would have as many Jugoslavs as Italians.

In the second place, the Jugoslavs based their claim upon self-determination. The Dalmatian deputies to the Austrian Reichsrat

had been Jugoslavs, and every commune but one in the whole province was in the control of the Jugoslavs. Evidence seemed to indicate that the great mass of the people in these regions resented Italian occupation of their territories. In fact, even the Italian statesmen seemed to realize that the population was Jugoslav in sentiment, for they opposed a solution of the question by a vote of the people themselves.

Finally, the Jugoslavs based their claim to Fiume on the fact that it was their only practicable seaport. South of Fiume there was in Jugoslavia only one railroad through to the coast, a winding rack-and-pinion road which came out at Ragusa but which would be very expensive to develop and operate as a first-class railroad. Actually, nearly all the standard-gauge railroads of Jugoslavia were in the latitude of Fiume and had their only direct outlet to the sea at that port. To hand over Fiume to Italy, it was maintained, would be an intolerable subjection of the Jugoslavs to foreign control.

On the other hand, Italy felt that she was entitled to more than the territories designated in the Treaty of London because the collapse of Russia had thrown a heavy burden upon her and had caused the war to last longer than anticipated. Orlando and Sonnino pointed out that the Dalmatian coast seemed to belong naturally with Italy, being shut off from the Jugoslav hinterland by rough mountain chains but being united to Italy by the sea which was the natural channel of communication for this region. In its climate, vegetation, and commercial activities, they asserted, the eastern shore of the Adriatic resembled Italy more than the Balkans. Furthermore, they declared, the city of Fiume was largely inhabited by Italians and, though in speech the great majority of people in Dalmatia were Slavic, in their customs, costumes, and cultural tastes they were Italian. Finally, the Italians invoked strategic reasons for their occupation of the Dalmatian coast, arguing that with the harbors of that province in the hands of a hostile power, Italy's long, harborless east coast was constantly open to attack.

On the latter ground the Allies were inclined to be generous with Italy. In the Tirol region they willingly conceded the territory designated in the Treaty of London, even at the expense of

including 250,000 Germans, in order that Italy might have an impregnable military frontier. Similarly in the region to the northeast, Italy's boundary for economic and geographic reasons was pushed to the crest of the mountain barrier although this brought more than 300,000 Jugoslavs under Italian rule. Wilson, for the reasons given and because he expected the Italians to moderate their demands in the Adriatic, assented to these boundaries.

But regarding Fiume and Dalmatia, Wilson was obdurate. He stood definitely against Italy's acquisition of Fiume, and even demanded the modification of the boundary drawn by the Treaty of London. In fact, Wilson himself drew a boundary, known as the "Wilson Line," which cut down the London terms though it conceded to Italy for strategic reasons the three key positions of Pola, Lissa, and Avlona. A memorandum supporting this line was presented directly to the Italian delegation by Wilson on April 14, but, since it denied Fiume to Italy, Orlando and Sonnino refused to accept it, fearing to offend the aroused national spirit of the Italian people.

Finally, on April 23, Wilson gave to the press a statement of his reasons for opposing Italy's claim to Fiume. He concluded his statement with the assertion that the claim was contrary to the principles for which America had fought, contrary to the principles upon which she could consent to make peace, contrary to those upon which she hoped and believed "the people of Italy" would ask her to make peace. Orlando at once condemned Wilson's statement as an appeal "to the peoples outside of the governments which represent them, I should say, almost in opposition to their governments." Excitement reached a high pitch when, later in the same day, it was announced that "the Italian Delegation has decided to leave Paris to-morrow." Although the Italian delegates actually returned to Rome, they realized that their continued absence from the conference would exclude Italy from the benefits of the treaty and so, having found that the Italian people supported them in their opposition to Wilson, they returned to Paris. Orlando resumed his place in the Council of Four on May 9, but on June 19 his ministry fell and he and Sonnino were succeeded in Paris by Nitti and Tittoni. The peace conference

never succeeded in solving this problem but left it to be settled by direct negotiations between Italy and Jugoslavia.[8]

Two perplexing problems of the conference had to do with affairs outside Europe; namely, the disposition of Germany's colonies and of her concession in Shantung. Before the peace conference met, it was generally taken for granted among the Allies that Germany's conquered colonies would not be returned, and, when the question of disposing of them first came up in January, the great powers of Europe favored outright annexation. Wilson, however, opposed this procedure and pronounced in favor of a mandatory scheme which apparently had been conceived earlier by both General Smuts and Colonel House, and which was supported by Lloyd George. This plan provided that to the various colonies which were "inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization." The various colonies should, therefore, be distributed among the powers as mandates which the powers should administer in trust for the League of Nations, to which they must make an annual report. The mandates might differ in character according to their conditions, but to all members of the League there should be equal opportunity for trade and commerce.

Wilson saw in this novel scheme, which had no counterpart in the past, an opportunity to increase the influence of the League of Nations and at the same time to prevent an out-and-out annexationist policy on the part of the European States. Others saw in it an opportunity to deprive Germany of her colonies without having to credit their value to the reparation account. Although French colonial circles were inclined to question the practicability of the proposal, the only open opposition came from Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa. In the end, however, the mandatory system was adopted and applied to the former German colonies and to non-Turkish regions of the Ottoman Empire.

At about the same time that the Fiume question was occasioning such a furor at the conference, the Shantung crisis became acute.

[8] See pp. 417, 446.

In 1898 Germany had acquired by lease extensive rights over an area of about 117 square miles in the Shantung peninsula. In this area she had constructed the port of Kiaochow and the fortress of Tsingtau. Early in the war Japan had joined the Allies and had captured Tsingtau; later, in 1917, Great Britain, France, and Italy had promised her Shantung and the German islands north of the equator. Definite engagements had thus been entered into which now arose to embarrass the conference. The Chinese government also had declared war on Germany, and at the conference the Chinese delegates demanded the restoration of Kiaochow to China. Wilson supported the Chinese in their demand and desired that Germany's rights in the Shantung peninsula should not be surrendered to Japan but should be returned directly to China.

But Japan was in possession of the district involved and her delegates were inflexible in their demand for the concession. Taking advantage of the strained situation at the time of the withdrawal of the Italian delegation, they insisted that the Japanese claim to Shantung be granted at once, else they would leave the conference, and refuse to sign the treaty or join the League. For a week the Shantung question monopolized the conference. Lloyd George and Clemenceau finally stated that they considered themselves bound by the pledges of 1917. Fearing that, in the face of these developments, the Covenant of the League of Nations might finally fail of adoption, Wilson yielded. On April 30 it was agreed that the peace treaty should stipulate that Japan obtained the former German rights in Shantung. On the same day that the agreement was finally reached, however, Japan promised that she would return the Shantung district to China in full sovereignty, keeping only the economic rights which had formerly been granted to Germany, and the right to establish a settlement at Tsingtau. This promise was carried out by Japan in 1922.

The Signing of the Treaty of Versailles

Despite the extreme strain produced by these different problems, despite the tense atmosphere which prevailed at such times as those when President Wilson in despair ordered his ship, the *George*

Washington, to come for him, when the Japanese plenipotentiaries threatened to leave the conference, and when the Italian delegation actually withdrew, the peace conference managed to hold together and continue its work. By the middle of April the German treaty was near enough to completion to justify inviting the German delegates to Versailles, and the latter, headed by Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, German foreign minister, arrived on the 29th. Although they were permitted unrestricted rights of communication with their own country, they were carefully guarded and given no opportunity to meet the other delegations until May 7, when the treaty was presented to them. On that day they were informed that they would have three weeks in which to make written observations on the terms but that no oral discussions with the Allied delegates would be permitted.

The counter proposals of the Germans, amounting to 443 pages, reached the Council of Four on May 29. They were immediately submitted to ten Inter-Allied committees of experts for consideration. On June 16 the Allied reply granted a few concessions, especially in regard to the Polish frontier, but in general left the treaty substantially unchanged. Germany was required to declare her willingness to sign the treaty, as modified, within five days or the armistice would terminate and the Allies would take the necessary steps to enforce their terms. In Germany the feeling was most bitter. "We are standing at the graveside of right," declared the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, "and the only doubt remaining is whether it also means the grave of the German nation. Never has a murder been committed in more courteous form in more cynical equanimity."

The Scheidemann government declared the treaty unacceptable, resigned, and was succeeded by one in which Gustav Bauer was chancellor and Hermann Müller foreign minister. In view of the necessary political reorganization in Germany, the Council of Four extended the final date of acceptance two days. "The time limit expired at 7 P.M. on the 23rd, but by 5: 20 P.M. displays of flags on the Hotels Crillon and Majestic and Astoria, and the press of people in the streets announced to all Paris that the Germans had consented to sign." Hermann Müller and Johannes Bell, minister for

the colonies in the new German government, were appointed German plenipotentiaries for the formal signature.

Although none of the meetings of the conference had been held in the great Palace of Versailles, arrangements were made to have the final ceremony in connection with the German treaty in the famous Hall of Mirrors in which, years before, the King of Prussia had been proclaimed German Emperor. There on June 28, 1919, the fifth anniversary of the assassination of the Austrian archduke, the final scene was enacted. When the delegates of all the Allied and Associated Powers—except China [9]—were seated, at three o'clock the German delegates were admitted. "Müller was pale and nervous, Bell held himself erect and calm. They were led to their seats just opposite the table of rose and sandalwood on which the book of the Treaty was placed." Upon Clemenceau's invitation the German delegates signed. After them the other delegates signed in the alphabetical order of their countries according to the French names, President Wilson signing first for *Amérique du Nord*. While the signatures were still being affixed the guns began to boom outside. At 3:40 P.M. the ceremony was over. In the gardens, whose gorgeous fountains were playing for the first time since the outbreak of the war, cheering throngs greeted the delegates at the conclusion of the historic ceremony which added the crowning distinction to the Palace of Versailles.

[9] As a protest against the Shantung settlement, the Chinese delegates refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles.

CHAPTER VIII

THE TREATIES ARISING FROM THE WORLD WAR

THE signature of the Treaty of Versailles did not conclude the work of the Paris Peace Conference. More than a dozen other treaties and conventions were eventually drafted and signed in the attempt to settle the many and complex problems raised by the World War—treaties between the Allies and the defeated powers, between the principal Allies and some of the newly created States, and even between some of the Allies themselves. Undoubtedly, however, the treaty with Germany was the greatest single achievement of the peace conference.

The Treaty of Versailles

The Treaty of Versailles, the longest document of its kind in history, consisted of fifteen parts comprising 440 articles, sufficient to fill a large-sized book of 250 to 300 pages. Part I was the Covenant of the League of Nations, to which the signatory powers agreed in order "to promote international coöperation and to achieve international peace and security." It consisted of twenty-six articles which will be discussed in a later chapter.

Part II of the treaty laid down the new German boundaries. In order "to redress the wrong done by Germany in 1871 both to the rights of France and to the wishes of the population of Alsace and Lorraine," these two territories were restored to French sovereignty. Slight changes in the German-Belgian frontier line were made in favor of Belgium in the vicinity of Moresnet, Malmédy, and Eupen. The last two were subject to a sort of plebiscite, which —although denounced by the inhabitants as unfair in its procedure— resulted in favor of annexation to Belgium. The rectification of this frontier was designed to clarify ambiguities in the treaties

of 1815, to compensate Belgium for certain losses resulting from the German occupation, and to increase slightly her economic and strategic strength. Belgium, in this way, added approximately 75,000 inhabitants to her population. Northern Schleswig, when taken from Denmark in 1866, was promised by Prussia that it would be reunited with Denmark if the inhabitants "should express such a desire by a vote freely given." This "vote freely given" Prussia never permitted. The Treaty of Versailles stipulated that the "frontier between Germany and Denmark shall be fixed in conformity with the wishes of the population," and provided for two plebiscite zones. In accordance with the plebiscites, which were held in 1920, the northern zone was assigned to Denmark and the southern to Prussia.

It was in the east, however, that Germany suffered her greatest territorial losses. She recognized the independence of Poland and renounced in the latter's favor about five-sixths of the former province of Posen and the greater part of the former province of West Prussia. In East Prussia two plebiscites were to be held in districts in the vicinity of Allenstein and Marienwerder, chiefly to determine whether Poland should control territory on both banks of the Vistula. Both districts later voted for union with Prussia and were retained practically intact. In industrial Upper Silesia a plebiscite was likewise to be held; but in this case the final division of the district was favorable to Poland.[1] Germany also surrendered a small section of Upper Silesia to Czechoslovakia. The Baltic cities of Danzig and Memel, together with a certain area in the vicinity of each, were renounced in favor of the principal Allied and Associated Powers. The former was established as a free city under the League of Nations; the latter was assigned in 1923 to Lithuania.

In territory outside her European frontiers, Germany renounced "all rights, titles and privileges whatever in or over territory which belonged to her or to her allies" (Part IV). Her former colonies were later distributed among Great Britain, France, Belgium, the

[1] See pp. 224–26.

Union of South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, as mandates of the League of Nations.[2] All the rights which Germany had secured in Shantung were renounced in favor of Japan, and all her other rights in China, together with those in Siam, Liberia, Morocco, and Egypt, she surrendered in totality.

A number of miscellaneous political and economic requirements were made of Germany (Part III). She consented to the abrogation of the treaties of 1839 which had established Belgium's neutrality. She adhered to the termination of the régime of neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, renounced her rights to the exploitation of the railroads therein, and recognized that Luxemburg had ceased to form part of the German Customs Union. She acknowledged, and promised to respect strictly, the independence of Austria, and agreed "that this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations." "As compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in the north of France and as part payment towards the total reparation due from Germany for the damage resulting from the war," Germany agreed to cede to France "in full and absolute possession, with exclusive rights of exploitation," the coal mines situated in the Saar Basin; and to renounce "in favor of the League of Nations, in the capacity of trustee, the government of the territory" for a period of fifteen years, as already discussed.[3] Finally, Germany agreed to recognize all treaties which might be made by the Allied Powers with States now existing in territory which was Russian on August 1, 1914, and to recognize the independence and frontiers of such States as determined by any of these treaties.

In the interest of French security as well as in the interest of general disarmament, the peace conference deliberately sought to weaken Germany's military and naval forces, and to limit her in the use of those which were actually left in her control. Part V and certain articles of Part III had this purpose in view. In these articles it was specifically agreed that, after March 31, 1920,

[2] See pp. 248–49.
[3] See pp. 166–67.

the Army of the States constituting Germany must not exceed one hundred thousand men, including officers and establishments of depots. The Army shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory and to the control of the frontiers.

There were to be neither military nor naval air forces. The Great German General Staff was to be abolished and might not be reëstablished in any form. The manufacture of arms, munitions, and other war material was strictly limited, and the import or export of war material was forbidden. Neither the manufacture nor the importation of poisonous gases was permitted.

A number of articles were designed to prevent Germany's evasion of the intended effect of the limitation of her military establishment. For instance, the number of customs officers, forest guards, and coast guards must not exceed the number functioning in 1913. The number of gendarmes might be increased only in proportion to the increase of population, and might not be assembled for military training.

Educational establishments, the universities, societies of discharged soldiers, shooting or touring clubs and, generally speaking, associations of every description, whatever be the ages of their members, must not occupy themselves with any military matters.

Universal compulsory military service was abolished. In order to prevent the extension of military training to a greater number of men, by having a rapid turnover in the personnel of the army, the treaty stipulated that the enlistments of officers must be for at least twenty-five consecutive years and those of privates for at least twelve, and that the number of officers or privates discharged in any one year must not exceed five per cent of the total effectives.

Germany was definitely restricted in the use of her military forces even within her own frontiers. She was forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications in her territory on the left bank of the Rhine, or on the right bank to a distance of fifty kilometers eastward. Those already existing were to be disarmed and dismantled. In this demilitarized area she was forbidden to maintain either temporarily or permanently any armed forces, or to conduct any military maneuvers. Germany's violation of these articles would be re-

garded as a hostile act against the signatory Powers. On the southern and eastern frontiers Germany must limit her system of fortified works to its existing state.

The German navy was restricted to six of the larger battleships, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers, and twelve torpedo boats, and she was forbidden to construct or acquire any warships except to replace units already in commission. Germany might not have any submarines, even for commercial purposes; and all existing submarines must be handed over to the Allied Powers or destroyed. As in the army, so in the navy the personnel was limited. The German navy must be recruited by voluntary enlistments for terms similar to those in the army, and must not exceed 15,000 men. Officers and men in the German mercantile marine must receive no training in the navy. The fortifications and harbor of Heligoland were ordered destroyed, never to be reconstructed.

Inter-Allied commissions of control were provided for in the treaty, to supervise the execution of the disarmament clauses. They were given the right to establish their organizations in Berlin, to send agents into any part of Germany, and to demand information and aid from the German government. The upkeep and cost of these commissions of control and the expenses involved in their work were to be borne by Germany.

Part VIII of the treaty had to do with the troublesome problem of reparation. The justification for reparation demands was stated in the now famous or infamous Article 231:

> The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

The Allied governments recognized "that the resources of Germany are not adequate . . . to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage"; but they did require that Germany should undertake

> that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property dur-

ing the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied or Associated Power against Germany by such aggression by land, by sea and from the air, and in general all damage as defined in Annex I hereto (Article 232).

The latter part of the statement was broad enough to include even the military pensions which the Allies had decided came within the category of civilian damages.[4] In addition to all this, Germany agreed to reimburse Belgium all sums which the latter had borrowed from the Allies up to the armistice, with interest at five per cent.

The treaty provided for a reparation commission which should determine the amount which Germany should pay over a period of thirty years, which decision was to be communicated to the German government by May 1, 1921. In the meantime, by the latter date Germany was to pay in gold, commodities, ships, securities, or otherwise as the Reparation Commission might fix, the equivalent of $5,000,000,000. Out of this amount the expenses of the Allied army of occupation should first be met, and the balance then applied on the reparation account.

As intimated above, reparation payments were to include certain definite commodities. Germany recognized

the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to the replacement, ton for ton (gross tonnage) and class for class, of all merchant ships and fishing boats lost or damaged owing to the war.

She therefore agreed to cede to the Allies all German merchant ships of 1,600 tons gross and upwards, together with one-half of her ships between 1,000 and 1,600 tons gross, one-quarter of her steam trawlers, and one-quarter of her other fishing boats, the last three groups to be reckoned in tonnage. In addition, Germany agreed to cause merchant ships to be built in German yards for the account of the Allies as directed by the Reparation Commission; but the total gross tonnage which she should be required to lay down over a period of five years should not exceed 200,000 per year.

Germany agreed to make certain definite deliveries of coal and coal derivatives to the Allies over a period of ten years: seven million tons per year to France, eight million tons to Belgium, amounts ranging from four and one-half million tons to eight and one-half

[4] See p. 68.

million tons to Italy, and such amounts as the Reparation Commission might designate to Luxemburg. She further agreed

> to deliver to France an amount of coal equal to the difference between the annual production before the war of the coal mines of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais, destroyed as a result of the war, and the production of the mines of the same area during the years in question; such delivery not to exceed twenty million tons in any one year of the first five years, and eight million tons in any one year of the succeeding five years.

France was also to receive per year for three years 35,000 tons of benzol, 50,000 tons of coal tar, and 30,000 tons of sulphate of ammonia.

In part satisfaction of her reparation obligations, Germany further agreed that she would devote her economic resources directly to the physical restoration of the invaded areas of the Allied Powers, to the extent that these powers might determine. The Reparation Commission, "for the purpose of meeting immediate and urgent needs," might demand the surrender by Germany of animals,[5] machinery, equipment, tools, building materials, heating apparatus, furniture, and like articles to replace similar articles which were "seized, consumed or destroyed by Germany or destroyed in direct consequence of military operations."

All of these various commodities which were delivered to the Allies would be credited to the reparation account at a price either fixed in the treaty or later fixed by the Reparation Commission. In case of default by Germany in the performance of any of her reparation obligations, the commission should give notice of such default to each of the interested powers, and might make recommendations as to the action to be taken in consequence of such default.

> The measures which the Allied and Associated Powers shall have the right to take, in case of voluntary default by Germany, and which Germany agrees not to regard as acts of war, may include economic and

[5] For example, Germany was required to deliver within three months to France, 500 stallions, 30,000 fillies and mares, 2,000 bulls, 90,000 milch cows, 1,000 rams, 100,000 sheep and 10,000 goats; to Belgium, 200 stallions, 5,000 mares, 5,000 fillies, 2,000 bulls, 50,000 milch cows, 40,000 heifers, 200 rams, 20,000 sheep, and 15,000 sows.

financial prohibitions and reprisals and in general such other measures as the respective Governments may determine to be necessary in the circumstances.

A great number of the articles of the treaty dealt with more or less technical matters: prisoners of war and graves; financial clauses; economic clauses; aërial navigation; ports, waterways, and railways; and labor. In the articles on waterways, the conference sought to provide access to the sea for landlocked countries of Europe by establishing international control over rivers which flowed through more than one country. International commissions were set up to control the Rhine, Oder, Elbe, Niemen, and Danube. In the control of three rivers considered as German—the Rhine, Oder, and Elbe—Germany was therefore placed in a minority. The treaty provided for free zones for Czechoslovakia in the harbors of Hamburg and Stettin. Finally, the Kiel Canal was to be free and open on terms of equality to the mercantile and war ships of all nations at peace with Germany. The articles on labor had to do with the International Labor Office which was to be established as part of the organization of the League of Nations, and will be discussed later.[6]

In response to the aroused public sentiment in Allied countries during the war and just following it, Part VII publicly arraigned "William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties." A special tribunal was to be constituted to try the ex-Emperor; but the Allied request for his extradition by the Netherlands was refused by the latter, so that the trial never took place. In respect to German "atrocities," Germany recognized the right of the Allied Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war, and agreed to hand over such persons as the Allied Powers should specify. In the face of German protests, however, the Allies later gave way and permitted trials in Leipzig to be substituted for the trials established by the treaty. Only about a dozen of the hundred or more accused were ever brought to court, and most of

[6] See pp. 215–16.

them received merely light sentences as a result of the perfunctory trials conducted by the Germans themselves.[7]

Certain guarantees for the execution of the Treaty of Versailles were stipulated in the treaty itself. German territory to the west of the Rhine, together with the bridgeheads, was to be occupied by the Allied troops for a period of fifteen years from the coming into force of the treaty. If the conditions of the treaty were faithfully carried out by Germany, the occupation would be gradually restricted. At the expiration of five years the Cologne area would be evacuated; at the end of ten years, the Coblenz area; at the end of fifteen years, the Mainz area and all other German territory under occupation. If before the expiration of the fifteen years Germany should comply with all the undertakings resulting from the treaty, the occupying forces would be withdrawn immediately. If, on the other hand, the guarantees against unprovoked aggression by Germany were not considered sufficient by the Allied governments, the evacuation of the occupying troops might be delayed to the extent regarded as necessary for the purpose of obtaining the required guarantees. Finally,

> In case either during the occupation or after the expiration of the fifteen years referred to above the Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to observe the whole or part of her obligations under the present Treaty with regard to reparation, the whole or part of the areas . . . will be reoccupied immediately by the Allied and Associated forces.

The effects of the treaty upon Germany were far-reaching. Of her territory in Europe she was deprived of more than 25,000 square miles; of her population she lost about 6,000,000. But her loss of raw materials was far greater and much more serious. Her pre-war resources of iron, coal, oil, potash, lead, zinc, and foodstuffs were all greatly diminished. With Alsace-Lorraine went iron, petroleum, and potash; with the Saar Basin went coal. With the removal of Luxemburg from the German industrial system went still more iron. With the lost regions in Upper Silesia, next to the Ruhr the most important industrial district in pre-war Germany,

[7] Field Marshal Hindenburg, who was elected President of the German Republic in 1925, was one of the "War Criminals."

went coal, zinc, lead, together with many foundries and mills. Altogether, Germany was compelled to surrender approximately 65 per cent of her iron ore reserves, 45 per cent of her former coal wealth, 72 per cent of her zinc ore, 57 per cent of her lead ore, from 12 to 15 per cent of her principal agricultural products, and about 10 per cent of her manufacturing establishments.

Oversea, Germany lost an area of about one million square miles with a population of more than 12,000,000 natives. With this region went about 25 per cent of her pre-war rubber supply, besides valuable oils and fibers. Her merchant marine, before the war totaling nearly 5,500,000 tons, was reduced to 400,000 tons. Many of the bases of her pre-war foreign commerce, such as her special privileges, capitulations, and concessions in China, Siam, Morocco, Liberia, and Egypt, were destroyed. She forfeited many of her pre-war commercial treaties with the Allied Powers, was for a short period forbidden to discriminate against the commerce of any of the Allies, and in several respects had to grant without reciprocity most-favored-nation treatment to the Allies for a period of five years.

Possessing before the war the mightiest military machine in the world, she was reduced by the treaty to a peace army less than one-eighth the size of her pre-war establishment, and with no reserves. Her navy from being second only to that of Great Britain was reduced to comparative insignificance. Foreign armies were stationed in her territory, there to be maintained at her expense. Foreign commissions, likewise maintained at her expense, were given power to interfere in her economic and military life. On top of it all, she was committed to a reparation bill of unknown size which gave every indication of mounting into the tens of billions of dollars. It was a severe treaty, but it was in response to popular demand in the Allied countries, and should always be read in connection with the treaty which the Central Powers dictated to Russia at Brest-Litovsk.[8] Furthermore, it was President Wilson's idea that most of the treaty provisions would be more or less temporary,

[8] See pp. 86–88.

while the League of Nations would endure and eventually operate to correct the evils which might later appear.

The Treaties with Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary

After the signature of the Treaty of Versailles,[9] other treaties were signed in 1919 with Austria and Bulgaria, and in the following year with Hungary and Turkey. In the drafting of the subsequent peace treaties, the Treaty of Versailles served as the general model. Many of its clauses were transferred bodily into the later treaties, and many of its principles were simply modified to fit the other States.

The treaty with Austria takes its name from St. Germain, near Paris, where it was signed. Most of this treaty was completed before the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. While the Germans were still considering their fate, the second of the peace treaties was presented to the Austrians on June 2, 1919. Like the Germans, they were given permission to make written observations. Then followed what has been called the "war of preambles." The Austrian delegates asserted that their State, "German Austria," was a new State, created after the armistice, and had never been at war with the Allies. It was just as much a successor State of the Habsburg empire, they declared, as Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the others. Although the Allies, in their first draft, had carelessly referred to the "Republic of Austria" as a "new and independent State," on second thought they altered their phraseology to conform more closely to their assertion that Austria was an old State simply shorn of certain of its outlying provinces and endowed with a new government. Accordingly the final preamble stated that "the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has now ceased to exist, and has been

[9] The departure of Wilson and Lloyd George immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Versailles brought about the dissolution of the "Big Four." Subsequent negotiations and treaty-drafting were under the direction of the Council of Five, which now became known as the Supreme Council and which continued to sit in Paris until January 21, 1920, when, upon Clemenceau's resignation, the Supreme Council as such formally ended. It was succeeded by the Council of Ambassadors composed of the American, British, Italian, and Japanese ambassadors at Paris and of a French representative.

replaced in Austria by a republican government." Austria was forced to drop the modifying "German" from her title, and was further compelled to accept responsibility for the loss and damage inflicted upon the Allied Powers "as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Austria-Hungary and her allies."

One reason that the Austrians had adopted "German Austria" as the official designation of their State was that it pointed the way toward their desired incorporation in the new German Republic. Their purpose in proclaiming their union with Germany on the same day that they proclaimed their republic, has already been discussed.[10] On racial and economic grounds the union seemed a natural arrangement and, in general, it was approved by the American delegation. The French, however, were firmly determined that Germany should not make good her losses in other places by annexing a still greater number of her kinsmen in Austria, and their view was finally accepted by the peace conference. It was stipulated in the treaty that the independence of Austria was inalienable except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. It was further specified that Austria must "abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly, or by any means whatever, compromise her independence."

In dealing with central Europe, the peace conference was "placed in the position of executor of the Habsburg estate." Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Jugoslavia, Austria, Hungary, and Italy were the heirs, and by the time the conference assembled in January, 1919, they had already divided the territories of the Habsburgs in a rough, provisional fashion. But the heirs were in general jealous, grasping, and quarrelsome so that the statesmen at Paris had a dual task. They had to adjust the conflicts which had begun between the different nationalities before they developed into actual war; and they had "to effect a definitive division of the Habsburg inheritance that would be just, practical, and conducive to the peace and security of Europe."

The drawing of international boundaries is not easy, at best.

[10] See pp. 134–35.

The principles that may be adopted for such work are many, and include ethnic, economic, geographic, historic, and strategic considerations. Perhaps most important of all is the factor of national safety. But few indeed are the instances where boundaries which afford adequate national safety at the same time conform to historic and ethnic rights. In central Europe the lines of nationality were rarely so clear-cut that boundaries could be drawn to the satisfaction of all involved. Few of the Habsburg races were separated from their neighbors by clearly marked natural frontiers. Lines of former administrative divisions were of little avail, for most of the provinces contained two or more races jumbled together. Questions of railway and canal communication as well as those of economic dependence had to be considered. It is little wonder, therefore, that the peace conference was obliged to work long and hard on this problem, only in the end to receive chiefly bitter criticism.

Again it must be emphasized that most of the provisions of the treaties were not drafted hastily by the statesmen of the great powers, but were rather the result of the careful investigation and study of a group of experts who were appointed for this purpose. Experts representing the United States, France, Great Britain, and Italy composed the commissions which drafted the new boundaries. When the report of a commission was unanimous, it was usually adopted without modification. Occasionally, however, when political considerations were involved or when a situation became especially acute, the "Big Four" took the whole problem into its own hands for settlement. Then "one might have seen President Wilson himself on all fours, kneeling on a gigantic map spread upon the floor and tracing with his finger a proposed boundary, other plenipotentiaries grouped around him, also on all fours."

Aside from the question of Fiume, which was left for Italy and Jugoslavia to decide, the statesmen at Paris succeeded in making some sort of provision for all the territory of the former Dual Monarchy. Austria lost not only all her earlier subject peoples but even some of her own Germans as well. To Italy she ceded Trentino, southern Tirol (although the latter included 250,000 Germans), Trieste, Istria, and two islands off the Dalmatian coast. To Czecho-

slovakia she lost part of Lower Austria, most of Austrian Silesia, Moravia, and Bohemia, with perhaps 3,000,000 Germans. To Poland she lost Galicia; to Rumania, Bukowina. The duchy of Teschen was divided between Poland and Czechoslovakia.[11] To Jugoslavia she surrendered Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with the Dalmatian coast and islands. Austria sank from an empire with a population of about 30,000,000 to a small landlocked State of only 6,500,000.

Most of the other provisions of the treaty were similar to those drawn up for Germany. Austria's army was reduced to 30,000 men, and placed under various limitations. Her entire navy was surrendered, and was in the future to consist of only three police boats on the Danube. She must make reparation, the amount to be determined by the Reparation Commission. States which contained territory of the former empire, however, were required to assume a proportional amount of the Austrian pre-war national debt. In order that Austria might have free access to the Adriatic, she was given the right to transport goods over the territories and in the ports formerly in the empire and was to receive in those territories and ports national treatment in respect to charges, facilities, and all other matters. On the other hand, she was obliged to concede to Czechoslovakia the right to send her own trains over certain Austrian lines toward the Adriatic. Although the Austrian Assembly vigorously protested against the detachment of Germans in Bohemia and Tirol, and against the prohibition of Austrian union with Germany, it eventually changed the name of the State from "German Austria" to "Austria," assented to the new boundaries as outlined in the treaty, and agreed to safeguard the rights of the racial, religious, and linguistic minorities of the republic. The completed treaty was finally signed on September 10, 1919.

Shortly before the signing of the Treaty of St. Germain, Bulgaria

[11] Teschen was a small industrial region claimed by both Poland and Czechoslovakia. The treaty called for a plebiscite to decide its fate, but the two claimants eventually requested the Council of Ambassadors to divide it. The line which the latter drew, based on the Olsa River, was accepted by the two powers on July 28, 1920. It gave most of the mines to Czechoslovakia, and the old town itself together with many industrial establishments to Poland. As was to be expected, it entirely satisfied neither country.

was presented with the first draft of the treaty which she finally signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine on November 27, 1919. Although she suffered far less shrinkage in territory than any other of the defeated powers, she did not escape altogether. Her most serious loss was western Thrace, which she had gained from Turkey in 1913, and which provided her only direct access to the Ægean. This she was compelled to surrender to the Allies, who handed it over to Greece. In the west she was obliged for strategic reasons to cede three small areas to Jugoslavia. These were awarded to the latter in order that she might control certain mountain passes and thus obtain greater security in time of war for her Nish-Saloniki railway. Slight alterations were made also in the Greco-Bulgarian boundary line. In view of Bulgaria's loss of her coast line on the Ægean, the Allied Powers undertook to insure her economic outlets to that sea. Bulgaria's military establishment was limited, like those of Germany, Austria, and Hungary, and her navy was surrendered. She was obliged to recognize her liability to make reparation, the amount in this case being fixed at $450,000,000, payable in thirty-seven years from January 1, 1921. As a result of the war and the peace treaties, Bulgaria became one of the least of the Balkan States in area, resources, population, and military power.

Although it had been intended to open the peace negotiations with Hungary at the same time as with Austria, the signing of the peace treaty in the Grand Trianon did not occur until June 4, 1920. The chaotic domestic political situation in Hungary was the cause of this delay. In March, 1919, Karolyi's government in Hungary gave way to a Communist régime under Bela Kun, which continued until August, when the Communist leader fled before an advance of Rumanian troops. A period of Rumanian occupation and looting then ensued, and it was not until late in November that a coalition ministry was organized in Hungary which the Supreme Council at Paris would recognize. In January, 1920, the first draft of the proposed treaty was presented to the Hungarian delegation headed by Count Apponyi.

As with Austria, so with Hungary a debate over the phraseology of the preamble occurred. The original draft treaty referred to the

Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as having ceased to exist and as having "been replaced in Hungary by a republican government." This latter statement the Hungarians wished to have deleted and they requested that the name of "Hungary" be substituted for that of "Hungarian Republic" wherever it occurred in the treaty or in official documents. The Allies consented to alter the preamble of the treaty in such a way as to satisfy the Hungarians and even to permit of the restoration of monarchy. But they clearly reiterated their view regarding the return of a Habsburg when, on February 2, 1920, they stated that

> they cannot admit that the restoration of the Hapsburg Dynasty can be considered merely as a matter interesting the Hungarian Nation, and hereby declare that such a restoration would be at variance with the whole basis of the Peace Settlement, and would be neither recognized nor tolerated by them.

In spite of vigorous Hungarian denunciations of the Allied procedure in announcing the future boundaries of Hungary as early as June 13, 1919, without recourse to plebiscites, the boundaries stood as proclaimed. Former Hungarian territory was awarded to every surrounding State—Jugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, even Austria. To Jugoslavia went Croatia-Slavonia, and part of the Banat of Temesvar; [12] to Rumania, the rest of the Banat, Transylvania, and some of the Hungarian plain to the west; to the Czechoslovak Republic, Slovakia and territory to the east and south of the Carpathians inhabited by some 500,000 Ruthenians; to Austria, German West Hungary,[13] the latter being the only case in Europe where one of the Central Powers was given additional territory. The fate of Fiume, Hungary's one direct outlet to the sea, was left to the negotiations of Italy and Jugoslavia, but at least it was lost to the Magyars. Hungary was reduced from a country with an area

[12] All of the Banat of Temesvar was claimed by Rumania on ethnic and geographic grounds, while Jugoslavia claimed the western and central part on historic grounds. The western third of the district was given to Jugoslavia, the rest to Rumania. For the ethnic characteristics of the Banat, see map in I. Bowman, *The New World* (1921), p. 272.

[13] As the result of a plebiscite held in December, 1921, the town of Sopron was later receded to Hungary. See A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1920–1923*, pp. 304–307.

of over 125,000 square miles and a population of over 20,000,000 to a small landlocked State with only 35,000 square miles of territory and about 8,000,000 inhabitants; while outside these greatly contracted frontiers dwelt some 3,000,000 of their kinsmen. The territorial adjustments were difficult to reconcile with any one clear-cut principle.

The rest of the terms of the treaty were substantially the same as those of the Treaty of St. Germain. Count Apponyi resigned from the Hungarian delegation as a protest against the refusal of the Allies to make desired modifications, but the delegation was reorganized and the Hungarian treaty was eventually signed on June 4, 1920, in the Long Gallery of the Grand Trianon Palace, adjoining the Park of Versailles.

The Minorities Treaties

In spite of the great advance toward nationalism which came as a result of the World War, Europe was still far from organized into purely national States. So many considerations entered into the drafting of the new boundary lines that, even with the best of intentions, it was impossible to prevent the inclusion of racial minorities in some States. Along almost every frontier there were these minorities, a fact which gave considerable concern to the statesmen at Paris. President Wilson, for example, believed that nothing was "more likely to disturb the peace of the world than the treatment which might in certain circumstances be meted out to minorities." To provide for this situation the "Big Four" decided to incorporate minimum guarantees for racial, linguistic, or religious minorities in the fundamental law of several of the European States. To this end, appropriate provisions were inserted in the peace treaties with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, and special treaties for this purpose were signed with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Jugoslavia, and Greece.[14]

Although the minorities treaties differed slightly in details, they were very similar. In general, the various States agreed to assure

[14] Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia, and Albania later entered into engagements with the League of Nations to observe toward their minorities obligations more or less identical with those laid down in the minorities treaties.

full and complete protection of life and liberty to all their inhabitants without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race, or religion. All inhabitants were entitled to the free exercise, public and private, of any creed, religion, or belief the practice of which would not be inconsistent with public order or public morals. Such minorities were further granted the free use of any language in private business and in private schools, and the right to instruction in the public primary schools in their own language if they constituted a considerable proportion of the population. In some cases particular privileges, such as the right of Jews to observe their Sabbath as a holiday, were guaranteed. The protection of minority rights was placed in the hands of the League of Nations, and the guarantees might be modified only with the consent of a majority of the Council of the League. The latter provision constituted a marked advance over the earlier method of guarantee merely by one or more of the great powers.

The States which were thus called upon to grant guarantees to minorities vigorously opposed the demand, insisting that they were being compelled to do something which the great powers themselves would never be willing to do. They pointed out that such exactions were an infringement of their own sovereignty and would only help to perpetuate the separatist tendencies which already existed among the minorities. The "Big Four," however, insisted that the demands were in the interest of the peace of Europe, for which, after all, they were chiefly responsible, and forced the acceptance of the various guarantees.

The Treaties with Turkey

The last of the peace treaties to be concluded at Paris, and the only one never to be ratified was that with the Ottoman Empire, signed at Sèvres on August 10, 1920. Years before the signing of this treaty it had been stated that one of the Allied war aims was the "setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to Western civilization." Back of this announce-

ment at that time stood numerous secret agreements of the Allies looking to the eventual partition of the Turkish lands. Roughly, according to these, Russia was to obtain Constantinople and European Turkey from the Straits up to a line running from Enos on the Ægean to Midia on the Black Sea. In addition, she was to have the islands of Imbros and Tenedos in the Ægean, all the islands in the Sea of Marmora, territory on the Asiatic shore of the Bosporus, and the provinces of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, Bitlis, and part of Kurdistan.

The other Entente Powers were to share in the partition. Great Britain was to secure southern Mesopotamia with Bagdad, and the two Mediterranean ports of Haifa and Acre; France, the coastal strip of Syria, the vilayet of Adana, and an extensive hinterland; Italy, the Dodecanese in the Ægean, and an area in southwestern Asia Minor in the vicinity of Adalia which she hoped would include the coast from Adalia to Smyrna and the hinterland as far as Konia. Other agreements stipulated that the Arab population of the empire was to be freed and established as an independent Arab State, and that Palestine was to be internationalized.

But this disruptive program was never fully incorporated in the treaty with Turkey. Perhaps the most important single cause for this failure was the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the subsequent Bolshevik renunciation of Russia's historic aim to control Constantinople and the Straits. Uncertainty and differences of opinion at once developed among the Allies as to the fate of these regions thus freed from secret-treaty commitments. Before long Lloyd George, in view of the changed situation wrought by "new circumstances, like the Russian collapse and the separate Russian negotiations," was denying that the Allies were "fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital."

While the other treaties were being formulated by the peace conference, discussions were carried on intermittently regarding the terms of the treaty with Turkey. The severance of Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Arabia was generally accepted, but President Wilson succeeded in having the mandatory system applied to the

first three. The last had been practically promised independence on the basis of self-determination. Regarding the "Freedom of the Straits," there appeared to be unanimity among the "Big Four," and it was proposed that the United States should take a mandate for Constantinople and the Straits. President Wilson personally favored this solution, but stated that it was a matter for the American people to decide. During the early weeks of the conference Venizelos, the Greek premier and delegate, laid claim to the Smyrna area on the basis of nationalism. In the Greek Territorial Commission the French and British supported Venizelos' claim, while the American and Italian representatives opposed it. During the period in which the Italian delegates withdrew from the conference, Venizelos again pressed the Greek claim and finally obtained from Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Wilson a secret invitation to occupy Smyrna with Greek troops. The occupation took place on May 15 with the protection of British, French, and American warships. The Greek demand for Thrace likewise caused a difference of opinion. The British favored the Greek claims, while the Italians and Americans opposed. In March, 1920, however, the Greeks occupied eastern Thrace with the consent of the Allies.

According to Lloyd George, doubt regarding the American attitude delayed the final drafting of the treaty with Turkey, for, he declared, "We cannot settle Turkey till we know what the United States is going to do." But by the fall of 1919 opposition in the United States to Wilson's peace proposals became so strong as to militate against any American mandate in Turkey, and the President's serious illness subsequently destroyed the last hope of American influence in the Turkish settlement. On April 24, 1920, the definite terms of the treaty were agreed upon by the Allied ministers, meeting at San Remo, but not until August 10 was the treaty finally signed by Turkish representatives.

Under the provisions of the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, Turkey surrendered sovereignty over practically all her non-Turkish populations. In Arabia the Kingdom of Hedjaz was recognized as independent. Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, with boundaries extended to include Mosul, were to be entrusted to, or "advised and

assisted" by, mandatory powers.[15] Smyrna and its hinterland were to be administered by Greece for five years, at the end of which a plebiscite was to decide their future status. The Dodecanese and Rhodes were ceded to Italy, which by another treaty agreed to turn over the former to Greece. Other Greek islands in the Ægean, together with eastern Thrace up to the Chatalja line, were surrendered by Turkey to Greece. Turkey agreed to recognize the independence of an Armenian State to be constructed in the area of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis, the frontiers of which were to be decided by the President of the United States. Kurdistan was to receive an autonomous government or, if a plebiscite so decided, independence. The Straits were to be internationalized and the adjoining territory demilitarized. Constantinople and a region in Europe up to the Chatalja line remained under Turkish sovereignty. Turkey thus became little more than a shadow of her former self, a small Asiatic State in the Anatolian uplands around Angora.[16]

Although the Sultan, in Constantinople within the range of Allied warships, might be content with the mere shadow of former things, there were those in Turkey who demanded more of the substance. Back in the hills of Anatolia, far beyond the reach of Allied guns, the spirit of Turkish nationalism and Moslem fanaticism had been aroused by an experienced army officer, Mustapha Kemal. In September, 1919, while Allied statesmen still discussed in Paris, a congress of Turkish notables had met by his call in Sivas. They denounced the cession of any truly Turkish territory and thus laid the basis for the National Pact which was later signed by a number of deputies of the Turkish Parliament on January 28, 1920.

This pact became the creed of the Nationalist movement. In it the Nationalists agreed to the loss of the Arab provinces, to the opening of the Straits to international commerce, to the provisions

[15] On May 5, 1920, the powers at San Remo named France as the mandatory for Syria, and Great Britain for Mesopotamia and Palestine. In July, 1922, the Council of the League of Nations formally assigned the mandates.

[16] On the same day that the Treaty of Sèvres was signed, a tripartite agreement was made between France, Italy, and Great Britain by which spheres of economic and political interest were mapped out in parts of the new Turkey. The French "sphere" was Cilicia, north of Syria; Italy's was the southwest part of Anatolia outside the Smyrna area.

of the minorities treaties. But they demanded the retention by Turkey of all territory "inhabited by an Ottoman Moslem majority"; a plebiscite in western Thrace; the security of Constantinople, "the seat of the Caliphate of Islam, the capital of the Sultanate, and the headquarters of the Ottoman Government"; and, by implication, the abolition of the capitulations.[17] When the Sultan, doubtless under Allied pressure, dissolved Parliament and denounced the Nationalists, the latter held a grand national assembly at Angora, and organized a government with Mustapha Kemal at its head. By June, 1920, Nationalist armies were threatening the British on the Ismid peninsula, the French in Cilicia, and the Greeks in the Smyrna area.

In these circumstances Venizelos proposed, and the Allies approved, a Greek offensive against the Turks, and Great Britain advanced a loan to the Greek government. Greek armies at once began operations and before the end of the year succeeded in defeating the Nationalists and in occupying extensive regions of Anatolia including the city of Brusa. Nevertheless, early in 1921 the London Conference of the great powers, by inviting representatives from Athens, Constantinople, and Angora to meet with them, practically recognized in principle that the Treaty of Sèvres would have to be revised. The suggested modifications of the treaty were rejected, however, by both Greeks and Turks. A rift now began to develop among the great powers, for secret negotiations took place at this time between France and Italy and the Nationalists which foreshadowed later separate agreements.

During 1921 further military successes brought the Greek armies within two hundred miles of Angora, but their supreme attempt to capture the Nationalist capital in August and September resulted in failure. About this time France decided to come to terms with the Nationalists. In reaching this decision she was influenced by several factors: the unwillingness of the war-weary French to continue to supply men and money for the difficult campaign against the Turkish Nationalists in Cilicia; jealousy of Great Britain, whose naval

[17] The Turkish National Pact will be found in H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference*, VI, pp. 605–6.

preponderance made her the dominant force in the "joint occupation" of Constantinople and the Straits; loss of sympathy for Greece after King Constantine's resumption of the throne in that country; [18] and fear that Greece might become merely a satellite of her rival in the Near East. On October 20, 1921, France signed a separate treaty with the Turkish Nationalist government, in consequence of which French troops were withdrawn from Cilicia and the northern frontier of Syria was modified to the advantage of Turkey. The latter promised to look with favor upon certain economic concessions which France desired. That the Allies were divided in their attitude toward the peace settlement in the Near East was now evident even to the Turks. In the Greco-Turkish War Great Britain was maintaining a neutrality benevolent toward Greece; France now adopted the same attitude toward Turkey.

Early in 1922 the Paris Conference of the great powers offered sweeping modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres to conform with many of the demands of the National Pact, but the Nationalists, scenting victory, demanded the immediate evacuation of Anatolia by the Greeks as a preliminary of negotiations. Following the failure of these attempts at mediation, the Allied diplomatic front was further broken when Italy announced that she had signed an agreement with the Ottoman government "by which the latter undertook to examine favorably Italian applications for railways, mines, and public works in Asia Minor." Thus the scramble for economic advantage continued.

Late in the summer of 1922 the military situation in Anatolia underwent a drastic change. On August 26 the Turkish Nationalists suddenly launched an attack at Afium Karahissar, and succeeded in administering a decisive defeat to the Greek forces. A general retreat began, the Greeks fell into confusion, and the retreat became a rout. On September 9 the Nationalist forces entered Smyrna. Within a short time every Greek soldier in Anatolia was captured or driven off the mainland and the Nationalists, flushed with victory, were tempted to try conclusions with the Allied forces along the Straits. From this they were deterred by Lloyd George's

[18] See p. 562.

announcement that, in spite of the immediate withdrawal of French and Italian forces from Chanak, Great Britain was "prepared to do her part in maintaining the freedom of the Straits and the existence of the Neutral Zones," and by the declaration of the British commander in the Near East that "any attempt to violate the Neutral Zone will be resisted by all the naval and military forces available."

In the latter part of September the great powers issued a joint note inviting Greece and Turkey to a peace conference, based on two assumptions: that Turkish sovereignty should be restored in Thrace as far as the Maritza River; and that, until the peace treaty, Turkish troops should stay out of the neutral zone and Thrace. "Mustapha Kemal, like Bismarck after the battle of Sadowa, had to struggle with victorious generals breathing fire against their enemies. He had to weigh policy against glory, and to look into the future through the bewildering chances of war. His own personal wishes must have drawn him as strongly as his generals to accept the challenge of the British and to march for Chanak. He decided instead to meet the British general in peaceful discussion, and so won a greater victory than that of Afium Karahissar: he conquered himself, his generals, the fanatical Nationals of Angora, and he won, without loss of another man or gun, a favorable and honourable peace." [19] An armistice convention was signed at Mudania on October 11, 1922. Some three weeks later, on November 2, the Grand National Assembly at Angora deposed the Sultan and declared Turkey a republic.

The "revisionary" peace conference which was to draft a new treaty with Turkey opened in Lausanne on November 20, and was attended by delegates of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, the United States, Russia, Greece, Rumania, Jugoslavia, and Turkey. The inclusion of Turkish delegates made this the only one of the peace treaties which was negotiated and not dictated. A draft treaty was finally completed and presented to the conference on January 31, 1923; but at the last moment the Turkish delegates asked for further time to consider, and at length on February 4 definitely refused to sign because of certain economic and judicial clauses. It

[19] R. B. Mowat, *A History of European Diplomacy, 1914-1925*, p. 296.

appeared that the conference had failed; the delegates returned home. But it turned out that the conference had only been interrupted. Although the Turkish National Assembly rejected the draft treaty, it authorized the continuance of negotiations. On April 24, therefore, the conference resumed its sessions. Three months later, after the Allies had yielded on enough points to satisfy the Turks, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed on July 24, 1923.

The territorial extent of Turkey was slightly increased over what it was to have been according to the Treaty of Sèvres. Although Mesopotamia, Arabia, Syria, and Palestine were still recognized as independent of Turkey, the latter advanced her frontier in Europe to the line of the Maritza River, plus a small district to the west of it in one place in order that she might control Karagach and its railway station. The frontier with Syria was that stipulated in the Franco-Turkish agreement of October 21, 1921, and that with Iraq (Mesopotamia) was to be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations in case Turkey and Great Britain could not reach an agreement within nine months. In the Ægean Turkey retained the Rabbit Islands, off the entrance to the Dardanelles, and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos—these last to "enjoy a special administrative organization composed of local elements." The Dodecanese,[20] Rhodes, and Castellorizo, Turkey ceded to Italy; and all her other Ægean islands to Greece.

Turkey renounced all rights and titles over Libya, Egypt, and the Sudan, and recognized Great Britain's annexation of Cyprus. She accepted articles for the protection of minorities similar to those signed by several of the European powers, and agreed that "these provisions constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations." On the other hand, she obtained the recognition by the signatory powers of the complete abolition of the capitulations in Turkey, suffered no restrictions of her military and naval forces, and was released from any claim on the part of the Allied Powers to reparation on account of the World War.

[20] On October 8, 1922, Italy had announced that she considered her agreement to cede the Dodecanese to Greece had lapsed, because of the non-ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres.

By separate conventions, a number of other agreements were entered into which had the same force as the treaty itself. The "principle of freedom of transit and of navigation by sea and by air in the strait of the Dardanelles, the sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus" was recognized, and an International "Straits Commission" was to operate under the auspices of the League of Nations. Both shores of the Dardanelles and of the Bosporus were demilitarized, as were the islands off the entrance to the Dardanelles, and all the islands in the Sea of Marmora except Emir Ali Adasi.

A Greco-Turkish convention stipulated that there should "take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory." Exceptions were made in the case of the Greeks on the islands of Imbros and Tenedos and of those who were established in Constantinople before October 30, 1918, and of the Moslem inhabitants in the district in western Thrace which Greece had obtained in 1913 by the Treaty of Bucharest. Other conventions provided for the demilitarization of a region on both sides of the Greco-Turkish and Turko-Bulgarian frontier lines, and for the withdrawal of British, French, and Italian troops from Turkish territory immediately after the ratification of the treaty by the Turkish National Assembly. A comparison of the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne with the aims announced in the National Pact reveals that the Turks obtained nearly everything for which they had fought—ethnographic frontiers, freedom from international servitudes, and national independence.

The Conflict of Ideas

The contents of these peace treaties drafted at the close of the World War clearly disclose the conflict which was waged within the peace conference between the diplomats and statesmen of the old, "practical," Machiavellian school, on the one hand, and those of the new, idealistic, "forward-looking" school, on the other. Certain of the provisions seem to indicate that the preceding century had seen little progress in the principles of treaty-making. If a fear-

EUROPE AFTER T

OCEAN
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Ob R.
Archangel
EASTERN KARELIA
Helsingfors
Leningrad
Volga R.
SOVIET REPUBLIC (U.S.S.R.)
Moscow
Ural R.
Volga R.
Riga
Kovno
WHITE RUSSIA
Kiev
Dnieper R.
Don R.
Dniester R.
UKRAINE
Odessa
CAUCASUS MTS
GEORGIA
Tiflis
AZERBAIJAN
BLACK SEA
Constantinople
Sofia
BULGARIA
Danube
Erivan
ARMENIA
Tabriz
Angora
TURKEY
Smyrna
Athens
SYRIA
IRAQ
Bagdad
PERSIA
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CRETE
Scale of Miles
0 100 200 300 400 500

inspired desire to protect Europe against France was one of the basic principles in the Vienna settlement of 1814, it was far more so in respect to Germany at Paris in 1919. If the principle of "compensations to the victors" prevailed in 1814, it dominated in a degree only slightly less in 1919–20. Many of the terms imposed in these later years were worthy of Metternich, Castlereagh, or Wellington.

Nevertheless, the statesmen of the new school left their impress on the settlement. If the victors' desire for spoils deprived Germany of all her colonies and Turkey of much of her territory, the idealists dictated that those who gained control of these regions must hold them as mandates of a world society to which they must render account as stewards. If the desire for compensation or protection against Germany led to the demand for territory inhabited by an alien people, it encountered vigorous opposition, for nationalism was as much exalted in 1919–20 as it had been suppressed in 1814. Although the statesmen at Paris failed to usher in the millennium in respect to nationalist aspirations, an examination of the map of post-war Europe discloses the marked advance which has been made toward the coincidence of national and political frontiers.

Despite the fact that there were some instances of the arbitrary shifting of peoples from one State to another which were reminiscent of the Congress of Vienna, such procedure was the exception rather than the rule. More frequently, when the will of the people was not fully known, it was determined through the use of a plebiscite. And in most cases where it was felt necessary, for strategic or economic or geographical reasons, to incorporate an alien people within the bounds of any State, the attempt was made to safeguard them in their political, religious, and linguistic rights by minorities treaties under the protection of the League of Nations.

Finally, the statesmen at Paris, in creating the League of Nations, succeeded in giving practical expression to something akin to that "Holy Alliance" which had been only vaguely conceived in the visionary mind of Alexander I, but which had been characterized by the statesmen of those days as a "sonorous nothing," a "piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense." Thus, in 1919–20, though the

statesmen failed to decide wisely and ideally in every instance, they went far toward providing a future means of correcting and remedying their own worst blunders. For the League of Nations was an integral part of the peace treaties, the keystone of the post-war settlement.

CHAPTER IX

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ONE of the notable results of the Paris Peace Conference was its recognition that many of the problems which confronted it could be solved only by some form of permanent international organization. In consequence, the League of Nations, which was at first advocated chiefly as an instrument for the maintenance of peace among the nations of the world, was eventually seized upon by the statesmen at Paris and pressed into service as an agency for carrying out certain features of the peace settlement. In fact, the League became so firmly woven into the very warp of the treaties that without it certain of their provisions become incomprehensible and altogether unworkable. An examination of the work of the League of Nations during the first decade of its existence reveals that its most spectacular activities had to do chiefly with the execution of various provisions of the peace treaties, the settling of international disputes arising out of post-war readjustments, the healing of national ills caused by the war and its aftermath—in other words, with liquidating the war and implementing the peace.

The Structure of the League

The constitution of the League of Nations is the Covenant,[1] which comprises the first twenty-six articles of the various peace treaties drafted at the Paris Conference. The Covenant may be amended by the unanimous vote of the members of the Council with a majority vote of the members of the Assembly, for the League was created to be not a fixed and static thing, but a living, growing organism. Its growth is not—may never be—complete, for new powers and new duties with new machinery for their execution may

[1] Found in Appendix II.

be added year by year. Already several articles of the Covenant have been amended to adapt it to altered conditions.

The original or "charter" members of the League were the signatory States named in the Annex to the Covenant and such of those "invited" States there named as acceded without reservation to the Covenant within two months of its coming into force. Any fully self-governing State, Dominion, or Colony not named in the Annex may become a member of the League by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly, provided it gives effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations and accepts such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military and naval forces. At the time of the first meeting of the Council there were twenty-four members; by the time the First Assembly met the number had increased to forty-two; today there are fifty-four. A member may withdraw from the League after two years' notice of its intention so to do. Two States—Costa Rica and Brazil—have availed themselves of this privilege.

The League functions through the instrumentality of an assembly, a council, and a permanent secretariat. The Assembly is empowered to "deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world," and in it each member State has one vote and not more than three representatives. Meetings are held annually in Geneva, beginning on the first Monday of September. The president of the Council of the League assumes the office of temporary president of the Assembly until the permanent president and vice presidents for the session have been chosen, the president and vice presidents then constituting the General Committee which supervises the conduct of business. In addition to special committees, the Assembly is divided into six standing committees,[2] consisting of one representative from each member State.

The Assembly is the representative body of the League and as such somewhat resembles the representative legislatures of national States, but with the essential difference that it has no real law-

[2] They deal with: (1) constitutional questions, (2) technical organizations, (3) armaments, (4) budget and administration, (5) social problems, (6) political questions.

Ewing Galloway, N. Y.

ASSEMBLY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

making power. It is the instrument by means of which the nations of the League confer, advise, and deliberate. Here members may present for discussion "any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends." The Assembly controls the budget [3] of the League, selects the nonpermanent members of the Council, admits States into League membership, and participates in the election of the judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

The Council is composed of one delegate from each of the States entitled to representation. The Covenant of the League provided that the Council should have five permanent and four nonpermanent members, but the refusal of the United States to enter the League left only four permanent members. The total membership was thus only eight until in 1922 the Assembly increased the number of nonpermanent members to six. With the admission of Germany to the League in 1926, the number of permanent members was fixed at five—France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Japan—and the number of nonpermanent members was increased to nine. At that time the Assembly drafted new rules for the terms of the nonpermanent members, adopting a system which provides for three-year terms and for the retirement of three members each year.[4]

From 1923 the Council followed the procedure of meeting four times yearly, with extraordinary sessions as required, but in September, 1929, it decided to reduce the number of its regular sessions from four to three annually. When the meetings are held in Geneva or in some State not represented in the Council, the president is chosen in rotation, the member States being taken alphabetically. When meetings are held in some State represented in the Council, the delegate from that State presides. Representatives of States not members of the Council may by invitation sit with the Council when questions concerning them are under consideration. The scope of the Council's powers is the same as that of the Assembly, but the

[3] The budget for 1929 amounted to 27,026,280 Swiss francs (about $5,237,650).

[4] The terms of Canada, Cuba, and Finland expire in 1930; Spain, Venezuela, and Persia in 1931; Poland, Jugoslavia, and Peru in 1932.

Covenant delegates to it more specific tasks. It has the duty of formulating plans for the reduction of armaments, of advising on the means of protecting member States in time of foreign aggression, of mediating in case of international disputes, and of receiving reports from mandatory powers. In most cases the decision of the Council must be unanimous. Special emergencies and current work throughout the year are handled by the Council, which has become to a certain extent the League's executive organ.

The permanent Secretariat comprises a secretary-general and a large staff. The first secretary-general, Sir James Eric Drummond, was named in the Annex to the Covenant, but subsequent secretaries-general are to be appointed by the Council with the approval of a majority of the Assembly. The secretary-general acts in that capacity at all meetings of the Council and of the Assembly, and with the approval of the Council selects the staff of the Secretariat.

The preliminary organization of the League began even before the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. At the time the peace conference approved the text of the Covenant, on April 28, 1919, it authorized the appointment of an organization committee consisting of representatives of the powers constituting the members of the Council. Provisional headquarters of the League were established in London, and the secretary-general with the committee's approval selected the staff of the Secretariat. Permanent headquarters were later established in Geneva, which thus became the administrative center of the League.

The secretary-general is assisted by a deputy secretary-general and three under secretaries-general. These offices are distributed among the great powers, the secretary-general being British, the deputy French, and the three under secretaries German, Italian, and Japanese. The body of the Secretariat is composed of eleven sections,[5] which vary in size from six or seven persons to forty or fifty, the total personnel of the sections numbering about two hun-

[5] Political, information, legal, economic and financial, transit, administrative commissions and minorities questions, mandates, disarmament, health, social problems, international associations.

dred. In addition to the sections, there are numerous other units known as services, offices, or branches. The Secretariat as a whole requires a personnel of about five hundred men and women who are gathered from about forty different countries. In general it deals with what have been called the "civil service duties of the League."

The Permanent Court of International Justice, commonly called the "World Court," is also in a sense an agency of the League. It was stipulated in Article 14 of the Covenant:

> The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.

The Council, at its second meeting, began the execution of this article by naming a committee of eminent jurists to draft a plan for such a court. This committee, under the leadership of Elihu Root, former secretary of state of the United States, met at The Hague, and later submitted its report to the Council of the League at San Sebastian on August 5, 1920. With slight amendment, the Council in turn presented the report to the First Assembly, which, after adding a number of amendments, adopted the plan. Three days later a protocol of signature, to which the project for the court was annexed as a statute, was opened, and it was eventually signed by fifty-two States, forty of which had ratified it by June, 1928. The statute became effective in September, 1921, at which time it had been ratified by twenty-eight States. With the first election of judges in September, 1921, the court came into being.

The court is composed of eleven judges and four deputy judges chosen for nine-year terms by the Council and the Assembly, an absolute majority of votes in each body being necessary for election.[6] The court elects its own president and vice president, each holding

[6] The first judges elected were nationals of Brazil, Cuba, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States.

office for three years. The seat of the court is at The Hague, where annual sessions begin on June 15.[7] The first ordinary session lasted from June 15 to August 12, 1922.

The court has both "compulsory" and "voluntary" jurisdiction. Attached to the protocol adopting the statute of the court was an "Optional Clause" which pledged the States acceding to it to "accept as compulsory, *ipso facto* and without special Convention" the jurisdiction of the court in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty, a question of international law, or a breach of an international obligation. Only a few of the member States adopted this clause immediately, but during 1929 the number of governments pronouncing in favor of its adoption increased rapidly. In case of "compulsory" jurisdiction one State may summon another to appear before the court for trial, and if the latter fails to respond, the court may give judgment by default. The jurisdiction of the court is "voluntary" when States having a dispute agree to refer it to the court. In either type of case the court receives a written statement from each side, hears evidence and arguments in public session, and renders its decision after deliberating in private. All questions are decided by a majority of the judges present at the hearing. The court has also the function of giving advisory opinions at the request of the Council or the Assembly, though this use of the court has been open to some criticism on the ground that such advisory opinions are somewhat in the nature of international politics.

The Permanent Court of International Justice should not be confused with "The Hague Court of Arbitration" which was created by The Hague Convention of 1899 and is still in existence. The latter is not a permanent court to try cases, but exists only as a list of the names of one hundred and thirty-two distinguished jurists from which disputing States may select arbitrators. The World Court, on the other hand, is a court of law and not of arbitration. Its decisions rest on legal principles and on the application of law

[7] A committee of jurists, appointed by the League Assembly to consider revising the statute of the World Court, recommended in March, 1929, that the number of judges be increased from eleven to fifteen, that the deputy judgeships be abolished, and that the court sit in continuous session, the judges acting in rotation.

and justice as found "in treaties, international practice and precedent or accepted international teaching."

To a certain extent the International Labor Organization is part of the machinery of the League of Nations. The representatives of labor who were present among the delegations to the peace conference feared that the interests of labor might be completely overshadowed by political considerations and perhaps be mishandled if left to the general jurisdiction of the League. To free the League organs from this responsibility and to insure proper attention and management for the affairs of labor, a separate organization was provided for by Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles and by similar sections in the other peace treaties of 1919–20. The International Labor Organization is an integral but autonomous part of the League. Although it is supported by the funds contributed by member States for the maintenance of the League,[8] and although membership in the League entails membership in the Labor Organization, the latter is completely self-directing.

The International Labor Organization consists of a General Conference, a Governing Body, and an International Labor Office. The General Conference meets annually and consists of four delegates from each member State, one representing labor, one representing the employers, and two representing the government of the State. In matters requiring a vote the delegates vote individually. The work of the conference generally takes one of two forms. It may draw up a recommendation in the form of general principles for the guidance of national governments in drafting legislation, or it may formulate a draft convention in more precise and detailed terms for ratification by the member States. The governments of these States are pledged at least to submit the conference proposals to their respective competent authorities for action.

The Governing Body of the Labor Organization consists of a group of twenty-four persons, six of whom represent the workers, six the employers, and twelve the governments. Of the last group, eight always represent the governments of Belgium, Canada,

[8] The budget of the League for 1929 carried about $1,670,000 for the International Labor Organization.

France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Switzerland, thus insuring that two-thirds of the government representatives shall be from the States of greatest industrial importance. The other four States represented are chosen by the government delegates in the conference, and the representatives of the workers and the employers are chosen by the delegates representing those groups respectively. The Governing Body elects its own chairman and its members hold office for three years. It meets at least once in three months and has the task of preparing the agenda for the conference.

The director of the International Labor Office is appointed by and subject to the control of the Governing Body, but he chooses his own subordinates. The Office is established at Geneva in a building erected for the purpose, the total personnel including about three hundred and fifty persons of over thirty nationalities. It collects information bearing upon the questions coming up for discussion, issues a journal dealing with labor matters, and keeps in touch with governments and various voluntary organizations throughout the world. Obviously the structure of the International Labor Organization is very similar to that of the League of Nations. Its annual Conference is analogous to the League Assembly, its Governing Body to the Council, and its International Labor Office to the Secretariat.

During the period since the establishment of the International Labor Organization more than fifty recommendations and conventions have been drafted by the annual Labor Conferences. These have had to do with working hours, woman and child labor, night work, sanitary conditions, unemployment, public labor exchanges, rights of combination among agricultural workers, conditions of employment at sea, protection against occupational diseases, and the like. Many of the conventions have been ratified, many have not, at least by the industrial powers of the West. The greatest successes have been achieved in the East—in India, Japan, China, and Persia. Although the Labor Organization has no actual legislative or executive power, it makes a strong appeal to public opinion and gives to labor such a vigorous leadership as it has never before known.

The first meeting of the Council of the League, called by Presi-

dent Wilson pursuant to Article 5 of the Covenant, was held at Paris in the ministry for foreign affairs on January 16, 1920, and was attended by representatives of Belgium, Brazil, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Japan, and Spain. After speeches appropriate to the occasion, the Council proceeded to the business of the day, which was the selection of members of the Saar Basin Delimitation Commission. A proposal of M. Bourgeois, the French representative and president of the Council, that the next meeting be held in London, and a proposal of Lord Curzon, the British representative, that the date and agenda be settled by M. Bourgeois and the secretary-general, were unanimously adopted. The business being completed, the president declared the session closed. Thus the great experiment was actually inaugurated and the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations passed into history. The first meeting of the Assembly was held in Geneva on November 15 of the same year.

The League and the Preservation of Peace

Undoubtedly the chief purpose in the minds of those who formulated the League of Nations was the prevention of future international wars. To this end, the member States in accepting the Covenant agree: "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League" (Art. 10); to concede it "to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends" (Art. 11); to resort to arbitration or judicial settlement in case of failure to settle satisfactorily any dispute suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement, to carry out in full good faith any decision that may be rendered, and not to resort to war against a member which complies with such a decision (Art. 13); to submit to the Council any dispute likely to lead to a rupture which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement (Art. 15).

In the case of mediation by the Council of the League, the parties to the dispute submit to the secretary-general statements of their case, together with relevant facts and papers. If the Council makes a unanimous report (the votes of the interested parties not counting), it is considered conclusive, and members agree that they will not resort to war against any State which complies with the decision. If the Council fails to obtain unanimity, the members are free "to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice." If the Council authorizes the Assembly to handle the dispute, a decision to be conclusive must be concurred in by the representatives of all those States which are represented in the Council and by a majority of the other members of the League. In case the Council finds that a dispute arises out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of one of the States, it is forbidden to make any recommendation. In other words, the League has no right of intervention, no power within a State.

Penalties are stipulated for a member of the League which goes to war in disregard of its agreements to resort to arbitration, mediation, or the World Court. All other members agree "immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations" (Art. 16). This is the so-called "economic weapon" and applies not only to the States involved but also to the nationals of those States. The Council may even "recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League." The members of the League agree to adopt similar measures to protect a member State against a non-member State which has resorted to war against it.

Political Disputes

Even before the First Assembly convened, international disputes arising out of post-war adjustments had begun to force the League to take steps "to achieve international peace and security." The first occasion was that of the Åland Islands controversy between Finland and Sweden. The Åland Islands, an archipelago of about three hun-

dred islands with a population of some 27,000, lie between Sweden and Finland and command the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia. They belonged for many years to Sweden but were lost to Russia along with Finland during the Napoleonic Wars. From 1809 to 1917 Finland and the Åland Islands were ruled by Russia as one administrative unit. After the Russian Revolutions Finland became independent and received the recognition of various States, including Sweden. Soon after this the inhabitants of the Åland Islands, chiefly of Swedish stock, began to talk of union with Sweden and even held two plebiscites in favor of this step. Finland naturally opposed such a movement, and for the time it was given no support by the Swedish government. When at length open revolt seemed imminent, however, Finnish troops were landed in the Islands and two of the separatist leaders were arrested. Public opinion in Sweden thereupon became aroused and began to demand some action on the part of the Swedish government.

At this juncture Great Britain, acting under Article 11 of the Covenant, had the matter brought before the Council in July, 1920.[9] An agent of each party appeared before the Council and presented its case. The representative of Finland held that the affair was purely domestic in nature, that there was no real danger of war, that when Sweden had recognized the independence of Finland, no reservation had been made regarding the Islands. The Swedish representative pointed to the desire in the Islands for annexation to Sweden, stated that this feeling was not aggravated by Swedish propaganda, and proposed a plebiscite.

The Council referred to a special committee of jurists the question of whether or not the matter in hand was within domestic jurisdiction, together with the question of the present state of international obligations regarding the demilitarization of the Islands, the Treaty of Paris (1856) having declared that they should neither be fortified nor have any military or naval establishments upon them. The committee of jurists on September 5, 1920, reported: (1) that, as Finland had not been recognized by Russia as a completely established State at the time the dispute in question arose, by interna-

[9] This was some three months before Russia recognized Finland's independence.

tional law the matter of determining the status of the Islands did not fall within the exclusive competence of Finland, and therefore the Council had authority to recommend a solution; (2) that the terms of the Treaty of 1856 were still in force and whoever possessed the Islands did so in conformity with the provisions of that treaty. The Council, having thus established the points of law, next sent a committee to visit Sweden, Finland, and the Islands to obtain evidence upon which a decision could be based. Its report upheld Finnish sovereignty but declared that the question was not domestic so that it came within the jurisdiction of the League.

In view of these reports, the Council, on June 24, 1921, decided: (1) that Finland should have sovereignty over the Islands; (2) that she should guarantee autonomy and the protection of the political rights of the Islands; (3) that she should preserve the rights of private property and the use of the Swedish language in the schools; (4) that the Islands should be neutralized and not fortified. A new international treaty neutralizing the Islands became effective on April 6, 1922.

Most of the other political disputes which came before the League Council during these years arose from boundaries left unsettled by the failure of the peace conference to take definite action, the inability or reluctance of the Council of Ambassadors to execute the decisions of the conference, or the failure of States to agree upon boundaries which had been left to them for settlement through the ordinary channels of diplomacy. One of the first of these was the long-drawn-out Polish-Lithuanian controversy regarding Vilna, which the League proved to be unable to settle with the same dispatch and success which had marked the Åland Islands dispute.

Prior to this controversy Vilna had had a varied history. Capital of the medieval kingdom of Lithuania, it had passed under Polish influence when the two countries became united by the marriage of the Grand Prince of Lithuania to the young Queen of Poland in the fourteenth century. This union, further cemented by the Act of Lublin in 1569, lasted until the close of the eighteenth century, and during this period the Polish language and people came to dominate in the region about Vilna; in fact, the latter became a center of

Polish culture. By the partitions of Poland, Vilna next passed under Russian control.

Following the overthrow of the Tsar and the defeat of the Central Powers, both Poles and Lithuanians declared their independence and set up their own governments—the former at Warsaw, the latter in the beginning at Vilna. In January, 1919, the Bolshevik army drove the Lithuanians out of Vilna, but the Bolsheviks in turn were driven out by the Poles who then occupied the city themselves. No definite frontier between the two States was laid down by the peace conference, but the Treaty of Versailles provided (Art. 87) that the boundaries of Poland not established by that treaty should be "subsequently determined by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers." Acting under this authority the Supreme Council on December 8, 1919, laid down a provisional boundary, the "Curzon Line," which gave to Poland most of the territory in which the Poles predominated, but assigned the city and province of Vilna to Lithuania. It was expected that a permanent boundary would be established by direct negotiations between the two States. Although the Poles were at that time in possession of Vilna, they were engaged in a war with Russia and so acquiesced in the temporary settlement.

During the successful advance of the Bolsheviks in 1920, Vilna was again occupied by Russian forces. While the latter were still in possession of the city, the Russian and Lithuanian governments concluded the Treaty of Moscow (July 12, 1920) by which Vilna and parts of the former provinces of Suwalki and Grodno were ceded to Lithuania. When the Russians were once more driven back, the Poles and the Lithuanians came into conflict over Vilna, and actual fighting began.

Poland appealed to the League of Nations. Although the duty of drawing Poland's boundaries rested with the Council of Ambassadors, the League Council at once dispatched to the scene of conflict a military commission which not only put a stop to the fighting between the two countries but by its continued presence in the contested territory made a renewal of hostilities on a large scale impossible, thus giving national feelings a chance to cool off.

On October 7 the two governments were persuaded to sign an armistice agreement at Suwalki, accepting as a provisional boundary a revised "Curzon Line" which still left Vilna to Lithuania. This agreement was to come into force on October 10. But on October 9 General Zeligowski, an independent Polish commander, with a large body of irregular Polish troops drove the Lithuanians out of Vilna and occupied the greater part of the province for the Poles. The government at Warsaw disclaimed any responsibility for his act, but he was supported by public opinion in Poland and the government indicated that any attempt to drive him from Vilna, pending a plebiscite, would be resisted.

The question once more came before the League Council, which eventually persuaded both countries to accept the principle of a plebiscite under the supervision of the League. A plebiscite commission was established, and preparations were made for the creation of an international force to insure a proper vote. But numerous difficulties were encountered and in March, 1921, the Council abandoned the idea of a plebiscite in favor of direct negotiations between the two governments. The latter were invited to undertake such negotiations at a conference under the presidency of a representative of the League, but the conference in turn proved to be unable to bring the two governments to the basis of an agreement. Finally, on January 13, 1922, the Council announced that the League commission at Vilna would be withdrawn, thus practically admitting its inability to settle the problem with its existing powers. An assembly elected in Vilna under Polish supervision voted in favor of union with Poland. On February 3, 1923, the Council again laid down a provisional boundary between the two States which assigned to Poland the district occupied by General Zeligowski's forces, and with this act washed its hands of the whole affair.[10] Although Poland's title rests only upon a freebooter's use

[10] On February 15, 1923, Poland appealed to the Council of Ambassadors for formal recognition of her frontiers. The latter, more or less in despair, finally established the permanent boundaries of the Republic, adopting between Poland and Russia the line laid down by the Treaty of Riga (1920) between those two countries, and between Poland and Lithuania the provisional lines

of force, Lithuania's attempts to reopen the boundary question have been unsuccessful.

The acquisition of Memel by Lithuania about this time may have mitigated to some extent the bitterness of defeat in the Vilna dispute. Memel, a city at the mouth of the Niemen, which is the natural outlet for Lithuania and part of Poland, in the Treaty of Versailles was surrendered by Germany to the Allies. At first it was administered by an Allied high commissioner supported by French troops, for at the time of the Treaty of Versailles the future extent of Lithuania had not been settled, nor had the latter received full recognition from the Allies. Although it seems to have been the original intention of the peace conference to hand the city over to Lithuania eventually, a long delay occurred. There were rumors that Poland desired the city as a Polish port in compensation for the loss of Danzig. Furthermore, Memel prospered under Allied control and there developed some feeling among the Allies that it might be better to give Memel a status like that of Danzig rather than to incorporate it in Lithuania. The Lithuanians became alarmed.

Early in January, 1923, Lithuanian troops entered the city, drove the French troops back, and set up a provisional government. It now became necessary for the Council of Ambassadors to settle the fate of the city. The Allied high commissioner and his troops were withdrawn but negotiations between the Council and the Lithuanian government for a permanent settlement became deadlocked. In September the whole problem was referred to the Council of the League. The latter appointed a special commission under Norman H. Davis, former under secretary of state of the United States, whose report was approved by the Council and incorporated in a convention finally accepted by Lithuania and the Allies on March 15, 1924. Lithuania was given full sovereignty over the city but the latter was accorded a large degree of autonomy in executive and

drawn by the League Council on February 3, 1923. Lithuania protested, refused to accept the boundaries, and continued to regard herself as in a state of war with Poland.

legislative matters and its port was to be administered by an international Harbor Board, composed of a Lithuanian, a Pole, and a citizen of Memel. In this case it was Poland which protested against the final settlement, but to no avail.

In the meantime the League had been called upon by the Council of Ambassadors to extricate it from the embarrassing position in which it found itself while attempting to execute the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles regarding Upper Silesia. The treaty stated that the results of a plebiscite conducted by an Inter-Allied commission should be reported to the Supreme Council, which in turn should undertake to settle the boundary between Germany and Poland in accordance with the wishes of the people, and "with consideration for the geographical and economic conditions of the locality."

An Inter-Allied commission, composed of representatives of France, Great Britain, and Italy, supported by an Inter-Allied force of 11,500 French and 2,000 Italian troops, arranged and supervised the plebiscite which was held on March 20, 1921. The official figures showed 707,605 votes for Germany and 479,359 for Poland, with 754 of the communes in favor of Germany and 699 in favor of Poland. The Poles at once claimed that they should be given those districts having Polish majorities, while Germany contended that the province was economically indivisible and that its fate as a whole should be decided by the majority.

While the controversy continued to become more and more acute, Korfanty, a Pole, at the head of a force of irregular troops, overran a large part of the territory. The French portion of the occupying troops openly favored the Poles, and six British battalions had to be sent to the scene to restore order. A line drawn by the British and Italian commissioners was rejected by the French commissioner. The Inter-Allied commission fell into factions and, being unable to reach an agreement, referred the problem to the Supreme Council, which proved to be no more successful in solving it. Finally, on August 12, 1921, the Supreme Council availed itself of Article 11 of the Covenant and laid the whole question before the League Council, requesting it to recommend a solution.

In spite of the fact that it was invited to do something comparable to "squaring the circle," the Council of the League decided to undertake the arduous task, and appointed a committee of four members—representing Belgium, Brazil, China, and Spain—to study the Upper Silesian problem with the aid of experts. In accordance with the report of this committee, the Council recommended that Upper

UPPER SILESIA

Silesia be partitioned, and unanimously approved a line which, though not following the plebiscite exactly, divided the territory so that the number of electors assigned to each State did not differ appreciably from the total number given in its favor in the plebiscite. This awarded the larger part of the population and territory to Germany, but gave Poland by far the greater proportion of the economic resources.[11]

[11] To Poland went: 53 of the 67 coal mines; 24,600,000 of the 31,700,000

The Council further recommended that Poland and Germany should conclude a general convention which would place Upper Silesia under a special régime during a transitional period of fifteen years, in order to insure the continuity of the economic and social existence of the region and to reduce to a minimum the inconveniences of the period of adjustment. It laid down a number of principles having to do with the regulation of railways, water power and electricity, monetary system, postal service, and the like, to serve as a basis for such a convention. It also recommended the creation of (1) an Upper Silesian Mixed Commission [12] to supervise the application of the temporary measures decided upon in the general convention, and (2) an Arbitral Tribunal to settle any private disputes resulting from the application of the convention.

These recommendations were adopted on October 20, 1921, by the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers. Poland and Germany proceeded to draft a general convention, completed and signed on May 15, 1922, which had the unenviable characteristic of being "more voluminous and more technical, if not more complicated, than the Treaty of Versailles." On July 9 the Inter-Allied troops left Upper Silesia, turning the region over to the Poles and Germans, who had already occupied those parts of the area to which they were entitled under the award.

No sooner had the League succeeded in solving the Upper Silesian problem than it was called upon to play a decisive rôle in preserving the territorial integrity of Albania. The peace conference had left unsettled the boundaries of this little Balkan State, it being understood that they would later be delimited by the Council of Ambassadors. For reasons of international politics the latter delayed taking action. Both Jugoslavia and Greece had occupied areas within the frontier delimited in 1913–14, and efforts were made to stir up disaffection among the Albanian people. The question of the

tons of coal output of 1920; 91.5 per cent of the accumulated 60,000,000 tons of pit-head stocks; 11 of the 16 zinc and lead mines, with 70 per cent of the total German zinc output; 21 of the 37 blast furnaces; 9 of the 14 steel and rolling mills; and all of the zinc and lead foundries.

[12] To be composed of two Germans and two Poles from Upper Silesia, and a president of another nationality appointed by the Council of the League.

territorial integrity, even the existence, of Albania became acute. In 1920 Albania applied for admission to the League of Nations. The Assembly committee's recommendation that she should not be admitted pending the adjustment of her frontiers was overruled by the Assembly itself, which on December 18, 1920, admitted Albania to membership in the League. Her independence as a State was thus recognized.

While the Council of Ambassadors continued dilatory, in 1921 the Jugoslav-Albanian frontier became the scene of agitation. Disruptive revolutionary activities were instigated within Albania and assisted with money, arms, and munitions from the Jugoslav side of the line. They were successfully suppressed by Albanian forces. Then followed the actual invasion of Albania by a well equipped Jugoslav army of 12,000 men whose advance was applauded by the Jugoslav press. The danger of another Balkan war was imminent, and Italy's intense jealousy of Jugoslavia's position on the Adriatic made the situation doubly serious.

On November 7, 1921, Lloyd George, invoking Article 11 of the Covenant, asked the secretary-general of the League to call a special meeting of the League Council to consider the application to Jugoslavia of Article 16 relating to economic blockade. Within two days the Council of Ambassadors, after a two years' impasse, announced that it had fixed the boundary of Albania in accordance with the line of 1913–14, with certain minor rectifications in favor of Jugoslavia. Along the northern frontier it laid out a temporary neutral zone and ordered that all Jugoslav and Albanian troops should be withdrawn from it until the work of the Delimitation Commission was finished. Pashitch, Jugoslav premier, bowed to the inevitable, declaring:

> The British Government . . . has summoned the Royal Government before the Counеil of the League of Nations, and threatens it with the applieation of extreme measures sueh as those provided in Artiele 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. By this aetion a threatening situation has been ereated resembling that arising out of an ultimatum. Plaeed in this position the Royal Government states with the greatest regret, and under protest, that it bows to the deeision of the Conferenee of Ambassadors, in order to avoid the dangerous eonsequenees of nonaeeeptanee. . . .

When the Council met in special session, there was no need to discuss the question of economic blockade—the mere threat to use it had proved sufficient.

The Treaty of Lausanne stated that the frontier between Turkey and Iraq (Mesopotamia) should be "laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months," but that, failing such an agreement within the time mentioned, the dispute should be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.

Representatives of the two States met at Constantinople in an attempt to settle the line but could reach no agreement, the chief difficulty arising over the northern part of the former Turkish province of Iraq, the vilayet of Mosul, which is rich in petroleum resources. Great Britain contended that this vilayet should be included in the new kingdom of Iraq, although only about a quarter of the district had been under British military occupation at the time of the armistice of October 30, 1918. Not until November 8 had the union jack been hoisted over Mosul City. All the oil supposed to be lying beneath the surface of Mosul, it was said, could not smooth away the friction between Turkey and Great Britain over the boundary, and on August 6, 1924, the latter referred the whole matter to the League of Nations.

When the question was taken up by the Council, an essential difference of opinion at once appeared regarding the nature of the problem. The Turkish representative insisted that the question to be decided was to whom the vilayet of Mosul belonged, while the representative of Great Britain asserted that the province of Iraq had included the vilayet of Mosul, that the Treaty of Lausanne made no mention of the vilayet but stated that the point was to fix the boundary between Turkey and Iraq, and that therefore the function of the Council was merely to lay down a frontier line. As the proceedings advanced, the Turkish representative seems to have yielded this point. A commission of inquiry was created to study the situation and to lay before the Council information and suggestions. In the meantime the status quo in the disputed territory was to be maintained.

After clashes between Turkish troops and those of the mandated territory, the question came before the Council again at an extraordinary session at Brussels in October, 1924. Since the disputing parties were unable to agree regarding the status quo which was supposed to be maintained pending a definite settlement, a committee of the Council laid down a line which was accepted by both parties and adopted by the Council as representing the status quo. The "Brussels Line," which left in British control practically all of the vilayet of Mosul, was intended as only a provisional boundary to be observed until the permanent frontier should be fixed.[13]

The commission on the Turco-Iraq frontier, consisting of a Swede, as chairman, a Hungarian, and a Belgian, proceeded to the scene of the dispute. Early in 1925 it spent weeks on a tour of investigation during which the various parts of the vilayet were penetrated on foot, on horseback, by automobile, and by airplane. Its report was submitted to the Council in September, 1925.[14] Because of the backward state of most of the population of the area, the commission rejected the Turkish argument for a plebiscite. It reported that the majority of the inhabitants south of the "Brussels Line" had sentimental leanings toward Turkey but calculated that their economic interests would be better served by a union with Iraq as a British mandate. In case Iraq were to remain under the effective mandate of the League for a period "which may be put at twenty-five years," and in case due regard would be paid to the desires of the Kurds in the disputed area, such union appeared to be the best solution. But if the League's control were to terminate on the expiration of the four-year treaty then in force, "it would be more advantageous for the territory to remain under the sovereignty of Turkey." A proposed line was given in case the Council should decide to partition the vilayet.

The Council now sought the advisory opinion of the World Court on two points: (1) Was the Council's decision to be an arbitral award, a recommendation, or a simple mediation? (2)

[13] On the question of frontiers, see Map III at the end of A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1925*, I.

[14] League of Nations, "Question of the Frontier Between Turkey and Iraq" —*Report* to Council by the Commission instituted on Sept. 30, 1924.

Might the representatives of the interested parties participate in the vote, and must the decisions be unanimous or merely by a majority? The court decided that the decision of the Council of the League would be binding on both parties, and would "constitute a definitive frontier between Turkey and Iraq." It held that the decision must be unanimous, but that the votes of the interested parties should not be counted in ascertaining whether there was unanimity.

The Council next appointed General Laidoner, a distinguished Esthonian soldier, to investigate the situation along the "Brussels Line." In the report which he made on December 10, he stated that the Turks were driving Christians out of the provisional Turkish zone, and that atrocities were being committed similar to those which accompanied the Armenian deportations of 1915, the soldiers exacting first money, then cattle, and finally women, the men being massacred if they interfered. Until the reading of this report certain members of the Council had favored a compromise division of the vilayet, on the ground that it would be unfortunate for the League to render a decision wholly favorable to a great power within the League against a small power outside. General Laidoner's report, however, produced unanimity. The Council decided on December 16, 1925, that the Turkish-Iraq frontier should be fixed at the "Brussels Line," but that this decision was to be final only in case Great Britain undertook by treaty to insure the continuance of the mandatory régime in Iraq for twenty-five years.

This decision was immediately accepted by both Great Britain and Iraq, which on January 13, 1926, concluded a treaty continuing the mandatory régime in the latter for the desired term of years. On March 11 the Council of the League of Nations pronounced definitive its previous decision. Although Mustapha Kemal had proclaimed, "Mosul is Turkish and nothing can ever change that fact, even bayonets," three months later Sir Austen Chamberlain informed the Council that a treaty between Great Britain and Turkey had put an end to the tension between them.

Meanwhile, in 1923 the League for the first time had been called upon to deal with an international crisis which directly involved one of the great powers. In the summer of that year the

Delimitation Commission, created by the Council of Ambassadors, was engaged in locating the boundary between Greece and Albania. On August 27 the Italian head of the commission was murdered on Greek soil near Janina, and with him four companions, of whom three were Italians and one an Albanian. The Italian government at once presented an ultimatum to Greece, demanding among other things a strict inquiry with the assistance of the Italian military attaché and the payment of an indemnity of 50,000,000 lire. The other demands Greece offered to accept, but these two she regarded as "outraging the honor and violating the sovereignty of the State."

The answer of the Italian government was the bombardment and occupation of the Greek island of Corfu on August 31. The city was being used to house Greek and Armenian refugees from Anatolia, and during the short bombardment fifteen were killed and many wounded. Mussolini, Italian premier, announced that the occupation of Corfu was only temporary, but many saw in the affair a strange similarity to the events of July, 1914. In one important respect, however, the situation differed from that which precipitated the World War—both the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations were now convening for their annual sessions in Geneva.

Greece, acting under Articles 12 and 15 of the Covenant, immediately appealed to the League. Salandra, the Italian representative on the Council, denied the competence of the League to deal with the affair, stating that the Delimitation Commission had represented the Council of Ambassadors, which should therefore handle the matter. Mussolini at first contended that the affair was entirely Italian and would be settled without outside interference. Popular indignation throughout the world, however, led him to retreat from this position to the one already taken by Salandra. On the same day on which Greece appealed to the League she received a note from the Council of Ambassadors calling upon her to institute an immediate inquiry, and she at once assented to its demand, agreeing in advance to accept its decisions.

On September 6 the League Council, while being careful to

avoid the question of its own competence, sent to the Council of Ambassadors a communication in which it urged the latter to find a solution of the crisis and stated its own views of what should constitute such a solution. Those of the Italian demands to which Greece had expressed a willingness to comply were incorporated in the Council's suggestions, but in place of an investigation in the presence of the Italian military attaché was substituted an inquiry by a Greek commission supplemented by delegates of the three powers represented on the Delimitation Commission. The Greek judicial proceedings were to be supervised by representatives of the League of Nations, and instead of paying 50,000,000 lire immediately, that amount was to be deposited in a Swiss bank until the question of indemnity should be decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice.

The decision reached by the Council of Ambassadors embodied most of the League's suggestions, but made an important modification in respect to the indemnity. The ambassadors stipulated that an Inter-Allied commission should supervise the preliminary investigation undertaken by Greece and complete its work by September 27, the date which Mussolini had set for the evacuation of Corfu, and that if the Council of Ambassadors considered the commission's report sufficient, it would at once assess damages out of the 50,000,000 lire on deposit. On September 22 the commission presented a preliminary report to the Council of Ambassadors, stating that the persons guilty of the crime had not been discovered, and on the 26th the ambassadors ordered Greece to pay to the Italian government 50,000,000 lire. Greece had agreed to accept their verdict and had already deposited this sum in the Swiss National Bank. The money was now paid to the Italian government and Corfu was evacuated on September 27.

Undoubtedly the League helped to bring about a speedy settlement, the early evacuation of Corfu, and the avoidance of actual hostilities, but it did not secure the adoption of its own program for the settlement. The affair was not a clear-cut case for the League to handle, since the Delimitation Commission was responsible to the Council of Ambassadors, whose decision Greece agreed to ac-

cept. Apparently the ambassadors' decisions were colored by the political situation in Europe in 1923 and by the fact that they were dealing with a great power. On the other hand, the League certainly proved an effective instrument for expressing the collective opinion of the world, and that this opinion played a part in changing Mussolini's attitude and in the final and early settlement of the affair is indisputable.

In handling the Greco-Bulgar affair two years later, the League proved much more effective. On October 19, 1925, shots were exchanged between Greek and Bulgarian sentinels at Demirkapu. A Greek soldier was killed, his body remaining on Bulgarian territory. Companions from each side came to the scene and further firing occurred. A few hours later the Greek captain in command of the post arrived, ordered the firing to cease, and under cover of a white flag advanced with a view to restoring order. He had gone only a few steps when he was killed, whether accidentally or deliberately has never been ascertained. Both sides received reinforcements during the night and on the next day, so that soon about 200 Greeks were opposed to about 160 Bulgarians. Firing continued at intervals throughout the next two days, resulting in only slight casualties. But reports reached Athens of a serious premeditated attack by the Bulgarians and, without confirming these reports, the Greek minister of war ordered the Third Army Corps to march on the Bulgarian town of Petrich. Just as the situation was becoming somewhat more tranquil along the border, Greek troops under orders crossed the frontier early on the morning of the twenty-second. They penetrated about five miles into Bulgaria and occupied during the following days some seventy square miles of Bulgarian territory.

The Bulgarian government during these days had repeatedly proposed a mixed commission of inquiry, but the Greek government had ignored the proposal and on the twenty-first had dispatched a note demanding full satisfaction, punishment of those found guilty, and an indemnity. The Bulgarian government on the twenty-second, after the Greek invasion began, requested the secretary-general of the League to convene the Council to consider what

steps should be taken in view of the Greek violation of the Bulgarian territory. By prompt action the Council was summoned to meet at Paris on the twenty-sixth, but three days earlier Briand, acting president of the Council, informed the governments at Athens and Sofia of the coming meeting, and demanded immediate withdrawal of the troops of each government within their respective frontiers and the cessation of hostilities pending the decision of the Council.

When the Council convened on the twenty-sixth it gave the two powers twenty-four hours in which to inform it that they had sent unconditional orders to their troops to withdraw behind their respective national frontiers, and sixty hours within which to inform it that all troops had been withdrawn within the national frontiers, that all hostilities had ceased, and that the troops had been warned that the resumption of firing would be visited with severe punishments. At the Council's request British, French, and Italian officers were immediately sent to the affected area in order to report to the Council on the execution of its orders.

On the twenty-eighth the Council declared itself satisfied that orders had been given within the time limit set on the twenty-sixth, and on the next day Briand announced that the withdrawal of the Greek troops had been completed. The danger of war was averted and Briand declared:

> It had been shown that the criticisms which had been brought against the League of Nations to the effect that its machinery was cumbersome and that it found it difficult to take action in circumstances which required an urgent solution, were unjustified. It had been proved that a nation which appealed to the League, when it felt that its existence was threatened, could be sure that the Council would be at its post ready to undertake its work of conciliation.

A commission of inquiry was appointed on October 29, and on November 28 its report was submitted to the Council and to the Greek and Bulgarian governments. It decided that there had been no premeditation on either side but that the invasion of Bulgarian territory had been unjustified, and recommended that the Greek government should pay to the Bulgarian government the sum of

30,000,000 levas (about $220,000) as indemnity. On December 14 the commission's report was adopted, with slight modifications, by the Council, and on March 1, 1926, the last installment of the indemnity was paid by the Greek government. In settling the matter the Council laid down the general principle that "where territory is violated without sufficient cause reparation is due, even if at the time of the occurrence it was believed by the party committing the act of violation that circumstances justified the action." This statement, coupled with the prompt action of the League, should in the future bring increased security in the Balkans.

Undoubtedly the League of Nations proved to be invaluable during the period of post-war readjustment, even though its machinery and principles were not always nor uniformly successful. Differences in national viewpoint and character did not disappear with the institution of the League. International complications became no less complicated because they were presented to the League for settlement. The League is not a super-State but a form of coöperation between States. It can do nothing except as the governments of the States members of the League will it.

Financial Assistance

Although the League has been repeatedly criticized for its failure to settle with uniform success all the difficult political questions which have been referred to it, nothing but praise has been heard for its efficient handling of the chaotic economic situation in post-war Austria and Hungary. The relatively balanced and unified economic organism which had existed in the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was completely destroyed when the Habsburg realm fell to pieces. Austria, left with inadequate food supplies for her population and with insufficient coal and other raw materials for her industries, faced the necessity of importing these commodities. But the free exchange of goods, which might have enabled her to pay for her imports by the export of her manufactured products, was prevented when each of the succession States of central Europe at once erected tariff barriers against its neighbors.

The new republican régime in Austria proved wholly incapable

of dealing with the economic and financial problems which devolved upon the little State as a result of the sudden disruption of the Dual Monarchy. Quite probably they would have been beyond the powers of any government to solve unaided. At the time of the peace negotiations it was recognized that Austria could not pay reparation but would in fact need relief. Although a reparation liability was imposed, it was indicated that the duty of the reparation authority in Vienna would be to assist Austria rather than to exact tribute.

The plight of Austria was recognized by the outside world and a number of relief measures were undertaken. Immediately after the armistice, food supplies were sent into Austria on credit, and further relief loans of $48,000,000 were furnished by Great Britain, France, and Italy in 1919. The United States contributed loans amounting ultimately to some $24,000,000, and an international relief credits committee by coördinating the assistance of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, and Switzerland was able to provide over $100,000,000 during the years 1919 to 1921. In addition to these public loans, about $50,000,000 was provided by extensive charitable work, while Austria further profited by foreign speculation in her rapidly depreciating currency. By means of this external assistance Austria managed to exist for a time, but she was living merely on loans and charity, while the fundamental problem remained unsolved and she became daily less able to support herself.

Early in 1922 it became apparent that only prompt assistance could forestall a general collapse in Austria. France, Great Britain, Italy, and Czechoslovakia came to the rescue and provided further credits, but upon different conditions of repayment from those stipulated in the case of earlier advances. The British credits, for instance, were to be repayable out of the first loans raised by Austria. Thus the collapse was arrested, but the republic's financial disorganization proceeded, nevertheless. In August the crown was worth about one-hundredth of its value a year before and only one fifteen-thousandth of its par value.

Austria now appealed to the Allied Powers, then meeting in

London, stating that the foreign bankers considered the revenues of the Austrian government a sufficient *financial* guarantee for loans but demanded a guarantee, such as could be given only by the principal Allied Powers, against the destruction of Austrian assets by social upheaval or further depreciation of the currency. It was evident that the bankers, in common with the general public, regarded the continued existence of Austria as doubtful. The Allied statesmen gave Austria no hope of immediate assistance. Because of the crushing taxation already borne by their own people they decided that no further financial aid could be provided by their governments. No solution seemed possible unless some scheme could be devised that would attract private capital. The Allies at this juncture referred the matter to the League of Nations for investigation and report.

During the interval between the London Conference and the meeting of the Council of the League the Austrian Chancellor Seipel visited Prague, Berlin, and Verona for the purpose of discussing the Austrian situation with the governments of Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Italy. By this time it was evident that the financial situation, coupled with the danger of social upheaval, had developed into a grave political problem. At Verona Seipel proposed a currency and customs union with Italy, hoping that if Italy and Austria formed one unit for currency purposes the latter would escape the threatening currency catastrophe. Austria according to the proposal would in return accept an Italian political and economic protectorate.

This solution was obviously incompatible with the interests of both Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, neither of which wished to see such a "greater Italy" come into existence. Czechoslovakia was particularly disturbed by the prospect of Italian control of her only outlet to the sea. Any attempt to put the plan into operation would have led to serious complications. The Italian government hesitated and indicated that, since the Allies had a few days previously referred Austria's financial condition to the League of Nations, only in case the action of the League led to no result would Seipel's proposals be considered. Benesh, the Czechoslovak foreign minister,

now actively worked to have the League save Austria in order to prevent her falling prey to Italian imperialism. He vigorously advocated the plan of procuring a large international loan to be guaranteed by the powers, in return for which Austria would be placed under the control of the League.

The Council of the League met on August 31, 1922, and immediately instructed the Financial Committee to study the problem. The Council, however, assumed no responsibility for a solution. On September 6 Seipel made his appeal, describing the conditions in Austria, stating Austria's willingness to accept a system of control if assistance were forthcoming, but warning that Austria unaided would constitute a grave danger to the peace of the world, a danger which it was the duty of the League of Nations to avert. The procedure followed in handling this problem affords a good example of League methods.

While the problem was under discussion both Austria and Czechoslovakia were given representation on the Council in accordance with Article 4 of the Covenant. An "Austrian Committee" [15] was appointed which consisted of five members of the Council representing Great Britain, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Austria. This committee determined the general outline of the questions and then distributed them among the various expert committees at its disposal. The League's technical organizations were freely used. The Austrian Committee itself considered the purely political aspects of the problem; the Financial Committee, including experts invited to give professional advice, attacked the general problem of currency and budget reform; the Economic Committee examined the economic side of the question; and the Legal Committee gave expert advice on such legal questions as were encountered. On the last day of the Assembly the Council reported that the problem was nearing solution, and on October 4 three protocols embodying the Council's scheme were signed by representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Austria.

[15] It was this committee, with changing personnel, which during the next four years met regularly every three months to supervise the work of reconstruction.

The first protocol contained a solemn declaration, which was the basis of the scheme, that all the signatories would "respect the political independence, the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Austria," while the latter agreed not to alienate her independence and to "abstain from any negotiations or from any economic or financial engagement calculated directly or indirectly to compromise this independence." Austria agreed to carry through a program of reform, involving increased revenue from taxation and rigid economy in expenditure, in order that her budget might be balanced by the end of 1924. The governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia guaranteed a loan up to 650,000,000 gold crowns ($135,000,000), of which 130,000,000 crowns should be employed to cover the advance already made during 1922, the rest to cover the excess of expenditure over revenue available from normal resources during the next two years. A bank of issue was to be established under prescribed conditions and the Austrian government agreed to surrender all right to issue paper money or to negotiate loans, except by special authorization.

The scheme provided for the appointment of a commissioner-general, who in collaboration with the Austrian government was to supervise the execution of the plan. This officer was to be a representative of the League and was to report monthly to the Council. To insure impartiality it was provided that the commissioner-general should not be drawn from any of the principal guaranteeing powers or from any State bordering on Austria. A "Committee of Control of the Guaranteeing Governments" was also provided for. The powers and duties of both commissioner-general and Committee of Control were specifically defined and limited to the execution of the reform scheme and the maintenance of the value of securities. On October 4 the plan was formally agreed upon.

A section of the third protocol provided for a delegation of the Council to coöperate with the Austrian government in working out the detailed program of reform. This delegation arrived in Vienna on October 18. During November the inflationary issue of notes was stopped and the government was invested with the ex-

traordinary powers stipulated in the third protocol. Early in December the Reconstruction Law was passed. With the arrival in Vienna on December 15 of Dr. Alfred Zimmerman, a Hollander, who had been appointed commissioner-general, the initiation of the plan was well under way.

From January 2, 1923, a new national bank of issue began to function independently of the State, and during the year external loans totaling 585,000,000 gold crowns were floated. The currency was stabilized at 14,400 paper crowns to one gold crown and the monetary reform of 1924 established a new unit, the schilling, on a gold basis. Although the reforms occasioned considerable suffering by the dismissal of some 80,000 public officials, expenditures were not reduced sufficiently to balance the budget for 1924. Continued progress in the work of reconstruction, however, led the Council of the League to decide in September, 1925, that League control should cease provided: (1) that the Austrian government could present satisfactory closed accounts for 1925, and (2) that the general economic situation of Austria should warrant the removal of control. In June, 1926, the Financial Committee reported that the above conditions had been fulfilled, and on June 9 the Council decided that the League's control of Austrian finances should end with that month.

Before the League's reconstruction of Austria's finances had had an opportunity to prove its success, Hungary requested the Reparation Commission to invite the League of Nations to prepare for her a plan of financial reconstruction. In September, 1923, Rumania, Jugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia asked the Council of the League to authorize the Financial and Economic committees to undertake immediately any preparatory work necessary to such reconstruction in Hungary, in case the Reparation Commission requested that it be undertaken, and on October 17 the Reparation Commission made the anticipated move.

One noteworthy difference existed between the situation of Hungary and that of Austria. In the case of the latter, governmental guarantees were required because of the imminence of social disorder which might render valueless any securities offered. The situa-

tion in Hungary was by no means so threatening. Her budget was not so completely beyond control, and inflation had not reached the degree attained in Austria. Still, depreciation could not be stopped so long as inflation had to be resorted to in order to meet the expenses of the government.

The main outline of the plan adopted by the Council in December, 1923, included: (1) the arrest of inflation and the stabilization of the crown; (2) an independent bank of issue, enjoying a monopoly of note issue; (3) the balancing of the budget by June 30, 1926; (4) a reconstruction loan of 250,000,000 gold crowns secured by specific Hungarian revenues, and (5) control by the League through a commissioner-general. The success of the plan required suitable arrangements in regard to relief credits and reparation and satisfactory political relations between Hungary and her neighbors.

The Council appointed a "Hungarian Committee" composed of representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia. The protocols drawn up by this committee were signed on March 14, 1924. The commissioner-general, Jeremiah Smith, Jr., of Boston, assumed his duties on May 1, 1924; the foreign loan was placed on the American, Dutch, Swiss, Swedish, Italian, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian markets; and on June 24 the new bank of issue was opened. The scheme contemplated a balanced budget by June 30, 1926, but in fact it was balanced a year and a half earlier without at any time using more than one-third of the foreign loan. Upon the recommendation of the Financial Committee, the League Council on June 10, 1926, decided to abolish the office of commissioner-general at Budapest at the end of that month.

In addition to these two major financial reconstructions arranged by the League, certain lesser financial operations were organized through the League's assistance. After the close of the Greco-Turkish War in 1922, the influx into Greece of nearly a million and a half Greek refugees, eighty per cent of whom were destitute women and children, presented an almost insuperable difficulty to a State of less than five million inhabitants. The Greek gov-

ernment did what it could in the way of temporary relief and shelter but finally appealed to the League for help. The latter in collaboration with Greek officials outlined a scheme for settling the refugees upon land provided by the government. The project was placed under the control of a commission nominated by the League, and a foreign loan of nearly $50,000,000 was successfully floated in 1924 to finance the undertaking. By the close of 1928 the commission had settled more than 143,000 families on the land and 28,000 in urban districts. It had built 76,000 houses and had under construction 7,000 more. Its work had given a great impetus to the prosperity of Greece, the area under cultivation almost doubling between 1923 and 1928. With the aid of another loan under League auspices a new bank of issue was opened in May, 1928, the currency was stabilized, and the national budget balanced.

In a similar way foreign loans were arranged to assist the Bulgarian government to care for some 220,000 Bulgarian refugees. In the two years, 1926–28, some 30,000 families were furnished with land, more than 2,000 houses were built, and equipment and draft animals were distributed. Loans were also arranged to assist the Esthonian government to place its currency on a gold basis, and to enable the Free City of Danzig to develop its municipal and harbor works. The League has thus demonstrated the efficiency of its methods and the value of its services in national financial reconstruction.[16] It has provided a way for arranging foreign loans without the necessity, which formerly sometimes arose, of making concessions to the particular States or organizations giving such assistance.

The Saar and Danzig

The peace treaties laid upon the League of Nations certain administrative and supervisory tasks having to do with the Saar Basin, the Free City of Danzig, the mandatory system, and the protection of minorities. The Council of the League at its first meeting took up its duty in respect to the Saar. The baffling problem which con-

[16] Some of the features of its Austrian scheme were later incorporated in the "Dawes Plan."

fronted the peace conference here will be recalled.[17] The solution which it adopted was totally dependent upon the existence of the League, and "provides the best justification of President Wilson's insistence that the League should form an integral part of the Treaty." At its first session in January, 1920, the Council appointed three members of the Saar Basin Delimitation Commission, naming nationals of Great Britain, Belgium,[18] and Japan. France and Germany each appointed one additional member of the commission, which laid down the boundaries of the basin to fit the mines, their dependent industries, and the residences of the workmen locally employed. The result was an area of some 741 square miles with a population of approximately 770,000.

During its second session in February, 1920, the Council appointed the Governing Commission of the Saar Basin. According to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles the commission was to consist of five members: one citizen of France, one inhabitant of the Saar territory, and three citizens of three countries other than France or Germany, all to be appointed by the Council for one-year terms subject to reappointment. The Council filled the three discretionary appointments with nationals of Belgium, Denmark, and Canada, and the commission entered upon its duties on February 25, 1920. The peace treaty also stipulated that an advisory council should be elected by the Saar inhabitants, and after considerable delay the commission finally ordered its election. This Advisory Council meets every three months and, although it cannot enact laws, it serves to make articulate native opinion.

The Treaty of Versailles had envisaged an impartial commission which should administer the basin in the interests of the inhabitants themselves without interference from either France or Germany. Unfortunately this proved not to be the case at first owing to the composition of the commission, in the appointment of which French influence had been paramount. The Belgian representative was sympathetic with France; the Dane had lived twenty years in

[17] See pp. 166–67.

[18] At its second session a national of Brazil was substituted for the one from Belgium, because the latter had been appointed a member of the Governing Commission.

Paris and had become French in his general outlook. The French representative, M. Rault, was made president of the commission, and when the Saar representative perceived that the commission was adopting a pro-French policy he resigned in protest. His successor coöperated with the French group. In consequence, the commission during the first few years was largely the instrument of French policy.

Rault remained head of the commission until 1926. It was he who attended Council meetings when Saar questions were under consideration, and since the Council had ordered that all complaints should go first to the Saar Commission, which in turn should send them with comments to the Council, he was in a position to minimize all complaints. Although he was undoubtedly honest and upright in his administration of the Saar, he believed that the basin should go to France and that it was his duty to look after French interests there. Editors who protested against the pro-French policy were arrested and many others who complained were sent out of the territory.

The commission, in spite of the vigorous protests of the inhabitants, retained a French armed force of 5,000 or more "for the protection of persons and property in the Saar Basin." With the rapid depreciation of the German mark, French currency was adopted as the sole legal tender in the basin, and the latter was included in the French customs union. French schools were established for children of French people in the Saar in accordance with the peace treaty, but apparently various forms of persuasion or indirect coercion were used to get German children into them. The amount of taxes which France paid on her mines in the Saar was arbitrarily reduced following the French government's protest that it was too high.

For more than four months, early in 1923, the Saar miners were on a strike for higher wages. This coincided with the French occupation of the Ruhr, and the Saar miners showed their pro-German feeling by meetings and parades. The commission resorted to severe measures. It was made a penal offense to "utter sentiments likely to incite to a breach of the peace, and in this category was included

speaking against the League of Nations." Picketing was forbidden, and France was called upon for military reinforcements. The press was muzzled and various papers in the Saar were suspended temporarily. Protests were raised against the commission's actions, and the British government finally requested the League to investigate the situation.

The League Council, in consequence, invited the whole Governing Commission to attend its session in July, 1923. Although the Council was careful not to criticize the work of the commission adversely, it suggested that foreign troops should be withdrawn and their places be taken by a local gendarmerie. Rault's position was undoubtedly undermined and the policy of the pro-French group in the commission checked by being openly exposed. In the following year the commission was reorganized by the substitution of members more impartial in their viewpoints. In 1926 Rault resigned from the Governing Commission and was succeeded as president by a Canadian. With the ascendancy of Briand's more conciliatory ideas in French foreign policy, and with the expansion of the League Council to include a representative of Germany, the situation in the Saar became more in accord with that anticipated by the peace treaty. Had it not been for the prospective plebiscite to be held in 1935 the League would probably not have been so much handicapped by the play of international politics.

The League's duties in respect to Danzig are not likely to end so soon as its duties in respect to the Saar, though many, both in and out of the city, would be pleased if such an eventuality could be brought about. By the Treaty of Versailles Danzig was constituted a free city under the protection of the League, which was to appoint a high commissioner. Its constitution, to be drawn up by duly appointed representatives of the Free City in agreement with the high commissioner, was to be under the guarantee of the League. The Council at its second session appointed a temporary high commissioner and, in order that the constitution might be "drawn up by duly appointed representatives," instructed him to see that the suffrage for the elections to the Constituent Assembly should be as broad and democratic as possible. In May, 1920, the Danzig Con-

stituent Assembly was elected on a franchise which permitted every inhabitant to vote who was twenty years of age, a German national before January 10, 1920, and a resident of Danzig since that date.

The Council maintained that since the constitution of Danzig was to be under the guarantee of the League, the latter must be convinced that it provided the necessary guarantees for a stable and peaceful political situation. It must insure a government which would function in accordance with the principles on which the Free City had been constituted and which would fulfill the obligations which had been imposed upon it by the Treaty of Versailles. The Council therefore decided that the constitution must be submitted for its approval before the high commissioner should agree to it. Furthermore the Council held that, before it approved the constitution, it must know the terms of the convention between Danzig and Poland which was to come into force at the same time as the establishment of the Free City. Because of the difficulty in reconciling the divergent viewpoints of the representatives of Poland and Danzig, however, it was not until November 15, 1920, that this convention came into force. On that day the Free City was officially constituted by a proclamation of the principal Allied Powers, and on the same day the League of Nations formally assumed its responsibilities in respect to Danzig. But not until after certain modifications had been made in accordance with the demands of the Council of the League did the constitution of the Free City receive the approval of the high commissioner in May, 1922.

Under the régime set up by the Danzig-Polish Convention and the Danzig Constitution, the Free City has a popular Assembly of 120 members and a Senate of 22 members. In case of conflict between the two bodies over legislation, the Senate must give way or appeal to a popular referendum. The smaller body, which contains eight administrative heads, constitutes the government. The city's foreign relations as well as the protection of its nationals abroad are committed to Poland. The control of the port of Danzig is under a commission composed of an equal number of Poles and

Danzigers with a neutral chairman, and Poland has "free use and service of the port."

The League high commissioner serves as a court of first instance for disputes between Poland and Danzig which have the right of appeal to the Council. A great number of disputes have arisen, owing to the complex intermingling of economic and political prerogatives in the Free City. Many of the disputes have been settled by direct negotiations between the two parties through the good offices of the high commissioner, but many others have been referred to the high commissioner himself, who between 1921 and 1926 handed down forty-nine decisions. Occasionally appeals have been carried to the Council, and in one case the World Court was invoked to decide Poland's right to maintain a postal service in Danzig.

Economically the Free City seems to have prospered under its present régime. Its importance as a port has increased. In 1925 the total tonnage of seagoing vessels entering and leaving Danzig was about 3,700,000 tons in comparison with only 1,900,000 tons in 1912, while the total import and export trade of the port for 1927 was more than four times as great as for any pre-war year. With the collaboration of the League Financial Committee, Danzig was enabled to raise a loan of about $7,500,000 for municipal and harbor works. Whether or not it would be better for Danzig to be fully incorporated into either Poland or Germany, is a matter of considerable controversy. But the League is not responsible for the present situation; its rôle is that of attempting to carry out the duties placed upon it by the Treaty of Versailles.

Mandates and Minorities

The mandatory system created by the peace conference was placed under the supervision of the League of Nations. By the peace treaties Germany renounced in favor of the Allied Powers all her oversea possessions and Turkey renounced the possession of her Arab lands. All of the former and part of the latter were placed under the mandatory system, in accordance with which they were

to be assigned to States which were members of the League, with the understanding that the mandates would be administered in the interests of their inhabitants.

As the territories were widely distributed over the globe and as the peoples had reached varying degrees of civilization, the mandates were ranged into three classes, known as Classes A, B, and C. Class A included the former Turkish possessions: Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordania. These territories were considered to "have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone." In Class B were the six mandates in central Africa, where a greater amount of supervision would be required, while Class C included Southwest Africa and the Pacific islands which, "owing to the sparseness of their population or their small size, or their remoteness from the centers of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory," subject to certain safeguards in the interests of the native population.

The distribution of the mandates was the work of the principal Allied Powers. The allocation of the African and Pacific mandates was accomplished by the Council of Four at the peace conference in May, 1919. In general these areas were placed under the rule of the country nearest them. Thus, of the C group, Southwest Africa was assigned to the Union of South Africa; Samoa to New Zealand; Nauru to Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand jointly; other former German islands south of the equator to Australia; and the former German islands north of the equator to Japan. Later in 1919 the Class B mandates were assigned. Kamerun (one-sixth), East Africa (Tanganyika), and Togoland (one-third) were allotted to Great Britain; Kamerun (five-sixths), and Togoland (two-thirds) to France; and Ruanda-Urundi to Belgium. The Class A mandates were not assigned until the San Remo Conference of the Allies in April, 1920. Palestine, Transjordania, and

Iraq went to Great Britain, while France received Syria and Lebanon.

In regard to the authority of the mandatories the Covenant of the League states:

> In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.
>
> The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.
>
> A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

At the end of 1920 a permanent mandates commission was created, and the Council then declared itself ready to examine the texts of the mandates to see that they were in accord with the provisions of the Covenant. Up to this point the League had had no authority over the territories involved. The C mandates were approved in December, 1920, the B mandates and Palestine and Syria in July, 1922, and Iraq in September, 1924.

Annually the mandatory powers present reports to the League regarding their mandates. These are examined by the Permanent Mandates Commission, which is composed not of governmental representatives but of ten independent experts, the majority of whom are citizens of non-mandatory States. This commission, which meets twice yearly, presents its observations to the Council of the League. Each year both the Council and the Assembly discuss the working of the mandates, and an opportunity is provided for the public opinion of the world to bring influence to bear upon the mandatory powers to protect the rights of the natives under their control. So far there has been no occasion for direct intervention of the League in case of maladministration of a mandate. The mandatories have sought to receive the approval of the League, and suggestions of the Mandates Commission have proved effective. After all, the mandatory system is a "great adventure in the difficult sphere of colonial government." It has at least provided an effective means of ex-

changing experience and establishing coöperation between powers burdened with the task of governing backward peoples.

The reconstruction of Europe following the war still left some thirty million of its inhabitants constituting racial minorities in various countries. Most of these people live under the protection of the minorities provisions of fourteen post-war treaties in which the League of Nations was named as guardian. Violations of the rights of minorities may be brought to the attention of the Council and petitions may be sent to the League. The usual procedure in these cases is for the head of the section of the League dealing with minorities to attempt to reach a settlement directly with the government involved, but more than once cases have been taken to the Council, and on two or three occasions they have been referred to the World Court.

The League's handling of the minorities problem has not met with the universal approval of its members. At the meeting of the League Council in December, 1918, the German representative, Dr. Stresemann, questioned the effectiveness of the League's action in respect to minorities, and at the next two meetings of the Council the minorities question occupied a prominent place on the agenda. A change was proposed in the existing system [19] of dealing with petitions received from minority groups. The Council decided that a thorough study should be made of its rules of procedure in respect to minorities, and appointed a committee for this purpose. The whole problem of protecting the rights of minorities is politically difficult and the League, rather than trying arbitrarily to impose its decisions upon the governments in question, has sought to develop the spirit of toleration and conciliation.

Not all the League's activities have been limited to the liquidation of the war and the peace settlement.[20] Less spectacular and less widely acclaimed in the press is the regular international coöperation which the League has organized in the drafting of sanitary, anti-epidemic, and quarantine regulations; in the suppres-

[19] In accordance with this the president of the Council and two colleagues decide whether the petitions are worthy of consideration by the Council.

[20] For the League's activities in respect to national disarmament and security see pp. 366–69.

sion of traffic in women and in the study of comparative legislation for the protection of the life and health of children; in the reduction and restriction of the sale of opium; in the abolition of slavery and forced labor; in economic, financial, transit, and trade matters; in the extension of intellectual relations. In these fields of endeavor international effort is no longer feeble and spasmodic as in pre-war days, for under the League's direction these questions are being systematically and continuously studied. Nor is the benefit of the League's activities limited to the problems involved. Repeated coöperation here means a wider extension of international contacts and closer understanding in many other spheres of action. The League's service has been great and its organs have won an important place in the political machinery of the world. They provide a solid foundation for future international coöperation and for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

CHAPTER X

THE PROBLEM OF REPARATION

THE part of the peace settlement which received the most criticism and the severest denunciation was not that calling for territorial adjustments and the shifting of political frontiers, but that dealing with the highly technical and deeply perplexing problem of reparation. No other feature of the peace treaties so intimately affected the lives of so many millions of people. Consequently, no other provisions have been so much discussed on the platform, in the street, and in the press. No other section of the Treaty of Versailles came so near splitting the Entente front in the years succeeding the war. No other terms have taken so long to fulfill.

The Problem of Determining Germany's Total Obligation

The lengthy and acrimonious debates which accompanied the formulation of the reparation clauses of the Treaty of Versailles have already been discussed.[1] It will be recalled that the final decision of the peace conference was that Germany must make compensation, in gold or in certain goods, for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied Powers and to their property during the war, but that the treaty did not stipulate the total amount which must be paid. This was left to be determined by a reparation commission,[2] which was to notify Germany of its decision by May 1, 1921. But in the meantime Germany was to pay, in gold or

[1] See pp. 167–70.

[2] The Reparation Commission was originally intended to have one representative each from the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Belgium. Owing to the non-ratification of the Treaty of Versailles by the United States, the commission represented only the other four States.

otherwise as the Reparation Commission might determine, the equivalent of $5,000,000,000,[3] to be applied first on the expenses of the Allied armies of occupation, and then on the reparation account.

After the Treaty of Versailles came into force on January 10, 1920, the reparation problem fell chronologically into several distinct periods. The first was chiefly concerned with the problem of determining the total amount which Germany must pay and the system of payments which she should adopt. Germany was invited by the Allies to propose a lump sum in settlement of her reparation liability, but the proposals laid before the Spa Conference by Germany in July, 1920, were considered to be so absurdly vague and inadequate that they were immediately rejected by the Allies. The latter, in turn, created a sensation and brought dismay even to some of their own financial experts when, on January 29, 1921, they demanded of Germany a total of $56,500,000,000, payable in a series of forty-two fixed annuities rising from $500,000,000 to $1,500,000,000, plus twelve per cent of the value of Germany's export trade.

Many experts were of the opinion that this scheme imposed upon Germany a far greater liability than she could carry. The proposals "raised a hubbub of defiance in Germany," where it was asserted that they had been drafted at a "meeting not of sane and earnest experts but of inhabitants of a lunatic asylum." Many Germans believed that France was deliberately seeking to put the reparation obligation so high that Germany could not possibly pay, and thus the Allied occupation of the Rhineland could be extended on the ground that Germany had refused to observe her reparation obligations. Others felt that a schism might be produced among the Entente Powers, and advocated counter proposals as a "roundabout refusal" and as "a useful instrument for dislocating the enemy front."

Germany was invited to submit her reply or counter proposals at

[3] The reparation figures given in this chapter in dollars are only approximate, for the German mark and reichsmark (normally worth 23.81 cents) are here counted as four to the dollar.

the London Conference in March, 1921. The atmosphere in which the conference met is revealed in the following editorial of a London newspaper on the day that the German delegates arrived:

> The British people have not forgotten the war, nor the guilt of Germany in making the war. . . . They know also that Germany has not yet shown any sign of true repentance which alone can merit forgiveness. They believe she will only become repentant through expiation and reparation. . . . The arrival of the German delegates in London should remind us that peace has still to be won.

The German delegates proposed that Germany should assume a total reparation liability equivalent to an immediate cash payment of $7,500,000,000. Of this sum $2,000,000,000 should be raised by a foreign loan at a low rate of interest. The remaining $5,500,000,000 should bear interest at the rate of five per cent. For a period of five years Germany would make an annual payment of $250,000,000 which, after deduction of the interest due, should be credited on the total liability. At the end of the five-year period, the manner of paying the remaining reparation liability should be reconsidered. These proposals were further based upon four conditions: (1) that Upper Silesia should remain German; (2) that all restrictions upon Germany's commercial relations should be removed; (3) that Germany should be relieved of all other payments or deliveries under the treaty; (4) that the Allies should renounce their rights under the treaty to liquidate private German property.[4]

These proposals were greeted by a storm of indignation in the Allied countries. In France it was believed that the Germans had made their proposals of "such palpable absurdity that even the Germanophile and pacifist Englishmen would be aghast." In Great Britain they were characterized as "grotesque," "shameful," a "combination of business cunning, chicane, and sheer impudence." Lloyd George denounced them as "an offense and an exasperation," and informed the German delegation that they mocked the

[4] In the Treaty of Versailles the Allies reserved the right to dispose of German assets and property within their jurisdiction at the date of the coming into force of the treaty (Art. 252).

treaty. Apparently both the Allies and the Germans, in making their proposals, were more interested in propitiating their own extreme nationalists than in getting at the real facts and arriving at a practical settlement.

Negotiations now broke down, and the Allies, in order "to shake the Germans out of their visions of triumphant arrogance," proceeded to take both military and economic sanctions. On March 8 French troops occupied the industrial centers of Düsseldorf, Duisburg, and Ruhrort on the right bank of the Rhine. Customs lines between the occupied and unoccupied regions were established, and German customs receipts on the western frontier were sequestrated. It was further proposed to divert for reparation part of the purchase money of German goods imported by the Allies.

High politics having failed to bring an agreement upon a definite total, the Reparation Commission took up the task and finally notified Germany, on April 28, 1921, that the amount of damage for which reparation was due was $33,000,000,000, in addition to Belgium's war debt. According to the "London Schedule" drawn up later, this was to be paid by fixed annuities of $500,000,000 plus variable annuities equal to twenty-six per cent of the value of German exports. The commission further announced, on May 1, that the total amount which Germany had paid up to that date ($650,000,000) had not been more than sufficient to cover the expenses of the various Allied control commissions and armies of occupation, exclusive of the expenses of the United States army. The total indebtedness as found by the Reparation Commission, therefore, still remained intact. In other words, up to May 1, 1921, the Allies had actually received nothing from Germany which they could credit toward reparation.[5]

On May 5 an ultimatum was dispatched to Germany requiring her to accept without reserve the proposals of the commission under threat of Allied occupation of the Ruhr. One day before the ex-

[5] At Spa the Allies had agreed that of the reparation payments, France should receive 52 per cent, Great Britain 22 per cent, Italy 10 per cent, Belgium 8 per cent, all other participants 8 per cent. Belgium's right to preferential treatment was fixed at $500,000,000.

piration of the ultimatum, a reorganized German government under Wirth accepted the terms laid down by the Reparation Commission, and undertook to carry them out. Thus, the first period of the reparation problem extended from January 10, 1920, when the Treaty of Versailles went into effect, until May 11, 1921, when Germany agreed to the total amount of reparation set by the commission and undertook to make payments according to the schedule the Allies had outlined.

Germany's Default

The acceptance of the London schedule opened the second period of the reparation problem. The violent storms of the preceding months gave way to a period of calm in which the "reparation bark, with cautious steering, could continue its difficult course." The chief concern of the Allies, during this period, was to obtain from Germany the payments which she had agreed to make, while for Germany the task was to fulfill her assumed obligations. A number of circumstances, however, made it difficult for the German government to do this.

In the first place, post-war Germany had no international credit; and even if she had had, no countries in the world, with the possible exception of the United States, were in a position to advance her any large amounts immediately. She could not, therefore, settle the reparation demands at once by foreign loans. In the second place, owing to the Allied blockade which had so long cut her off from sources of raw materials and at the same time destroyed her pre-war commercial system, Germany was faced with the necessity of buying extensively abroad, but was unable immediately to export an equivalent amount of goods. Thus was created an adverse balance of trade which had to be met by specie payments and the purchase of foreign exchange. This resulted in draining the country of most of its gold, and in increased inflation and consequent depreciation of Germany currency.

At the same time there occurred a tremendous "flight" of German capital from the country. Capitalists were fearful lest their wealth be attached for reparation payments, and hastened to place

as much of it as possible safely out of the clutches of the tax-gatherer. Considerably more than a billion dollars was thus placed beyond the reach of the government. The "flight" of German capital, together with the necessity of purchasing gold for the early reparation payments, led to a still further inflation of the currency. This, in turn, coupled with the then existing inefficient fiscal system, resulted in a continuous national deficit which not only made it impossible for the government to meet the reparation payments by taxation, but compelled a resort to still greater inflation. It proved exceedingly difficult, however, "to sink war debts with inflated currency."

Finally, there existed in Germany a very definite lack of "the will to pay." This was especially true of the great industrialists, who with the depreciation of the mark waxed in power and arrogance. They appeared to defy the Allies, and refused to coöperate with their own government in any serious attempt to fulfill the terms of the treaty.[6] They were primarily concerned with using the favorable situation created by inflation to increase their own wealth. "Had Germany put the effort of will into the Reparations that she did into avoidance of them," wrote the German editor, Maximilian Harden, "if with no less loud a drumbeat she had summoned her wealthy class to pay the indemnity to the conquerors, then no Frenchman and no Belgian would have come to Essen."

But the combination of circumstances just cited resulted in Germany's failure to meet the cash payments or even to make full deliveries in kind according to the London schedule. The first payment of $250,000,000 under the terms of this agreement was completed according to schedule by Germany on August 31, 1921, but was accompanied by a very decided decline in the value of the paper mark. By the end of the year the German government came to the conclusion that it could not continue to make full payments of reparation without the assistance of foreign loans or a resort to much greater inflation of the currency. Germany therefore raised the ques-

[6] "One was always being told in London in those days of what the late Herr Stinnes or some other German industrial magnate had said in private about the determination of his country not to pay reparation."—Sir A. Willert, *Aspects of British Foreign Policy*, p. 42.

tion of a moratorium for 1922. Following a discussion of the situation by the Allied statesmen at Cannes in January, 1922, the Reparation Commission on March 21 granted a partial moratorium for the year. Under the new scheme Germany was to pay $180,000,000 in cash and $362,500,000 in goods. The fixed cash payments were so distributed throughout the year that from May 15 to October 15, $12,500,000 was payable each month, and on November 15 and December 15, respectively, $15,000,000.

This revised schedule for 1922 was reluctantly accepted by the German government, and payments were regularly made up to and including the one due on July 15. But the German mark, meanwhile, continued to sink rapidly in value. Whereas it had averaged 56 to the dollar in July, 1921, a year later it had dropped to an average of 435 to the dollar. The German government ascribed this disastrous depreciation to its efforts to pay reparation, and feared a financial catastrophe if it was forced to continue the payments. On July 12 it addressed another note to the Reparation Commission, this time demanding a total moratorium upon all cash payments until January, 1925. On August 14, the Reparation Commission suspended the payment of $12,500,000 due from Germany the following day, and on the 31st it announced that, "taking into account the fact that the German State had lost its credit both internal and external, and that the mark had depreciated continuously down to 3 one-thousandths of its normal value," it had decided to accept for the rest of the year six-months treasury bills of the German government. But it granted no total moratorium.

As a result of Germany's demand for a total moratorium, the reparation problem for a time ceased to be merely a question between the Allies and Germany, and resolved itself into a diplomatic conflict between Great Britain and France, a conflict in which, during most of 1922, Lloyd George and Poincaré were the protagonists. Fundamentally, the view of each in respect to the policy to be adopted toward Germany was based upon the economic situation in his own country, and the divergence which developed in the viewpoints of the two governments was due chiefly to the changed economic situation in Great Britain.

For some time following the armistice, business had boomed in Great Britain. Thanks to the immediate demand from European countries which had been cut off from the outside world by the war, exports increased. Prices were high. Labor was in demand. But for various reasons which will be discussed later,[7] the boom collapsed in 1920. Exports fell off in that year approximately fifty per cent, and during the succeeding years Great Britain's foreign trade remained far below the pre-war figure. With the decline in exports, the volume of shipping fell off, and factories curtailed production. Business stagnation ensued, accompanied by widespread unemployment. At the beginning of 1921 over one million were out of work, and by the middle of the year the number had mounted to over three million. This, in turn, entailed the payment by the government of millions of dollars in unemployment "doles."

British statesmen, therefore, were confronted with the task of rebuilding the nation's prosperity, and since the latter was dependent chiefly upon the ability of foreign markets to consume British goods, they were concerned with the economic rehabilitation and stabilization of Europe and the world. Particularly were they eager that Germany, normally Great Britain's best customer, should regain her prosperity and with it her ability to purchase British commodities. Therefore, while British statesmen willingly conceded the French right to receive and the German duty to pay reparation, in 1922 they began to put forward the view that the economic restoration of Germany must precede the adequate payment of reparation. They became, accordingly, more and more tolerant of German excuses for nonpayment, more and more willing to make concessions, and less and less ready to take any step in behalf of reparation which might delay Germany's economic recovery.

On the other hand, the French economic situation and the resultant attitude toward reparation were quite different. France had emerged from the war, victorious to be sure, but with a devastated region of nearly thirteen thousand square miles to be restored. This region, which in pre-war days had contained about one-eighth of the total population of the country, had been both an agricultural and

[7] See p. 378.

an industrial area. Approximately three-fourths of the land had been under cultivation or in pasturage, while at the same time it had yielded about 55 per cent of the coal production and more than 90 per cent of the ore production of France. Furthermore, it had been an important manufacturing region, producing for France 94 per cent of her woolen goods, 90 per cent of her linen thread, 80 per cent of her pig iron, 70 per cent of her sugar, 60 per cent of her cotton goods, and generating 45 per cent of her electric power. The estimated cost of repairing the frightful damage caused by the war in this area ran from 95,000,000,000 to 123,000,000,000 francs.

The chief economic problem for France after the war, consequently, was to restore this devastated area to its former wealth-producing capacity. By the middle of the year 1922 France had spent $7,500,000,000 in reconstruction and pensions.[8] It was expected that this would ultimately be recovered from Germany, for the latter by the Treaty of Versailles had agreed to make compensation for such expenditures. But, up to May 1, 1921, France had received nothing in reparation from Germany, and had been compelled to finance her reconstruction work mainly through short-term internal loans. Out of the $250,000,000 paid by Germany in the summer of 1921, France, because of the expenses of the Allied armies of occupation and because of priority payments to Belgium, had actually received only $35,000,000. Unless France obtained substantial payments for reparation soon, she was bound to incur a heavy debt burden.

French statesmen, therefore, were not prone to look with favor upon Germany's demand for a moratorium, especially when they figured that for two years France had been spending for restoration and pensions at the rate of $5,700 a minute, while Germany in the same period had contributed at the rate of only $381.[9] Moreover, Frenchmen believed that the German fiscal difficulties were not caused chiefly by the payment of reparation, but by Germany's bad administration of her finances, her refusal to adapt public fi-

[8] A. Tardieu, in *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Sept., 1922, p. 13.
[9] *Ibid.*

nances to the situation rising out of the Treaty of Versailles, and by the bad faith of her nationals, who were deliberately evading taxation and sending millions of dollars in gold and securities out of the country. Poincaré, speaking for France, asserted that the Reparation Commission should make the fullest use of its powers of control in order to guarantee the satisfaction of the Allied claims on Germany. He was determined that no moratorium should be granted unless "productive guarantees" were secured. Furthermore, Poincaré probably saw some point in the editor's gibe that whenever "Lloyd George has a generous moment, he forgives Germany a little more of the debt she owes France," for the French premier asserted that no greater amount of the reparation debt would be remitted to Germany than the amount of the French war debt which Great Britain might remit to France.

During the four years since the armistice Germany had paid in cash and deliveries in kind about $1,200,000,000. About half of this had gone toward the expenses of the armies of occupation, and most of the remainder, owing to the priority of Belgium's claims, had gone to the latter. Out of the large sum which Germany had paid, France had received toward reparation in the whole four years only $73,000,000 and even this had not been in liquid form. Germany had never fully carried out the required reparation payments in any one year. Of the $542,500,000 which constituted her total obligation for 1922 under the partial moratorium which had been granted, she had actually paid $350,671,484. Poincaré believed that these figures did not represent an honest attempt of the German government to meet its obligations. In addition, Germany had failed to execute many of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. Her army estimates at the close of 1922, for example, were four times what they should have been.

When, therefore, Germany on November 14, 1922, once more demanded a total moratorium for three or four years and a grant of bank credit from the Allies in order that she might stabilize the mark, it was practically inevitable that the Allies at their London conference in December should come to a deadlock. Poincaré was determined to have Germany declared in default in order that

further sanctions might be exacted. On the other hand, Bonar Law, who had succeeded Lloyd George as British Prime minister in October, believed that any such step as the occupation of the Ruhr was bound to fail. Furthermore, Germany could not be declared in default in regard to cash payments because she had been granted concessions in this respect by the Reparation Commission. She had, however, failed to meet all the requirements of deliveries in kind. The French government concentrated its attacks on deliveries of timber and coal, and by a vote of 3 to 1, the British government dissenting, the Reparation Commission declared Germany in default in these respects. On January 10, 1923, the second period of the reparation problem came to a close when the French government announced that a mission of control would be sent into the Ruhr.

The Struggle in the Ruhr

The third period of the reparation problem lasted from January 11, 1923, when French and Belgian forces occupied the Ruhr, until September 1, 1924, when Germany finally began to carry out the plan outlined in the Dawes Report. During this period the French and Belgian governments, with the support of Italy, sought a solution of the reparation problem through direct action. While France announced that she had "no intention of annexing any portion of German territory" and "no mad idea of confiscating the Ruhr," she declared that she would "hold it until we are paid our due." Within a few days the whole Ruhr and Lippe region was occupied as far east as Dortmund.

Although the occupied area was only about sixty by twenty-eight miles in extent, it constituted the industrial heart of Germany. It was estimated that, at the date of the occupation, 80 to 85 per cent of Germany's coal, 80 per cent of her steel and pig-iron production, and 70 per cent of the goods and mineral traffic on her railways, came from this territory. Owing to the fact that almost all of her gun steel during the war had been produced here, the Ruhr had come to be called the "German arsenal." Naturally it was one of the most thickly populated regions in Europe, containing 10 per cent of the

German people. Nine cities, with a total population of two million, almost touched one another. Finally, the district was knit together by one of the most intricate railway systems in the world.

These facts constituted the basis of Poincaré's policy. By holding this small area, France and Belgium would either secure reparation payments at first hand by direct action, or so paralyze the industrial life of Germany as to force her to agree to their terms. These facts likewise constituted the basis of British opposition to Poincaré's demand for "productive guarantees." Although Lloyd George himself had once threatened Germany with the occupation of the Ruhr, that had been before he had become so concerned with the restoration of German prosperity as a possible means of relieving Great Britain's industrial stagnation. Believing that with the Ruhr gone, industrial Germany would wither, the British government feared the effect which this might have on conditions across the Channel. But the French, who were practically self-contained in their economic life, had no such qualms, for, even if French occupation of the Ruhr brought the collapse of Germany, this would have relatively little economic effect in France itself.

The German government now had two alternatives before it, and upon its choice depended the fate of countless millions of people. It might accept the French demand and make new proposals for the payment of reparation, or it might refuse to coöperate with France and passively resist all French efforts. The German chancellor believed that without German assistance France would be unable to operate the Ruhr industries, that the cost of the profitless occupation would force the French treasury into bankruptcy, and thus the French would be compelled to withdraw in defeat from the territory. His unhappy guess as to the outcome led him to choose a policy of passive resistance which, in turn, "plunged Germany down the abyss of hunger, poverty and national humiliation."

The German government now proceeded to do everything that it could, short of open resistance, to oppose French efforts. It stopped all deliveries of reparation in kind to France and Belgium. It ordered the inhabitants of the occupied area to pay no customs duties, coal taxes, or export duties which could come into French hands, and

forbade them to render any assistance to the French under threat of severe penalties. Finally it entered upon a program of financial aid to all those—officials, railwaymen, miners, and industrial workers [10] —who by reason of passive resistance lost their means of support.

The French and Belgian authorities countered these measures by declaring a state of siege and by prohibiting the export of all manufactured goods from the occupied district. The economic isolation of the Ruhr became complete. Furthermore, they imposed heavy fines and prison sentences, placed a censorship on the press, seized private property and private funds, and expelled countless officials and leaders. During the first two months, every city and town in the Ruhr, with four exceptions, lost its chief burgomaster, and, altogether, some 147,000 German citizens were expelled during the first eleven months of the occupation. Nor was this all. The French estimated that 76 Germans were killed and 92 wounded by the Allies, while 20 Allied soldiers were killed and 66 wounded by the Germans. Logically, as Professor Toynbee has pointed out, this struggle in the Ruhr "can only be regarded as a renewal of war between France and Belgium on the one side and Germany on the other."

Large numbers of men in the Ruhr were thrown out of employment and food became scarce, the French allowing only sufficient to come into the district to ration the population. The German government was ruining itself to sustain passive resistance by paying allowances to expelled officials, to miners "on strike," and in a multitude of other ways. The deterioration of the mark was catastrophic. In December, 1922, it had fluctuated between 7,000 and 8,000 to the dollar; by the end of January it stood at 50,000

[10] "The mining and metallurgical industrialists refused to appear at the summons of the Commission of Engineers, to answer their questions, to supply them with information, to satisfy their requisitions, and even to open the doors of their establishments. The postal, telegraphic, and telephonic employees refused to make any communications to the French and Belgians, to transmit their letters, to sell them stamps and so on. The railway employees refused to run the trains necessary for the troops or to make room in the stations for the occupying authorities. The German officials of all ranks affected to be unaware of the presence of the French and Belgians; they furnished them with no assistance and no explanations; they declined all requisition orders. The newspapers refused to publish any documents—whether notices, arrêts, instructions, or ordinances—which emanated from the Allied authorities."

to the dollar. Not only the workmen in the Ruhr but, because of the decline of the mark and the cutting off of goods from that district, millions outside the Ruhr suffered as well.

Nevertheless, the German people rallied about their government. Said one prominent German, "Two men have united the German people—Bismarck in 1871 and Poincaré in 1923." This loyalty was largely because of the motive which the German people ascribed to Poincaré. They believed that he was actuated not by a desire to secure reparation but by fear of the economic recovery of Germany, by the wish to tighten the French hold on the Rhineland and the Rhine frontier, by the hope of building up a great industrial trust under French control, combining French iron ore with the Ruhr coal. So intense was the feeling of hostility toward France and Belgium that the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission had to cease its work in Germany until after passive resistance was given up.

But the strangle hold which France held on German industry began to tell. France might not secure enough out of her occupation to pay for the cost of maintaining that occupation, but Germany could not go on indefinitely without free access to this great center of her national industrial life. Unemployment in other parts of Germany soon resulted from the loss of products from the Ruhr. Toward the end of March labor organizations and state governments began to urge the chancellor to supplement passive resistance with an active policy of definite proposals. Consequently, on May 2 Germany submitted an offer of renewing payments, proposing to pay in cash and goods a total of $7,500,000,000, but declared that passive resistance would continue until the evacuation of the Ruhr, that the starting point of negotiations must be the prompt restoration of the *status quo ante*. This was practically her old offer of March, 1921, and was rejected as being unworthy of serious consideration. France and Belgium officially announced that they would consider no German offer so long as resistance in the Ruhr continued, and that they would evacuate the territory only in proportion as payments were made by Germany.

On June 7 the German government submitted fresh proposals

in identic notes to the Allies and to the United States. This time it offered definite guarantees for reparation: (1) first mortgage 5 per cent railway bonds for $2,500,000,000; (2) a first mortgage on the entire real property of German industry, banks, commerce, transport, and agriculture for the same amount; (3) an additional security provided by customs receipts and taxes on certain articles, which had yielded $200,000,000 for the year preceding the war. It further proposed that an impartial international body, such as had already been suggested by the United States secretary of state, Charles E. Hughes, should investigate Germany's capacity to pay. Although Germany never received any official reply to this offer, a significant exchange of notes took place between France and Great Britain.

In a scathing denunciation of Germany, Poincaré declared that she would have to cease her passive resistance before any reparation program could be prepared.

> Germany has always attempted to evade her obligations, because until now she has not been convinced of her defeat. . . . Germany as a nation will keep her word only under the pressure of necessity. . . . She will keep her future promises no better than her past ones. Germany must first learn that she is really vanquished. . . . As Germany will do nothing except under compulsion, compulsion must continue, and be carried through without weakness. . . . The pledge must not be released until Germany has met all her obligations.

Lord Curzon, speaking for Great Britain which was still vitally interested in the economic restoration of Germany and Europe, took an altogether different view. He recommended (1) German abandonment of passive resistance, (2) resumption of the civil administration of the Ruhr and its progressive evacuation, (3) the constitution of a body of impartial experts, including one from the United States, to ascertain Germany's capacity to pay and to prescribe the mode of payment, (4) expert advice to the Reparation Commission in regard to the securities and guarantees to be pledged by Germany, (5) early Inter-Allied discussions of a comprehensive plan for a general and final settlement of reparation, (6) evacuation of all German territory occupied outside of the limits set by

the Treaty of Versailles as soon as the economic guarantees had been put into effective operation.

This reasoned reply, however, had little apparent effect on Poincaré. "In strict accordance with the precedent established by Germany in 1871," he declared, "the Ruhr District will be released only when Germany pays. The Reich must be brought to such a state of distress that it will prefer the execution of the Treaty of Versailles to the conditions created by the occupation." Although diplomatic exchanges between Lord Curzon and Poincaré continued until late in the summer, no common ground could be discovered. The rift between France and Great Britain was wide and sharp.

Meanwhile, the conditions in Germany for which Poincaré was waiting were not long delayed. The mark continued its precipitate decline. By the middle of June it stood at 100,000 to the dollar; a month later it had sunk to 200,000, and on August 8 it finally reached 5,000,000. Popular dissatisfaction with the complete failure of Chancellor Cuno's policy of passive resistance brought the downfall of his government on August 12. A new cabinet was organized under Stresemann, who now had the unenviable task of extricating Germany from her embarrassing situation by the only possible course—the cessation of passive resistance. Difficult as it was for the German government to admit defeat, "necessity proved stronger than pride." Stresemann publicly admitted that passive resistance had failed, and on September 26 the German government announced that resistance had been abandoned. Two days later the German ordinance suspending reparation deliveries to France and Belgium was also withdrawn. Poincaré's victory was complete.

The effect of the occupation of the Ruhr was widespread and deep. In Germany it brought a change in the attitude of the great industrialists. Formerly indifferent or hostile to the payment of reparation, they had been too often defiant in the face of the Allied demands for fulfillment. With the seizure of their industries in the Ruhr, however, their attitude gradually underwent a change, and with the utter collapse of the Germany currency—which was more

than they had bargained for—they came to the place where they themselves were willing to make sacrifices to pay reparation in order that the French might be got out of the Ruhr and the way cleared for currency stabilization in Germany. The German people as a whole learned that France was really in earnest and had the upper hand. All this, in turn, made it easier for the German government to carry through the reparation program as later outlined.

Outside Germany the effect of the Ruhr occupation was equally important. It went far toward convincing the British government that it was to its advantage to support France in an effective, peaceable program of collecting reparation. To the French, in turn, it revealed the fact that mere force could not wring from Germany the money they desired. Although in the fall of 1923 the occupation actually did begin to prove profitable,[11] the net returns for the first year were not great, and were accompanied by a decline in the value of the franc. The majority of the French were again ready to try the method of peaceable adjustment if there appeared to be any likelihood of its success. And in the negotiations which must precede a new program of fulfillment, France would no longer stand as a weak suppliant begging for her rights; she now held something with which to get them. The German need for relief from the situation caused by the Ruhr occupation now matched the French need for reparation payments. The Ruhr experiment may therefore be said to have had a salutary effect on the reparation situation.

The Dawes Plan

For a month after the German abandonment of passive resistance the situation was allowed to drift. Poincaré, perhaps because he did not know what to do next, did nothing. On October 24, in a note to the Reparation Commission, Germany declared her willingness in principle to resume payments under the Treaty of Versailles, and requested an examination of her capacity to pay. Two

[11] According to figures issued by the occupation authorities, the receipts for 1923 were 1,329,000,000 francs and the total expenses were 850,000,000 francs.

days later France agreed to the calling of a committee of experts for this purpose. The Reparation Commission, on November 30, decided to appoint two committees of experts, one to consider the means of balancing the German budget and stabilizing the German currency, the other to consider the means of estimating the amount of capital which had been exported from Germany and the means of bringing it back. In this non-political investigation the United States government consented to the participation of American experts.

The First Committee of Experts, headed by Charles G. Dawes of the United States, came to be known as the "Dawes Committee." It included two representatives each from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium, and began its work on January 14, 1924. The Second Committee of Experts was headed by Reginald McKenna of Great Britain, and had one representative each from the above-mentioned countries. It took up its task one week later. On April 9 the two committees simultaneously submitted their reports to the Reparation Commission. The Second Committee's report, being shorter and less important, may be summarized briefly. It estimated that the total amount of German capital abroad at the end of 1923 was probably about $1,687,500,000, and that the amount of foreign currency held in Germany was about $300,000,000. It stated that the return of the capital could be hastened by permanently stopping German inflation and in general by carrying into effect the recommendations of the First Committee.

The task originally assigned to the First or "Dawes" Committee was to recommend ways and means of balancing the German budget and stabilizing the German currency. But the committee stated that unless the amount of reparation which was to be contributed from the ordinary budget resources was known, financial and currency stability could not be insured. It thus cleared the way for recommendations in regard to German payments of reparation. Its report filled a volume of 124 pages. The committee went on the assumption that since the creditors of Germany were paying taxes to the limit of their capacity, "so also must Germany be encour-

aged to pay taxes . . . to the limit of her capacity." Moreover, it was to Germany's own good to pay reparation.

> Her economy cannot flourish unless the nations surrounding her likewise return to sound conditions and carry on a normal exchange of goods. And Germany is strong. She has a growing and industrious population, great technical skill, and rich material resources; the development of her agriculture is on progressive lines; she is eminent in industrial science. Ever since 1919 the country has spared no expense to improve its plant and equipment—particularly its railway system, its telephone and telegraph communication, and its harbors and canals. The German industry has constructed an entirely modern plant which can produce a much greater output than before the war. Germany is therefore well equipped with resources and the means to exploit them. When the present credit shortage has been overcome she will be able to resume a favored position in world competition. Without undue optimism, it may be anticipated that Germany's production will enable her to satisfy her own requirements and raise the amounts contemplated in the Plan for reparation obligations.

In other words, Germany had all the factors necessary for a prosperous future, the only thing which she really lacked at the moment being credit, and the committee had a scheme for providing this.

In brief, the Dawes Report embodied the following recommendations: (1) Germany should revert to the position of an economic unit—that is to say, the Ruhr should be evacuated; (2) Germany should pledge certain revenues as security for payment of reparation, the standard annuities to be paid from railway bonds and a transport tax, from industrial debentures, from the ordinary budget; (3) the annual reparation payments should start at $250,000,000, and rise gradually over a four-year period to a normal figure of $625,000,000; (4) future payments might be increased or decreased according to an "index of prosperity"; (5) a foreign loan of $200,000,000 should be made as a foundation for Germany's fiscal system; (6) a central bank should be established with a fifty-year monopoly for the issue of paper money, subject to the control of an international board of seven Germans and seven foreigners.

The committee made very definite recommendations regarding the sources from which reparation payments were to come. In the first place, the 33,000 miles of state-owned German railways—valued conservatively at $6,500,000,000 and practically free from debt—were to be subject to a first-mortgage bond issue of $2,750,000,000. This at six per cent would yield annually $165,000,000 for reparation payments. A transport tax upon the railways was to yield an additional $72,000,000 annually. In the second place, the industries [12] of Germany—which were valued at approximately $8,000,000,000 and were likewise practically debt-free, thanks to the inflation of the currency—were to assume a blanket mortgage of $1,250,000,000. This would provide another annual payment of $75,000,000. In the third place, certain specific revenues—customs, alcohol, tobacco, beer, and sugar—were to be assigned to Germany's creditors as a pledge for $312,500,000 annually.[13] All revenues from these latter sources were to pass directly into the hands of an agent general for reparation payments who, after deducting the above amount, would surrender the balance to the German government. It was estimated that these assigned revenues would yield between $425,000,000 and $535,000,000 annually when the plan came fully into effect.

The Dawes Report closed with the admonition that there must not "be undue delay in giving execution to the Plan. It can work only when Germany's economic sovereignty is restored. Its operation will be proportionately postponed if there is a delay in effecting the restoration." Two days after receiving the report, the Reparation Commission notified Germany that it considered the report as a practical basis for the solution of the reparation problem. Five days later Germany gave her full consent. On April 24 Great Britain, Belgium, and Italy gave their consent, but Poincaré was inclined to be dilatory. The French elections of May 11, however,

[12] Excluding agriculture, forestry, gardening, stock-breeding, vine-growing, and fisheries.

[13] It is interesting to note that the curtailment of Germany's naval and military establishment brought in 1924–25 a saving of about $365,000,000 in comparison with her yearly expenditure for these purposes just before the war.

caused the downfall of Poincaré and brought in Herriot, who was conciliatory in spirit.

In July a conference of the Allies, with American representatives participating unofficially, was opened in London for the purpose of drafting a protocol to put the Dawes Plan into effect. The conference came near being wrecked when the Anglo-American bankers insisted that France must surrender once and for all her claim for independent sanctions in the way of military measures and the like. France at first stubbornly refused, but finally agreed that only in case of Germany's flagrant failure to fulfill her reparation obligations should sanctions be imposed, and that then a conference of the Allies should determine the nature of the sanctions and the method of application. Default was to be declared only by the unanimous vote of the Reparation Commission, the United States participating. This agreement effectively removed the possibility of independent action in respect to reparation procedure.

The German laws for the execution of the Dawes Plan were promulgated on August 30. On the same day in London occurred the formal signature of the protocol embodying the acceptance of the plan by the various governments and the Reparation Commission. On September 1, 1924, the plan began to operate; on July 31, 1925, the last French and Belgian soldiers left the Ruhr. On both sides of the Rhine, "economic necessity finally triumphed over political stubbornness."

During the four transitional years from September, 1924, to September, 1928, Germany made her reparation payments fully and regularly in accordance with the terms of the Dawes Plan. During this period about $1,350,000,000 was collected for reparation, and practically all of it was either successfully transferred to the Allies or spent for their account in Germany. This was accomplished without any noticeable strain on the Dawes machinery or upon the external value of the German reichsmark. With the opening of the fifth year the first standard annual payment of $625,000,000 began, the experts having assumed that by this time the financial and economic situation in Germany would have become normal.

The "Complete and Final Settlement"

The Dawes Report had limited itself merely to pointing out the amount which Germany could pay annually over a period of years. It had said nothing about how long she should pay nor what the total should be. This now became the burning question. So far as Germany was concerned, she was still legally bound to pay $33,000,000,000 by the agreement which she had been forced to accept in May, 1921. But no one longer considered it possible to exact any such amount, and the fact that there was still no real final determination of Germany's reparation liabilities left an element of uncertainty in the affairs of all the States concerned. It became increasingly clear that, as the American delegates had earlier argued at the peace conference, it would be to the best interests of both creditors and debtor to know the exact amount to be paid. The next step in the reparation problem, therefore, was to reach some new decision either as to a revised total which Germany must pay or as to the specific number of years over which the Dawes Plan was to operate. At the same time, Germany was demanding that the Rhineland occupation come to an end.

During 1928 considerable discussion occurred over the possibility of an agreement between the Allies and Germany under the terms of which the Allies might cancel further reparation payments and withdraw their armies of occupation from the Rhineland, in return for which Germany might liquidate the total reparation claim by one tremendous issue of bonds based upon her railways, her industries, and her budget. These bonds would be sold in the world market, and the proceeds divided among the Allies on the basis of the agreement made at Spa in 1920. During the sessions of the Ninth Assembly of the League of Nations in September, 1928, conferences were held between representatives of France, Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, Japan, and Germany, which led to an agreement on the opening of official negotiations relating to the early evacuation of the Rhineland, and on the necessity for a complete and final settlement of the reparation problem. For the latter pur-

pose the powers further agreed upon the constitution of a committee of financial experts to be nominated by the six governments. Three months later it was decided that experts from the United States also should be asked to participate.

A new committee of experts was accordingly appointed which included in its personnel some of the best financial brains of the nations concerned. Six of its members had been on the original Dawes Committee. Beginning on February 11, 1929, sessions of the committee were held in Paris under the chairmanship of Owen D. Young, one of the American delegates, who had played an important rôle in the drafting of the Dawes Plan. As in the latter case, the committee soon became known from its chairman as the "Young Committee." The personnel was such that its decisions were expected to be in essence an international bankers' settlement.

The committee's task, however, was not simply economic. If it were to succeed, it had to draft a report that would be acceptable to the governments involved, to their parliaments, and in the last analysis to general public opinion. Naturally the creditor States desired to obtain as large an amount as possible from Germany, while the latter sought to have her payments reduced below the Dawes Committee's figures. More specifically, France desired such a settlement as would permit the early mobilization of some part of the reparation debt; Great Britain wished to have the existing system of deliveries in kind abolished or greatly limited; Germany sought the appointment of some sort of non-political committee to function in case she should encounter difficult periods in the payment of reparation. Most of the bankers desired to substitute some non-political authority to receive and distribute the reparation annuities in place of the machinery of control of the Agent General's Committee. It was inevitable that the final solution should be in the nature of a compromise.

Subcommittees were appointed to study the various problems and to recommend solutions, and some weeks were spent in this preliminary work. General agreement was reached on various points until in April the fundamental question of the amount which Germany must pay had to be faced. The creditor States, after much



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THE COMPLETE AND FINAL REPARATION SETTLEMENT

The first meeting of the "Young Committee," February 11, 1929

negotiation and compromise among themselves, finally agreed upon a settlement which contemplated payments by Germany over a period of fifty-eight years. During the first thirty-seven years the annuities would average $550,000,000; during the last twenty-one years, slightly under $425,000,000. These annuities were considerably less than the normal payment under the Dawes Plan, and after deducting the amount due to the United States would leave a total of about $2,500,000,000 for restoration work.

A crisis was precipitated on April 13 when Hjalmar Schacht, president of the German Reichsbank and Germany's ranking delegate on the committee, immediately declared that he would not accept these figures. When four days later he submitted his figures they caused consternation and indignation in the creditor States. His program called for uniform annuities of $412,500,000 over a period of thirty-seven years. These, however, would be sufficient to cover only the Allied debts to the United States, the service on the Dawes Loan, and the cost of the American army of occupation. Nothing would be left for the expenses of restoration, no part of the payments would be free from transfer protection, and therefore no part of the obligation could be commercialized. Furthermore, the German delegate introduced political issues by stating that Germany's inability to pay more was caused by loss of her colonies, Upper Silesia, the Saar Basin, and the Polish Corridor. Schacht stated that he would accept no change in his figures unless Germany could be shown how to increase her capacity to pay, and it appeared at the time that the conference had failed.

The French press characterized the German proposal as ludicrous, and in general the Allied press put the blame for the apparent failure of the conference on the German government and people. Schacht was denounced for his "surprising and arrogant tactics." In Germany heavy withdrawals of gold began to be made and the reichsmark fell to 23.60, the lowest point since its stabilization in 1923. Premier Poincaré announced that if, "after all the concessions we have made in the spirit of conciliation, no final satisfactory settlement is reached . . . we shall be compelled to fall back upon the execution of the Dawes Plan, which permits of

an important increase in the present annuities by the automatic application of Germany's prosperity index."

Although Schacht's proposal had been looked upon as a sort of ultimatum, he later denied that it had been made in that spirit, and the chairman of the committee was finally able to work out a compromise. On May 4 it was announced that a tentative agreement had been reached on the question of German payments. Some weeks were still required to complete the committee's work, but on June 7, after nearly four months of struggle and compromise, what has been characterized by one of its participants as "the grimmest conference on record," came to a close with the signing of the final report.

The Young Committee's Report constituted a document of some forty pages, and was divided into twelve sections and nine appendices. On the difficult and controversial problem of German annuities the Young Plan provided for thirty-seven payments averaging $512,500,000, to be followed by twenty-two further payments averaging $391,250,000. Of each annuity $165,000,000 was to be unconditional, that is, payable without any right of postponement of any kind; and of this amount $125,000,000 was assigned to France in order to allow her to mobilize a substantial part of her share in the total settlement. The amount which each of the creditor governments should receive during the first thirty-seven-year period was agreed upon, Great Britain being assigned an amount slightly less than her share under the earlier Spa agreement.[14]

[14] The annuities were to be distributed among the creditor powers throughout the first thirty-seven years in annual amounts averaging for the period as follows:

France	$261,625,000
British Empire	102,250,000
Italy	53,425,000
Belgium	28,875,000
Rumania	5,025,000
Jugoslavia	21,000,000
Greece	1,750,000
Portugal	3,300,000
Japan	3,300,000
Poland	125,000
The United States	16,525,000

Germany's payments were fixed in relation to the sums owed by the Allied countries in war debts, and the *de facto* relationship between war debts and reparation was clearly recognized. If any of the creditor powers received any relief in its payments of war debts, during the first thirty-seven years Germany should benefit two-thirds, and during the last twenty-two years the whole relief should be applied to the reduction of Germany's liabilities. Thus was destroyed the fiction that the problems of war debts and reparation were unconnected. Furthermore, Germany was relieved of responsibility for the costs of the occupation of the Rhineland after September 1, 1929.

The experts recommended that the annuities during the first thirty-seven years should be derived from two sources: the German Railway Company and the budget of the republic. For its share in the annuity the railway company should pay a direct tax to the German government of $165,000,000. The railway bonds imposed by the Dawes Plan should be abolished, together with the attendant circumstance of foreign participation in the management of the railway. The industrial debentures imposed by the Dawes Plan should likewise be abolished, the contribution formerly made to the annuity from this source being transferred to the budget of the republic. After the thirty-seventh year the whole annuity should come from the German budget.

On the ground that the system of deliveries in kind had come to play an important rôle in the economic life of Germany and that its immediate cessation would not be in the interest of Germany or of the creditor powers, the plan provided for the continuance of the system for a period of ten years. The amounts to be absorbed in this way by the creditor powers were to range from $187,500,000 in the first year down to $75,000,000 in the tenth year. Actually, the payments in kind were reduced to approximately half of what they were under the Dawes Plan.

The Dawes Plan began the process of removing the reparation problem from the political to the financial sphere; the Young Plan carried the process still further by the creation of the Bank for International Settlement. This institution was to perform the

banking functions necessary in the sequence between the initial payment of the annuities and the final distribution of the funds. It would take over such functions of the existing agencies as might be necessary and would perform the whole work of external administration such as the receipt and distribution of payments and the commercialization of those parts of the annuities which were susceptible of being commercialized.

The organization of the Bank for International Settlement would be outside the field of political influences, and its powers and facilities would be sufficiently broad to enable it to deal freely and promptly with the problems involved in the settlement of Germany's obligations. It would be equipped with the necessary machinery to provide an elastic element between the payments to be made by Germany and their realization. The creditor governments, therefore, would have the assurance that the effects of economic changes on the flow of payments would be minimized, while Germany would have the possibility of assistance during temporarily unfavorable conditions. The bank should deal with the question of postponement of the conditional annuities if raised at any time by the German government.

The control of the management of the bank should be placed in the hands of the central banks of the countries involved in the reparation settlement, including Germany. The governor of the central bank of each of the seven countries represented in the Young Committee, or his nominee, would be entitled to be a director of the bank *ex officio*. Each of these governors might also appoint one director from his own country. These directors should elect not more than nine additional directors from lists furnished by the governors of the central banks of the other countries participating in the reparation settlement. Obviously the reparation problem was lifted out of the political sphere, and the former political method of handling what was purely an economic problem now became obsolete.

Although the primary function of the Bank for International Settlement at the start would be to act as trustee in receiving from Germany the annuities and disbursing them among the creditor

nations, it would seek in general to provide additional facilities for carrying on international settlements and to contribute to the stability of international finance and the growth of world trade. The committee believed that by judicious noncompetitive financial development the bank should prove a useful instrument for opening new fields of commerce, of supply, and of demand. Its facilities, however, were not to supplant but simply to augment and perfect existing arrangements for carrying through international settlements. It would extend to international finance a system somewhat analogous to the Federal Reserve system in the United States.

In contrast with the Dawes Plan, the Young Plan definitely fixed the number and the amounts of the annuities necessary for a final settlement. It removed the uncertainty attendant upon the operation of the index of prosperity. It further abolished the system of external controls, gave Germany full financial autonomy, and left to her the obligation of facing her engagements on her own responsibility. The system of deliveries in kind was greatly limited, and on the other hand the annuities were to be paid in a form lending themselves to mobilization. Finally, the whole scheme was placed in charge of a purely financial institution in the management of which Germany was to have an appropriate part.

The Young Plan was, in general, well received. The experts were of course acting independently of their governments, and their decisions had to be approved by the governments concerned. The French government took the first step when on June 18 it decided unanimously to approve the proposals of the Young Committee and to proceed to ratification in accord with the other governments. On the following day Briand and Stresemann began conversations at the Quai d'Orsay with a view to the calling of the diplomatic conference necessary for putting the new Reparation Plan into execution.

The diplomatic conference, which opened at The Hague on August 6, came near being wrecked at the very outset when Chancellor of the Exchequer Snowden, ranking British delegate, bitterly attacked the Young Plan and demanded its revision in the interests of Great Britain. The latter's share in the reparation payments, he

declared, must be restored to that agreed upon at Spa in 1920, her share in the unconditional annuities must be increased from the negligible amount fixed in the Young Plan to an amount proportional to the Spa percentages, and further restrictions must be placed upon German deliveries in kind. Most of the delegates of the powers present vigorously opposed any revision of the Young Plan, so that a crisis resulted. For three weeks the conference remained virtually deadlocked. When, in the afternoon of August 27, the creditor powers met in a last desperate attempt to reach an agreement, it was widely believed that the conference would end in failure. But at one-thirty in the morning of the 28th came the unexpected announcement that an agreement had been reached. The Young Plan was saved.

Great Britain secured a large part of what Snowden had demanded. By various arrangements it was provided that she should receive annually $10,000,000 more than stipulated in the Young Plan, and that her share of the unconditional annuity should be increased to $24,000,000. It was further specifically agreed that German deliveries in kind should in no case continue for more than ten years. The Young Plan as a whole stood, however; the concessions to Great Britain were made without altering its framework. The long deadlock had so delayed the work of the conference that it was necessary to postpone until November 1, 1929, the coming into effect of the Young Plan. Nevertheless, it was agreed that Germany should begin making her reparation payments in accordance with the provisions of the new plan on September 1, the date originally fixed by the financial experts.

The question of the evacuation of the Rhineland was also settled at The Hague Conference. Stresemann in the beginning demanded that the evacuation should be completed within three months after the Young Plan went into effect, and that the costs of occupation after September 1, 1929, as well as the costs of evacuation should be borne by the occupying powers. Briand, on the other hand, asserted that a year would be required to complete the evacuation, and demanded that the costs of occupation and evacuation should be paid by Germany in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of

Versailles. A compromise resulted. It was agreed that the evacuation should begin on September 15, 1929, and be completed by June 30, 1930, that the costs of evacuation should be paid by Germany, and that the costs of occupation after September 1 should be paid from a fund provided by France, Great Britain, Belgium, and Germany, the last contributing fifty per cent.

With the Allies and Germany at length in agreement both regarding the number and amounts of Germany's future reparation payments and regarding the time of Rhineland evacuation, it appears that the tortuous problem of reparation is at last virtually settled.

CHAPTER XI

THE EAST IN REVOLT

THE Turkish Nationalist movement with its repudiation of the Treaty of Sèvres, its opposition to the loss of Turkish territory, and its determination to throw off the servitude of the capitulations, was but one phase of a widespread revolt against the domination of the West which during the immediately post-war years swept through northern Africa, western and central Asia, India, and China—in other words, through those regions of the world which, because of their type of civilization, are usually referred to as the "East." Riffians, Egyptians, Arabs, Persians, Afghans, Indians, and Chinese, all displayed during this period an increasing resolution to fashion their own national and racial development, free from the restrictions of Western control. Among the Asiatic peoples especially, this anti-Western movement received active encouragement from the Russian Bolshevik government, which professed to have a desire to coöperate with Eastern peoples in their revolt against Western imperialism.

Several European powers, therefore, emerged from the World War only to find themselves almost immediately confronted or threatened in distant parts of the world with uprisings of native populations. Where these powers were forced to resort to military operations, the efficiency of their modern weapons in the end brought victory, but only at a considerable cost in men and money. In some cases European countries, in preference to actual war, made sweeping concessions to discontented peoples, and occasionally even military success was followed by measures designed to placate the conquered. Full political independence, extensive national autonomy, or a measure of local self-government was obtained by various non-European groups, accompanied in some instances by the abolition of capitulations, the cancellation of foreign privileges, and the grant of economic freedom. At the same time, recent years have

witnessed a pronounced tendency on the part of the East deliberately and voluntarily to adopt many features of the civilization of the West against which it has been in revolt.

Northern Africa

In pre-war days northern Africa was the scene of intense international conflict between certain of the powers of Europe; after the war it continued to be the scene of conflict, but the struggle became one of native peoples against European ascendancy. Although the revolt of the East against the West was evident here even before the World War, the most serious outbreaks came in the post-war years.

Italy's invasion of Tripoli in 1911 was immediately challenged by the Arabs and Berbers, who, armed and organized by the Turks, continued their struggle even after Turkey herself had been compelled to make peace; and Italy's failure to control effectively all the territory over which she acquired sovereignty, dealt a serious blow to European prestige in this portion of the Islamic world. By 1918 the Italians had been driven down to the coast towns, and in spite of attempts to conciliate the natives by granting a sort of parliament, Italy for a number of years controlled little more than the coastal region, while the tribes in the oases of the interior refused to submit. Even as late as 1925–26 the Italian government was obliged to inaugurate expensive military operations in the interior.

Meanwhile, by the end of 1921 Italian failures in Libya (formerly Tripoli) were somewhat eclipsed by the sensational reverses of the Spaniards at the hands of the Riffians farther west. Native resistance to Spanish encroachments had begun immediately with the occupation of the small Moroccan zone allotted to Spain in 1912. In spite of vigorous military campaigns finally undertaken by the Spaniards in 1918, Abd-el-Krim, the Riffian chieftain, succeeded by 1923 in driving the Spaniards back into the coast towns. The dictatorship which was established in Spain in that year arose in part from the army's discontent with the situation in Morocco.[1]

[1] See p. 589.

The repercussion of events in the Spanish zone began to be felt in the French zone in 1924, and in the next year Abd-el-Krim began an attack upon the French as well. Two European powers were thus defied by one small group of Moroccan hill tribes. France and Spain concerted their military efforts, and by the end of October 280,000 Franco-Spanish troops were in conflict with some 60,000 Riffians. Abd-el-Krim's spring offensive (1925) had failed to capture Fez, the capital of French Morocco, but the Franco-Spanish counter offensive in the fall likewise failed to destroy the Riffian army or to cut the Riffian territory in two.

In such a one-sided struggle, however, the great and modern resources of France and Spain were sure to bring victory in the end if the home populations would submit to the losses and the cost of military campaigns. Abd-el-Krim's confidence was shaken by 1926 and the loyalty of his tribes was weakened. During the early part of 1926 came various peace offers, and on the morning of May 27 Abd-el-Krim rode into the French lines and surrendered. Resistance in Morocco thereupon collapsed. France and Spain by sheer weight of numbers retained control of the territory, though the years that followed were marked by sporadic outbreaks among the tribesmen of the interior.

In Tunisia, to the west of Libya, open fighting was avoided, though the spirit of unrest among the natives revealed itself in demands for greater equality and a deliberative assembly. France granted slight reforms in 1921, and because of continued discontent established elective councils in December, 1922. Demonstrations again occurred in 1925 and eventually brought further reforms in the following year. In Algeria, between Tunis and Morocco, an increase in local control over the government, granted by France after the war, resulted in keeping that section of northern Africa tranquil and friendly.

Egypt

British control in Egypt, inaugurated in 1882, had been in no way legalized when the World War began, but on December 18, 1914, a proclamation was issued by the British government declar-

ing a protectorate over Egypt. On the succeeding day the ruling Khedive was deposed by a proclamation which stated that the succession had been accepted by Prince Husein Kamel, whose title was to be Sultan of Egypt. The title indicated independence of Turkey, but actual control still rested in the hands of Great Britain.

British rule during the war caused much discontent. Egyptians were forced to serve in the army labor corps under a form of conscription; grain and animals were commandeered; the supply of cotton was controlled. The natural discontent because of arbitrary foreign rule was further stimulated by the Arab movement for independence, the Wilsonian theory of self-determination, and Moslem dislike for Christians. General unrest gradually crystallized into an Egyptian Nationalist movement against British rule. Led by Saad Zaghlul Pasha, the Nationalists in 1918 began demanding complete autonomy.

In March of the following year Zaghlul and three of his associates were deported by the British authorities. Violent outbreaks among the Egyptians, however, soon secured their release, upon which they at once proceeded to Paris and constituted one of the many unrecognized national delegations during the peace conference. Sporadic rioting, strikes, and continuous agitation throughout 1919 finally led the British government to send to Egypt a mission to investigate the situation and to suggest a form of constitution. Lord Milner, who had at one time been an official in the Egyptian government, was appointed to head the mission, which recommended that Great Britain recognize Egypt as a sovereign State, provided the latter would recognize Great Britain's special interests in the Suez Canal as a link in the system of British imperial communications.

Such a proposal, however, was unacceptable to the Egyptian Nationalists. In 1921 serious riots caused many deaths, and when agitation continued despite the British government's announcement that it had no intention of maintaining the protectorate, Zaghlul was again arrested and deported to Gibraltar. At length, on February 28, 1922, the British government by proclamation terminated the protectorate, abolished martial law, and recognized Egypt as

"an independent sovereign State," but reserved for future discussion (1) the security of British communications, (2) the defense of Egypt, (3) the protection of foreigners and minorities in Egypt, and (4) the Sudan.[2] This arrangement was characterized by Lord Allenby, British high commissioner, as equivalent "to the declaration of a British Monroe Doctrine over Egypt."

The Sultan, in order to give formal expression to Egypt's new international status, on March 15 assumed the title of King, and in April, 1923, a constitution was enacted by a royal rescript. Meanwhile Zaghlul had returned to Egypt. In the first general elections for the Egyptian Parliament his party won an overwhelming majority, and in January, 1924, he became premier. Zaghlul still demanded Egypt's complete freedom from Britain's control, but his mission to London in September failed to bring any alteration in the situation.

With popular feeling again running high, Anglo-Egyptian relations were suddenly subjected to a severe strain when, in November, 1924, Sir Lee Stack, *sirdar* (commander-in-chief) of the Egyptian army and governor-general of the Sudan, was killed by assassins in Cairo. The act came as the culmination of a long campaign against British officers and British sympathizers. Both the King and Premier Zaghlul immediately expressed their profound sorrow and their horror at the crime, and in the name of the Egyptian government Zaghlul pledged himself to put forth every effort to bring the criminals to justice and to inflict exemplary punishment.

Nevertheless, the British government asserted that the Egyptian Nationalist government had made itself at least indirectly and morally responsible for the deed by permitting the murder campaign to be carried on, and on November 22 presented an ultimatum. It

[2] The chief interest of both Great Britain and Egypt in the Sudan was economic, arising from the development of irrigation projects which make possible the extensive growth of cotton. Because the Assuan dam marked the limit of easy exploitation of the Egyptian Nile, and because of deterioration in the quality of Egyptian cotton in recent years, the Nationalists were eager to incorporate the Sudan in Egypt. This would entail the withdrawal of the British, for an Anglo-Egyptian condominium had governed the Sudan since 1899.

demanded an apology, punishment of the criminals, prohibition of political demonstrations, and the payment of an indemnity of $2,500,000. It further required the withdrawal of all Egyptian troops from the Sudan within twenty-four hours, the removal of limitations which in Egyptian interests had been placed on the area to be irrigated in the Gezira, and the withdrawal of all opposition to Great Britain's wishes in regard to the protection of foreign interests within Egypt.

Zaghlul's government at once accepted all the demands except those referring to the Sudan and to the protection of foreign interests, and paid the indemnity within twenty-four hours. Failure to accept all the demands, however, brought the British announcement that the Alexandria customs would be occupied. Zaghlul thereupon resigned, and a new premier accepted the British requirements in full.[3] The Egyptian Parliament protested to the League of Nations against Great Britain's exploitation of a tragic incident for "imperialist" purposes, but as no member of the League raised the question, the latter had no authority to act.

In December the strong Nationalist Chamber of Deputies was dissolved, but the new Chamber proved to be of a similar complexion and at once elected Zaghlul as its president. A second dissolution thereupon followed, and for a time Egypt was governed by decree. Popular pressure at last forced new elections in May, 1926, and again the Nationalists won a decisive victory. The existing pro-British government gave way to one composed largely of Zaghlul's followers, though he himself was omitted.

The complete reconciliation of the policies of the Nationalists with those of Great Britain has thus far proved impossible. In 1927 a clash occurred over the question of the size and control of the Egyptian army. Later in the year an Anglo-Egyptian treaty, drafted in an attempt to regularize the relations of the two countries, encountered the vigorous opposition of the Nationalists, chiefly be-

[3] As a result of the crisis of 1924, Egyptian troops were forced from the Sudan, which was left solely under British control. Under the scheme subsequently inaugurated, in general the waters of the Blue Nile will be utilized by the Sudan, while those of the main stream, the White Nile, will be reserved wholly for Egypt.

cause it would permit British troops to remain indefinitely in Egypt. In August, 1927, the Nationalists lost their most outstanding leader by the death of Zaghlul, and many believed that his passing was likewise the death knell of the hope of complete independence for Egypt.

How shadowy that independence was became evident in April, 1928, when the British government sent an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal within forty-eight hours of bills in the Egyptian Parliament granting to Egyptians the right to assemble, to hold public demonstrations, and to carry arms. Great Britain asserted that such legislation would jeopardize the safety of foreigners in Egypt and that it was contrary to the British declaration of February, 1922. Five warships were dispatched to support the ultimatum.

The Egyptian government, while refusing to "recognize Great Britain's right, based upon the declaration of February 20, 1922, to intervene in Egyptian legislation," nevertheless expressed the desire to maintain a good understanding between the two countries, and withdrew the legislation. The British government, in closing the incident, admonished Egypt to be "careful to avoid any revival of the controversy which has led to the present crisis," and stated that should similar bills again be introduced, it "would again be obliged to intervene . . . to prevent their enactment."

Six months later, because of continued agitation of the Nationalists and because of their parliamentary obstructionism, the King by royal decree suspended Parliament for at least three years and invested full legislative authority in his ministers. Freedom of press and assembly was abolished, Nationalist agitation in the Delta was prohibited, and the Egyptian premier ruled practically as a dictator under British supervision. In the summer of 1929 conferences in London between the Egyptian premier and the British foreign minister resulted in the drafting of another treaty to regularize the relations between the two countries.

By the terms of this proposed treaty of alliance it was agreed that neither State should conclude with a third power any agreement of a political character which might be prejudicial to the interests of

the other, and that should either State become engaged in war, the other would immediately come to its aid in the capacity of ally; particularly that Egypt would furnish Great Britain on Egyptian territory all facilities and assistance within her power. "In view of the desirability of identity in training and methods between the Egyptian and British armies," Egypt agreed that should foreign military instructors be employed, they would be chosen from British subjects. Great Britain, in turn, agreed to withdraw British troops from all Egyptian territory except a strip along the Suez Canal, the presence of the latter in no way to prejudice the sovereign rights of Egypt.

Great Britain further agreed to support Egypt's request for admission to the League of Nations, to use all her influence to terminate the capitulatory régime in Egypt, and to recognize that responsibility for lives and property of foreigners in Egypt devolves henceforth upon the Egyptian government. Both powers agreed that the condominium established in the Sudan by the conventions of 1899 should continue. Egypt agreed, when engaging the services of foreign officials, as a rule to engage British subjects. Great Britain will no longer maintain a high commissioner in Egypt, it being agreed that the two States will exchange ambassadors instead. Differences regarding the application or interpretation of the treaty are to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The British foreign minister declared that this treaty represented the utmost which Great Britain could grant in the way of concessions. Whether or not the new concessions were enough to satisfy the Egyptian Nationalists remains to be discovered.

The Middle East

In western Asia, as a result of the World War, the region which the Arabs looked upon as Syria was divided into two mandated territories and several States, and assigned frontiers and political régimes which were in large measure unpopular. The administration of the French mandate for Syria and of the British mandate for

Palestine encountered the opposition of the native population from the first, and in all but a fraction of these two territories the system had to be imposed by compulsion.

The pledges made by the British government for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine rendered the administration of that mandate especially difficult, since nearly 90 per cent of the population was non-Jewish. The Moslems refused to coöperate with the British authorities, and for a time serious riots occurred. Although the Moslems failed to become reconciled to British policy, their open opposition abated for a time, owing to the improvement of the economic condition of the country, and to the fact that the British government controlled the immigration of Jews and showed no hostility to the Arabs. Nevertheless, late in August, 1929, the Moslems broke out in open rebellion and began an attack upon the Jews in Palestine which resulted in the death of more than two hundred and compelled the British government to rush forces to Palestine to restore order.

But the difficulties of the French in Syria were even greater than those of the British in Palestine. The original hostility of the Moslems, increased by their impression that the French government was supporting the Christians against them, was still further aroused by the introduction of a depreciating French currency, the use of French in the law courts, and the long continuance of martial law. A protest of the Druses against the iron-handed methods of the French administration brought no relief; on the contrary in July, 1925, Druse delegates, invited to Damascus by the French authorities, were seized and placed in confinement.

The tribesmen immediately broke out in revolt. Airplanes, sent by General Sarrail, the French high commissioner, bombarded some of the native villages, and the uprising in consequence spread rapidly during the month of August. When natives in the vicinity of Damascus attempted to cut the French line of communication, French forces retaliated by burning several villages. On October 14 the dead bodies of twenty-six insurgents were displayed in the streets of Damascus by the French, and immediately the natives killed several irregular French soldiers and left their bodies just

outside the city. Five days later French troops withdrew from Damascus and subjected the city to a bombardment which on the next day was followed by charges of tanks and bombing by airplanes. After a thousand lives had been lost and the best streets of Damascus ruined, the bombardment was terminated upon the natives' promise to pay a fine and to deliver up 3,000 rifles.

But the rebellion having now spread throughout the country, the French authorities armed the Christian population, and atrocities soon began to occur on both sides. Senator de Jouvenel, who was sent out in December, 1925, to replace General Sarrail as high commissioner, opened negotiations with the insurgents, but no progress toward pacification was made. The Druses demanded practically complete independence and requested a "peace conference"; Jouvenel refused such a conference, not wishing to recognize the insurgents as belligerents, and demanded unconditional surrender.

Early in 1926 military operations were resumed. A second bombardment of Damascus (May 7) with the loss of another thousand lives, led the Mandates Commission of the League to suggest that "the mandatory authorities should not have recourse to such measures of suppression as the bombardment by airplane, incendiaries, destruction of villages and collective fines, except in cases of absolute necessity."

In the guerrilla war which ensued, the French maintained control of the cities, but for a time made little headway in the rural districts. The high commissioner continued to refuse to recognize the tribesmen as belligerents, and the latter continued to demand independence, with admission to the League of Nations. By the middle of 1927, however, the revolt was practically crushed. Early in 1928 the French permitted elections to be held for a constituent assembly which should draft a Syrian constitution, the understanding being that the adoption of the constitution would be followed by a Franco-Syrian treaty defining the relations between the two countries and giving Syria her place among the nations of the world.

In the Constituent Assembly which opened on June 9, 1928, the Syrian Nationalist party held a substantial majority. Although some demand was expressed for a monarchy, the Nationalists desired a

republic which should be independent not only of French but of League control as well. The French were unwilling to permit the adoption of such a constitution, and in August the high commissioner suspended the Constituent Assembly. Negotiations ensued between the French authorities and the leaders of the Syrian Constituent Assembly, in the course of which the former sought to have a reservation incorporated in the Syrian constitution recognizing France's obligations to the League of Nations in respect to the maintenance of order and public security in Syria, and to the defense and foreign relations of the country. Inability to reach an agreement led the high commissioner on February 5, 1929, to issue a decree adjourning the Constituent Assembly *sine die*.

Although the British encountered little opposition in Transjordania, where they confided the local government to King Abdullah, son of Hussein, the first King of Hedjaz, in Iraq they encountered open revolt in the summer of 1920. Emir Faisal, brother of King Abdullah, had been installed by the British as King of Iraq. Nevertheless, hostility to British rule was so great that despite the suppression of open resistance, the mandate had to be transformed into an Anglo-Iraq treaty which a constituent assembly in Bagdad was finally prevailed upon to accept.

Meanwhile, to the east of Iraq, the Persians had become imbued with the same nationalistic spirit which had led the Turks to rebel against the West. They had every reason to fear the extinction of their independence as a sovereign State, for the Anglo-Russian treaties of 1907 and 1915 had practically divided Persia between these two great powers. The withdrawal of Russian forces after the Bolshevik Revolution gave little encouragement to Persian Nationalists, since their place was taken by the British, and in 1919 an Anglo-Persian treaty made Persia dependent upon Great Britain in political and military matters.

The weak Persian government which consented to this treaty came to be regarded by Persian Nationalists as an instrument of foreign rule. In February, 1921, this government was overthrown by a military revolution led by Riza Khan, who, like Mustapha Kemal, was a soldier who had risen from the ranks to be head of

a small and efficient military force. Riza Khan at once became commander-in-chief of the Persian army and the real power in the government, which promptly denounced the Anglo-Persian treaty.

Reconstruction in Persia, as in Turkey, was chiefly the work of a single dominant personality. Soon after the *coup d'état* of February, 1921, Riza Khan became minister of war, and, after making and unmaking several ministries, he finally assumed the premiership in October, 1923. The Shah was induced to leave Persia for Europe, and plans were laid for proclaiming Riza Khan the first President of the Persian Republic on March 21, 1924—the Persian New Year's Day. But events in Turkey disarranged plans in Persia. Early in March the Angora government abolished the Ottoman Caliphate and disestablished the Islamic "Church" in Turkey. An immediate reaction against things republican occurred among the Moslem people of Persia, and Riza Khan thereupon prohibited any further mention of the projected political change. On December 12, 1925, however, a Persian constituent assembly made Riza Khan hereditary Shah.

By this time the reconstruction of Persia had been largely accomplished. The Russian-officered Cossacks, British-officered South Persian Rifles, and Swedish-officered gendarmerie, had given way to a national well organized and well equipped Persian army of some 40,000 men. With this force Riza Khan had succeeded in restoring order and in asserting the authority of the Teheran government over many tribes which had been enjoying *de facto* independence. In 1921 the Persian government had sought foreign assistance in its task of remodeling its public finances and promoting the economic development of the country. With the services of an American financial adviser, Dr. A. C. Millspaugh, much had been done in the realm of health, education, and public works. In April, 1927, Riza Khan announced the abolition of all foreign capitulations in Persia after May 10, 1928.

Opposition to the West was much more vigorous in Persia's neighbor, Afghanistan, than it was in Persia; or perhaps the ruler of Afghanistan was not so wise as Riza Khan. Before the World War Russia's advance had led the Afghan government to accept

British control of its foreign policy. The collapse of Russian power in 1917 removed the danger to Afghanistan from that quarter and at the same time removed the necessity of remaining under British control in the field of foreign relations. Amanullah Khan, who became Amir in February, 1919, upon the assassination of his father, launched an anti-British program in April by declaring "that the Government of Afghanistan should be internally and externally independent and free, that is to say that all the rights of government that are possessed by the other independent Powers of the world should be possessed in their entirety by Afghanistan." Proclamations to this effect were distributed in India.

Early in May Afghan forces began an advance upon India, but after a disastrous defeat by the British Indian army on the seventeenth the Afghan main army dispersed and practically ceased to exist for the time being as an organized force. On the twenty-eighth Amanullah Khan asked for peace, and terms were finally signed on August 8. By this treaty, and more definitely by a letter handed by the British delegate to the Afghan delegate after the treaty was signed, Afghanistan was recognized as officially free and independent both in internal and in external affairs, and a later treaty with Great Britain on November 22, 1922, formally granted complete independence.

Amir Amanullah proceeded to consolidate his government and to try to modernize the country. Experts from France, Italy, and Germany were invited to introduce Western methods in engineering, education, and administration. Modernization in these things, however, encountered the opposition of the orthodox Afghan tribes, who resorted to military revolt against the Amir in 1923–24. But by 1925 the Amir had temporarily destroyed all opposition, and three years later Amanullah himself, like Peter the Great, went to Europe in quest of further Westernization.

Like Peter, too, Amanullah returned to his own country determined to introduce European civilization. He began a number of Westernizing reforms which affected the daily life of the Afghans and resulted in another serious uprising among the Moslem tribes. Vainly he sought to pacify his people and to save his crown by

withdrawing most of his Europeanizing decrees. Kabul, his capital, was besieged and so serious did the situation become that Amanullah on January 14, 1929, abdicated the throne in favor of his oldest brother. The latter, however, within three days was forced to surrender the throne to the rebel leader, who assumed the title of Habibullah Khan. In Turkey and Persia revolt against the West brought the downfall of governments which appeared too subservient to the dictates of European States; in Afghanistan, on the other hand, opposition to the West drove from the throne a ruler who, although maintaining the independence of his country, was too eager to adopt certain features of Western civilization.

In the Middle East, Moslem resistance to the West was strengthened by the foreign policy of Soviet Russia. In Moscow, in 1921, representatives of Afghanistan, Persia, Turkey, and Russia united in a policy to safeguard the freedom of Oriental nations. Afghanistan and Turkey rejoiced that "at this time, thanks to the Almighty, an awakening of the Oriental world is being observed," and Afghanistan and Russia each agreed to consider as an offense against itself any action against the other "by an imperialistic State which follows the policy of invading and exploiting the East." Treaties resulted between Russia and Afghanistan, Afghanistan and Turkey, Turkey and Russia, and Russia and Persia. During 1926–27 treaties of perpetual peace and neutrality were signed between Persia and Turkey, and Persia and Russia.

India

The World War directly affected India, for nearly a million and a half men were sent oversea, more than a third of them actually becoming combatants. As a consequence of the war, India incurred or assumed a financial burden of about $700,000,000. Out of this contact with the war came a sense of added prestige and an increased desire for freedom from European control, for a place as an equal among the States of the world. If the war was being fought in the interests of oppressed nations, if every people had the right of self-determination, if Indian blood was to be poured out in defense of these ideals, then India had the right to enjoy their

blessings. A great impetus was thus given to the nationalist movement which had already begun in India before 1914.

In December, 1916, a meeting of representatives of both Hindus and Moslems in India drafted a scheme of reform for which the National party in India should stand, and the British government soon took steps to recognize the national awakening. Two Indians were included among the four delegates from India at the Imperial Conference of 1917, and in August of that year Mr. E. S. Montagu, secretary of state for India, made an important announcement. The British government, he stated, was planning to increase the association of Indians in the administrative branches of the government and to develop gradually self-governing institutions "with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." In July, 1918, came a report on the reforms which had been drafted as a result of consultations between Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford, the viceroy of India.

The moderate parties in India accepted the scheme outlined, but in December the National Congress, now the organ of the extreme National party, wholly condemned the proposals and demanded immediate and full autonomy. For the time being, however, the constitutional question was eclipsed by the course of events in India. The Indian government, having become alarmed by the unrest and revolutionary agitation, a sedition committee, under the chairmanship of Justice Rowlatt, in January, 1919, proposed certain emergency measures. These the Nationalist press and Nationalist politicians at once violently denounced as attacks upon popular liberties and as instruments of tyranny and oppression.

Mr. M. K. Gandhi, a Hindu social and religious reformer, became the spokesman and leader of the agitation and initiated a movement of passive resistance. Gandhi, a devoutly religious man, strongly inclined to asceticism, approached political problems from a religious point of view. As a champion of Hinduism and all that is best in Indian civilization, he became the representative of the revolt of the East against the West. When the Rowlatt bills became law, Gandhi announced a day of national humiliation and

prayer. A wave of excitement spread over the Punjab, and reached its height when on April 13 the "Amritsar massacre" occurred. Military forces were employed to disperse an unlawful gathering in Amritsar, and caused the death of about 400 Indians and the wounding of three times that number.

In Great Britain it was hoped that the admission of Indian claims to self-government would alleviate Indian unrest and Indian hostility. The Montagu-Chelmsford scheme of constitutional reform was accordingly pushed through Parliament, and became the Government of India Act in December, 1919. This act applied not to the three hundred or more Indian principalities which have relations with the British government, but only to the 230,000,000 people living in British India.

The Government of India Act fundamentally altered the political situation in India. In the first place, it provided for decentralization through the establishment of provincial governments which should have charge of such matters as education, public health, agriculture, irrigation, criminal law, prisons, and labor legislation. For most administrative purposes, the provinces—some of which include as many as forty million inhabitants—are treated as separate States within a kind of federation. Each of these provinces has a legislative council in which at least seventy per cent of the members are elected and not more than twenty per cent are officials. All men over twenty-one years of age have the vote provided they meet certain property or occupational requirements, but these are of such a character that only about 5,350,000 persons have the franchise. The constituencies are divided on communal lines in order to reflect in the legislatures the chief social distinctions among those who have the vote.

Within each province the functions of government are divided, under a system known as dyarchy, into reserved and transferred subjects. The reserved departments, including irrigation, land revenue, factory inspection, and police, are administered by the provincial governor and his executive council; the transferred departments, including public health, education, public works, and agriculture, are administered by ministers chosen from the provincial assembly and

responsible to it. In this way it was planned to provide a field in which Indian leaders could be trained in the actual practice of government; and the dyarchical scheme was intended to be only transitory and experimental.

No dyarchy was provided for the central government, however, which consists of the governor-general in council, and two advisory bodies—the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State. The governor-general and his Executive Council remain directly responsible to the British Parliament for the government of India, but the two advisory bodies are chosen by very restricted Indian electorates. Those entitled to vote for the Legislative Assembly number less than a million men, while the electorate for the Council of State includes less than eighteen thousand. The Legislative Assembly has developed into the chief agency for crystallizing and voicing Indian opinion, and has come to be something of a parliament without power.

The first elections under the new régime were held in November, 1920, and in the following January the new system of government went into operation. Anti-British agitation continued, however, and a policy of nonviolent noncoöperation was encouraged by Gandhi, who led the Nationalist movement. The introduction of the new scheme, therefore, was accompanied by the abstention of students from schools and colleges, the nonpayment of taxes, the boycott of European manufactured goods, and the refusal of many Indians to participate in the new government. Despite Gandhi's desire to avoid violence, rioting and outbreaks occurred. In March, 1922, the Hindu leader was arrested, but his movement declined so much that in January, 1924, he was released. Noncoöperation had apparently proved a failure.

In 1924 part of the Nationalists abandoned Gandhi's program of boycott, organized the All-India *Swaraj* (Home Rule) party, and entered the Legislative Assembly, which in the same year demanded an advance toward full responsible government. In a report made to the government in December, 1924, both English and Indian members agreed that the dyarchy had not proved successful. In September, 1925, the *Swarajist* leader in the name of the In-

dians demanded complete responsible government in the provinces, and the same thing in the central government except in respect to military and foreign affairs.

The Government of India Act had stipulated that ten years after its passage a parliamentary commission should go to India to inquire into the working of the plan and to report on the desirability of extending or modifying the degree of responsible government already existing. Two years before the expiration of the designated decade, however, the British government appointed an inter-party parliamentary commission under Sir John Simon to consider possible amendments to the Act of 1919. The exclusion of Indians from the commission led to dissatisfaction among the Nationalists, who demanded that responsible Indians should themselves devise the future system of government in India or at least be treated as equal coöperators. The commission attempted to give Indian statesmen an opportunity to help construct the future constitution of India by proposing that Indians should work with them "on equal terms in joint conference." This proposal was unsatisfactory, however, and the commission was boycotted during its first visit to India in 1928.

By the time the preliminary survey was completed in May, the Indian boycott had given evidence of waning. When the commission returned to India in the fall of the year, the Indian Council of State appointed a committee to sit with the commission, and Sir John Simon announced that eight of the nine provincial governments had decided to coöperate. By the close of 1928 the demand for dominion status seemed to be gaining over the demand for complete independence. In December the All-India Congress adopted a report demanding autonomy, and even Gandhi began advocating dominion status, provided it was granted by 1930.

During the early months of 1929 the Simon Commission continued its investigations, while Indian radicals did their utmost to awaken a widespread distrust of it and its objects. Gandhi again conducted a vigorous campaign against the use or sale of British cloth in India, resulting in the seizure and burning of such cloth, and in subsequent riots and arrests. At the same time strikes, said

to have been fomented by Bolshevik emissaries, became increasingly frequent and violent in Indian cotton and steel mills. Finally, on April 8, in the presence of Sir John Simon, two bombs were hurled into the Indian Legislative Assembly at Delhi, wounding five persons. From such a situation the commission, having finished its labors in India, embarked three days later upon its return journey to Great Britain.

China

In China conditions existing in 1914 were such as inevitably to provoke a strong nationalist reaction against the West. Foreigners residing in that country had the privilege of extraterritoriality, that is, were exempt from Chinese laws and were subject only to the jurisdiction of their own government. China's national tariff was regulated and administered by the Western powers rather than by the Chinese themselves. In many important Chinese cities extensive districts had been acquired by foreigners, and had been converted into foreign concessions. The latter constituted municipalities which were free from Chinese control and in which the government was in the hands of foreigners. Troops of various Western powers were stationed in China, and the country's resources were being largely exploited by foreign capital.

Even before the World War a Chinese nationalist spirit had begun to awaken, and as in India the war gave an added impetus to the movement. The attempts of the powers to obtain China's entry into the conflict gave the Chinese a more exalted opinion of their country's position, and aroused the hope of an improvement in its international status. At the peace conference, consequently, China presented demands which included tariff autonomy, the abolition of extraterritoriality, the cancellation of foreign spheres of influence, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the surrender of leased territories. The statesmen at Paris, however, held that they had no power to deal with these questions.

On the other hand, the peace conference, shackled by secret treaty agreements, decided in April, 1919, to award the former

German rights in Shantung to Japan.[4] In China a violent popular movement against foreigners resulted and numerous student demonstrations were organized in protest. In June a Chinese national federation of students was founded at Shanghai, which with other similar associations became the organizing center of the patriotic movement. A widespread and vigorous boycott of Japanese goods was instituted and Japanese trade in China suffered severely. The direct negotiations with Japan concerning Shantung, which the peace conference recommended, China scorned; and on June 28 she refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles.

Nevertheless, some nationalist gains came to China as a result of the war. She obtained membership in the League of Nations by signing the Treaty of St. Germain, and by a separate treaty with Germany she secured the cancellation of the latter's extraterritorial rights. Furthermore, China saw to it that treaties with the new States of Europe made no extraterritorial concessions.

At the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments (1921–22) China again put forward her demands for the recognition of her integrity and independence, and for the abolition of all special privileges of foreigners in her territory. Out of the conference came Japan's restoration of Shantung to China, a treaty on Chinese customs which permitted an increase in the tariff rates and gave China greater control of the expenditure of the proceeds, and provision for the appointment of two commissions to study the problems of Chinese tariff autonomy and extraterritoriality.

Meanwhile, China's struggle for full national independence was being complicated and handicapped by civil war which had begun some years earlier. Following the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty (1911) and the proclamation of the republic, Sun Yat-sen, who for years had worked to bring about the republic, had been elected President. In the interest of Chinese harmony and unity, however, he had resigned in favor of Yuan Shih-k'ai, the last prime minister under the empire. Immediately Chinese liberals, who were suspicious of the new President, organized the Nationalist (*Kuo-*

[4] See pp. 177–78.

mintang) party. In 1913 Yuan Shih-k'ai ordered the unseating of the Nationalist members who constituted a majority in Parliament, and began to take steps looking toward the restoration of the monarchy.

The Nationalists thereupon went into opposition and later proclaimed a new provisional government in Canton. Rebellions forced Yuan Shih-k'ai to postpone indefinitely the establishment of the monarchy. After his death in 1916 a succession of presidents held office in Peking, but the real power in China fell more and more into the hands of various military chiefs (*tuchuns*). The Nationalists denounced the Peking government as illegal, asserted that their provisional government in Canton was the only constitutional one in China, and finally, in 1921, elected Sun Yat-sen President of the Chinese Republic. They embarked upon a campaign not only to bring the whole country under Nationalist control, but to emancipate China from all foreign restrictions as well.

For a time the Nationalists turned to Soviet Russia for assistance against both Western imperialism and the opposing Chinese forces in the north. The Communists willingly gave aid, but at the same time sought to exploit the industrial unrest among the Chinese. During 1925 and 1926 strikes were frequent in the foreign mills and factories in China. Clashes occurred between the Chinese and the foreign police, the most notorious being that in Shanghai in May, 1925, when twelve Chinese were killed. A strong anti-foreign feeling was aroused, a general strike was called, and a boycott was organized, especially against British goods. Hongkong's commerce suffered severely until October, 1926.

Meanwhile, the Conference on Customs, decided upon at Washington in 1922, eventually met in Peking in October, 1925. It passed a resolution agreeing that Chinese tariff autonomy ought to be restored but, in view of the chaotic conditions within China, it adjourned without taking positive action. The Commission on Extraterritoriality likewise met in Peking early in 1926. Although China during the four years after the Washington Conference had been laboriously attempting to introduce judicial reform, the commission reported that the republic was not yet in a condition to ad-

minister justice in accord with Western ideas. It therefore recommended the postponement of the abolition of extraterritoriality until a later date. Nevertheless, the Peking government began denouncing all treaties granting extraterritoriality as they expired.

Late in 1926 the Western governments began to adopt an attitude more conciliatory toward the Nationalist program. Great Britain in a note to the powers, for instance, advocated an immediate admission of some of the Nationalist demands, and urged assistance to the Nationalist movement. Possibly this change was hastened by the repudiation of Communism by Chiang Kai-shek (the successor of Sun Yat-sen, who had died in 1925), possibly by the disastrous effects of the Chinese boycott on Western commerce. No immediate concessions to the Chinese were forthcoming, however.

During 1926 and 1927 the Nationalist forces proved successful in their northward advance against the various opposing military chiefs. In September, 1926, they captured Hankow and early in the following year Shanghai and Nanking. Anti-foreign demonstrations and strikes continued, however, with occasional outbreaks of violence and looting. Many foreigners were compelled to flee from the interior to some of the strong concessions, and troops were dispatched by various Western powers to protect foreign lives and property. During 1928 the Nationalists continued their victorious advance, captured Peking in June, and ultimately brought practically all of China under their control. In August the Nationalist government was recognized *de jure* by the League of Nations, which accepted its representative at the meeting of the League Council in that month.

In July the Nationalist government announced that it would abrogate all the "unequal treaties" as they expired, and in the same month the United States concluded a treaty restoring to China complete national tariff autonomy. Other Western powers took the same step, and the year closed with practically all countries recognizing China's tariff autonomy. Early in 1929 a new national tariff was put into effect by China, raising the basic rate from the former 5 per cent to 12½ per cent.

A new criminal code and a new code of criminal procedure in accordance with Western ideas were introduced by China in September, 1928; and in October the Chinese government sent identic notes to all powers which still held extraterritorial privileges, asking them to take steps to abolish such privileges as soon as possible. Germany and Russia had already surrendered their extraterritorial rights, and late in 1928 Belgium, Italy, Denmark, and Portugal did the same. Gradually, also, steps were taken by some of the powers to surrender their foreign concessions or to give the Chinese some part in their government. Again in April, 1929, the Chinese foreign minister informed the governments of States still exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction in China that courts and prisons had been established or were being established throughout the country and that the civil code and commercial code would be ready for promulgation before January, 1930. He requested action toward the relinquishment of the rights now held under treaties, "so that steps may be taken to enable China, now unified and with a strong central government, to rightfully assume jurisdiction over all nationals within her domain." If China can end her civil wars, it would seem to be only a matter of time until she fully emancipates herself from the various restrictions on her political sovereignty.

CHAPTER XII

THE GERMAN REPUBLIC

NO sooner had the German Empire collapsed on November 9, 1918, than there began a determined struggle to control the new régime, a conflict especially bitter in the opening period and, though less bitter later, no less a conflict. At the outset the conservative parties were discredited, so that the struggle for control was confined to the parties of the Left—the Communists, the Independent Socialists, and the Majority Socialists.

The Struggle to Control the New Régime

The Communists, or Spartacists as they were known in the early period, demanded the institution of the rule of the proletariat on the Russian Bolshevik model. They vigorously opposed every attempt to establish a middle-class democracy, sought the indefinite postponement of the National Assembly, and were not adverse to the use of terror as a means to their ends. "Whoever stands in the way of the Social Revolution will be cut to pieces," threatened their official organ, the *Rote Fahne*. Karl Liebknecht was the "voice," Rosa Luxemburg the "brain," of this group during the early weeks of the republic.

Somewhat less extreme than the Communists were the Independent Socialists, who demanded the immediate beginning of socialization in Germany and the quickest possible transformation from the old class-state to a socialist régime. They favored the establishment of the council system, and desired the postponement of the National Assembly until after socialism had been established and the danger of reaction or of militarism had passed. This party was to a certain extent a middle group between Bolshevik communism on the one

hand and the evolutionary socialism of the Majority Socialists on the other.

The latter opposed the introduction of Bolshevism into Germany, and maintained that workmen's and soldiers' councils were merely a temporary expedient for administrative purposes and should cease to function as soon as a national assembly came into being. They advocated the early convocation of this assembly. As for socialism, they desired a slow and protective method of socialization, limited to those industries which were ready for nationalization, and they believed in the principle of indemnity to the factory owners. Friedrich Ebert, their leader, was at heart more of an evolutionist than a revolutionist.

It was into the hands of the leaders of these three groups that the reins of government fell when the empire collapsed on November 9. Prince Max gave way to Ebert, who took the first constructive step of the new régime when he invited the Communists and Independent Socialists to unite in the formation of a government constructed entirely of members of the Left. Although the Spartacist leaders scornfully rejected the invitation, the Independent Socialists were more willing to consider a coalition. Since the latter had left the Social Democratic party exclusively on the issue of ending the war, there seemed to be no reason, now that an armistice had been signed, why they should not coöperate. Furthermore, they realized that their supporters among the proletariat and soldiers were at that time too few to enable them to control the government alone, and the fear that a widespread mutiny in the army and navy might produce universal anarchy in the Fatherland held them in line with the Majority Socialists. They decided therefore to unite in forming a joint council of people's commissars, equally divided between the two groups.

Differences of viewpoint on two fundamental policies, however, militated against the success of this coalition from the very beginning. In addition to differing over the calling of the National Assembly, they disagreed about the proper policy toward the military. The Independent Socialists wished to reduce the old military to impotence, while the Majority Socialists, fearful of Bolshevism and

chaos, came to depend more and more upon it for the maintenance of order. Thus from the outset the government embodied two antagonistic tendencies.

Meanwhile, throughout Germany workmen's and soldiers' councils were being organized, and everywhere these revolutionary bodies seized local power and arbitrarily altered the established political and economic life. On the day after the proclamation of the republic the first workmen's and soldiers' council was organized in Berlin. This body confirmed the six People's Commissars who were already installed in the government, and immediately assumed supreme power in Germany until the convocation of a national congress of councils. The meeting of the latter body in Berlin on December 16 provided an opportunity for a trial of strength between the various groups of the Left. The temper of the congress was at once shown when, by an immense majority, it rejected the proposal to invite Liebknecht and Luxemburg to share in its deliberations. That the greater part of the German proletariat approved the moderate policy of the Majority Socialists became still more clear when the congress decided upon an early date, January 19, for the election of the National Assembly.

The Spartacists had hoped to dominate the Berlin Congress of Councils in the same manner that the Parisian mob had ruled the Convention during the French Revolution. Their failure to do this led them to oppose the government's program by force, for to them the calling of the National Assembly meant the beginning of counter revolution. Within three days after the conclusion of the congress, therefore, they stirred up a revolt among the sailors stationed in Berlin. Chancellor Ebert called upon veteran troops of the old régime to suppress the revolt. Some have seen a touch of tragi-comedy in the fact that the democratic republic was saved and the former revolutionaries were protected by the much-hated and much-feared army officers of the monarchist régime. The Independent Socialists in the government at once denounced the Majority Socialists for ordering former imperial troops to fire upon the people, and forthwith resigned.

The Central Committee of the workmen's and soldiers' coun-

cils, however, came to the support of the Majority Socialists by immediately confirming the appointment of two of their number to the vacancies created by the resignation of the Independents. What may be called the first period of German republican history lasted, therefore, from November 10, 1918, when Ebert organized a joint ministry of Majority and Independent Socialists, until December 28, when the latter withdrew from the government. A second period began when a purely Majority Socialist government, less radical than the preceding coalition, was established with the consent of the representatives of the workmen's and soldiers' councils and with the support of the bourgeoisie. This shift marked the beginning of a gradual, almost uninterrupted swing to the Right which continued in the German government through the next nine years.

It now appeared fairly certain that the forces of order and democracy would triumph in Germany unless a Communist *coup d'état* overthrew the provisional government. That this possibility was imminent became clear when the German Communist party,[1] in its convention in Berlin, voted to prevent by force the election of the National Assembly. The Communists believed that if the assembly ever met, their program would be defeated and the Revolution would be over. On January 5 they began their attempt to overthrow the Majority Socialist government in Berlin; by the next day over one hundred thousand Spartacists and Independents were in arms. If they had had determined leaders with clearly defined aims, they might have seized the city; but these they lacked. To the iron-handed Gustav Noske was entrusted the task of suppressing them, and so energetically and ruthlessly did he set about it that by the 15th, after more than a thousand had been killed or wounded, the revolt collapsed. On that day Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were arrested. Liebknecht, "while attempting to escape," was shot; and Rosa Luxemburg, attacked on the way to prison, was likewise killed. Thus the Spartacists lost their two most eloquent leaders but acquired two beloved martyrs.

With the announcement that elections would be held for the

[1] The official name adopted by the Spartacists on January 1, 1919.

National Assembly on January 19, the political leaders of Germany again became active. The old monarchical parties reorganized themselves, abandoned their former platforms, adopted new party names, and advocated democratic measures for preserving the State from anarchy. The German Nationalist party, composed of the conservatives, the Pan-Germans, the militarists, and the majority of the Junker class, succeeded to the old Conservative party. During the election campaign its leaders openly avowed their monarchical sentiments and championed the rights of private property and inheritance.

The Right wing of the old National Liberal party organized itself into the German People's party, and posed as the champion of liberalism in the new State. Although it preferred monarchy, it announced that the way toward internal peace and a greater Germany led over the ground of republican government. Freedom, justice, and national unity were its highest ideals. It specifically denounced all class rule, strikes, socialization, communism, Spartacism, Bolshevism, and anarchy. It was the party of "big business," and was ably led by Gustav Stresemann.

The former Center party now appeared under the name of Christian People's party. It sought to gain not only Catholic but non-Catholic votes as well. It supported the democratic republic but was strongly opposed to the council system and to all attempts to establish a socialistic régime. It favored the immediate framing of a constitution, the maintenance of the unity and federal character of Germany, universal suffrage, proportional representation, opening of all offices to all classes, and the adoption of a bill of rights. Its most outstanding leader was Mathias Erzberger.

The Left wing of the old National Liberals united with the former Progressive party to form the German Democratic party, the first bourgeois party to organize after the Revolution. In addition to supporting the republic it advocated the partial socialization of industry, the partition of the State domains, the prosecution of war profiteers, the adoption of a single progressive capital tax, the legal guarantee of the rights of workmen, employees, and officials,

and the protection of the independent middle class. It denounced the "divine right" of kings, the "squirearchy," and the military bureaucracy.

The Social Democrats, retaining their old party name and platform, entered the campaign with the prestige of their success in the government since November, 1918. They proposed a scientific and gradual policy of socialization to be accomplished through the ordinary channels of parliamentary government. Of all the parties in opposition to the existing provisional government, the Independent Socialists conducted the most bitter campaign, accusing the Majority Socialists of treason to the cause of socialism. The Communists, because of their aversion to parliamentary tactics in any form, refused to take part in the election.

The National Constituent Assembly

On January 19, four days after the collapse of the great Spartacist revolt, national elections were held throughout Germany with only minor disturbances. Although the Spartacists declined to participate in the elections, they made no concerted efforts to prevent their being held. Over 30,500,000 men and women voted in this first German election under universal suffrage. Because of the system of proportional representation the strength of each party was fairly represented in the number of seats it obtained. The Majority Socialists stood first with 163, followed by the Center party with 88, the Democrats with 75, the Nationalists with 42, the Independent Socialists with 22, the People's party with 21, and minor parties with a total of 10. Many had seen in the elections a triangular struggle between reactionary monarchists, moderate republicans, and revolutionary proletarians. The outcome was decisive in favor of the moderate group.

Two days later the government issued a proclamation summoning the National Assembly to meet on February 6 at Weimar, the renowned seat of German culture. In spite of the ardent protests of the Central Committee of the workmen's and soldiers' councils and the bitter denunciation of the Independent Socialists who preferred Berlin, the National Assembly was formally convened in

the New Theater at Weimar on the day designated. A provisional constitution, prepared by Hugo Preuss, a former official in the ministry of the interior and a professor of constitutional law, was adopted with modifications as the basis for a government which should have authority at home and abroad. Scheidemann, speaking for the Council of People's Commissars, thereupon surrendered to the assembly the power which it had held since the proclamation of the republic.

Since December 28 the provisional government had been solely controlled by the Majority Socialists, but the outcome of the national elections made such a situation no longer possible. Although the Majority Socialists elected by far the largest number of delegates to the assembly, they did not control a majority, so that a coalition now became necessary. The Majority Socialist government therefore gave way to the "Weimar Coalition," composed of Majority Socialists, Centrists, and Democrats, under the leadership of Scheidemann. The admission into the government for the first time of representatives of bourgeois parties marked a further shift to the Right, and brought to a close the second period of German republican history. On February 11 the National Assembly by a vote of 277 to 102 elected Friedrich Ebert, "a Heidelberg saddler, trained in the school of socialism, and a true son of the workmen," first President of the German Republic.

Following the establishment of a temporary government, the National Assembly at once turned its attention to constitution-making. On March 4 it selected a committee on the constitution, composed of twenty-eight members who represented the various parties in the Assembly roughly in proportion to their strength. Even before the National Assembly convened, the provisional government had requested Hugo Preuss to draw up a preliminary draft of a constitution, and this now served as the basis of discussion during the many meetings which the committee held before it finally reported back to the assembly some three months later.

Meanwhile, like the Convention during the French revolutionary period, the Weimar National Assembly was compelled to undertake a number of different and difficult tasks. Although its primary

work was to draft a permanent constitution for the new republic, it had likewise to maintain internal order, to provide food for the starving population, to reëstablish the national economic life, and to conclude peace with the Allies. Nor was it left to fulfill these arduous duties in peace and quiet. The Spartacists had threatened to dissolve the National Assembly by force if it did not show a revolutionary majority, and although they did not succeed in doing this, partly because the assembly met at Weimar, they did bring about numerous sporadic uprisings throughout the country. A revolt in Berlin early in March was put down only after twelve hundred persons had been killed and property to the value of millions had been destroyed. Again Noske resorted to strong-arm methods, ordering: "Any person found fighting with weapons in his hands against the Government troops is to be shot at once." In Munich a Communist uprising, provoked by the murder (by a Nationalist) of Kurt Eisner, the Bavarian premier, on February 21, led to the proclamation of a soviet republic which was not suppressed until two months later.

On May 7 the text of the Treaty of Versailles was presented to the German Delegation and at Weimar the government began struggling against the inevitable. The parties of the Right were loudest in denouncing the treaty, but the Democrats threatened to resign unless the terms were declared unacceptable, and Scheidemann from the first was determined to reject "this murder plan." The Independent Socialists organized demonstrations in favor of immediate acceptance but the Majority Socialists replied by demonstrating against a "peace of violence." Erzberger, the leader of the Centrists, fearing for the unity of the Reich, urged moderation.

On June 16 the Allied ultimatum made action unavoidable. The government parties were divided within themselves, and at a cabinet meeting on the night of the eighteenth the opposing sides were of equal strength. On the twentieth Scheidemann resigned and the efforts of Erzberger resulted in the formation of a "cabinet of surrender," composed of Majority Socialists and Centrists, with Bauer, a Majority Socialist, as chancellor. Two days later the new government proposed acceptance of the treaty with reservations re-

garding the clauses which recognized Germany's sole responsibility for the war and which demanded the surrender of "war criminals." The motion was carried by a vote of the Centrists, the Independents, most of the Majority Socialists, and a few Democrats. At the eleventh hour came the Allied demand for acceptance without reservations, and the threat that if such decision were not forthcoming by seven P.M. on the twenty-third, hostilities would be resumed. There was no alternative to acceptance, save annihilation. On the afternoon of the twenty-third the decision was made, the telegram of acceptance reaching Paris less than two hours before the expiration of the ultimatum.

Five days before the final vote to sign the peace treaty the committee on the constitution, after having held forty-two sessions, reported back to the assembly. The draft which they submitted was in turn discussed by the assembly, modified to some extent, and at length accepted on July 31, 1919, by a vote of 262 (Majority Socialists, Centrists, Democrats) to 75 (Independent Socialists, People's party, Nationalists).

The New Structure of Government

It has been said that "the constitution of a nation is its apparel, its mantle." The German people replaced their former royal robe with the latest mode of the plainer garb of democracy. "Inspired by the determination to renew and strengthen their Commonwealth in liberty and justice, to preserve peace both at home and abroad, and to foster social progress," they chose a republic in which political authority is derived from the people. Every member State must have a republican constitution and representatives "must be elected by the universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage of all German citizens, both men and women, according to the principles of proportional representation." The chancellor and the ministers require for the administration of their offices the confidence of the Reichstag (National Assembly), and must resign if the Reichstag by formal resolution withdraws its confidence. The republic is therefore a truly representative democracy.

The executive of the republic consists of the President and the

cabinet, composed of the chancellor and other ministers. The President is elected by the direct vote of the people, holds office for seven years, and may be reëlected. On the other hand, he may be removed before the end of his term by a vote of the people if the Reichstag by a two-thirds majority submits that proposal to them. A refusal by the people to remove the President, however, has the effect of reëlecting him for another seven-year term and entails the dissolution of the Reichstag. Like the French President and the British King, the German President has little real power, every executive order requiring the countersignature of the chancellor or some other minister. The chancellor, responsible to the Reichstag, is the one who determines the general course of policy and assumes responsibility therefor.

The National Legislature consists of two houses, the Reichstag and the Reichsrat (National Council). The former is composed of members elected for a term of four years by the direct vote of all men and women over twenty years of age. It may be dissolved by the President, but only once for the same cause. The Reichsrat represents the States. In it each State has at least one vote, the larger States having one vote for each 700,000 inhabitants; but no State may have more than two-fifths of all the votes. The States are represented in the Reichsrat by members of their State cabinets.

The constitution specified that elections to the Reichstag should be by a system of proportional representation, and a law of 1920 established what is known as the Baden system. Germany as a whole is divided into thirty-five electoral districts, each of which is entitled to one member in the Reichstag for every 60,000 votes cast at the election. The size of the Reichstag, therefore, is not fixed but varies with the number of voters who participate in an election. Each political party may nominate a list of candidates for each district, and may include in this list any number of names. Voters are not permitted to express their preference for individual candidates but must vote for a list, on the assumption that they are interested in policies and principles rather than in personalities. When the ballots are counted, each district list is allotted one seat for every 60,000 votes cast for it, the candidates being elected in the order in

which their names appeared on the party list. By a complex system of union lists and a national list, party surpluses over 60,000 in the districts are combined, and each 60,000 votes elects an additional party candidate from a union or national list.

National laws are enacted by the Reichstag, but the Reichsrat has the right to object to laws passed. If agreement is not reached, the President *may* refer the subject to a vote of the people. If the Reichstag passes a law a second time by a two-thirds majority, however, the President *must* either promulgate the law or refer it to a vote of the people; but an act of the Reichstag may be annulled by a popular vote only if a majority of the qualified electors participate. The Reichsrat functions, therefore, as a sort of "brake on legislation," and, contrary to the condition under the empire, the Reichstag is by far the more powerful branch of the legislature. The principles of referendum and initiative are definitely incorporated in the constitution, for a law passed by the Reichstag must be referred to the people if one-third of the Reichstag and five per cent of the popular electorate demand it; and if ten per cent of the electorate demand the enactment of a certain law, either the Reichstag must pass it or the electorate as a whole must be permitted to vote upon it.

Preuss, in drafting his preliminary plan, had two major ideas: (1) concentration of authority in the republic to such an extent that the States would survive merely as autonomous administrative units; (2) destruction of Prussia's hegemony in German affairs by the provision that any State might be split up at the demand of a majority of its citizens on the ground of racial, historic, social, or economic differences. He failed to carry through his program, but the influence of his ideas is found in the completed constitution.

The German Republic, though not a unitary State like France, is much more centralized than was the former empire. The national government has exclusive jurisdiction over many matters, and has the right to legislate concerning a great number of others which, until the national government does exercise its jurisdiction, may be regulated by the States.[2] But national laws are supreme over State

[2] Technically, under the new constitution, the various divisions of the German Republic are not called "States" but "Lands" or "Territories" (*Länder*).

laws which conflict with them, and in case of doubt recourse must be had to the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of the republic. National laws are usually executed by the State authorities under the supervision of the national cabinet, unless otherwise provided by national law.

The increased centralization produced by the Weimar constitution has occasioned many conflicts and much friction, especially between Bavaria and the Reich. Bavaria under the new constitution lost some of the special privileges which she had enjoyed under the imperial constitution, especially those reserved rights having to do with the railroad, postal, and telegraph systems, and with the administration of culture and education. She has sought to regain some of these rights and has wished to restore the Reichsrat to the position of the old Bundesrat as a means of conferring upon the various States of Germany a greater influence in the formulation of the policies of the republic. She has at various times defied the national government and has compelled the latter to make some concessions. The particularist movement eventually resulted in a split in the Center party when the Bavarian Catholics broke away and organized the Bavarian People's party which places more emphasis upon "states' rights."

The idea of providing for the subdivision of the various States was incorporated into the constitution with some restrictions. State boundaries may be altered and new States may be created by the process of constitutional amendment, or under certain circumstances by an ordinary national law. In practice, however, these provisions have brought about, not the division of Prussia into smaller States, but the combining of smaller States into larger ones.

Although the elections to the Weimar Assembly had denied to the Socialists a majority control in the drafting of the constitution, their influence was powerful enough to impart a certain socialistic tone to the final document. "It is the duty of the Commonwealth to acquire ownership of the railroads . . . and to operate all waterways serving as a means of general public communication." The "Commonwealth may by law, without impairment of the right of

compensation, . . . transfer to public ownership private business enterprises adapted for socialization." Landed property, "necessary to satisfy the demand for housing, to promote settlement and reclamation, or to improve agriculture, may be expropriated." Entailments shall be dissolved and unearned increments to the value of land shall inure to the benefit of the community as a whole.

In a similar way the workmen's councils movement which prevailed in Germany during the revolutionary period made itself felt in the constitution, which provides for a series of economic councils rising from the local industrial establishments to a national workers' council. "The wage-earners and salaried employees are entitled to be represented in local workers' councils, organized for each establishment in the locality, as well as in district workers' councils, organized for each economic area, and in a National Workers' Council, for the purpose of looking after their social and economic interests. The district workers' councils and the National Workers' Council meet together with the representatives of the employers and with other interested classes of people in district economic councils and in a National Economic Council. . . . The district economic councils and the National Economic Council shall be so constituted that all substantial vocational groups are represented therein according to their economic and social importance."

Drafts of laws of fundamental importance relating to social and economic policy must be submitted by the national cabinet to the National Economic Council for consideration before introduction into the Reichstag, and the National Economic Council itself has the right to propose such measures for enactment into law. The council is an advisory body and possesses no legislative or executive powers; yet to the extent that it has been created, it is a recognition that the old type of political legislature gives at best only a haphazard and scrappy representation of the economic interests of the people. According to this scheme, "the political legislature will continue to represent the people as individuals and to insure to them individual liberty; but the functional parliament will represent the great economic groups and corporations." This plan for a separate

functional representative body has been characterized as "the most original contribution of the German revolution to political thought."

The constitution contained many compromises, but in general it reflected the more moderate desires of the Democratic and Social Democratic parties, with numerous concessions to the Centrists in matters relating to education and religion. Contrary to the United States Constitution, the German Constitution deals specifically with education and the school system. As a concession to the Centrists it was stipulated that "within the municipalities, upon the petition of those entitled to instruction, common schools shall be established of their faith or ethical system." The details for carrying out this provision were to be regulated "in accordance with principles to be prescribed by a national law." The establishment of these denominational schools proved even more difficult than the inclusion of the provision in the constitution. Not until 1927 was any attempt made to enact a national law, and the attempt brought the downfall in March, 1928, of the government headed by the Centrist leader, Marx.

The finished document was, as might have been expected, far too conservative to please the Independent Socialists and much too liberal to suit the parties of the Right; yet, in view of the manifold difficulties which confronted the republic in the years following its adoption, the new framework of government proved exceptionally strong. On August 11, 1919, it received the signature of President Ebert, and three days later it came into force by presidential proclamation. On August 21 President Ebert took the oath of office required by the new constitution before the last session of the National Assembly at Weimar. The assembly, however, did not dissolve with the conclusion of its constituent work but constituted itself a legislative body which from September 30 sat in the Reichstag palace in Berlin.

The Defense of the Republic

To draft and set up a republican form of government for Germany was one thing; to defend it against the onslaughts of domestic foes of the Left and Right was quite another. From the day of its

proclamation the republic encountered the bitter opposition of the Communists, who believed, not in democracy, but in the rule of the proletariat organized in soviets on the Russian model. The first open attempts to overthrow the republic came from this group, but their numerous riots, strikes, military uprisings, and political *coups d'état* during 1919 were eventually quelled by the government, though not without much anxiety and bloodshed. Although the Communists have continued to exist and have fluctuated in political strength according to the exigencies of the republic, they have never seriously threatened its existence since the early months. They still continue to "blow off steam" occasionally by having their parades, singing their songs, and flaunting their banners. They have even come to constitute a group of respectable size in the Reichstag; but as the republic has gradually emerged from economic chaos into stabilized conditions, they have lost something of their driving force.

Somewhat in proportion as the threat from the Communists declined in the early years of the republic, that from the monarchists of the extreme Right increased. So long as Germany was actually threatened by communism, the monarchists delayed their attack on the republic, for they feared communism more than bourgeois republicanism. But by 1920 the immediate danger from communism seemed to have passed, and the Junkers, Pan-Germanists, irreconcilable militarists, and remnants of the pre-war Conservative party took heart. If the Germans rejected communism, perhaps they would accept monarchism.

In March, 1920, the reactionaries of the Right struck their first blow against the republic in what is known as the Kapp-Lüttwitz *Putsch*. General Baron von Lüttwitz, commander-in-chief of Berlin, obtained control of several brigades of the Germany Army of the Baltic which had refused to disband in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. His confederate in the plot was a former East Prussian official, Dr. Wolfgang von Kapp of Berlin. On the night of March 12 Lüttwitz with about 8,000 troops occupied Berlin. Kapp was proclaimed chancellor and Lüttwitz was appointed head of the national defense.

Although President Ebert's government, which had at the time

only about 2,000 troops in the capital, fled precipitately to Dresden and then on to Stuttgart, the *Putsch* proved a miserable failure. Some of the monarchist leaders refused their active support, and the bulk of the army and of the propertied classes failed to rally to it. At the same time it encountered the determined opposition of the working classes, to whom President Ebert issued a passionate appeal:

> Strike! Lay aside your work and throttle this military dictatorship. With every means, fight for the preservation of the Republic. Cease all dissension. There is only one way to prevent the return of William II. Paralyze the economic life. Let no hand stir, let no proletarian help the military dictatorship. Let there be a general strike along the whole line. Proletariat, unite!

Necessities like water, gas, and electricity were suddenly shut off; railway and tramway services ceased. A general strike throughout the country began on the fourteenth. The revolutionary government was paralyzed and collapsed within a week, Kapp fleeing to Sweden.

The reactionary *Putsch*, the strike by which it was opposed, and the general disorder occasioned by both were again seized upon by the Communists as an opportunity to stage revolts against the republic in several districts of Germany, especially in the Ruhr, where a crudely organized "Red Army" of some seventy or eighty thousand was scattered about in the cities. *Reichswehr* troops were sent to suppress the rebellion there, but it was not until April 6 that the Communists were overcome. The terrorist trials and courts-martial which followed further discredited the government in the eyes of the Communists and Independent Socialists.

The first Reichstag elections held under the republic, on June 6, 1920, revealed the growing strength of the parties theoretically opposed to permanent acceptance of the democratic republic. As a result of the elections the Reichstag representation of the Majority Socialists fell from 163 to 113, the Centrists from 88 to 67, and the Democrats from 75 to 45. The strength of the Weimar Coalition thus declined from 326 to 225. On the other hand, on the Right, the Nationalists increased their representation from 42 to 66, and the People's party theirs from 21 to 62; while on the Left the Independent Socialists rose from 22 to 81, and the Communists,

participating in an election for the first time, secured two seats. Another shift to the Right occurred in the government when, for the first time since the Revolution, a ministry was organized in which no Socialists were included. The new government was a coalition of People's party, Centrists, and Democrats, with the Centrist leader, Fehrenbach, as chancellor.

During the next three years events in connection with the fulfillment of the peace treaty provided numerous opportunities for the reactionary monarchists to criticize the republican régime and to seek to weaken and discredit it. The losses of territory by plebiscites, the Allied demand for the punishment of German "war criminals"—many of whom were looked upon as national heroes in the Fatherland, the reparation and disarmament demands, the forced disbandment of the Bavarian *Einwohnerwehr* (citizen guard), all presented points of attack for the monarchists. A "stab in the back" legend was developed to the effect that all the post-war ills were due to the military defeat which in turn had been caused by the pre-armistice revolutionary intrigues of the present republicans. The past glories of the Hohenzollern monarchy were constantly placed over against the present ills of the democratic republic.

A campaign of agitation, centering in Bavaria, was directed against all who had played a part in the events leading to the signing of the Versailles Treaty. Following the forced disbandment of the Bavarian *Einwohnerwehr*, there began a series of political murders of those who were suspected of giving information to the Allied commissions of control. This movement eventually broadened into one of greater significance and on August 26, 1921, claimed as its victim Mathias Erzberger, Centrist leader and former finance minister. He it was who had taken the initiative in bringing about the Reichstag resolution of July 19, 1917, demanding a peace without annexations, who had led the commission which arranged the armistice terms, who had been largely instrumental in creating the Bauer government which had accepted the treaty. These activities, coupled with the confiscatory nature of his finance legislation, led the reactionaries to make him the scapegoat for all the evils of the new régime. In the emergency an ordinance for the "protection

of the Republic" was issued suspending the constitutional guarantees.

Reactionary agitation increased daily but, owing to the emergency legislation enacted, violent disturbances were avoided during the remainder of 1921. On June 24, 1922, however, Walther Rathenau, a Democrat and minister for foreign affairs in the existing government, was assassinated by extreme Nationalists. A great industrialist of Jewish birth, he had won an international reputation for extraordinary efficiency as head of the War Materials Office. As minister of reconstruction and later as foreign minister he had shown unusual ability. His murder was due to his moderate policies and to the popular hatred of Jewish finance. Again the reactionary campaign, in the attempt to deprive the republic of its leaders, had claimed one of the ablest statesmen of the new régime. The government now enacted a drastic "Law for the protection of the Republic" to be in force for five years, but experienced great difficulty in having it accepted in Bavaria.

The monarchists continued their agitation and intrigue. In September, 1923, when Germany was in chaos as a result of French occupation of the Ruhr and German passive resistance, various plots were hatched in Bavaria looking toward the overthrow of the Berlin government. Their lack of unity was their undoing. One reactionary group under the leadership of Gustav von Kahr plotted the establishment of a directory which, backed by the *Reichswehr*, would assume control of the Reich. At the same time another group led by Ludendorff and Adolf Hitler, the latter the founder of a sort of German *fascisti*, planned to march on Berlin, where Hitler would be proclaimed President under the military dictatorship of Ludendorff. Hitler's plans conflicted with those of Kahr, with the result that the two factions consumed their ardor in quarreling between themselves, and the "beer cellar rebellion" of November 8 collapsed without having seriously threatened the republic. The chief conspirators were arrested and tried, but friendly courts let them off with lenient treatment. Although they later denied that their aim was the restoration of the monarchy, there seems to be little doubt that the success of their *Putsch* would have endangered the republic. Many despairing Germans must have felt during these

years the truth of Lichtenberg's words: "To build up a republic with the materials of a shattered monarchy is a difficult problem. It cannot be done until each stone has been re-cut. And that takes time."

In the midst of the republic's struggles against domestic foes of the Left and the Right a blow was struck at its territorial integrity. Almost simultaneously with the Hitler-Ludendorff *Putsch* in Bavaria came a separatist movement in the Rhineland which aimed, not to overthrow the German Republic, but to bring about its disintegration. With the tacit consent of "Frenchmen in high places," agitation for a separate republic had been fomented in the Rhineland ever since the armistice; but until 1923 it had consisted chiefly of anti-Prussian, pro-separatist propaganda. With the occupation of the Ruhr by Franco-Belgian troops, the movement took more definite form.

Under two leaders, Dr. Dorten and Herr Matthes, preparations were made for the establishment of a new Rhineland republic. The first blow was struck on September 30, 1923, when the separatists seized Düsseldorf in the Ruhr. During the following month the "Rhineland Republic" was proclaimed at Aachen (October 21) and at Coblenz (October 25). Bonn, Wiesbaden, Treves, and Mainz were immediately occupied by separatist forces. The "Autonomous Government of the Palatinate" was proclaimed at Speyer on November 11, and was at once officially recognized by the French high commissioner. Approximately 19,000 officials who refused to make declarations of loyalty to the Palatinate government were deported.

But the unnatural Rhineland movement failed. Dr. Dorten and Herr Matthes soon fell to quarreling with one another; the great majority of the lawful officials and population of the region refused to support it; the Belgian and British governments opposed it. The movement soon collapsed in the Belgian zone. In January, 1924, the President of the Autonomous Government of the Palatinate was assassinated and one of the separatist burgomasters was shot. In February the French officials withdrew their support and by the end of the month the separatist régime in the Rhineland had ended.

As a matter of fact, the obstacles in the way of a successful restoration of monarchy in Germany or a dismemberment of the republic are great. The monarchists have their "Swastika" and "Steel Helmets" associations which occasionally hold spectacular demonstrations in favor of monarchy, but the republicans have likewise their "*Reichsbanner-Schwarz-Rot-Gold*" organization with its millions of militant men determined to preserve the republic. The bulk of the trade unionists, who represent nearly half the population of Germany, stanchly support the republic and constitute a force against which, as Kapp soon discovered, no monarchist government could long endure. The assassination of Rathenau brought over a million workers into a procession of protest which took from the small hours of the morning until late in the afternoon to pass down the great boulevards in the west end of Berlin.

In September, 1922, the schism in the Social Democratic party, which had occurred early in the war, was healed when the Independent Socialists and Majority Socialists came together once more in the United Social Democratic party. The closing of this breach in Socialist ranks brought a further strengthening of the republic, for the program which was adopted by them in 1922 demanded the protection of the republic and a finish fight on communism. Furthermore, throughout the post-war period both the Center and Democratic parties have constituted a bulwark of strength in defense of the republic. Finally, as in France in the early years of the Third Republic, the monarchists are faced with the difficulty of uniting upon a candidate. With the Hohenzollerns discredited and the Bavarian monarchists strong for a Catholic Wittelsbach, the difficulty is almost insuperable.

Equally powerful are the influences against dismemberment. The post-war economic reorganization in the direction of vertical trusts, and the great industrial enterprises which exist in Germany today militate against separation. Bavaria, Berlin, the Rhineland, and Westphalia constitute a firmly knit economic unity which is destined to counteract every attempt at dismemberment. Even the trade unionists have gone on record in opposition to the movement.

The Currency Debacle

While German statesmen of the new régime were engaged in a life-and-death struggle to prevent the destruction or disintegration of the republic, they were forced to deal with the reparation problem which has already been discussed. At the same time, they were compelled to wrestle with the perplexing and baffling problem of a currency rapidly depreciating toward the vanishing point. At the beginning of the World War Germany had one of the most solid currencies in the world, but the unwillingness of the imperial government to resort to heavier direct taxation during the conflict led to the gradual inflation of the currency until by the close of the war it had been increased about four hundred per cent. The republic inherited, therefore, a greatly inflated currency.

But unfortunately the inflation was not stopped with the conclusion of hostilities. Immediately after the armistice Germany was faced with widespread unemployment, resulting from the rapid demobilization of her armies, the disorganization of her national economic life by the sudden ending of the war, and the continued Allied blockade. The extensive payment of unemployment doles to alleviate the resultant hardships placed an additional drain upon the budget which was already facing deficits. But instead of increasing the burden on the great capitalists and war profiteers as Great Britain had done, the German government resorted to further inflation of the currency.

Furthermore, Germany's acute need of food and raw materials at the close of the war, coupled with her lack of credit or a favorable trade balance with which to pay for them, led the government to keep the printing presses going. Then the necessity for making reparation payments in gold or in goods entailed buying gold from abroad or buying goods for deliveries to the Allies from German industrialists. Without adequate revenue, the government again printed more marks in order to make the required purchases for her reparation account.

The result of these repeated inflations of the currency during the early months of the republic was the continued depreciation of the

mark. By May, 1921, when Germany was forced to accept the decision of the Reparation Commission, the mark had declined to over sixty to the dollar; and on June 1, 1921, the Reichsbank for the first time began to pay a premium for gold coin, thus officially recognizing the inflation. This depreciation of the mark operated still further to keep the national budget unbalanced, for taxes, assessed with the mark at one figure, were paid later with a mark depreciated below that figure. The continued deficits which resulted led to still more inflation. By November, 1922, the mark had sunk to about 7,000 to the dollar.

The occupation of the Ruhr by the French and the Belgians and the adoption by Germany of the policy of passive resistance, with the accompanying need for subsidizing the idle workers, started the mark upon its toboggan slide. By the close of January, 1923, it stood at 50,000 to the dollar. In spite of the heroic attempts of the Reichsbank to stop its disastrous decline, the descent continued. By July it stood at 160,000, and during the month it declined to 1,100,000 to the dollar. From this date began the so-called repudiation of the mark. By the middle of November it had become practically worthless, being quoted in Berlin at 2,520,000,000,000 and in Cologne at about 4,000,000,000,000 to the dollar. Even to print the currency needed was a tremendous task. In 1923 over thirty paper factories were working full time exclusively for the Reichsbank, and 133 printing offices and 1,783 machines were engaged at top speed in producing paper currency. In spite of all this, the supply of currency became insufficient.

The economic and social results of this practical repudiation of the mark were terrific. The obvious effect of the devaluation of the mark was the destruction of savings, pensions, and insurance. Those who had laid by or inherited a sum sufficient to maintain them in comfort according to the standards of their class, suddenly discovered their capital dwindling. Of what value were 100,000 marks invested in banks, bonds, or fixed annuities when the mark declined until it took 1,000,000,000 to buy a dollar's worth of food? The inevitable consequence of such a declining currency was the forced transfer of wealth from the creditor to the debtor class. Mort-

gages were lifted, bonds retired, and notes paid off with currency worth only an infinitesimal fraction of its value.

A decline in the standard of living of the bulk of the people resulted from the divergence between the cost of living and wages or salaries. In January, 1923, even before the catastrophic decline of the mark that followed, the cost of living for a family of five in Berlin was in terms of marks 1,120 times the cost in 1913. What it was by November, when the price of milk was over 250,000,000,000 marks a quart, one can only surmise. Although attempts were made to revise wages and salaries in accordance with the changing scale, they were futile, for they always lagged far below the rising cost of living. In the closing weeks of the debacle it became impossible to adjust wages fast enough to keep pace with the sinking mark.

Naturally all incentive to thrift was destroyed. The universal aim was to transform currency into goods. A "*Flucht aus der Mark in die Ware*" occurred, which led to a feverish demand for commodities. This, in turn, temporarily produced an industrial boom. Merchants, on the other hand, soon sought to protect themselves against the continued depreciation of the mark by sliding prices until, in 1923, many in despair finally closed up their stores and refused to sell their goods at any price.

Undoubtedly the most lasting of the disastrous results of the currency inflation was the destruction or disintegration of a great part of the previously prosperous middle class. Fundamentally, inflation was only another form of taxation, but most unjust in that it hit the middle class disproportionately. This whole large and vital class was, in the words of one German, "economically guillotined." According to Count Kessler, no Soviet could have wiped out the middle class more thoroughly than inflation did it in Germany. Just as there was "cannon fodder" in the tremendous German drives on the west front in 1918, so there was "mark fodder" in Germany's passive resistance drive in the Ruhr in 1923. In each case whole classes were deliberately sacrificed. A great part of the middle class was now forced into the ranks of the working people.

On the other hand, the wealth and power of a few great indus-

trialists of Germany increased enormously. Availing themselves of artificially cheap labor, extensive Reichsbank loans, and a rapidly falling currency, they piled up tremendous paper profits. With these they purchased substantial assets abroad, enlarged and modernized their plants at home, or paid off loans and bonded indebtedness. At the same time the depreciation of the mark destroyed the financial reserves of the trade unions, thus placing the industrialists in a relatively stronger position in respect to labor. It likewise had the effect, temporarily, of protecting the capitalists from the weight of the income taxes which the government sought to collect, for by the time payment became due, the tax had sunk to a merely nominal amount. Thus the mighty capitalists and industrialists profited enormously by the inflation and showed no great concern to check it until the mark had become worthless.

When, however, farmers and merchants began to refuse to sell food for worthless currency, when "the catastrophe of currency developed into a catastrophe of the food and other supplies, which was worse than in the worst periods of the war," when plunderings and riots began to be of daily occurrence, the German government, in order to cope with the social dangers which the collapse of the mark had provoked, on September 27, 1923, declared a state of siege. Not since the spring of 1919 had Bolshevism been so near in Germany. In desperation the government decided to create a new bank of issue, the Rentenbank, and a new currency.

On October 15 the decree for the establishment of the Rentenbank was issued, the bank to open one month later. On November 12, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, general manager of one of Germany's largest banks, was appointed special currency commissioner with the task of stabilizing the mark and introducing the new currency, the Rentenmark. His first step was to stop the printing presses in order to prevent further inflation of the currency. Simultaneously he issued the new Rentenmark, a currency supposedly based upon a blanket mortgage on all productive lands and industries of Germany to the amount of 3,200,000,000 gold marks. The new currency was stabilized at the old rate of 4.2 to the dollar and circulated along with the old mark at the ratio of one to one trillion.

Meanwhile the government, through Finance Minister Dr. Luther, was taking energetic steps to balance the national budget. Even before the new currency was put into circulation, Luther had introduced the calculation of all tax payments on a gold basis. Why such a scheme had not been adopted long before is difficult to understand. This step, together with improved methods of collection, increased the government's revenues. At the same time, by decreasing the number of government employees, by cutting salaries, and by ceasing the payment of reparation, the government's expenditures were decreased. The result of these heroic measures was at last a balanced budget and the end of the need for inflation.

Of course such drastic changes could not be initiated without far-reaching effects upon the economic life of the country. With the return of a stable currency the incentive to save once more appeared and the demand for goods consequently fell off. Prices declined. This fact, together with the lack of liquid capital and the rise of interest rates (to about 45 per cent), led to retrenchment in industry with its consequent dismissal of superfluous employees. Widespread unemployment ensued. Inevitably many new firms, which had appeared during the inflation boom, were swept into bankruptcy by the restriction of credits and the stabilization of the currency. But out of the travail of the period came once more the long-desired stability of currency, prices, and wages.

Finally, in October, 1924, the loan of 800,000,000 gold marks, which was made to Germany under the Dawes Plan, added to the working capital of the country and provided the economic backing which the situation required. With the organization of the new Reichsbank, a new currency known as the Reichsmark took the place of the Rentenmark with the same value. Provision was made that the old depreciated marks might, until July 5, 1925, be converted into the new Reichsmark at the ratio of one trillion to one.

Politics Since 1924

Before the foreign loan could be obtained, however, the Dawes Plan had to be adopted and the necessary legislation enacted by the German government. In the Reichstag election of May 4, 1924,

the two outstanding issues were the maintenance of the republic and the acceptance of the Dawes Report, which was favored by the then existing Marx government. During the campaign the republic was vigorously attacked by both the reactionary monarchists and the radical Communists. The government parties lost heavily, as might have been expected from the universal tendency to vote against the government in times of economic stress. On the Right the Nationalists obtained 95 seats, and the Völkische party (more monarchist than the Nationalists) 32; on the Left the Communists increased their representation to 62. Nevertheless, a vote of lack of confidence was defeated on June 6; the government still held a bare working majority.

As some of the legislation necessary for the execution of the Dawes Plan required a two-thirds majority, it was only after a struggle that the necessary votes were obtained. The Nationalist party, opposed in principle to the plan, allowed its members to vote independently, thus making possible the adoption of the essential laws. This concession was purchased by promises that a statement would be made by the government repudiating Germany's "war guilt" and that Nationalists would be admitted to the cabinet. As no arrangement could be made for fulfilling the latter promise, the Reichstag was again dissolved and new elections were held on December 7. On this occasion the middle parties, aided by the adoption of the Dawes Plan, gained votes while the extremists lost, the Communists being reduced to 45 and the Völkische party to 14. The Nationalists, however, once more increased their representation, this time to 103, being second only to the Social Democrats. There ensued a long political crisis which was not ended until January 15, 1925, when Dr. Luther formed a cabinet composed of members of the Center, People's, and Nationalist parties. Once more the government moved to the Right, for this was the first cabinet which had ever admitted Nationalists.

On February 28, 1925, President Ebert died. As chancellor or President he had been at the head of the government ever since the proclamation of the republic on November 9, 1918. Although originally favoring a democratic parliamentary monarchy like Great

Britain's, he had accepted the republic after its proclamation by the proletariat and had used the influence of his unselfish patriotism to strengthen and stabilize it. An artisan and the son of an artisan, lacking the academic training so highly esteemed in Germany, a plain man of the people, his presence at the head of the State had gone far toward winning the radical proletariat from Bolshevism to the support of the republic. President Ebert's term of office had been provisional. The unsettled conditions during the early months of the republic had convinced the members of the Weimar Assembly that it would be unwise to hold a popular election at that time. They had therefore elected Ebert President without referring the question to the people. In 1922 his provisional term had been extended until June 30, 1925. His death now precipitated the first popular presidential election, for the German Constitution, like the French, makes no provision for a vice president.

German electoral procedure calls for one or two elections, as the case may be, to determine the popular choice. In the first balloting a candidate to be successful must receive a clear majority of all votes cast. If no candidate receives such a majority, a second election must be held in which the candidate receiving the largest number of votes, whether a majority or not, is elected. The first election, however, is not a preliminary elimination contest, for in the second poll voters are not restricted to the two or three candidates who received the highest vote in the preceding election. The parties may even nominate new candidates altogether.

Seven candidates were presented in the election of March 29, and none received the requisite majority.[3] A second vote therefore became necessary and party coalitions were the result. The Centrists, Democrats, and Social Democrats, who together had polled over 13,000,000 votes in the first election, finally agreed to support

[3] The popular vote in the March election was distributed as follows:

Jarres (Nationalist and People's party)	10,416,658
Braun (Social Democrat)	7,802,497
Marx (Center)	3,887,734
Thälmann (Communist)	1,871,815
Hellpach (Democrat)	1,568,398
Held (Bavarian People's party)	1,007,450
Ludendorff (extreme Nationalist)	285,793

ex-Chancellor Wilhelm Marx, leader of the Centrists. The Communists refused to join this coalition and persisted in running their own candidate. The combined vote of the parties of the Right in the first election had been less than 12,000,000, so that they were now confronted with a serious problem. They solved it unexpectedly by dropping all their earlier nominees and naming as their common candidate the aged Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, the idolized hero of the German people.

In the first poll some 12,000,000 qualified voters had failed to participate. In the final election on April 26, between three and four million of these lethargic citizens were galvanized into action by the dynamic magic of Hindenburg's name, and nearly three million of them cast their ballots for the war hero—enough to turn the scale in his favor. Throughout the campaign, however, the Right group was for the most part on the defensive. Nothing more clearly reveals the firm hold which the republic has on the masses of Germany than the passionate attempts of the speakers of the Right bloc to convince the German people that the election of Hindenburg would not be a blow at the republic, a step toward militarism. Even as it was, the combined vote of the Left bloc and the Communists more than outnumbered that which Hindenburg received. Once again a majority of the electorate registered itself against a restoration of the monarchy, and the irony of the situation was that the most extreme party of the Left had made possible the election of the candidate of the Right.[4]

By many it was feared that the election of Field Marshal Hindenburg to the Presidency by "militarists" and "monarchists" would lead to the overthrow of the republic. But the new President took the oath of loyalty to the republic without qualification, and apparently sought sincerely to fulfill it. He did not hesitate on occasion to declare that any new cabinet to receive his approval must be "faithful to the Weimar Constitution." Instead of becoming a dictator, he became the "moral leader of a democratic, republican,

[4] The returns in the second election were:

Hindenburg	14,655,641
Marx	13,751,605
Thälmann	1,931,151

and peaceful Germany." He did his utmost to bring about a reconciliation between monarchists and republicans. If it was Ebert's "historic mission" to win many of the radical proletariat to the new State, it was Hindenburg's to win the less reactionary monarchists to the republic.

The number of ministries which the German Republic has had during the first decade of its existence is in marked contrast with the few which served during the period of the empire. Germany, like France, has a multi-party system. The multiplicity of parties [5] was a direct advantage to the chancellor under the old imperial régime, since he was responsible only to the Kaiser and could play off one party against another. But now that the chancellor must have a majority of the Reichstag behind him, the multi-party system results in frequent changes of the ministry, of which there were nineteen during the first eleven years of the republic.

In the shifting of the ministries the Center party well exemplified its name. Its strong sense of moderation and responsibility has made it the nucleus of practically all the coalition governments of the post-war period. Its chief task was to determine whether it would ally itself with the Left or the Right. The trend, however, during the first nine years was steadily toward the Right. Although the first four ministries, beginning in November, 1918, were headed by Socialist chancellors, during the eight years from June, 1920, there was not a single Socialist chancellor, and only twice during that period were the Socialists even included in the ministry. On the other hand, the People's party four times had the chancellorship and the Nationalists were twice included in the government. In other words, the drift in German politics during these years was distinctly toward bourgeois control.

Nevertheless, the Center party remained unwaveringly loyal to the republic. In January, 1927, before it would consent to enter a coalition government including Nationalist ministers, it required the Nationalists to agree in advance (1) to a recognition of the republic as the only form of German State at present admissible,

[5] Deputies representing ten different parties held seats in the Reichstag at its dissolution in 1928.

(2) to a reform of the German army to insure recruits loyal to the republican constitution, and (3) to an adherence to the League of Nations and the Locarno Pacts.[6] Furthermore, with the support of even the Nationalists in the Reichstag, in May, 1927, they extended for two more years the "Law for the protection of the Republic," stipulating that neither William II nor any other Hohenzollern should ever again be monarch of Germany. In the words of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, "Whoever has eyes to see can no longer doubt after to-day that a return of the monarchy to Germany is impossible."

The fourth general elections for the Reichstag, on May 20, 1928, revealed the growing strength of the republicans, and marked a swing back from the Right. The Nationalists lost heavily, being reduced to 73, while the Social Democrats increased from 131 to 152 and the Communists from 45 to 54, the latter thus outnumbering the People's party and becoming the fourth largest group in the Reichstag. It was hoped that a "Grand Coalition" might be formed of all the parties from the People's party on the Right to the Social Democrats on the Left. Since the negotiations attendant upon the organization of such a coalition might take months, a temporary "Ministry of Personalities" took office, and for the first time since 1920 a Socialist, Hermann Müller, became chancellor. He it was who almost exactly nine years before had signed the hated Treaty of Versailles—a thought for reflection.

Although Müller's government included leaders of the Bavarian People's party, People's party, Centrists, Democrats, and Social Democrats, the parties themselves were not bound. The ministry, therefore, was only loosely held together. The Centrists believed that Germany's situation, with the reparation negotiations approaching, demanded a strong and consolidated government, and after some months had passed without the organization of the projected "Grand Coalition," the representative of the Center party resigned from the government on February 5, 1929. For a time it was feared that parliamentary government might be supplanted by a dictatorship, but eventually in April the "Grand Coalition" became a reality

[6] See pp. 342–44.

with the five parties represented in the government in proportion to their strength in the Reichstag. The Centrists now held three portfolios instead of one, but Müller continued as chancellor.

Economic Recovery

While the Republic has become more and more stabilized politically, it has likewise experienced a profound economic recovery. Pre-war Germany had been the third most powerful wealth-producing organism in the world. Her prosperity had been dependent upon a very delicate interrelation of territory for food supplies, population for industrial man power, coal and iron for basic raw materials, a highly developed and unified railway system for adequate and economical transportation, the income from her ocean shipping, her foreign investments, her oversea possessions for liquid capital, and excellent international credit for loans. This "closely knit organization, welded together through unremitting industry and research" was carefully dissected and destroyed by the war and the peace.

It has already been pointed out that the Treaty of Versailles deprived Germany in Europe of about 13 per cent of her territory, 12 per cent of her population, 65 per cent of her iron-ore reserves, 45 per cent of her former coal wealth, 72 per cent of her zinc ore, 57 per cent of her lead ore, from 12 to 15 per cent of her principal agricultural products, and about 10 per cent of her manufacturing establishments.[7] Her railroads, the sinews of her commercial system, already greatly weakened by the drain and wear and tear of the war, were further demoralized by the Allied armistice demands for locomotives and rolling stock. Her magnificent pre-war merchant marine was reduced to barely 400,000 tons, and her oversea possessions were lost entirely. Her merchants had been cut off from their connections abroad so that her pre-war bases for foreign trade were lacking.

Confronted by these obstacles, Germany set resolutely to work to rebuild or adapt her economic machine to the new situation. In this she was aided by several circumstances. In the first place, she

[7] See pp. 189–90.

had not been devastated by the war and consequently had no great reconstruction problem such as burdened France. Germany's factories, within her post-war frontiers at least, were intact. In the second place, the treaty prohibition upon military and naval expansion not only released for productive purposes funds which before the war would have gone into the unproductive pursuits of war preparation, but released for productive labor some hundreds of thousands of young men who in pre-war days would have spent their time in unproductive military training. The number of productive workers was further swelled by additions from the middle class as a result of the disastrous depreciation of the currency.

As a matter of fact, the currency debacle, which in no sense diminished the real wealth of the country, contributed to the industrial recovery of Germany in several ways. By the sale abroad of German currency, drafts in marks, bank notes, and other securities which became worthless as a result of the inflation, real wealth estimated as high as $2,000,000,000 came into German hands. Inflation enabled Germany to compete for a time in the markets of the world with goods produced at home by labor unusually cheap, while at the same time it enabled her industrialists to expand and modernize their plants with loans which were repaid with an almost worthless currency. By 1924, as the Dawes experts pointed out, Germany's industries and transportation system were in admirable physical condition. All that she needed was international credit, and as a result of the introduction of the Dawes Plan, abundant credit became available.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Germany's economic recovery was rapid in the years that followed. She had lost a considerable proportion of her coal resources; to compensate for this, she resorted to the more extensive use of electricity. She possessed water power whose total potential output it is calculated would produce in power annually the equivalent of 32,000,000 tons of black coal; this she began to develop. She had vast beds of lignite or "brown coal"; these she began to transform into electricity, constructing in their vicinity great generating plants. In her steel industry new methods of furnace construction and better utilization of coal

POST-WAR GERMANY

brought lower costs. She soon reached the place where she again had a surplus of coal for export and by 1927 her production of steel ingots was back nearly to the pre-war figure. Her commercial bank deposits increased from $342,000,000 in 1923 to $1,657,000,000 in 1926, and by October, 1929, her savings-bank deposits —which had been practically wiped out by the currency inflation— had reached a total of $2,125,000,000. The rolling stock in her railroads became superior in quality and condition to that of pre-war days. The gross tonnage of her merchant vessels rose from 400,000 to 3,738,067 by 1928, and possessed the great advantage of being nearly all new. In the total tonnage of shipping launched in 1928 Germany ranked next to Great Britain, and in the following year she wrested the transatlantic steamship record from the British with her new liner, the *Bremen*. A few weeks later (August 29, 1929) the German airship *Graf Zeppelin* thrilled the world by completing the first circumnavigation of the globe by air in a little less than twelve days of actual flying.

German industrialists felt confident of their ability to achieve success. They planned to resume their pre-war commercial and industrial relations, and hoped to regain the place in the world's markets which they had held in 1914. Following the expiration of the five-year commercial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany proceeded to conclude commercial treaties with all the important countries, while introducing a stricter protectionist policy by her own customs tariff act. Her iron and coal magnates extended their interests into Austria, Jugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. In the sale of steel rails they were soon able to compete in the United States even with American producers. By 1926 her foreign trade in terms of marks was within five per cent of the pre-war total, and early in 1928 it reached that figure. No country in Europe, with the possible exception of France, staged so complete a recovery.

Foreign Policy

Germany's economic recovery was to a considerable extent connected with her foreign policy. The latter, in turn, was based upon certain definite features of her post-war situation. She inherited a

national life politically, industrially, commercially, and financially demoralized and fast approaching chaos. An important part of her national territory was occupied by alien troops, and under certain circumstances might continue to be so indefinitely. Her military establishment had been drastically curtailed and was under the supervision of Inter-Allied commissions of control. She was weighted down with the burden of an indefinitely large reparation obligation and with the odium of "war guilt." She found herself isolated, almost an outcast among the powers of Europe. Her former Habsburg ally had been utterly destroyed; her lesser allies had been defeated and rendered insignificant in European affairs. The great powers were all her former enemies, and apparently still suspicious of her. She had been refused an invitation to become a member of the League of Nations.

These fundamental facts practically dictated Germany's foreign policy, the cardinal point of which was peace. From the beginning she realized her military weakness and well understood that should she again resort to arms, the battle field would this time be Germany. Peace was absolutely essential if she would strengthen the republic, reorganize her economic life, make her reparation payments, and liberate her territory. As an industrial country, her foreign policy was bound to be influenced by economic considerations. Almost as essential as the maintenance of peace was the restoration of world economy and the removal of those conditions which impeded German trade. Only by the rebuilding of her foreign commerce could Germany hope to regain her prosperity, a condition precedent to the payment of reparation and the liberation of her territory. More specifically, she sought to reduce and define the total reparation indemnity which she must pay; to liberate her military establishment from Inter-Allied control, her territory from foreign military occupation; to regain her international position as a free and equal member in the States system of Europe.

In respect to foreign policy her statesmen were divided into two groups—those who looked to the East, and those who turned toward the West. The former cordially hated the victorious Allies, spurned any move toward reconciliation with them, repudiated the peace

treaty which they had dictated, declined to adopt a policy of fulfillment, and hoped eventually, by forming an alliance with Russia, to be able to defy them and overthrow the treaty. The economic recovery of Germany they would hasten by reëstablishing the trade relations with Russia which had been so valuable before the war and by extending German economic control over the boundless resources of the Soviet Republic.

The most spectacular step taken in this policy of Eastern orientation was the signature of the Treaty of Rapallo with Russia in April, 1922. Both powers were at that time outside the concert of Europe, and by many in Allied countries the treaty was considered to be "a menacing gesture," forecasting a possible "alliance of all the vanquished." Germany accorded *de jure* recognition to the Soviet government, and each renounced all war claims and pre-war indebtedness, though Russia agreed that if she indemnified other creditor States, Germany was to receive similar treatment. Probably the most important articles of the treaty, so far as Germany was concerned, were those providing for the resumption of consular and diplomatic relations, the application of the most-favored-nation principle, and the extension of mutual facilities of trade.

The group in Germany who favored a policy of Western orientation believed that the republic's salvation was to be found only with the aid and coöperation of the Allies. They demanded a "policy of fulfillment and reconciliation." The one who more than all others developed a constructive foreign policy for Germany based on the idea of Western orientation was Gustav Stresemann, who assumed the office of foreign minister in the critical days of August, 1923, and held it through ten shifting ministries down to his regrettable death on October 3, 1929. A member of the bourgeoisie, associated with big business, he belonged before the war to the old National Liberal party. During the revolutionary days he formed the German People's party and became its leader. Content during the early years of the republic to assume a more or less negative policy of opportunism, his assumption of a share of the governmental burden of responsibility in 1923 led him to become increasingly constructive

in his policies. Under his guidance the republic chose the path leading toward fulfillment and reconciliation.

Real gains came to Germany from Stresemann's policy. The Dawes Committee's investigation brought the settling of the method and amounts of reparation payments in accordance with the views of impartial experts, and the introduction of the Dawes Plan brought the financial assistance of the West which made the economic rehabilitation of Germany possible. It led within a year to the military evacuation of the Ruhr area and the cities of Ruhrort, Duisburg, and Düsseldorf. The spirit of conciliation which prevailed assisted in the drafting of new commercial treaties with Great Britain, France, and Belgium, and led to the establishment of a potash agreement between German and French producers, and a steel syndicate among German, French, Belgian, and Luxemburg industries.

But undoubtedly Stresemann's outstanding achievement was the negotiation of the Locarno Pact. In Germany's foreign policy Franco-German relations overshadowed all other factors. The relations between these two countries have long turned in a vicious circle, first one and then the other being in the ascendancy. Following the World War, both countries were dominated by fear. France feared the recovery and vengeance of Germany; Germany feared a French policy which should seek, by cloaking itself in unfulfilled clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, to perpetuate the occupation of the Rhineland and the subordination of Germany.

In order to break the vicious circle, Stresemann in February, 1925, offered France a pact of guarantee somewhat similar to that offered by Cuno's government in 1922 just before the French entered the Ruhr. The new proposal suggested a pact by virtue of which the powers interested in the Rhine—above all, England, France, Italy, and Germany—should enter into a solemn obligation for a lengthy period not to wage war against a contracting State, a pact which should expressly guarantee the existing territorial status on the Rhine and Germany's fulfillment of her obligations to demilitarize the Rhineland in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles. Such a pact would of course involve the recognition by Ger-

many of the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, but it would involve for France the permanent renunciation of a French frontier on the Rhine together with the possibility of another invasion of the Ruhr. The offer further proposed arbitration treaties between Germany and the bordering States.

During the extended exchange of notes which followed, France admitted that such an agreement might be possible provided that (1) Germany became a member of the League, (2) Belgium became a party to the pact, and (3) nothing in the pact should be construed to prevent France from going to the aid of Poland, or the Allies from acting in accordance with the Covenant of the League. France was already bound to Poland and Czechoslovakia by definite defensive alliances which, in one case specifically and in the other by implication, involved armed support in the event of unprovoked aggression. She insisted that the interrelation of the proposed pact and these treaties required the participation in the discussion of representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

On October 4, 1925, representatives of Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia gathered in the little Swiss town of Locarno beside the blue waters of Lake Maggiore. Here for the first time since the war German representatives met those of the former hostile nations upon terms of genuine cordiality. In August, 1924, the German delegation had been received at the London Conference upon the basis of technical equality, but an atmosphere of constraint had prevailed. As one German official expressed it, "They treated us decently but never permitted us to forget that we were Huns!" The "Spirit of Locarno," not only revealed the new feeling of cordiality and conciliation which was the product of Stresemann's and Briand's endeavors, but emphasized the advance which Germany had made under the former's guidance toward her pre-war position in European affairs. After twelve days of negotiations carried on formally and informally, the conference closed on October 16 with the initialing of a treaty of mutual guarantee, four arbitration treaties between Germany on the one side and France, Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia respectively on the other, and two treaties of guarantee between

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OUTLAWING WAR ON THE RHINE

The final signing of the Locarno treaties, December 1, 1925

France on the one side and Poland and Czechoslovakia on the other.

By Article 1 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy, as a group and individually, guaranteed the inviolability of the existing frontiers between Germany and Belgium, and between Germany and France, together with the demilitarization of German territory west of a line drawn fifty kilometers east of the Rhine. By Article 2 Germany and Belgium, and Germany and France mutually agreed in no case to attack, invade, or resort to war against each other except (1) in case of legitimate defense against a violation of Article 2 of the treaty, (2) in case of a "flagrant breach" of the agreements regarding the demilitarized zone, (3) in case of being directed by the League against a State which had first attacked another member of the League. They further agreed to settle by peaceful means "all questions of every kind which may arise between them, and which may not be possible to settle by the normal methods of diplomacy."

In case of a "flagrant violation" of either Article 1 or Article 2, the signatory powers agreed to come immediately to the assistance of the injured party. In case of a doubtful violation, the question was to be considered by the Council of the League, and the signatory powers agreed to fulfill their obligations as above if the Council was satisfied that a violation or breach had been committed. The agreement was in no way to affect the rights and obligations of the signatory powers under the Treaty of Versailles nor to restrict the League of Nations. It was to come into force as soon as Germany became a member of the League of Nations, and was to remain in effect until the League Council should decide that "the League of Nations ensures sufficient protection to the high contracting parties."

The significance of the treaty in Franco-German relations was later set forth by Briand in eloquent words:

> Peace for Germany and for Franee: that means that we have done with the long series of terrible and sanguinary eonflicts whieh have stained the pages of history. We have done with blaek veils of mourning for sufferings that ean never be appeased, done with war, done with brutal and sanguinary methods of settling our disputes. True, differenees between

us still exist, but henceforth it will be for the judge to declare the law . . . Away with rifles, machine guns, cannon! Clear the way for conciliation, arbitration, peace!

By the network of arbitration agreements Germany on the one side and Belgium, France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland severally on the other engaged to settle by peaceful means all disputes, of every kind, which proved impossible of adjustment by the normal methods of diplomacy. By the guarantee treaties which France signed with Czechoslovakia and Poland it was agreed that in case Poland or Czechoslovakia or France should suffer from a failure to observe the undertakings arrived at between them and Germany, France and reciprocally Poland, or France and reciprocally Czechoslovakia should "lend each other immediately aid and assistance, if such failure is accompanied by unprovoked recourse to arms."

Stresemann's offer of a pact of guarantee had originally been violently opposed by the Nationalists, who had done their best to hamper the subsequent negotiations at every turn. They now objected to what they called the "stabilization" of the settlement made by the Treaty of Versailles which they had long been eager to overthrow. They feared that the French guarantee of the eastern arbitration treaties meant the end of the possibility of altering the East Prussian and Upper Silesian situations. In the Reichstag they opposed the pact to the last, and after the party committee had declared it unacceptable, the Nationalist ministers on October 26 resigned from the government. President Hindenburg, however, favored the pact, and other Reichstag groups saw in it security for Germany in the Rhineland and evidence of the republic's reception into full membership in the European concert of powers. The cabinet continued as a minority, and with the aid of the Social Democrats the pact was ratified on November 27. On December 1 the treaties were signed in London, and on the same day the Allied military evacuation of the Cologne area of occupation began.

Germany's entry into the League of Nations with a permanent seat on the Council had been made the keystone of the Locarno agreements. In spite of Nationalist opposition, the government made its application. Owing to international politics, however, the League

in special session in March, 1926, proved unable to grant Germany a permanent seat on the Council, and was obliged to postpone action until the regular meeting of the Assembly in September. The inevitable feeling of disappointment which ensued in Germany was seized upon by the Russian Soviet government as an opportunity for obtaining a new treaty with that country. Russia had been concerned ever since the initiation of the Locarno negotiations lest Germany should be drawn wholly within the political orbit of the Western powers and Russia in consequence be isolated in Europe.

On April 24, 1926, the two powers signed a five-year treaty of neutrality, providing that should either be attacked by a third party or parties, the other would maintain neutrality. Each agreed further not to adhere to any coalition formed "for the purpose of imposing an economic boycott" against the other. The two governments declared that the Treaty of Rapallo remained the basis of relations between them, and that they would "remain in friendly contact with each other, in order to insure mutual understanding in all questions of a political and economic nature affecting their two countries." Germany wished Russia to understand that the former's entrance into the League would offer "no obstacle to a friendly development of Russo-German relations," in other words, that Germany had not entirely surrendered her policy of Eastern orientation because she sought understanding and conciliation in the West.

With the reassembling of the League of Nations in the fall, Germany was granted membership by the unanimous vote of the Assembly on September 8. She was at once given a permanent seat on the Council along with France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan. On September 10 the German delegation, headed by Stresemann, took its seat in the Assembly of the League. Early in the following year Germany secured the abolition of the Inter-Allied commissions of control, having their duties transferred to the League, of which she herself was now an influential member.

During the meetings of the Ninth Assembly in 1928 Germany secured the initiation of negotiations between herself and the Allies looking toward a final settlement of the reparation problem and

the early evacuation of the Rhineland. The adoption of the Young Plan which eventually resulted brought still further gains for Germany. The definite total which was fixed for German reparation liabilities was placed far below that originally fixed by the Reparation Commission in 1921; and it was agreed that all Allied forces of occupation should be withdrawn from the Rhineland by June 30, 1930. The healing process which had been initiated at Locarno was thus carried one step further, and Stresemann, before his death, might well have looked back with satisfaction upon the results of his policy of fulfillment and reconciliation.

CHAPTER XIII

THE RECOVERY OF FRANCE

AMONG the numerous questions which have confronted French statesmen during the years since 1918, three major problems stand out. The most pressing was undoubtedly the reconstruction of those parts of France which had been so grievously devastated in the course of the World War. Closely connected with this, however, was the problem of obtaining the necessary funds for the great task of restoration without bringing on in France a currency debacle such as occurred in Germany. Last, and not unrelated to the other two, was the problem of creating some system of security which should effectively safeguard France in the future against the recurrence of her terrible experience in the years from 1914 to 1918.

The Problem of Reconstruction

At the close of the World War, throughout some 12,884 square miles of northern France chaos reigned. Here in pre-war days had dwelt one-eighth of France's population. Here had been concentrated the greater part of her industries and mines.[1] But as a result of the war hundreds of towns and villages had become deserted wastes of shapeless ruins. Hundreds of thousands of homes had been wrecked or totally destroyed. Thousands of factories had been looted or blown up; mines had been allowed to fill with water or been deliberately destroyed; railroads had become dilapidated and worn out. Millions of acres of once smiling farmland had been cut and torn and scarred with trenches and shell holes. Orchards and forests had been shot to pieces or razed by the retreating Germans; thousands of wells had been damaged, contaminated, or destroyed; hun-

[1] See pp. 259–60.

dreds of thousands of cattle and other stock had been carried off; and everywhere mile upon mile of barbed-wire entanglements and heaps of débris had been left to encumber the ground.[2] The devastated area was a great wound in the side of France which must be healed.

The restoration of this territory to its pre-war state constituted a gigantic problem for France, for if the region were to regain its former wealth-producing capacity, railroads, highways, and bridges must be opened up, débris cleared away, cities and towns rebuilt, factories and mills erected and refitted with machinery, mines pumped out and superstructures raised, trenches and shell craters filled in and leveled off, hundreds of miles of barbed-wire entanglements and millions of tons of munitions removed from the soil, the refugee population brought back, and civil government and administration once more established.

The attitude which the French government took toward the destruction caused by the war constituted a distinct departure from all previous procedure. As early as December, 1914, it had promised to reimburse its citizens for all direct and material losses occasioned by the war. Again in April, 1919, it had announced that all damages, certain, material, and direct, to real or personal property were entitled to reparation. In other words, the French government took the stand that losses occasioned by war were to be reimbursed by the State as a matter of right, a position which no State had ever previously taken.

A commission was created in each canton of the devastated area to evaluate the damages, and by May 1, 1921, demands had been made for actual losses of over 34,000,000,000 francs and for indemnities of nearly 106,000,000,000 francs. With the cost of replacement of damaged and destroyed property averaging five times its estimated value in 1914, partly in consequence of the decline of the franc, the French government was thus called upon to expend

[2] Of dwellings, 293,039 had been destroyed and 435,961 seriously damaged; 6,147 public buildings had been utterly ruined and 10,731 partially wrecked; 20,090 factories had been destroyed wholly or in part; 29,851 wells had been completely destroyed and 91,257 required repairs; 1,359,000 cattle, sheep, goats, horses, and mules had been carried away or lost.

billions in the work of restoration. But it was hoped and expected that whatever was spent for this purpose would ultimately be recovered from Germany, for the latter, by the Treaty of Versailles, had agreed to make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied Powers during the period of belligerency.

The procedure of the French government, therefore, was to create for the reconstruction of the devastated area a special budget known as the "Budget of Recoverable Expenditure." To this budget were charged all expenditures for restoration, and for this purpose money was spent freely and some said not without fraud. Since reparation payments were not immediately forthcoming, however, income for the special budget was provided from loans floated by the French government with the understanding that they would ultimately be retired when German reparation payments began to come in. By May, 1921, great strides had been made in the work of restoration, in the course of which the French government had spent over 20,000,000,000 francs, but up to that date France had actually received nothing from Germany to apply on her reparation account. And of the $250,000,000 paid by Germany during the summer of that year France, for reasons already discussed, actually received only $35,000,000.

Reparation and Politics

It was inevitable that the reparation problem should become involved in French politics. The government during the early postwar period was in the control of the Right group. In the parliamentary elections of 1919, the fear of Bolshevism had led the conservative parties to unite in a National bloc which had won a decisive victory. With Clemenceau's retirement into private life in January, 1920, Alexandre Millerand, who had played the chief part in organizing the National bloc, became prime minister; but upon the resignation of President Deschanel in September of that year, Millerand was elected to succeed him. A few months later Aristide Briand assumed the premiership. It was he who throughout the year 1921 had the difficult task of attempting to adapt his

reparation policy to German actualities, British desires for moderation, and French demands for tangible payments.

Briand stood for a policy of reasonable moderation and conciliation. He believed it was essential that France, from the viewpoint of both reparation and security, should not break with Great Britain. But with France's failure to receive reparation payments of any size, Frenchmen became restless. When at the close of 1921 Germany asked and was later granted a partial moratorium the extreme Nationalists, led by such men as Raymond Poincaré and André Tardieu, took up cudgels against Briand. His foreign policy they denounced as feeble and altogether too submissive to Great Britain. He had yielded, they said, far too much to British demands in respect to both reparation and security negotiations; France must be treated as an equal and not dragged at Britain's heels. There must be strict execution of the treaty.

In January, 1922, Briand was finally forced out of office and was succeeded by the extreme Nationalist, Poincaré. The latter's policy, culminating in the French occupation of the Ruhr and the subsequent appointment of the Dawes Committee, has already been traced. Not long after the Dawes Committee made its report, however, the statesman who had been responsible for the Ruhr occupation was repudiated by the French people. A number of influences conspired to bring this about. The continued fall of the franc, caused largely by the government's loans and unbalanced budgets, reacted against Poincaré, as did the accompanying rise in the cost of living. The failure to secure reparation payments from Germany, the increase in the national debt, the heavier taxes being laid upon Frenchmen, and the inability of the government to balance the national budget gave his opponents numerous opportunities to attack him. An anticlerical reaction had set in, with the result that the government of the Right, which had resumed diplomatic relations with the Vatican in 1921, was criticized for its clericalism. In addition to all these factors, French opinion during the opening months of 1924 began to swing back from the militant war spirit which had led it to support Poincaré in his Ruhr venture, and to favor a more moderate policy in foreign affairs.

Poincaré was constantly subjected to attacks of the Radical Socialists and other parties of the Left, which demanded: a general amnesty for all but rebels and traitors; the suppression of the Vatican embassy and the abolition of the clerical policies of the government; the reduction of the term of military service; greater use of direct taxation, together with budget and fiscal reform; a reversal in foreign policy which should lead to greater coöperation with Great Britain, recognition of the Russian Soviet government, conciliation rather than force in dealing with Germany, and an attempt by coöperation to strengthen the League of Nations. Through the efforts of Briand a Left bloc was finally organized with the purpose of defeating Poincaré and bringing in a government of the Left. The effect of all these influences was revealed in the general parliamentary elections of May 11, 1924, when the National bloc lost more than one hundred seats and the parties of the Left were returned in a majority, the Radical Socialists constituting the largest single group in the new Chamber.

The Left Bloc in Control

The immediate result of this reversal in French politics was the downfall of both Premier Poincaré and President Millerand. That Poincaré should be forced to resign was, of course, quite to be expected under the French parliamentary system. But the French President was constitutionally considered to be in somewhat the same position as the King of England relative to party politics, that is, not affected by the fluctuations in party strength or by the rise and fall of ministries. But Millerand, upon being elected President, had announced that he intended to play a larger part in formulating French policy than had French presidents hitherto, and the leaders of the Left bloc now resolved that he must resign because he had overstepped his presidential prerogatives by pursuing a personal policy and openly supporting the National bloc during the preceding electoral campaign.

When, therefore, following Poincaré's resignation, President Millerand called upon Edouard Herriot, leader of the Radical Socialists, to form a government, the latter declined on the ground

that it was impossible to construct a cabinet which would be acceptable to the Chamber of Deputies so long as President Millerand remained in office. The President then invited another member of the Chamber to assume the premiership, but the latter's cabinet when presented failed to secure the support of the Chamber. An impasse was thus created which was surmounted only when President Millerand resigned his office on June 11. Two days later Gaston Doumergue, president of the Senate and a member of the Left group, was elected President, the first Protestant ever to hold that office under the Third Republic. Herriot now accepted the new President's invitation to form a cabinet and thus ushered in a period of rule of the Left.

During the succeeding eighteen months, at first under the ministry of Herriot and later under that of Painlevé, the Left bloc proceeded to carry out its policies. The change in attitude toward Germany and the willingness to collaborate more closely with Great Britain were revealed at the London Conference in August, 1924, when the French government agreed to accept a settlement of the reparation question in accordance with the Dawes Plan and to withdraw French troops from the Ruhr within the following year. They made possible also the success of the negotiations leading to the Locarno Pact in 1925. During this period of Left control came the recognition of the Russian Soviet government by France, the strengthening of the bonds of friendship with the new States of central Europe, and a more friendly attitude toward the League of Nations.

In domestic affairs the Left bloc at once inaugurated its policy of political amnesty, the most spectacular result of which was the return to politics of Joseph Caillaux, a former prime minister who had been arrested and imprisoned by Clemenceau because of his "defeatist" policy during the war. After having spent some three years in prison, Caillaux had been finally tried in 1920 and condemned to the loss of his civic rights for ten years and to exile from Paris for five years. The action of the Left bloc now restored to him his political and civic rights, and within a short time he became once more a figure in French politics.

The parties of the Left had long possessed a deep-rooted anti-clerical bias, arising from their belief that the Church is the implacable enemy of the republic. It was the determined efforts of this group which had brought about in France the separation of Church and State and the prohibition of the teaching of nuns and monks in Church schools in the early years of the present century. They had looked with distrust and misgiving at the return to France of unauthorized religious orders during the years just after the war and at Briand's reëstablishment of a French embassy to the Vatican. They had made the clerical policies of the National bloc one of the issues of the election in May, and there were not lacking those who asserted that the outcome of the election was "a triumph of the Republic over Clericalism."

In the statement of his policies Herriot announced his purpose to abolish the embassy to the Vatican, to enforce once more the pre-war laws directed against religious congregations, and to bring the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine under the same religious and educational régime as prevailed in the rest of the republic. In consequence, it was voted to omit from the national budget for 1925 any provision for the reëstablished embassy to the Vatican, and a beginning was made of expelling the unauthorized religious orders. These steps aroused such opposition, however, that in the end the French ambassador to the Holy See was permitted to remain. At the same time the Church took several steps to indicate that it was no longer an enemy of the republic. In January, 1927, *L'Action Française*, the publication of the French monarchists, was placed on the Index by the Pope, and early in 1928 the archbishop of Paris issued an edict practically excommunicating those Catholics who continued to belong to the monarchist party.

The Problem of Alsace-Lorraine

But it was in Alsace-Lorraine that the greatest resistance was encountered by the Left bloc. At the time when these provinces were taken from France in 1871 the religious and educational situation throughout the republic was regulated by the concordat which Napoleon had concluded with the Pope in 1801. Under this agree-

ment the salaries of the clergy were paid by the government, which had a voice in their appointment, and education was almost entirely under the control of the Church. The German government had respected these arrangements in Alsace-Lorraine when it annexed the provinces and had permitted them to continue. The result was that in Alsace-Lorraine the salaries of the clergy were paid by the local government, and the children were permitted to attend Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish schools in accordance with the religion of their parents. In the rest of France, on the other hand, subsequent anti-clerical legislation had meanwhile altered the situation. Church and State had been completely separated, all religious instruction had been removed from the schools, and teaching by religious orders had been forbidden.

France is a highly centralized unitary State with no provision for local differences in such matters as education. Nevertheless, President Poincaré, at the time of the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine, had pledged the retention of their religious system without change, and the National bloc had winked at the anomalous situation created in France when it permitted the religious and educational system in Alsace-Lorraine to continue undisturbed. Herriot, however, was determined to "assimilate" the provinces, to efface the legislative differences between them and the rest of the republic. When he sought to introduce there the same régime as existed elsewhere throughout France, when he attempted to disestablish the churches and to introduce secular schools, he encountered the active obstruction of the people. The Catholic school children of Alsace-Lorraine united in a great strike and Catholics in many other parts of France vigorously protested. In the end a compromise solution was adopted. An "inter-confessional" school system was introduced in accordance with which the children are sent for their academic instruction to a common school without regard to their religious beliefs but are separated for their religious instruction.

The attempt to "assimilate" Alsace-Lorraine produced friction and ill feeling in the provinces on other grounds than religion alone. Under Germany the provinces had constituted a single political unit which, though ruled arbitrarily by the imperial government until

1911, had in that year been granted a local legislature with considerable power. But in a unitary State like France there is no place for provincial legislatures. In accordance with the French system of government Alsace-Lorraine in 1919 was divided into three departments and the legislature was ignored. Strassburg ceased to be a capital with governmental powers and organs and became simply a prefecture. The inhabitants of the provinces were naturally reluctant to lose their local rights.

Furthermore, they complained that officials sent out from Paris knew no German, the language most nearly akin to that spoken by the majority of the people. The great majority of Alsatians and Lorrainers speak patois or dialects closely related to high German, which is used in printing and writing. Only German was taught in the elementary schools during the years in which the provinces were included in the German Empire, but with the return to France the official language of the schools of Alsace-Lorraine became French. It is required that during the first two years of the elementary schools French shall be studied exclusively; after that three hours a week of instruction in German is provided. The French government has insisted that French should have a primary place in the school system and has discouraged the use of German, despite the desire of many Alsatians for language equality.

Many of those who in November, 1918, welcomed French troops so enthusiastically as "liberators" who would bring in "a new era of liberty, prosperity, and happiness" later had serious doubts as to whether their return had been altogether an unmixed blessing. In fact, stimulated by grievances and fears as well as by a highly financed propaganda, disgruntled elements of the Alsatian population were gradually won over to an autonomist movement which sought home rule or even separation from France. So serious did the situation become that early in 1929 the Chamber of Deputies devoted itself for more than two weeks to a consideration of the problems connected with the administration of Alsace-Lorraine.

Poincaré, once more prime minister, while stating his determination to make no concessions to autonomy, admitted at that time that even Germany had realized that she must not offend the sentiments

of the great majority of the Alsatian people. France, he declared, could do no less; the government's policy would be one of status quo. By an overwhelming vote the Chamber of Deputies declared its confidence in "the patriotic attachment of the population of Alsace and Lorraine to the Republic and to France united and indivisible." Autonomist agitation, nevertheless, still continues.

Fiscal Chaos and Poincaré

But in 1925–26 the rock upon which the Left bloc finally foundered was national finance. Four factors united to produce a serious crisis in the French fiscal system: the tremendous increase in the service charges on the debt of France, which had risen from 35 billion francs to 180 billion francs during the war; the enormous current expenditures required for the reconstruction of the devastated area in the early years of the post-war period; the relatively insignificant amounts actually received in reparation payments prior to 1926; and the failure of the government's system of taxation to bring in revenue sufficient to balance the budget. During the five years before the Left bloc came into power annual deficits had added a total of 150 billion francs to the already gigantic national debt, despite the fact that national taxes had been increased until they brought in for 1923 five and one-third times as much as for 1913, and the French people were paying in net taxes a little over 16 per cent of their national income. The government had been forced to resort to long-term loans, short-term bills, and borrowings from the Bank of France. The national currency had become greatly inflated, and the franc, normally worth 19.3 cents, had depreciated until by March, 1924, it was worth less than 5 cents.

In 1924 the French people began to show a reluctance to make further loans to the government, and holders of short-term bills displayed an unwillingness to renew their loans as they came due. The government was unable to increase the national revenue materially because of the bitter conflict in Parliament over the method of taxation. The extreme Socialists asserted that French capital had not been subjected to as heavy income and excess-profit taxes as had British and American capital and now demanded that it be

forced to help solve the fiscal problem of France by a capital levy. The government, unwilling to adopt such a measure, resorted to further increases in the paper currency. On the top of all this, the situation was further complicated by the government's failure to reach definite agreements with Great Britain and the United States regarding the rates of payment and the interest on the huge loans already made to France by these countries.

Inability to solve the fiscal tangle forced three changes in the ministry in 1925. On April 10 Herriot fell because the Chamber of Deputies refused to support his plan for still further inflation of the currency. A colleague in the Left bloc, Paul Painlevé, succeeded him and appointed as his minister of finance, Joseph Caillaux, long known as a "wizard" in fiscal affairs and only recently returned to politics. But Painlevé's ministry in turn fell, largely because of Caillaux's failure to conclude a satisfactory debt settlement with the United States and his desire to resort to further inflation rather than to accept the demand for a capital levy. A second Painlevé ministry lasted less than a month, and fell on November 22, 1925, when the Chamber opposed his taxation measure and his plan for further currency inflation.

With the fall of Painlevé's second ministry the Left bloc was shattered, and ministerial instability in France increased. During the ensuing eight months no less than four different ministries held office, three of them led by the veteran premier, Aristide Briand. Despite the ability of this experienced statesman the fiscal impasse remained. No acceptable scheme of taxation could be agreed upon, no means of preventing the decline of the franc could be discovered. When on June 15, 1926, the Briand ministry fell for the second time within four months, the franc had declined to 36.5 to the dollar. In his reorganized ministry Briand again turned to Caillaux but to no avail, for the Socialists refused to pass the legislation to carry through his program of increased taxes.

By July, 1926, French bonds were selling far below par, the treasury was practically empty and had no borrowing margin at the Bank of France, the budget was still unbalanced, an enormous floating debt was maturing at the rate of 7,500,000,000 francs a

month, maturities were exceeding renewals, the franc had fallen to 48 to the dollar, and the confidence of the French people in the integrity of the financial measures of their government had become seriously impaired. The crisis brought a radical change in the government. Party lines were at last obliterated, and a ministry of National Union was organized to include six former premiers under the leadership of France's "strong man," Poincaré, who was given practically dictatorial powers in the realm of finance.

Drastic measures were at once taken. The Budget of Recoverable Expenditures was absorbed into the national budget, which in turn was greatly simplified. New tax measures were enacted increasing the State's revenue by 9,300,000,000 francs. Extensive reforms in the administrative system reduced expenditures. The budget —the largest in the nation's history—was balanced and the year 1926 closed with a surplus of over 1,500,000,000 francs in the treasury. The franc was gradually raised in value until by December 20, 1926, it stood at 25.19 to the dollar, where it was given *de facto* stabilization.

These measures brought a return of investors' confidence in the government which enabled the latter to adjust its floating debt advantageously. A sinking fund and public debt management commission began converting short-term bills into one- and two-year obligations, thus postponing dates of maturities. By 1928 the floating debt had been entirely converted into two-year bills, none of which matured before 1929, and short-term loans had been refunded so that none fell due until 1931. Renewed confidence in the government made it possible to reduce interest rates, in some cases from six per cent to three per cent, so that by 1928 the service charges on the floating debt had been decreased by over 300,000,000 francs yearly. The reconstruction of the devastated area was practically completed so that extraordinary expenditures for this purpose became negligible, while income from reparation payments under the Dawes Plan increased.

The stabilization of the franc at a figure approximately one-fifth of its pre-war value greatly reduced the effective value of pre-war bonds, and even those issued since 1914 were lessened in value to

a considerable extent. In this way what was really a special levy was made on the creditor classes of France for use toward the extinction of the public debt. By many it has been considered that this depreciation of the currency was the best means available for France

FRANCE'S NEW RESOURCES

to carry a fiscal charge to her class of moderately well-to-do citizens.

Despite the fact that France lost over a million and a half of her ablest producers by the war, that her population even with the addition of Alsace-Lorraine is less than it was before the war, that her

national wealth has declined from $64,000,000,000 (1913) to $48,000,000,000 (1927), and that she is now subjected to taxation estimated at from 20 to 22 per cent of her national income, higher even than that in Great Britain, France is economically sound. The return of Alsace-Lorraine and the acquisition of the Saar mines have greatly increased her economic resources and placed her in the forefront of the world's leaders in metallurgical industries. Comparative figures tell the story. Although the production of coal, pig iron, and steel in 1926 for Europe as a whole was 24 per cent, 22 per cent, and 5 per cent less respectively than in 1913, the production in France was 31 per cent, 78 per cent, and 80 per cent greater. The reconstruction of her devastated areas has increased her industrial capacity, for the new factories are larger and more modern than those which were destroyed, the machinery and processes improved and more efficient, and the use of electrical power more extensive. Her industrialists have shown a willingness to adopt new ideas and have reorganized many of their enterprises with a view to large-scale production. France is today in a much stronger position than ever before. By 1926 her total exports in terms of dollars were nearly 50 per cent greater than they were in 1913, and she had a favorable balance of trade—something which she did not enjoy before the war. The reconstruction of her devastated area has been practically completed at a cost of billions of dollars, most of which was provided by France herself.

In 1928 France had an opportunity to pass upon Poincaré's achievements in the parliamentary elections which were held in April. As in the elections four years earlier, the chief issue was Poincaré and his policies. In general the election was waged on the question of the continuance or disruption of the government of National Union. Poincaré himself made no clear-cut statement of his future intentions, being content to stand upon his record and practically asking for a "blank check" indorsement by the electorate. His one concession to the changed spirit of the times was his moderate praise for the policy of Locarno and for Franco-German *rapprochement*. The elections were an apparent victory for the government.

Practically every party of the Right increased its strength in the Chamber of Deputies, while on the Left every group except the Republican Socialists of Briand and Painlevé declined. The National Union appeared to have a strength of about 427 in a Chamber of 612.

On June 24, 1928, the Chamber of Deputies voted *de jure* stabilization of the franc at 25.19 to the dollar, the rate which had prevailed for eighteen months. With the final attainment of currency stability on a gold basis, party politics became more active, since the fiscal crisis which had led to the subordination of party lines for the good of the nation had been weathered. For some time the Radical Socialists, formerly led by Herriot, had been restless. In 1927 a split had occurred in the party congress over the question of supporting the Poincaré government, and many complained because their leaders, especially Herriot and Sarraut, had been "lassoed" into Poincaré's ministry. The Left temper of the new Chamber was shown when it elected a Socialist as its president, another Socialist as chairman of its foreign affairs committee, and a Radical Socialist to head its finance committee.

In November the Radicals and Socialists used the budget as an occasion for an attack upon the government, denouncing certain clerical and military provisions in it. The Radicals in their party convention passed a vote of lack of confidence in the National Union, and suggested the formation of a Left bloc once more. The four Radical ministers were forced to resign from the government and Poincaré thereupon handed in the resignation of his whole ministry. But the Left bloc proved to be unable to form a ministry and on November 11, the tenth anniversary of the armistice, Poincaré was returned to the premiership with a government minus the Radicals. Many apparently still felt that Poincaré was needed to head the government during the important negotiations which had been opened looking to a final settlement of the question of reparation. Ill health, however, forced Poincaré's resignation on July 26, 1929, and the task of dealing with the reparation problem fell upon Briand, who once more assumed the premiership.

The Search for Security

The shifting ministries of post-war France have varied in their political composition, they have differed in their domestic policies, but throughout the period they have possessed a singleness of purpose in foreign affairs. France must be secured against a repetition of the German invasion. French statesmen realized at the close of the war what they clearly perceived during the years preceding it, that Germany was potentially much more powerful in a military sense than France. They saw that, though deprived of some millions of her former population, Germany even within her post-war frontiers still had the largest population of any of the national States of Europe. It took very little mathematical ability for a French statesman to prove that France's 39,000,000 would be no match for Germany's 62,000,000 and that each year would see the disparity grow greater if the French population continued to remain stationary while that of Germany increased. Great was their alarm lest the "fall in the French birth rate might undo the work of Foch in a single generation."

Before the war, in order to counteract this situation which had existed for many years, France had allied herself with populous Russia so that their combined man power and resources might be protection against their powerful neighbor, Germany. The loss of Russia as an ally, with the coming of the Bolsheviks in 1917, was a terrible blow for France, but at the peace conference her statesmen sought to repair this damage by carrying through the Program of Security drawn up by the French government for their guidance as early as November, 1918.[3]

Although the French obtained a number of the points for which they contended at the conference, they did not obtain all. As protection against another German invasion they were obliged to accept, instead of French military control of the Rhine, a compromise which included Allied military occupation of the left bank of the Rhine for fifteen years, the permanent demilitarization of this area together with a strip of territory fifty kilometers wide on the

[3] See pp. 163–64.

right bank, and a tripartite guarantee treaty promising that the United States and Great Britain would come to the assistance of France in case of a future unprovoked attack by Germany. But this bulwark of protection was soon weakened. Although Great Britain ratified the Guarantee Treaty, the United States refused to have anything to do with it, and consequently the whole scheme fell to the ground, for Great Britain's adhesion to the treaty was contingent upon that of the United States. Even more staggering than the loss of her former Russian ally in 1917 was the blow which fell upon France when her new and compensating alliance with the English-speaking powers thus failed to materialize.

French statesmen lost no time in crying over spilt milk. If they must now construct their own security alliance, they would proceed at once to do so. There was one country of western Europe which was as much concerned as France in the problem of her future security against Germany. Belgium after her terrible experiences of the World War would be only too eager to obtain protection against their repetition; therefore to Belgium France now turned in a conciliatory spirit. Although these two powers in the months following the war had been earnest rivals for the economic control of Luxemburg, which by the peace treaty had been separated from the German Customs Union, France now deliberately and graciously renounced her prospects in this grand duchy in order to obtain her other major object. Military conversations between the French and Belgian staffs began in the early summer of 1920 and culminated on September 7 in the signing of an agreement. Although this agreement was registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations, its specific provisions were not given, for the two powers claimed that the terms were purely defensive and that to publish the technical details would be to destroy their efficacy in advance. One thing at least was clear—France and Belgium were united in a mutually defensive military alliance against Germany.

But France with Belgium alone could still not hope to cope with Germany. She must seek some greater power to take the place of her lost ally, Russia. With this in mind she turned to the new Polish Republic, largest of all the new States of Europe. If France

needed security for her eastern frontier facing Germany, to no less a degree did Poland need a similar security for her western frontier which had been established at the expense of Germany. If France had reason to fear for the stability of her German frontier, twice justified was Poland, for the loss of Upper Silesia, Posen, and West Prussia with their mineral and agricultural resources and their large German minorities was felt by the German nation, or at any rate by the Prussian people, more keenly than the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. Fear of German attack thus created a strong common bond between Poland and France.

In the summer of 1920 during the crisis of the Russo-Polish campaign [4] the French government sent a military mission to Poland and helped to save Warsaw from the Bolsheviks. Diplomatic negotiations next ensued and a Franco-Polish treaty of alliance was signed on February 19, 1921. According to the preamble, the object of the treaty was the maintenance of the treaties to which both States were parties "or which may in future be recognized by both parties." The two powers agreed that in case of unprovoked attack upon either, they would take concerted measures for the defense of their territory and the protection of their legitimate interests, "within the limits specified in the preamble." Since at that time France and Poland were not both parties to any treaty signed with Russia, the Franco-Polish alliance was obviously designed for protection against Germany. The treaty was ratified in May, 1922. The treaty system thus far created by France provided that if Germany should attack her, France would be aided by Belgium in the west and by Poland in the east.

But French statesmen were not yet content with the security which they had obtained for France. In December, 1921, the French ambassador in London outlined to Lord Curzon, British foreign secretary, suggestions for a definite political alliance between Great Britain and France. What was proposed was a reciprocal agreement which would take effect in case of indirect as well as direct German aggression. France believed that unless Germany were "smitten with incurable lunacy," the contingency of direct

[4] See p. 455.

aggression would probably not arise. What she desired was an alliance which would bring her aid in case she went to the assistance of Poland against an attack by Germany. In the negotiations which ensued between Briand and Lloyd George, the latter asserted that the British people were not greatly concerned in Germany's eastern frontier and were reluctant to become involved in quarrels arising there. The best that Briand could do was to get Lloyd George to agree to draft a treaty which would remain in force for ten years and which provided that, in the event of a direct and unprovoked aggression against the soil of France by Germany, Great Britain would immediately place herself at the side of France with her naval, military, and air forces.

This agreement was reached at Cannes on January 12, 1922. On the next day, however, Briand was forced from office and was succeeded by the more militant Poincaré. The latter, of course, found a number of holes in the Briand–Lloyd George proposal. He demanded that the treaty should be reciprocal rather than merely a unilateral guarantee, that it should provide assistance in the event of an attack on "France" instead of "French soil," that it should be supplemented by a definite military agreement, and that it should run for a period of thirty years. But the British government was utterly opposed to a military entente or convention, with the result that negotiations dragged along half-heartedly and finally lapsed in July, 1922, when differences of opinion regarding reparation policies made it impossible for the two countries to agree in other matters.

For a time, under Poincaré, France appeared to be returning to her earlier-conceived Program of Security. The occupation of the Ruhr was directly or indirectly connected with this plan in at least three ways. In the first place, it was an attempt to force Germany to assume the heavy burden of reparation payments which had been part of the original French plan. In the second place, it constituted such a serious interference with Germany's industrial system that it was bound to retard her economic recovery and her return to power as an economic rival, and this had been one of the original French aims. Finally, the occupation of the Ruhr was accompanied by a

revival of the idea of creating a buffer State between France and Germany. The separatist movement in the Rhineland which was encouraged by the French at this time has already been discussed.

During 1923, too, France returned to that policy of encirclement which her statesmen had conceived before the peace conference and which had subsequently been carried out to the extent of linking Poland and Belgium with France in defensive alliances against Germany. A new step was taken when the French Chamber of Deputies voted Poincaré's proposals to grant credits to Poland, Jugoslavia, and Rumania for the purpose of purchasing from France munitions and other military equipment. The second step came in October, 1923, when President Masaryk and Foreign Minister Benesh of Czechoslovakia visited Paris. The conferences at this time resulted in the drafting of the terms of a Franco-Czechoslovak treaty of alliance, and it was believed that Benesh agreed to try to persuade Czechoslovakia's allies to conclude a Franco-Jugoslav and a Franco-Rumanian alliance respectively. For a number of reasons, however, the latter alliances were not immediately forthcoming.

Nevertheless, the treaty with Czechoslovakia was formally signed at Paris on January 25, 1924. By the terms of this treaty the two powers agreed to consult each other on questions of foreign policy involving a danger to their security or to treaties signed in common. They likewise bound themselves to come to an agreement on measures to be taken to safeguard their common interests in the event of their being menaced, and more specifically, in case of an attempt to unite Austria and Germany, or an attempt to restore the Habsburgs in Hungary or the Hohenzollerns in Germany. "In conformity with the principles laid down in the Covenant of the League of Nations," the two powers agreed to settle all disputes arising between them by pacific means.

By this time French efforts to obtain national security had become bound up with the attempts of the League of Nations to provide general security, which were the natural and inevitable result of the League's investigation of the question of disarmament. In signing the Covenant of the League, the powers had recognized "that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national

armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." Upon the Council of the League was imposed the duty of formulating plans for such reduction, due account being taken "of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State." It was further agreed that once such plans had been adopted by the several governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed were not to be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council. Provision was made in the Covenant for the establishment of a permanent commission to advise the Council on the execution of the disarmament program and on military, naval, and air questions generally.

A beginning of compulsory disarmament had been made at the peace conference when Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary were compelled by their peace treaties to agree "strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses" contained therein, which were to be considered as the first step toward making "possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations." In fact the Allies in their reply to Germany on June 16, 1919, had specifically stated that the restrictions placed upon Germany's military and naval establishments "were not made solely with the object of rendering it impossible for Germany to resume her policy of military aggression," but were "the first steps towards that general reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war, and which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote."

The First Assembly of the League of Nations formally invited the Council to establish a temporary commission to prepare proposals for the reduction of armaments, and such a commission was appointed in February, 1921. The Second Assembly next resolved that the commission should be asked to make proposals on general lines for the reduction of national armaments, such proposals to be in the form of a draft treaty or some equally definite plan. The commission decided, however, that no scheme for disarmament could be effective which was not general and which did not provide some form of mutual security to be given in exchange for the reduction of armaments. The Third Assembly thereupon requested the com-

mission to prepare a draft treaty embodying this idea of mutual security. The result was the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, unanimously adopted by the Fourth Assembly in September, 1923.

The security provided in this draft treaty consisted of the assurance given by the signatory powers that, in the event of a State being attacked, the rest of the signatory powers would come to its assistance. It was further stipulated that regional agreements or "partial alliances" might be entered into by the signatory powers as separate defensive agreements, provided that such agreements were strictly complementary to the general treaty and their terms known in advance and registered with the Secretariat at Geneva. The question of deciding which State was the aggressor in case of war was delegated to the Council of the League, which must render its decision within four days of its being summoned. In order to link together security and disarmament, the treaty further provided that no State should be entitled to claim the benefits of the mutual guarantee unless it had limited its armaments to a scale approved by the Council of the League. The latter, after considering the proposals of the various States on the subject, was to draw up a general scheme of reduction which the signatory States were to carry out completely within two years.

This draft treaty was circulated to all States regardless of whether they were members of the League. The replies received indicated that sixteen States, including France, Italy, and Japan, accepted the treaty in principle while twelve States, including Germany, Great Britain, the United States, and Russia, declared that they could not adhere to it. In general those States which stood definitely in need of immediate guarantees of security, such as France and the newly created States in central Europe and along the Baltic, accepted the treaty; while those farther removed from danger were less ready to accept a treaty which would greatly increase their international obligations. Nearly all the replies pointed out the absence in the draft treaty of a definition of aggression and criticized the policy of giving full power to the League Council to determine the aggressor State. It was asserted that particularly because of these weaknesses the plan did "not provide that element of certainty and re-

liability which is essential if the League of Nations is to recommend the adoption of the Treaty by its Members as a basis for reduction in armaments."

In May, 1924, general elections brought the downfall of Poincaré and the elevation to the premiership of Herriot. Some months earlier general elections in Great Britain had resulted in the Conservative government's giving way to one headed by Ramsay MacDonald, leader of the Labor party. The presence of these two Socialists at the head of their respective governments brought an Anglo-French *rapprochement* which led to the decision to coöperate in devising through the League of Nations or otherwise some means of preserving peace and providing general security.

In consequence, the two prime ministers in September, 1924, submitted to the Fifth Assembly of the League a joint resolution reopening the question of disarmament and security. The various criticisms of the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance had convinced those interested in disarmament that such a treaty must include a definition of aggression and a clear-cut indication of the aggressor. The Anglo-French resolution therefore linked with disarmament and security the third feature, arbitration. As a result of this resolution, a protocol for the pacific settlement of international disputes was unanimously adopted by the League Assembly on October 2, 1924.

The principal feature of this so-called "Geneva Protocol" was the new element of arbitration. The protocol provided that all legal disputes must go before the Permanent Court of International Justice and all nonlegal disputes must be submitted to arbitration. War was declared a criminal offense and every State which resorted to war in violation of the undertakings contained in the Covenant or in the protocol became an aggressor. The definition of an aggressor State was thus made almost automatic, and one of the chief objections to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance was overcome. The "Sanctions" to be taken against an aggressor State remained those provided for in Article 16 of the Covenant; namely, economic boycott and possible military action. The definition of aggression, the system of arbitration, and the effective measures to be taken

against an aggressor were supposed to create a threefold guarantee of security.

The Geneva Protocol met very much the same fate as the preceding Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Only seventeen States signed it, and they were to a great extent the same as those which had the previous year accepted in principle the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. The others felt in general that it increased the international obligations of the member States of the League over and above those undertaken in the Covenant. In consequence, the Geneva Protocol likewise failed of adoption.

But one of the most valuable features of the League of Nations is the permanence of its organization. This makes it not only possible but customary and natural to carry on progressive research and discussion from year to year. It therefore follows that immediate failure in any given case does not necessarily mean ultimate failure. The League now set up a preparatory commission to pave the way for a conference for the reduction and limitation of armaments. But once again, after two years of investigation and deliberation, the conclusion reached was that the greatest obstacle to the calling of a general disarmament conference was the lack of adequate provisions for national security. The commission therefore appointed a committee on arbitration and security, which drew up a number of model conventions for the pacific settlement of international disputes and a number of treaties of nonaggression and mutual assistance. These the Ninth Assembly recommended to the consideration of the nations of the world.

Meanwhile, it was along these latter lines that France was obtaining increased security. The Geneva Protocol, though rejected, had made its imprint on European affairs. A new spirit of conciliation and good will began to appear among the nations, and it was this change in spirit which made possible the next step in French security. The move this time came from across the Rhine in an offer from Germany of a pact of mutual guarantee and nonaggression. It envisaged in a more restricted area an arrangement analogous to that proposed in the Geneva Protocol. Similar suggestions had been made by Germany as early as 1922, but they had been re-

ceived with suspicion and incredulity in France and had borne no result. The spirit which had prevailed at Geneva now ruled in Paris and London and resulted in the Locarno Pact.

The Locarno Treaties [5] immeasurably increased French security against an unprovoked attack by Germany. The latter agreed to recognize the inviolability of the French frontier and the inviolability of the demilitarized zone. She agreed to settle by arbitration all difficulties which might arise with France and never to attack, invade, or resort to war against her except in case of legitimate defense. Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia promised that if Germany, unprovoked, should attack France across the Rhineland, they would give the latter their armed assistance. Furthermore, France by her earlier treaties had assumed obligations for the protection of Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia against aggression by Germany. While the obligations remained and were even more binding now than before, the likelihood of France's having to carry them out was greatly decreased by Germany's promise to settle all questions which might arise between herself and these States by peaceful means.

The Locarno spirit is clearly evident in French foreign policy during the years that followed, for it was in accordance with the ideas of nonaggression, arbitration, and the renunciation of war that France under Briand's direction extended her system of alliances and agreements. On June 10, 1926, she signed with Rumania a treaty of friendship in which the two States mutually agreed never to attack, invade, or resort to war against each other except in legitimate defense or in pursuance of Articles 15 and 16 of the Covenant of the League. They undertook to settle by peaceful means all questions which might arise between them and, when these could not be settled by the normal methods of diplomacy, to resort finally to the Council of the League. They promised, "subject to any resolutions that may be passed by the Council or Assembly of the League of Nations," to consult each other in all matters which might threaten the external security of France or Rumania or which might tend to subvert the situation created by the treaties of peace.

[5] See pp. 342–44.

If either State should be attacked without provocation the two governments engaged immediately to consult one another as to the action to be taken by each "within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations" in order to safeguard their legitimate national interests and to maintain the order established by the peace treaties. The two States agreed to concert their policy in case of any attempted modification of the political status of the countries of Europe and, subject to any resolutions of the Council or the Assembly of the League, to confer regarding the attitude to be taken in such an event. Rumania further stated that she would follow a policy of nonaggression toward Russia. France signed an almost identical treaty with Jugoslavia on November 11, 1927.

Briand's desire to extend the network of treaties of arbitration and nonaggression brought a notable event in the international relations of the world in 1928. On April 6, 1927, the tenth anniversary of the entry of the United States into the World War, the French foreign minister issued a statement to the press declaring that France would be willing to subscribe publicly with the United States to any mutual engagement tending "to outlaw war" as between these two countries.[6] Two months later Briand's declaration was embodied in a draft treaty which was presented to the United States government. The treaty proposed a declaration by the two powers condemning recourse to war, renouncing war as "an instrument of national policy," and agreeing that a settlement of all disputes arising between them should be brought about only by pacific means.

After a delay of more than six months the American secretary of state, Frank B. Kellogg, on December 28 suggested that instead of a bilateral treaty a similar multilateral treaty should be drafted in order to extend "throughout the world the benefits of a covenant originally suggested as between France and the United States alone." In his reply to this suggestion Briand took the stand that a State like France, which had obligations under the League of Nations and

[6] For the negotiations and documents connected with the Pact of Paris, see J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Information on the Renunciation of War* (1928), and J. T. Shotwell, *War as an Instrument of National Policy and Its Renunciation in the Pact of Paris* (1929).

under a variety of guarantee treaties, could not negotiate a multilateral treaty outlawing all war with the same freedom as it could a bilateral agreement with a State which was not a member of the League and with which there was little likelihood of war arising.

In the course of negotiations which extended over the following months Kellogg's proposal was subjected to a number of reservations and interpretations, as a result of which it appeared that the nations were agreed that all war was to be renounced except (1) in self-defense, (2) against any treaty-breaking signatory State, (3) in the execution of any obligation consequent upon the signing of any treaty of neutrality, (4) in the case of Great Britain, in defense of certain strategic places which are considered vital to the safety of the empire, (5) in fulfillment of the obligations and responsibilities incurred by membership in the League of Nations and by the signing of the Locarno agreements.

Subject to these reservations, which were not, however, incorporated into the treaty, the plenipotentiaries of fifteen States gathered at the Quai d'Orsay [7] on August 27, 1928, and there signed a general treaty for the renunciation of war, the so-called Pact of Paris. In it

> The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare, in the names of their respective peoples, that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. [Art. I.]
>
> The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means. [Art. II.]

Immediately following the signing of the treaty, it was opened to the adherence of all States, and within a few weeks it was accepted by over thirty other States, including Russia. The treaty was to become effective upon ratification by the governments of the

[7] The presence of Gustav Stresemann made the event doubly significant, for this was the first time since the Franco-Prussian War that a German foreign minister had been officially received at the Quai d'Orsay.

original fifteen signatory powers, and it was finally promulgated by President Hoover on July 24, 1929. While the treaty doubtless has great moral value, the agreement is somewhat in the nature of a "pious aspiration," for it provides in itself no machinery nor method for settling disputes. In these respects the Covenant of the League of Nations, which Briand was determined to give precedence over the Paris Pact, seems much more tangible and real. In one respect, however, the latter accomplished a service: the two great powers, Russia and the United States, which were still outside the League, now became associated with the League members in a treaty renouncing war.

CHAPTER XIV

THE BRITISH STRUGGLE WITH UNEMPLOYMENT

THE chief task which confronted Great Britain in the years following the World War was not the construction and defense of a new government as in Germany nor the reconstruction of a devastated area and the raising of funds therefor as in France, but the recovery of her pre-war foreign markets. Although Great Britain never permitted her fiscal system to become so demoralized as other European States, although she alone of the European belligerents succeeded in restoring her pre-war currency to its earlier exchange value, although she was one of the first to balance her budget, to fund her debt to the United States, and to return to the gold standard, she proved to be unable to increase her foreign trade to its pre-war level. The chronic unemployment which resulted became such a serious problem that it repeatedly affected the policies of the British government both at home and abroad. Like a scarlet thread it can be traced through the history of the post-war period.

The Lloyd George Coalition

Great Britain emerged from the World War with a coalition government, a thing which, as Disraeli once pointed out, Englishmen seem instinctively to detest as an evil to be accepted only in the face of some greater calamity. In 1914 a Liberal government, supported by the Irish Nationalist and the Labor parties, had been in power under H. H. Asquith. But the exigencies of the war had brought a reorganization of the government in 1915, when Asquith had become the head of a coalition ministry composed of representatives of the Liberal, Conservative, and Labor parties. In 1916 a

further change had occurred when Lloyd George, not without arousing bitter enmity, forced Asquith out of the premiership and himself assumed the office.

Politics had been "adjourned" in Great Britain for the duration of the war, so that the dissolution of Parliament which should regularly have occurred in 1915 had been postponed. When the armistice was signed in November, 1918, therefore, eight years had elapsed since the last election. It was high time for the electorate to be consulted. Undoubtedly, too, that astute politician, Lloyd George, clearly perceived that the immediate post-war enthusiasm in Great Britain would operate in favor of him who had carried the country through to victory. Parliament was at once dissolved and new elections were set for December 14, 1918.

On a platform which called for the punishment of German "war criminals," the full payment of the Allied war costs by the defeated powers, the protection of "essential" British industries, the prevention of dumping in Great Britain of goods produced by cheap foreign labor, the improvement of housing and labor conditions, and the settlement of the Irish question, Lloyd George appealed for the continuation of the war coalition. But his appeal failed to receive universal approval. Asquith denounced the coalition and entered the lists at the head of a party known as the Independent Liberals. Certain irreconcilable Conservatives would have nothing to do with Lloyd George; and the Labor party, declining longer to participate in the coalition, waged a campaign to increase its own parliamentary strength. The elections of 1918 were particularly notable, since they provided the first opportunity for nearly 13,000,000 new voters to register their views.

Earlier in the year Great Britain had taken another great stride toward political democracy by passing the Representation of the People Act. Aside from certain temporary provisions this act conferred a parliamentary vote on all men twenty-one years of age who could qualify by six months' residence or by the occupation of business premises, and on all women thirty years of age who were local government electors or wives of such electors. Fear of the effect of the outnumbering of men by inexperienced women voters

prevented the extension of the franchise to women on the same age basis as men. The act also provided for the redistribution of representatives in accordance with the principle of single-member constituencies of approximately equal size, and the limiting of an elector's vote to not more than two constituencies. The number of electors participating in this election, therefore, was far greater than in any other in the previous history of Great Britain.

The result of the voting was an overwhelming victory for the Lloyd George coalition, which captured 467 seats. Asquith's Independent Liberals and the irreconcilable Conservatives managed to win only 28 and 23 seats respectively, but the Labor party increased its representation to 63. In Ireland the Sinn Feiners, demanding complete independence, practically wiped out the Irish Nationalist party by electing 73 candidates who immediately announced that they would not take their seats at Westminster. Lloyd George therefore had a large majority over all opposition groups. But the character of the majority must have given the Liberal leader pause, for it was made up five to two of Conservatives. In the reconstitution of the ministry in January, 1919, this fact was reflected. The proportion of Conservatives became so great that the coalition ceased to be predominantly Liberal in tone, and Great Britain was presented with the anomalous spectacle of an extreme Liberal at the head of a government consisting largely of Conservatives.

Economic Depression and Chronic Unemployment

The new ministry was soon called upon to wrestle with the problem of unemployment. For a time, thanks to the sudden demand for commodities in European countries long isolated from the rest of the world by the war, British industries prospered immediately after the armistice. With the war safely won, the workingmen seized the opportunity provided by the need for labor to demand shorter hours and wages more nearly in accord with the high cost of living. Numerous strikes occurred, one after another, with a gradual attainment of the eight-hour day and somewhat increased wages as a result. But the business boom collapsed toward

the close of 1920. In the next year exports fell off about one-half and during the succeeding years, though some improvement was shown, Great Britain's foreign trade never reached the pre-war figure.

Various circumstances account for this decline. Great Britain's foreign trade is obviously dependent upon world and especially European conditions. But the war had impoverished the world's purchasing power so that, after the first spurt in buying, purchases were greatly curtailed. Just as the business of a department store falls off when its territory passes through a period of "hard times," so British business now suffered. The situation was further aggravated by the depreciation of so many Continental currencies. At the very time when Great Britain was trying to deflate her own currency, most European countries were resorting to inflation. This situation worked to the great disadvantage of British manufacturers, who were forced to compete in foreign markets with goods produced where labor was relatively cheaper because of the depreciated currency in which it was paid. The price of Britain's goods became too high in relation to the purchasing power of her customers. Furthermore, the war had ended in the creation of numerous new States and each, led by an excessive national zeal, began to erect "political dams across the economic streams of Europe." National tariffs inevitably interfered with the flow of British goods to their accustomed markets. The result was a great decline in the export trade of the country.

But the evil, of course, could not and did not stop there. Since the prosperity of Great Britain's shipping and manufacturing is directly dependent upon her export trade, any blow to the latter is bound to be felt by the former. With the decline in foreign trade, the volume of shipping declined and factories curtailed production. Business stagnation followed, accompanied by extensive unemployment among those engaged in shipping, manufacturing, and commerce.

Had Great Britain been an agricultural country like Russia, this condition would not have been so serious. Had she even been like France with forty per cent of her population dependent upon agri-

culture for its livelihood, the crisis might not have been so severe. But the welfare of most of the British is bound up with industry and commerce, for only six per cent of the people of England are directly dependent upon agriculture for a living. Nearly eighty per cent (1921) of the population is urban in England and Wales. Anything affecting the industrial or commercial life of the country, therefore, is bound to affect to a greater or less degree the majority of the British people.

The reduction in British foreign trade was even more serious at this time because in the period since 1913 the total population of Great Britain had increased by about two million. The natural increase in the number of workers which this brought was further augmented by contingents of women who during the war had entered the industrial field, and by part of the former "leisure class" who had been driven, by the increased cost of living and the relative decline in their incomes, to join the ranks of the workers. With the collapse of Britain's commerce in 1921, therefore, came a rapid increase in unemployment. At the beginning of the year over 1,000,000 were out of work, and by the middle of the year the number had considerably more than doubled.

The government took prompt steps to alleviate the situation. The Unemployment Insurance Act of 1920 was modified to give greater relief and the government itself contributed millions in "doles" to the unemployed. Such measures, however, could at best be only temporary palliatives. They did not strike at the root of the evil. In order to relieve British unemployment, British commerce must be revived, British industry rejuvenated.

Despite the feeling that Great Britain should have no dealings with a government of violence, Lloyd George advocated the resumption of trade relations with Soviet Russia in order to rehabilitate British trade and industry. "Have we never," he asked, "traded with countries which have been guilty of atrocities? What about Turkey?" On March 16, 1921, a trade agreement was signed with Russia providing for the resumption of trade and commerce between the two countries pending the conclusion of a formal general peace treaty which should regulate their economic and political

relations in the future. The agreement was made subject to the condition that each would refrain from propaganda directed against the institutions of the other and that Russia would refrain from encouraging the peoples of Asia to hostile action against British interests or the British Empire. It was earnestly hoped that the reopening of trade with Russia would hasten the recovery of British industry, though many still insisted that Russia could export "nothing but Communist principles."

Later in the year, partly in deference to the Conservative element in the government, a significant step was taken in British legislation by the passing of the Safeguarding of Industries Act. This measure was designed to protect key industries which would be vital in the event of future war, and to protect British workmen against the competition of cheap foreign commodities. For these purposes the act provided for a 33⅓ per cent duty to safeguard certain special industries, and for a tax on imports from countries with depreciated currencies. This partial abandonment of Great Britain's traditional policy of free trade aroused much opposition throughout the kingdom.

Desertion of Lloyd George by the Conservatives

Meanwhile, as the years passed, Lloyd George discovered that the Conservative portion of his coalition was becoming restless. The effect of the partial adoption of the old Conservative policy of protection in 1921 was nullified by his conclusion late in that same year of the Anglo-Irish Treaty recognizing the Irish Free State.[1] The protests of the Conservatives against this treaty were vigorous and undisguised, and their threat to secede from the coalition early in 1922 nearly overthrew the government. Conservative leaders like Bonar Law and Stanley Baldwin, eager to secure freedom of action for their party, quietly fostered a movement looking toward secession. Finally, in October, 1922, the Conservative party declared its independence when, at a meeting in the Carlton Club, the Conservative members of the House of Commons decided to support the Lloyd George coalition no longer. Instead they resolved

[1] See Chapter XV.

to enter the approaching electoral campaign as an independent party with their own leader and their own program.

With the defection of the Conservatives the coalition government was doomed. Lloyd George immediately resigned and Bonar Law was called upon to head a new ministry. The government which the latter organized was drawn entirely from the ranks of the Conservatives and was the first homogeneous ministry since 1915. Parliament was at once dissolved and new elections were called for November. In the ensuing campaign Lloyd George led what was known as the National Liberal party but Asquith and his Independent Liberals continued their active opposition and held aloof. At the same time, the organized workmen largely deserted the Liberals and voted for a party of their own, thus leaving the divided Liberals with little more than the middle class to fall back upon. There was small chance of a Liberal victory. The real struggle was between the Conservatives and the Laborites, with the outcome complicated by the possibility of the return of many minority candidates. Fear of the supposed radical tendencies of the Labor party and hope of obtaining once more a one-party parliamentary government both helped to place the Conservatives in power with a majority over all opposition parties.

Although the Conservatives had won a great electoral victory, the achievement of the Labor party was of even greater note. Organized early in the twentieth century, this party had received only 471,000 votes in the election of 1910. Eight years later its total had risen to 2,245,000 and now in the election of 1922 it had received over 4,000,000 votes. Undoubtedly economic conditions during 1921–22 contributed to the phenomenal increase in the Labor party's vote. The collapse of trade and industry had resulted in a great surplus of labor and had accordingly and inevitably led to the weakening of labor's position. In contrast with the demand for workers and the rise in wages which immediately followed the armistice, there came a period in which employers were able to attack the newly won wage standard and beat it down. In spite of strikes against the lowering of wages, such reductions were made, accompanied by much bitterness and increasing unrest in the ranks

of labor. These conditions led to a pronounced movement of the workers to the support of the Labor party. With the 142 seats which it now controlled it became the second largest group in Parliament and therefore stepped into the position of "His Majesty's Opposition."

Free Trade or Protection?

The chief task of the Conservative leaders when they assumed control of the government was to "concoct a potion to cure the malady arising from bad trade, unemployment, heavy taxes and high cost of living." In May Bonar Law, the skillful pilot of the Conservative party, was obliged to resign the premiership because of ill health. He was succeeded in that position by his somewhat less experienced colleague, Stanley Baldwin. The latter, haunted by the specter of unemployment, resolved that some drastic step must be taken to meet the situation, for to him it seemed incredible that the government should continue longer without a program or a remedy. While he was in this state of mind, the extremists of his party apparently suggested protection as a solution. Without consulting his party as a whole regarding such a radical change in policy, Baldwin suddenly announced his determination to try protection as a remedy for the chronic unemployment.

The Conservatives had taken office with the general understanding that they would embark upon no aggressive or radical program without further consulting the electorate. Had Baldwin been content to pursue a moderate course he might have remained in power for the next four years. Such a radical departure from the long-accepted British policy of free trade, however, called for an appeal to the people, and Baldwin, recognizing this, dissolved Parliament and went to the country on the issue of protection. In order to relieve British unemployment and maintain a reasonable level of wages for British workers he demanded the defense of the home market by means of a tariff on manufactured goods.

The leaders of the Liberal party, recalling their triumph under somewhat analogous circumstances in 1906, were jubilant. From the United States Lloyd George issued a statement characterizing

Baldwin's pronouncement as "an insult to the intelligence of the nation," and hastened home for the campaign. Personalities were subordinated in the face of this attack upon the cherished Liberal principle of free trade, and a reconciliation, at least superficial, was brought about between the followers of Asquith and the Welsh leader. The latter declared that the reuniting of the Liberal party would go down in history as the sole achievement of Baldwin's government. Rallying to the cry of free trade the reunited Liberals went into the campaign determined at least to oust the Labor party from its recently won position as His Majesty's Opposition.

The latter, under the leadership of Ramsay MacDonald, joined the Liberals in rejecting protection as a means of solving the industrial depression in Great Britain and attacked it as a measure which would increase the cost of living. While resembling the Liberals in favoring a wider adoption of industrial insurance and industrial coöperation, they went beyond the latter in their proposal to use national credit for such undertakings as housing, roads, and power development. They reiterated their previous demands for (1) a capital levy on all fortunes of £5,000 and over, (2) nationalization of mines and railways, (3) generous pensions for the people, and (4) revision of the Treaty of Versailles.

The Conservatives argued that the whole world was erecting tariff barriers against British goods and that British duties might be utilized as a means of forcing reductions in these foreign tariffs. They asserted that the British Empire was economically sufficient unto itself and advocated a scheme of imperial preference under which there would be free trade or low duties within the empire but a high tariff against products from outside. They promised to keep raw materials on the free list, to place no tax on such foodstuffs as wheat and meat, and to reduce duties on tea and sugar. But the opposition parties had little difficulty in proving that in an exporting country like Great Britain protection could not cure chronic unemployment.

Although as a result of the election the Conservatives still retained the largest number of seats, their former safe majority over all opposing parties was transformed by the loss of 89 seats into a

decided minority. On the other hand, Labor maintained its position as the chief opposition party by adding 48 more seats, raising its total in the House to 192. The reunited Liberals stood third with 158. The popular vote in 1923 differed relatively little from that in 1922, the shift in parliamentary strength being due more particularly to the spirited three-cornered campaign and the lack of a system of proportional representation. Many candidates were elected by a minority vote. An examination of the figures, however, revealed that a majority of the electorate favored the traditional free-trade policy and at the same time rejected Labor's proposal of a capital levy.

Britain's First Labor Government

The outcome of the election entailed a change in the government. Clearly Baldwin had been rejected on the platform of protection, but on the other hand no single party now controlled a majority. Either a coalition or a minority government therefore became necessary. But none of the parties appeared anxious to merge its identity in a coalition again. The final outcome was the resignation of the Baldwin ministry and the elevation of Ramsay MacDonald to the premiership as the head of Great Britain's first Labor government, the highest point yet reached by Labor in its rapid rise from a minor parliamentary group with only twenty-nine seats in 1906.

But the change in government meant no radical departure from well established British policies by the introduction of anything suggestive of Bolshevism, for, in the words of MacDonald, "Our Labor movement has never had the least inclination to try short cuts to the millennium." In fact, one of the reasons why the Labor party had increased so rapidly was the growing recognition by the British people of the essentially constitutional character of the movement. Leaders of the party had directed every effort toward making this point clear. Although the Laborites accepted class consciousness, they rejected class warfare, holding that the British Constitution was their heritage as much as that of any other party, and asserting that their allegiance to it was as true. They sought merely to have Labor win a place among British parties in order to ad-

vance by parliamentary means those measures which might benefit the working classes.

But a second reason why nothing radical was to be expected in the way of legislation was the fact that Labor was dependent upon one of the other parties for the support necessary to enact any measure. Consequently Labor was compelled to defer its more far-reaching proposals such as the capital levy, for lack of an adequate majority. No bill could be pushed through Parliament by party discipline alone; it would have to be decided upon its merits and win the support of more than one political group. MacDonald's government was therefore bound to cut rather a sorry figure in domestic affairs, especially since the economic situation was largely out of the power of any British government to control.

The Laborites were almost immediately confronted with an epidemic of serious strikes, but by their firmness in handling the strikers who came from their own ranks, they gained the confidence and respect of the country at large. This confidence was retained by their handling of the fiscal problem, in which nothing especially radical was undertaken. The tax on cheap amusements was repealed and, in spite of the vigorous protests of the protected interests, the McKenna war duties were abolished. The Snowden budget which they enacted provided for a reduction in the duties on tea, coffee, and chocolate. No attempt was made to introduce a capital levy. In accordance with their platform the Wheatley Bill was passed providing a scheme for building inexpensive houses with the aid of government subsidies. Although they proved to be unable to lessen noticeably the number of unemployed, they did modify the thrift disqualification for the "dole."

It was in the realm of foreign affairs that MacDonald achieved his most outstanding successes. Even before his elevation to the premiership he had announced certain fundamentals which should guide him in his foreign policy. These included (1) greater coöperation with the Continental States, (2) the support of a policy of law, conciliation, and equity in international affairs, with the League of Nations as the focus of Great Britain's contacts with Europe, and (3) the immediate recognition of the Russian govern-

ment, together with the adoption of those steps which should be necessary for the increase of trade with that country.

The closer spirit of coöperation which developed between Great Britain and France under the leadership of MacDonald and Herriot has already been discussed,[2] as has been MacDonald's support of the League's efforts to provide security as a preliminary to disarmament. Although his government voted five new battle cruisers, his desire to lessen armament rivalries was indicated by his order to discontinue the building of Britain's naval base in Singapore, on the ground that such an undertaking could only create suspicion and lead to greater naval competition in the Far East. The Labor premier's interest in solving the reparation and Ruhr tangle played a great part in securing the acceptance of the Dawes Plan at the London Conference in 1924. In the words of one of his admirers, "His monument is the acceptance of the Dawes Report, the participation of American capital in the German loan, and the beginning of the evacuation of the Ruhr." Undoubtedly the spirit of conciliation which he helped to inject into European international affairs paved the way for Locarno.

But the most spectacular of MacDonald's moves in foreign politics was probably his unconditional *de jure* recognition of the Soviet government of Russia on February 1, 1924. This was in full accord with his earlier pronouncement that the first step in the process of settling affairs with Russia should be recognition, which was the key for reopening the markets of that country to British goods. The immediate sequel of MacDonald's move was the Anglo-Russian Conference, which opened in London in April, 1924, in the attempt to negotiate a general treaty of amity and commerce to replace the Trade Agreement of 1921, and to effect a settlement of the claims arising out of the Soviet government's repudiation of Russia's debts and the confiscation of private property.

On the British side the chief aim was to secure Russia's recognition of the £1,000,000,000 owing to Great Britain and her subjects. The aim of the Russian diplomats, on the other hand, was principally to secure a loan of £60,000,000 to finance Russia's

[2] See p. 369.

much-needed importation of manufactured goods, most of which would be purchased in Great Britain. On condition that Russia honored her debts, the British delegation saw no reason why credits might not be arranged, but emphasized that the possibility of raising a loan in London would otherwise be small. MacDonald believed that such a treaty with its subsequent demand for British goods would help revive British industry and would diminish the number of unemployed.

Two treaties were finally drafted and signed. In a treaty of commerce and navigation Russia gave unconditional most-favored-nation treatment to British goods. In a general treaty she admitted liability for the claims of British bondholders and promised to negotiate with them, and agreed that such other claims as were established by a joint commission should be embodied in a subsequent treaty. The British government, for its part, agreed that as soon as the British claims had been settled by a subsequent treaty, it would submit to Parliament a proposal to guarantee a loan to the Soviet government. Obviously the immediate effect of ratifying the two treaties would be merely the favorable treatment of British goods in Russian markets. So far as the debt question and a Russian loan were concerned, the treaty was, in the words of one wit, "an agreement to agree if and when the parties could agree to agree."

The Russian treaties were immediately attacked not only by the Conservatives but even by Lloyd George, who had been responsible for the first Trade Agreement of 1921. In fact, the desertion of MacDonald by the Liberals at this time was the beginning of the end. A little later he was again attacked by them because his government had abandoned the prosecution of a Communist accused of inciting British soldiers to mutiny. Without a majority to support him, MacDonald dissolved Parliament and appealed to the electorate. For the third time in two years the British voters were called upon for a decision.

In this campaign both the Conservatives and the Liberals directed their attacks against Labor, going so far in some districts as even to unite on a single candidate. Labor's prospects were injured by the publication, shortly before the election, of a letter purporting

to be from the Russian Communist, Zinoviev, in which British Communists were urged to prepare the way for a revolution in Great Britain. Moderates were frightened by the specter of what might follow if the detested Socialists were returned to power. At the same time many workers were disappointed by the continuance of unemployment even under a Labor government. The economic rehabilitation of the world was an achievement which British statesmen could do little directly to hasten, and the question was even beginning to be raised as to whether, with all the new industrial countries competing for the world's markets, Great Britain's earlier commercial ascendancy was not gone. But all this was difficult to discuss with grumbling British workmen.

In the election, although Labor piled up a total of 5,500,000 popular votes, its parliamentary representation was reduced to 155. Since the Liberals elected only 36 members, the Conservatives were swept back into power with a top-heavy parliamentary majority of over two hundred, though they obtained less than a majority of the popular vote. Recent elections in Great Britain have disclosed the need for some system of proportional representation if Parliament is to reflect the actual views of the British people. With such a Conservative majority in the House, Baldwin of course returned to Downing Street and MacDonald stepped down to his earlier position of leader of the opposition.

Five Years of Conservative Government

But the change in government brought no immediate improvement in Britain's economic situation. During the ensuing year the production of coal, iron ore, and pig iron, the basic industries of the kingdom, remained considerably below the pre-war figure. In the hope of "safeguardng employment" and, incidentally, of satisfying certain British industrial interests, Baldwin returned to the tariff policy inaugurated by Lloyd George and afterward repealed by the Labor government. Over the protests of the opposition, who declared that he was violating his campaign pledges, a plan for partial protection was enacted. By its provisions duties might be authorized to

protect British industries, subject to the approval of the Board of Trade and Parliament.

The coal industry, in which the industrial depression was most pronounced, profited little from this scheme, however. In pre-war years Great Britain had been accustomed to export some 62,-500,000 tons of coal annually, but the rapid development of new sources of power—hydroelectric plants, petroleum oil, and low-temperature carbonization of coal and lignite—had decreased the demand for raw coal. Between 1920 and 1923 the output of Europe's water-power plants increased by over 3,000,000 horse power. Germany's delivery of coal to France and Italy as part of her reparation payments further lessened the demand for British coal. The price of coal continued to fall and the operators, in order to cut the cost of production, asked the miners to lengthen the working day from seven to eight hours and to accept a cut in wages. The miners refused to agree to these proposals, whereupon the operators availed themselves of a provision of the existing wage agreement to terminate it on July 31, 1925. In order to prevent the complete cessation of operations, the government decided to subsidize the industry temporarily.

It was announced that work must continue during the next nine months and that the wages current in June, 1925, must be paid until May 1, 1926. During this period, pending a permanent settlement, the government would refund to the coal operators the amount paid in wages over and above the figure at which the latter had stated their willingness to give employment. Despite the protest of the mine owners, this arrangement was put into effect and work continued without interruption, though the government was widely criticized for the solution which entailed the expenditure of nearly £20,000,000 from public funds.

Meanwhile a royal commission under Sir Herbert Samuel made an investigation of the coal industry. In its report, published on March 11, 1926, it stated that three-fourths of the coal raised was being produced at a loss. It recommended national ownership of the mines and an extensive reorganization of the industry including

the closing of the pits which were permanently impossible of operation at a profit. It declared that the coal industry was facing disaster, and that, to avoid this and to restore the industry to solvency, a sacrifice by the miners was inevitable. The government's subsidy was ruled out completely and wage reductions were recommended as the only means of establishing a sound basis for future operation. Negotiations between the miners and the operators failed to bring about an agreement on these points, and the latter finally notified the unions that the existing wage agreement would end on May 1. The miners thereupon decided to strike.

On Saturday, May 1, the Trades Union Congress, in order to assist the miners, determined to call a sympathetic strike in certain vital industries including the transport services and the printing trade. If the mines dispute had not been settled by the following Monday at midnight, it announced, this more extensive strike would begin. In popular belief Great Britain faced a "general strike," but this was hardly the case. Less than half the six million trade-union members were called out, and it was specifically ordered that work should not cease in electric and gas, sanitary, and health and food services.

The government at once declared a state of emergency and issued an appeal for volunteers to maintain the essential services. It was the generous response to this appeal which more than any other factor contributed to the failure of the sympathetic strike. Even without their regular employees the railroads were soon able to provide a service of several thousand trains a day. The wireless and radio operated to neutralize the press strike. "From John o' Groat's to Land's End," said one Britisher, "we became a nation of listeners-in."

The "general strike" lasted only nine days. On May 12 the Trades Union Congress announced the decision to end it with the understanding that negotiations would be resumed regarding the wages of miners. These, however, resulted in no agreement. The operators demanded lower wages; the miners refused to return to work. In July Parliament passed a law providing for an eight-hour day in the coal industry, but the act produced no coal and

it became necessary to import large quantities from Germany and the United States. Finally, after more than seven months, the coal strike came officially to an end on November 19 with the complete surrender of the miners' unions. Their submission was forced by the exhaustion of their resources and by their inability to prevent numbers of miners from returning to work. With winter coming on, longer hours and lower wages seemed preferable to no work at all. In most cases the working day was lengthened. The recommendations of the royal commission were not carried out, and Britain's coal problem still remains to be solved.

The Conservative party, never particularly sympathetic with trade unions or the labor movement, availed itself of the state of public opinion and the exhaustion of labor after the great strike of 1926 to pass the Trades Disputes and Trades-Union Act in the following year.[3] By the terms of this law, a general strike became illegal, picketing forbidden, and no member might be disciplined by a trade union for refusing to participate in an illegal strike. The Trades Dispute Act of 1906 was repealed in so far as it exempted trade unions from legal suit, and trade-union funds might be enjoined by the attorney general. A blow was struck at the Labor party by including a provision that trade unions might make political levies on their members only if the latter gave specific permission in writing. Formerly the law had stated that such levies might be made unless a member formally protested.

Growing alarm in the ranks of the Conservatives at the increasing strength of the Labor party further contributed to the demand for strengthening the House of Lords. This question of reforming the upper house of the British Parliament had long been an important one. As far back as Gladstone's time it was asserted that the House of Lords must either be mended or be ended. In 1911 the Liberals with the aid of the Laborites and Irish Nationalists had passed the Parliament Act depriving the Lords of practically all control over money bills and leaving them with only a two years' suspensive veto on other legislation. The act was at the time con-

[3] The text of the act may be found in *New York Times Current History*, XXVI, pp. 447–49.

sidered an emergency measure and its preamble declared that future legislation should "substitute for the House of Lords as it at present exists a second chamber constituted on a popular instead of a hereditary basis."

The Conservatives had originally been opposed to weakening the House of Lords, for in that body their party was always sure of a majority. Furthermore, they felt that Parliament, with its upper house so shorn of power, had become little more than a unicameral legislature. By many it was urged that the Lords should be strengthened in order to protect the "considered judgment of the people" against a temporary wave of opinion which might place the Labor party in control of the House of Commons. The constitutional powers of the House of Lords should be increased as a bulwark against the "Socialistic peril." Baldwin during the electoral campaign of 1924 had pronounced in favor of reforming the upper house, and it was finally decided to attempt to strengthen that body by making it more representative and less hereditary in its composition and by increasing its powers.

In June, 1927, accordingly, the Baldwin government introduced a plan for the reorganization of the House of Lords. Its membership was to be reduced from 800 to about 350, and was to consist of two types—those appointed by the Crown for life, and those elected for definite terms by the hereditary peers of the realm. The latter would resemble those representing the Scottish peers. Provisions were made for increasing and protecting the powers of the Lords. Whether or not a bill was a money bill should be decided not by the speaker of the House of Commons but by a joint committee of the Lords and Commons. The right to create peers in case of a deadlock between the two houses should be surrendered by the Crown.

The plan at once encountered the vigorous opposition of Liberals and Laborites and even of the more progressive younger element of the Conservative party itself. The Liberals, in a meeting presided over by Lloyd George, drew up a manifesto in which they asserted that the plan, by permitting interference of the Lords in matters of finance, would "leave the House of Commons in a weaker position than it has been for centuries. By taking away the

royal prerogative to create Peers in case of deadlock, they might force the nation to choose between an uncontrolled hereditary Chamber and revolution." By others it was feared that the Lords might become the "rulers of England, whose powers in the future could be modified only by steel or bullets." So strong was the opposition that the government was forced to give way, and although the question was again debated in 1928, no legislation of this type was enacted.

In carrying out his campaign pledge to extend the ballot to all women on the same age basis as to men, Baldwin was more successful. In spite of numerous arguments advanced against conferring the vote upon "flappers," a law was eventually passed in 1928 enfranchising all women twenty-one years of age on equal terms with men. Another five million voters, it was estimated, were thus added to the registers. A number of measures of social legislation were also enacted, perhaps the most important being the act for widows', orphans', and old-age pensions. Based on the principle that the State, the employer, and the worker should each contribute to the fund, it provided that every insured worker should receive a pension at the age of sixty-five, and that, if he died before that age, his widow and children should receive pensions.

The chief measures taken by Baldwin's government to deal with unemployment were those for safeguarding certain British industries and for relieving them from local taxation. By 1929 industries producing motor cars, silk and artificial yarns, clocks and watches, cinematograph films, gloves, cutlery, china, and rubber tires and tubes were being safeguarded or, as critics asserted, "protected by the back door." By the reform in local taxation the great basic industries were freed from the oppressive burden which they declared was strangling them. As a consequence of the new legislation they were relieved to the extent of seventy-five per cent of the local taxes. In general, however, Baldwin advocated a policy of *laissez faire* toward business as a cure for unemployment.

In foreign affairs the Conservative government largely continued the spirit of coöperation and conciliation so happily inaugurated by the Labor premier. Sir Austen Chamberlain, as foreign secretary,

continued at Locarno, Geneva, and Paris the rôle played by MacDonald at the London Conference. Only in respect to Russia was the latter's foreign policy completely reversed. Baldwin refused to submit to Parliament the treaties which the Labor government had negotiated, so that both lapsed and the Trade Agreement of 1921 remained the basis of relations between Russia and Great Britain.

During 1925 the original enmity of the Conservatives toward Russia was further increased by the discovery of close connections between the Bolshevik Third International [4] and the Communist party of Great Britain. In the following year relations between the two governments were strained nearly to the breaking point during the great coal strike when it was learned that Russian funds had been sent to subsidize the British strikers. At the same time it was believed that Great Britain's difficulties and loss of trade in China were largely due to the propaganda of the Russian Communists carried on there in violation of the Trade Agreement of 1921.

Early in 1927 the British government complained to Russia of the Communist propaganda being carried on both in the British Isles and in China, and threatened that if it continued relations between the two countries would be broken off. Suddenly, on May 12, in the belief that certain secret documents which had disappeared from the British War Office had come into Russian possession, the government raided the offices of Arcos, Ltd., the headquarters of Russia's trading agency in Great Britain and also of the Russian Trade Delegation. Although the lost documents were not discovered, the government declared that considerable evidence was found of Russian military espionage in Great Britain and of other revolutionary activities in the British Empire. As a result, Parliament a short time later voted to sever all relations with the Russian government.

Meanwhile, despite the establishment of many new industries in southern England and the noticeable shift of industrial population into that region, and despite the fact that London in general was prosperous, the unemployment problem continued unsolved. The

[4] See p. 484.

year 1928 saw a considerable increase in the number out of work, and ended with close to 2,000,000 unemployed—the highest number since the worst days of 1921–22. The unparalleled distress and suffering, especially in the coal fields, aroused public generosity to supplement government grants in the work of alleviation.

Gradually there came the conviction that these conditions could no longer be ascribed merely to temporary factors arising from the war, that the causes were much deeper seated. It began to be realized that the industrial situation to which Great Britain had been accustomed for more than a century was changing, that the reign of coal was being threatened by oil and water power, that the spread of the industrial revolution to new countries was depriving British industries of long monopolized markets. The expansion of cotton manufacturing in India, China, and Japan, for example, was seriously felt in Lancashire. The 3,057,000,000 linear yards of cotton goods which Great Britain had exported to India in 1913 had declined to 1,546,000,000 in 1927, while exports to China and Japan had fallen from 773,000,000 to 128,000,000 yards. Outside Europe, Britain's exports of cotton cloth had been practically halved since 1913.

To meet the keen competition of the modern industrial plants of the United States, Germany, France, and other countries, many began to assert, British industries with their old plants and antiquated methods must be "rationalized"; that is to say, out-of-date machinery must be scrapped, the best cost-saving and labor-saving machinery installed, waste of material, labor, and mechanical energy prevented, purchasing and selling organizations concentrated, superfluous officials eliminated, inefficient or unremunerative works or departments closed down, efficient plants extended, and industries in the same field unified or brought to coöperate in the formulation of common policies. To emphasize the need for concentration in British industry, critics pointed out that from 80 to 90 per cent of the 4,259,627 motor cars manufactured in the United States in 1926 were the product of only ten concerns, while the 198,700 cars produced in Great Britain in the same year were manufactured by 88 separate firms.

Recent years have, in fact, seen some progress toward rationalization in Great Britain. The chemical industry has been completely reorganized, with the result that it has been able to hold its own in the markets of the world, and employment within it has been steadily maintained. The tin-plate industry has undergone an internal reorganization, has recovered its foreign markets, and in 1928 had an export trade greater than before the war. Similarly, in the electrical industry coöperation has largely replaced competition. In the great staple industries where the need for rationalization is greatest, however, the movement has been slow. Although schemes for mergers and unification have been discussed, although here and there modernized equipment has been installed, the rationalization of these industries has not yet become national in its extent or outlook.

The Rejection of the Conservatives

Inevitably the problem of unemployment and rehabilitation of British trade was again the outstanding issue in the general election of May, 1929. The legal life of a British Parliament is five years. Therefore, the House of Commons elected late in 1924 had to come to an end before the close of 1929. On this occasion Parliament was not suddenly killed as in 1924 but was permitted to fade peacefully out of existence. On May 10 the House of Commons was dissolved, and the active electoral campaign was begun for the election of a new Parliament on May 30. "The great need of the day," declared one influential journal, "is a positive policy for dealing with unemployment by promoting industrial recovery as well as by providing immediate work. The party that has the best unemployment policy deserves to be the next Government."

This fact the leaders of all three parties well realized, and in the campaign to win public favor which had actually been going on for several months, each party stated its position in respect to this problem. *We Can Conquer Unemployment* was the title of a little book outlining the official program of the Liberal party, which, abundantly financed by Lloyd George, hoped to regain its position as one of the two major parties in Great Britain. The solu-

Underwood & Underwood

BRITAIN'S SECOND LABOR GOVERNMENT

Left to right, front row: Mr. J. R. Clynes, Lord Parmoor, Mr. J. H. Thomas, Mr. Philip Snowden, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Mr. Arthur Henderson, Mr. Sidney Webb, Lord Justice Sankey, Capt. Wedgwood Benn. *Left to right, back row:* Mr. George Lansbury, Mr. A. V. Alexander, Sir Charles Trevelyan, Miss Margaret Bondfield, Lord Thomson, Mr. Noel Buxton, Mr. W. Graham, Mr. W. Adamson

tion put forward by this party was national works on a colossal scale, including roads and bridges, telephone and electrical development, land drainage, London passenger traffic, and housing. This program, Lloyd George asserted, would reduce the terrible figures of unemployment to normal proportions in a single year, would enrich the nation, would equip it for competing successfully with all its rivals in the business world, and would not add one penny to national or local taxation. Leaders of the other two parties declared, however, that one must be either reckless or ill informed who would commit himself to the declaration that such measures alone would solve the difficult problem of unemployment.

Labor, which was confident of becoming the largest single party in the next House of Commons and hopeful of obtaining a clear majority over both of the other parties, offered a much more extensive and detailed program. The Labor party, MacDonald wrote in the foreword to *Labor and the Nation*, was not concerned with patching the rents in a bad system, but with transforming capitalism into socialism by means of the ordinary machinery of democratic government. It advocated nationalization of the coal, transport, and power industries, and of life insurance; the fostering of the migration of miners into other districts and other occupations, and the prohibition of the recruitment of adults from other industries into mining; the immediate raising of the school-leaving age from fourteen to fifteen or sixteen; a great national scheme for development of electrical power; and the establishment of a national economic committee to advise the government regarding economic policies, and of a national development and employment board to prepare schemes for the development of national resources. To the workingmen it specifically promised the repeal of the Mines Act (1926) and the Trades Disputes Act (1927), the creation of a superannuation scheme for aged miners, a forty-eight-hour week, and steeply graded inheritance taxes and high supertaxes on the rich.

The Conservative party was disposed to stand on its record and to appeal to the conservative electorate. "Safety first!" was its slogan, and it asked the voters to support it as the defender of the

constitution against the threat of the general strike and against the perils of socialism, and as the only party which could secure stable conditions and ordered progress along sound, practical lines. It maintained that the existing economic ills were the legacy of past strikes and industrial unrest. It pointed to the measures it had enacted to safeguard certain British industries and to relieve the basic industries of the oppressive burden of local taxation; and asserted that a substantial improvement in the problem of unemployment was taking place, that rationalization and continued coöperation between employers and workers would lay the foundation for lasting improvement. Industry should be left to work out its own salvation.

Although the problem of unemployment was unquestionably the chief issue discussed during the electoral campaign, some attention was given to foreign policy. The Conservatives, who were not inclined to feature their past foreign policy overmuch, announced that they stood for the reduction of armaments and the continued development of the League of Nations. Liberal and Labor candidates, however, gave more attention to foreign affairs. Both parties advocated the resumption of full diplomatic and commercial relations with Soviet Russia, the immediate evacuation of the Rhineland, free trade, and the strengthening of treaties for the prevention of war. "An agreement with the United States for a common naval policy," Labor declared, "is necessary and overdue."

A number of circumstances made the outcome of the election particularly uncertain. In the first place, the electorate was the largest that had ever been entitled to go to the polls, numbering over 27,000,000. In the second place, there were about 5,000,000 new electors, most of whom were women under thirty years of age. Finally, the election was being waged by three parties, without any system of proportional representation. Hundreds of minority candidates would probably be returned. Although few actually believed that the Liberal party had any chance of electing a large number of its candidates, its presence in the campaign befogged the issues. If the by-elections of the preceding years indicated the trend of opin-

ion, however, the Labor party would greatly increase its strength.

This, in fact, proved to be the case. Labor, which had had 160 seats at the time of the dissolution, was returned with 289, while the Conservatives declined from 396 to 259. Owing to the fact that the Liberal party elected 58 candidates, Great Britain again faced the prospect of a minority government. It was quite evident, however, that the Conservatives with their policy of safeguarding had been rejected, and Stanley Baldwin at once resigned the premiership. So far as the economic situation was concerned, the Conservatives left the country much as they had found it in 1924. Neither trade nor industry had greatly increased or declined, and the State was still making payments from the treasury to more than 1,000,000 unemployed.

On June 5 Ramsay MacDonald for the second time accepted the King's invitation to form a government. The cabinet which he appointed included many who had had experience in the earlier Labor government of 1924, and was chosen largely from the Right and Right Center of the Labor party. For the first time in British history a woman was appointed as a cabinet minister. As indicative of the new government's interest in the problem of unemployment, J. H. Thomas was appointed lord privy seal, whose duties are merely nominal, in order that he might undertake the task of coördinating all schemes for the relief of unemployment. That the prime minister intended again to play an important rôle in foreign affairs became evident when he attended the meeting of the Tenth Assembly of the League of Nations in September, and journeyed to Washington in the following month to discuss with President Hoover the possibility of an agreement for the limitation of naval armaments. Late in September the Labor government took steps to bring about the resumption of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Soviet Russia, and on October 7 it issued invitations to the United States, France, Italy, and Japan to attend a five-power naval conference in London in January, 1930.

The circumstances leading to the appointment of one member of the ministry were particularly significant. W. A. Jowitt, who was

made attorney general, had been elected as a Liberal. On June 5 he wrote to MacDonald stating his belief that men of his type must consider whether they ought not to give active support to the Labor party as the only effective instrument to carry through those reforms which the country desired, and his own conclusion that it was to the Labor party alone that they must turn to achieve those objects. In consequence, he definitely joined the Labor party.

The small number of Liberal candidates elected in 1924, and the fact that, in spite of the great amount of money spent by Lloyd George, only 58 were elected in 1929, convinced many Liberals that something was wrong. Demands began to be made that Lloyd George should be repudiated as the party leader. He constituted, so many declared, a liability rather than an asset. Others outside the party maintained, however, that the day of the Liberal party was past; that the most notable of its traditional policies—the extension of the franchise, the curtailment of the power of the Lords, and Home Rule for Ireland—had been carried out; and that the Labor party had usurped in the minds of progressive Britishers the place formerly held by the Liberals.

Certain it is that the parliamentary history of no other European country contains such an example of rapid and astounding expansion as the British Labor party has experienced during the present century. At the general election of 1900 it won only two seats, but the following table [5] shows the party's steady rise, with only one setback:

Election	Seats
1900	2
1906	29
1910 (Jan.)	40
1910 (Dec.)	42
1918	57
1922	142
1923	191
1924	151
1929	289

[5] Issued by Arthur Henderson, secretary of the Labor Party.

Whether the measure of success which has attended the Labor party's efforts to win the support of the electorate will be duplicated in its efforts to solve Great Britain's unemployment enigma as a minority government, only the future can unfold. Certainly there will be little likelihood of socialistic experiments, with the Conservatives and Liberals both in opposition.

CHAPTER XV

THE SETTLEMENT OF THE IRISH QUESTION

ONE of the problems which perplexed and baffled British statesmen for centuries is summed up in the word Ireland. Careers were made and unmade, governments rose and fell because of connection with this problem. By many of the British the whole Irish question came to be looked upon in the light of an unsolvable riddle. Nevertheless, the post-war period saw the riddle solved in a manner satisfactory to the majority of the Irish people and to the great relief of most of the British.

The Demand for Home Rule

From the time when Ireland was absorbed into the United Kingdom in 1801 there existed in the island a persistent and insistent demand for Home Rule. During the nineteenth century this meant to most people returning to the Irish the parliament of which they had been deprived. Twice during the latter part of the century Gladstone had introduced a bill to confer Home Rule upon the Irish, but twice the measure had been defeated, once in the House of Commons and once in the House of Lords. During the years 1912–14, however, advantage had been taken of the Parliament Act of 1911 to pass a third Home Rule Bill. This measure had brought Ireland to the verge of civil war, because the Protestant Ulsterites of northeast Ireland, for economic and religious reasons, were determined never to be included in any Irish State in which they would constitute a minority; while the majority of the Irish people were equally determined that the restored Irish parliament should rule the whole island as it had formerly done. In 1914 both Irish groups had organized well equipped military forces to defend their views. Upon the outbreak of the World War the British gov-

ernment, because of the serious situation in Ireland, had suspended the act for the duration of the war.

During the war the situation in Ireland improved not at all. Irish demands became more radical and, under the direction of Sinn Fein leaders, Home Rule came to mean for many not merely a parliament for an Ireland which would still constitute a part of the British Empire, but the establishment of a republic under which Ireland should be as independent of Great Britain as is the United States. This desire for independence resulted in an abortive Irish revolt in 1916, planned in conjunction with the military leaders of Germany. The proclamation of independence issued by "the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic" was followed by open hostilities in the course of which 450 people were killed, but the rebellion was quickly suppressed by the British government, which arrested some 3,500 men and women and executed 15.

In 1917 Premier Lloyd George sought a solution of the Irish enigma by summoning a convention of representative Irish leaders of all types and viewpoints. It was understood that if this convention reached substantial agreement on a scheme for the future self-government of Ireland, the British government would give legislative effect to its decisions. The convention opened its meetings in July, 1917, but the scheme which was ultimately accepted by a majority in April of the following year failed to reveal the "substantial agreement" sought, so that the problem remained unsolved.

Meanwhile another convention, summoned by the leaders of Sinn Fein, had met in the Dublin Mansion House to draft a constitution for Ireland. The men who gathered there aimed to throw off Great Britain's control and to secure the international recognition of Ireland as an independent republic. Eamon de Valera, one of the leaders of the rebellion of 1916 and a man of eloquence and almost fanatical zeal, was elected president, and Arthur Griffith, founder of Sinn Fein, one of the vice presidents.

During the ensuing months a very decided drift into the ranks of Sinn Fein occurred in Ireland. This was clearly revealed in the parliamentary elections of December, 1918, when, outside of Ul-

ster, the struggle in Ireland was largely between the Irish Nationalist party which stood for the old conception of Home Rule and the Sinn Feiners who demanded an independent Irish Republic. The latter won an overwhelming victory, capturing seventy-three seats while the Nationalists obtained only six.

The newly elected Sinn Fein representatives now asserted that the elections constituted a mandate of the Irish people in favor of the republic. They assumed the title, "Irish Republican Party," and refused to take their seats at Westminster, organizing themselves instead into an Irish parliament, the "Dail Eireann." On January 21, 1919, the Dail held its first formal meeting in the Dublin Mansion House, at which time Count Plunkett, Arthur Griffith, and Eamon de Valera were chosen "delegates to the Peace Conference." The latter, however, declined to receive these representatives of "the so-called Irish Republic." On January 22 De Valera [1] was elected "President of the Irish Republic," and under him a ministry was constituted with departments of foreign affairs, home affairs, finance, and defense. During the following months, what practically amounted to a state of war existed between the "Irish Republic" and Great Britain.

The Home Rule Act of 1920

Lloyd George believed that so long as the Irish question remained unsettled there could be no political peace either in the United Kingdom or in the empire. He regarded it as a matter of prime necessity for British statesmanship to explore all practical paths toward the settlement of the question on the basis of self-government. At the same time, he was unalterably opposed to the complete independence of Ireland and to the forcible submission of Ulster to a Home Rule parliament against its will. It was in conformity with these ideas that shortly before the legal termination of the World War, a new Government of Ireland Bill was introduced in the British Parliament.

[1] "He was the son of an Irish-American woman by a Latin-American father, and was born in New York. He was brought to Ireland as a baby."—W. A. Phillips, *The Revolution in Ireland, 1906–1923*, p. 164.

This measure provided for two parliaments in Ireland, one for the six counties in northeast Ulster, and one for the rest of the island. It conferred greater powers upon the Irish legislatures than those given by the act of 1914, but reserved certain imperial services such as the army, navy, foreign relations, customs, and excise to the Parliament at Westminster. In this latter body the two divisions of Ireland were still to be represented by duly elected though somewhat less numerous members. A council of Ireland, consisting of members nominated by the two parliaments, was to bring about harmonious action between the parliaments, to promote mutual intercourse and uniformity in relation to matters affecting the whole of Ireland, and to provide for the administration of services which the two parliaments mutually agreed should be administered uniformly throughout the whole of Ireland. This council was to be not unlike the Delegations in the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The plan further provided that the two parliaments might by agreement establish in place of this council a parliament for the whole of Ireland. On December 23, 1920, the new Government of Ireland Bill became law.

Northern Ireland at once accepted this plan as preferable to subordination to a parliament at Dublin, and proceeded to carry it out. The act provided that, while retaining thirteen members in the House of Commons of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland should have its own parliament consisting of a House of Commons and a Senate. As at Westminster, the lower house was to be the more powerful of the two. The members of the first House of Commons were elected by universal suffrage on May 24, 1921. The Senate, consisting of the lord mayor of Belfast, the mayor of Londonderry, and twenty-four senators elected by the lower house, was first chosen on June 12, 1921. In both houses there was an overwhelming Unionist or Conservative majority. The executive power, nominally vested in the King, who was to be represented in Northern Ireland by a lord lieutenant,[2] actually was to rest in the hands of a ministry responsible to the local House of Commons. Sir James Craig, leader of the Unionist party in Northern Ireland,

[2] The title was later changed to governor.

was chosen first prime minister. On June 22, 1921, the Parliament of Northern Ireland was formerly opened by King George V.

But in Ireland, outside of Ulster, the act was generally repudiated, for the Sinn Feiners refused to have anything to do with a scheme which seemed to make permanent the partition of the island. Nevertheless, the British government sought to carry out the plan, and in April, 1921, instructions were sent to Dublin to prepare for the holding of elections. In the voting which followed, the Sinn Feiners captured 124 of the 128 seats. They refused to recognize the new parliament and when it was formally opened in June only the four representatives of Trinity College were present in the House of Commons. The house immediately adjourned and never met again.

By this time conditions in southern Ireland had become chaotic. During the early months of 1920 the legal organs of government had broken down in many parts of the country and the Sinn Fein organization had taken over the administration in the name of the "Republic." The "Irish Republican Army," the military force of the Sinn Feiners, greatly outnumbered the forces of the Crown, which were almost powerless to restore order. Only after the government's forces had been strengthened by the addition of the "black-and-tans" [3] and other auxiliary cadets, were they able to turn the tide against the Sinn Feiners. Gradually the authority of the Crown was reëstablished in many districts where for months the only real government had been that of the "Republic," though the struggle was frequently accompanied by murder, arson, and assassination.

The Irish Free State Treaty

Even while the conflict in Ireland continued, Lloyd George on June 24, 1921, invited De Valera to attend a conference in London "to explore to the utmost the possibility of a settlement." Two weeks later De Valera accepted the invitation, and on the following

[3] So called because, owing to the lack of regular Royal Irish Constabulary uniforms, many of the new recruits were clothed temporarily in khaki, with a black hat and a black armband to mark them as constables.

day (July 9) a formal truce was signed between the contending forces in Ireland. But the proposals which the British prime minister made in the ensuing conference were characterized as unacceptable by De Valera and were rejected by the Irish Dail Eireann. Nevertheless Lloyd George, apparently determined to settle the Irish question in some way, extended a second invitation to De Valera to attend another conference in which the basis of discussion should be "how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire can best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations."

On October 10, 1921, the opening conference was held in the prime minister's official residence in London. Among the British representatives were Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, Sir Hamar Greenwood, Austen Chamberlain, and Lord Birkenhead; while representing the Sinn Feiners were such Irish leaders as Arthur Griffith, Michael Collins, Eamon J. Duggan, and Gavan Duffy. De Valera did not attend the conference. After eight weeks of intermittent negotiations during which it seemed at times that the conference must end in failure, the Irish representatives were informed on December 5 that an agreement must be reached that night or the conference would be broken off. Shortly after midnight the signatures of the plenipotentiaries were fixed to a treaty for the establishment of the "Irish Free State."

Under this agreement the Irish Free State was to have "the same constitutional status in the community of nations known as the British Empire as the Dominion of Canada," and the other self-governing dominions. The office of lord lieutenant was abolished, and the Crown was to be represented in Ireland by an officer "to be appointed in like manner as the Governor-General of Canada." The Free State assumed responsibility for a share of the British national debt, the amount to be determined later. It was to have its own military forces, and its own armed vessels for the protection of revenue and fisheries. Certain harbor facilities were conceded by the Free State to the imperial government, and the coast of Ireland was to be defended by the British fleet, pending an arrangement to be negotiated later by which the Free State should undertake a share

of this duty. Northern Ireland was not to be included in the Free State if it declared its desire to continue under the act of 1920. In the latter case, the boundary between the two parts of Ireland was to be determined by a joint commission. The Free State was not to endow or favor any religious denomination.

The treaty at once created a schism in the ranks of Sinn Fein. De Valera denounced it as in violent conflict with the wishes of the majority of the Irish and urged its rejection. Arthur Griffith, on the other hand, asserted that the treaty would lay the foundation of peace and friendship between Ireland and England, that the end of the conflict of centuries was at hand. In the Dail the treaty, after much debate, was accepted by a vote of 64 to 57. De Valera thereupon resigned from the Presidency; a motion to reëlect him was defeated by a close vote; and Arthur Griffith was chosen to succeed him. When, a few days later, the Dail Eireann was transformed into the "Parliament of Southern Ireland," De Valera and his followers withdrew from that body. The bare majority which remained set up a provisional government under the chairmanship of Michael Collins, and late in January, 1922, a committee was appointed to draft a constitution.

Civil War in Ireland

De Valera, who has been characterized as "the most reasonable man in the world if he gets his way in everything," now plunged Ireland into civil war. "We made it impossible for the British Government to rule Ireland," he boasted, "and we can also make it impossible for an Irish Government working under British authority to rule Ireland." During the following months the two wings of the old Sinn Fein organization were in conflict, though actual battles were few. The "Irregulars," as the men in De Valera's Irish Republican Army came to be called by Free State officials, resorted to murdering, looting, and seizing farms and country houses, with occasional raids across the border into Northern Ireland. The new Free State Army, being organized by Collins, appeared reluctant to use vigorous measures against former comrades.

On May 29 the "Parliament of Southern Ireland" was dissolved,

and elections for a new provisional parliament were fixed for June 16. The issue in the elections was the acceptance or non-acceptance of the treaty providing for the Free State. The Irregulars attempted to prevent a free vote of the people. Trees were felled across roads, and rails were torn up from railroads to prevent people from attending meetings; newspapers were seized to prevent people from reading about the meetings; firearms were used against speakers; and methods of terrorism were in general adopted. Nevertheless, the result was a decisive victory for the treaty, for of the 128 members elected, only 36 were opposed to its acceptance.

The first session of the new provisional parliament was to have been held on July 1, but renewed activities of the Irregulars caused its postponement. In the name of "war on England," the followers of De Valera subjected southern Ireland to an orgy of destruction, in the course of which the country was desolated. Bridges and viaducts were blown up, railroads and roads were destroyed, houses were burned, supplies were requisitioned, "traitors to the Republic" were "executed." On August 16 Michael Collins, a Sinn Feiner who had turned his unbounded courage and energy to the defense of the Free State, was ambushed and killed. Ireland presented, in the words of Kevin O'Higgins, "the spectacle of a country bleeding to death, of a country steering straight for anarchy, futility and chaos." Four days before Collins' assassination came the unexpected death of Arthur Griffith, founder of Sinn Fein but since 1921 a loyal supporter of the Irish Free State Treaty. To many the situation seemed almost hopeless.

But under the guidance of William Cosgrave and Kevin O'Higgins the provisional government resorted to vigorous measures to restore order. An act was passed setting up army courts with summary jurisdiction and power to inflict the death penalty. To this the Irregulars replied by proscribing all members of the provisional parliament which had voted for the act. Though forced for a time to seek safety behind steel plates and barbed-wire entanglements, the government persisted in the policy of repression. By January, 1923, thanks largely to O'Higgins' efforts, fifty Irregulars had been executed and some ten thousand had been imprisoned. Measures far

more severe than any adopted by the British government during 1920–21 were taken, but they eventually had their effect. In the spring of 1923 De Valera finally admitted the impossibility of continuing the struggle, and ordered his followers to put aside their arms. Gradually the thousands of prisoners were released and by the following autumn civic life in southern Ireland was once more nearly normal.

The Establishment of the Irish Free State

Some months before this the Free State had been legally established. In September, 1922, the provisional parliament had met and elected Cosgrave President and chairman of the provisional government. Parliament at once gave its attention to its constituent duties and on October 25 adopted a Free State constitution which was characterized as essentially republican. "In Ireland under this Constitution," O'Higgins asserted, "the real power is in the hands of the people acting through their Parliament, no matter what fictitious or theoretical powers are supposed to reside elsewhere."

As in the other dominions, the executive authority is vested nominally in the King who is represented in the Free State by a governor-general. Actual executive power is in the hands of an executive council or ministry which is directly responsible to the lower house of the legislature. The legislature (Oireachtas) consists of two houses, the Chamber of Deputies (Dail Eireann) and the Senate (Seanad Eireann). The latter is composed of sixty members elected for twelve years, one-fourth of the members being chosen every three years. In 1928 an amendment to the constitution provided that senators should be elected by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate voting together from a panel nominated by the two houses in equal parts. The Chamber of Deputies is elected by a system of proportional representation with universal suffrage, the age limit of electors being twenty-one. The lower house is the more powerful of the two, for the Senate has no authority to amend a money bill and has only a suspensive veto on other legislation. Provision is made for popular initiative and referendum.

Early in December the constitution received the assent of the

King, and on December 6, 1922, the Irish Free State was established by royal proclamation. The last of the lord lieutenants was succeeded by Timothy Healy, an aggressive Irish Nationalist, who was appointed to represent the King as the first governor-general of the new dominion. By the end of the year the last of the British troops had left Ireland.

In August, 1923, the Free State held its first elections to the Chamber of Deputies. Of the 153 seats De Valera's Republican party obtained 44. The Free State party, with 63 seats, controlled less than a majority, but the refusal of the Republicans to take their seats in the Chamber permitted Cosgrave to remain in office. In September representatives of the Free State were received into the Assembly of the League of Nations; in October Cosgrave for the first time attended a Dominion Conference in London. Diplomatic representatives of the Free State were established in Washington, Geneva, Paris, Berlin, and Brussels, and a high commissioner took up his residence in London.

A difficult problem yet remained to be solved. By the Treaty of 1921 the boundary between the Free State and Northern Ireland was to be determined by a commission of three members, one each appointed by the Free State, Northern Ireland, and the British government. Northern Ireland, however, steadily declined to recognize this provision of the treaty, insisted upon the boundary as laid down in the Act of 1920, and refused to appoint a member of the commission. After considerable delay the imperial Parliament passed a new act which provided that if Northern Ireland refused to appoint a boundary commissioner, the British government might appoint one to function for her. Such a commissioner was finally appointed by the British government, and during 1925 the commission visited the border districts and heard evidence.

As the time for making the boundary award approached the general fear of an outbreak of violence along the border increased, for it was felt that the award would probably not be acceptable to either the Free State or Northern Ireland. In view of the threatening situation, a compromise was reached. The commission's award was never published; the boundary stood as stipulated by the Act

of 1920. In return for accepting this boundary, the Free State was released from its liability for a share in the public debt of the United Kingdom as existing in 1921; and to the government of Northern Ireland were transferred the services "reserved" to the Council of Ireland under the Act of 1920. Many saw a step toward reconciliation in the preamble of the agreement whereby the govern-

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ments of Northern Ireland and the Free State, "being united in amity . . . resolved mutually to aid one another in a spirit of neighborly comradeship."

Despite De Valera's order that the members of the Irish Republican Army should lay aside their arms, many of the Irregulars continued to meet and to plot against the government. In 1925 they apparently turned against De Valera himself and cut free from

his control. In the summer of 1927, when it began to seem that Ireland was at last settling down to a somewhat ordered life, the world was shocked by the recurrence of assassination. On July 10 Kevin O'Higgins, vice president of the executive council of the Free State and the "strong man" of the government, was deliberately shot and killed by three assailants. O'Higgins had been Cosgrave's chief lieutenant since the assassination of Collins and the death of Griffith. As minister of justice he had been largely responsible for the vigorous measures which had suppressed the Republican opposition. The Irregulars had long hated him.

The government at once determined upon vigorous measures. A public safety bill, greatly increasing the government's power to deal with such acts of lawlessness, was rushed through both houses. Following this an electoral amendment bill was passed prescribing that any one who wished to become a candidate for election as a deputy must first proclaim his intention to fulfill the requirements of the constitution so that he could sit in the Chamber. At the risk of having his own government turned out of office, Cosgrave was determined to force the Republicans to take the oath of allegiance or cease to be nominal members of the Chamber.

Although De Valera and his followers disclaimed any connection with the assassination of O'Higgins, popular opinion throughout the world was inclined to place part of the responsibility for the deed upon the obstructionist tactics of the Republican leader. Possibly it was the outcry in the United States, from which he had been drawing a great part of his funds, that convinced De Valera that it was time to change his policy; possibly it was the Electoral Amendment Act which threatened the extinction of his party (Fianna Fail) at the next elections; or possibly De Valera realized that the Free State Constitution had won the support of the great majority of the Irish. Whatever the reason, the Republican leader suddenly declared that he would undertake to become the head of a constitutional opposition. On August 10, 1927, the Republicans announced that they would take the oath of allegiance as contained in the constitution. The subsequent entry of the Republican deputies

into the Chamber of Deputies constituted a landmark in Free State history. Bullets were now to give way to ballots as a means of settling the issues.

The entrance of the Republicans into the Chamber was the immediate signal for an attempt to bring about the downfall of Cosgrave's government by a vote of no confidence. From this fate the government was saved only by the deciding vote of the speaker of the Chamber. The latter body was at once dissolved, and an appeal was made to the electorate. In the elections of September, 1927, De Valera's Fianna Fail party increased its representation from 44 to 57, many deserting the lesser opposition parties in favor of De Valera's followers now that they had adopted constitutional methods. Nevertheless, Cosgrave's Free State party won the largest number of seats, and with the support of some of the lesser groups President Cosgrave was enabled to remain in office.

During the preceding years, Cosgrave's government, in addition to restoring order in the country, accomplished much constructive work. The administrative system was reorganized, many of the overlapping and inadequate departments were consolidated, local government was reformed with some tendency toward greater centralization. The judiciary was remodeled and the police force reduced in size. Immense economies were effected in the post-office system. The whole scheme of education was overhauled and organized on a modern basis. The method of poor relief, long obsolete, was abolished and replaced by one both more humane and less wasteful. The national budget was balanced and a measure of protection introduced. Agriculture was strengthened, further land purchase legislation was enacted, and with government subsidies the sugar-beet industry was introduced. A beginning was made of the electrification of the river Shannon. Such measures inevitably appealed to the material instincts of the people.

Gradually most of the Irish have been weaned away from their demand for complete independence. They have come to realize that there are advantages to be gained by membership as a dominion in the British Commonwealth of Nations. All of the important parties now accept the treaty, though some still hope to alter it by con-

stitutional methods. Although there is some desire to claim further immunity from interference in Irish affairs by the imperial government, although there is some demand for the abolition of such formal symbols of imperial sovereignty as the oath of allegiance, there seems to be little likelihood that the existence of the Free State will be threatened. Subject to constitutional alteration, it would seem that the Irish question has at last been settled.

CHAPTER XVI

THE FASCIST RÉGIME IN ITALY

HOWEVER sudden and startling in their appearance, however sharp the contrast with their immediate environment, historical institutions are the outgrowth of conditions which precede them. Fascism, one of the two most discussed political and economic experiments of contemporary Europe, was the rather natural, though not inevitable, result of the post-war plight of Italy, for in the years immediately following the armistice a great portion of the Italian people came to feel that their existing political régime was able neither to preserve and defend Italy's just national interests abroad nor to provide law, order, and efficient government at home.

Disappointment with the Government's Achievements Abroad

More than the people of any other great power, perhaps, the Italians entered the war for the purpose of securing certain definite additions of territory, and during the conflict their territorial ambitions further increased. They emerged from the war with the high hope and confident expectation of territorial acquisitions which should meet their nationalistic and imperialistic aspirations—only to be almost immediately disappointed.

The crisis which arose when Italy sought at the peace conference to obtain the Adriatic port of Fiume, has already been discussed. It need only be pointed out here that during the months immediately following the armistice the nationalistic spirit of the Italian people was aroused to expect and demand the annexation of this city. Fiume suddenly acquired a place in the Italian mind quite out of proportion to its commercial importance. The failure of

the statesmen at Paris to award Fiume to Italy, or to draw any definite boundary between Italy and Jugoslavia in the Dalmatian region, bitterly disappointed the Italian people and stirred the national spirit to the point where it applauded and supported D'Annunzio's spectacular seizure of the city for Italy in defiance of the Allies in September, 1919.

When, in spite of this patriotic exploit, the Italian government later signed with Jugoslavia the Treaty of Rapallo (November, 1920) recognizing "in perpetuity" the independence of the Free State of Fiume, and surrendering to Jugoslavia the whole Dalmatian coast south of that city with the single exception of the town of Zara, the nationalists of Italy denounced the government for its weakness and pusillanimity. And when in the following month D'Annunzio's Legionaries were expelled from Fiume by the order of the Italian government and by Italian regular troops, nationalist denunciation of the ministry knew no bounds.

But Fiume was not the only region in which the Italian government seemed to be unable to protect the "vital interests" of the country. The plan to make of the Adriatic an Italian lake called for the establishment of Italian control and influence in Albania. During the war Italian troops occupied part of Albania, and the possibility of partitioning the country between Italy, Greece, and Jugoslavia, with Italy retaining the important port of Avlona as the key to the control of the Strait of Otranto, was seriously considered. For months after the war the Albanian situation dragged along without a settlement by the peace conference, Italian troops meanwhile remaining in the country.

Finally the Albanians began a guerrilla war to drive foreign troops from their territory. The small force of Italians stationed there was gradually forced back into Avlona and virtually besieged during the summer of 1920. Giolitti, harassed by conditions at home, was in no position to wage another war, and therefore signed a treaty with the Albanians recognizing their complete independence, and withdrew Italian troops from all Albanian territory except the island of Sasseno. The latter, he hoped, might still enable Italy to dominate the Albanian port of Avlona and might contribute

to Italian control of the Adriatic. Italian nationalists, however, denounced Italy's withdrawal from Albania as an "inglorious page of our political and military history."

If the complete control of the Adriatic was one of the aims of Italian foreign policy, another perhaps equally important was the acquisition of a greater colonial empire. The colonies which Italy possessed before the war were chiefly liabilities. They apparently contained neither great natural resources nor adequate water supplies for European settlement, and their climate made them unattractive to Italian emigrants. On the other hand, Italy was lacking in raw materials and at the same time was one of the most densely populated of the great powers. Her population was increasing at the rate of half a million a year. Italy, therefore, aspired to territorial acquisitions in Asia and Africa.

Ever since the Tripolitan War in 1911–12, Italy had occupied the Dodecanese Islands in the Ægean. Soon after the close of the World War she landed troops in Adalia, where Italians already held railroad concessions, and sent warships to Smyrna in preparation for carving out a colonial realm in Asia Minor. But her aspirations in the eastern Mediterranean were never fulfilled. By the Treaty of Sèvres and complementary treaties Smyrna with its hinterland was allotted to Greece, and Italy was forced to agree that the Greek-inhabited Dodecanese Islands, which might have been used as bases for Italian commercial penetration into Asia Minor, should be surrendered to Greece. Furthermore, just as Italian troops had been forced out of Albania, so for similar reasons they were compelled to withdraw from Adalia, Italy obtaining in return merely certain commercial concessions.

In Africa Italy fared little better. The secret treaty of 1915 had promised that if Great Britain and France obtained African territory as a result of the war, Italy should receive additional territory in that continent also. But the German African colonies were granted as mandates to Great Britain, France, and Belgium, while, in the words of Count Cippico, "Italy, who had given to the cause of the Allies 5,500,000 soldiers; who had lost 632,000 men killed; who had 2,000,000 wounded; and who had mortgaged

in the common interest her entire national wealth . . . Italy with her lack of raw materials, her scanty colonies, her population which increases by 5,000,000 every ten years—failed to obtain one square inch of those vast territories." To be sure, the Italian colonies of Libya and Somaliland were subsequently enlarged by concessions from France and Great Britain, but the additions brought no appreciable increase in resources and fell lamentably short of Italian imperialistic desires.

These disappointments and humiliations in foreign affairs led many Italian nationalists to believe that "the sacrifices made in the war were in vain"; that the Allies "were robbing Italy of the fruits of the victory"; that they were "obsessed with the absurd idea of making her [Italy] renounce in their favor, her rank and prestige as a great power." The bitter hostility which was thus aroused against Italy's "faithless allies" was turned eventually even against their own government itself because of its inability to protect Italian national interests. Discontent and exasperation brought at length a strong nationalist reaction.

Dissatisfaction with the Government's Weakness at Home

Meanwhile, the domestic policies of the numerous ministries which succeeded one another were not such as to win popular support. Like so many other European countries, Italy faced a serious economic situation immediately following the war. Her national fiscal system was in a hopeless state. The government feared to reduce expenditures at once lest it demoralize industry and incur the wrath of capitalists and trade unions. At the same time it proved unable to enact fiscal schemes to provide anything like adequate revenue. Staggering deficits therefore resulted, deficits amounting to 12,369,000,000 lire for the year 1919–20, 18,205,000,000 lire for 1920–21, and 17,157,000,000 lire for 1921–22.[1] The currency, already depreciated at the close of the war, fell steadily during the next two years to less than a third of its face value.

This brought a rapid increase in the cost of living which was

[1] C. E. McGuire, *Italy's International Economic Position*, p. 77.

further aggravated by the fact that Italy, always an importing country in respect to food and raw materials, experienced during these months a serious shortage of such essentials. Living costs, in terms of paper currency, rose to six or seven times their pre-war level. Many soldiers, returning to civil life at a time of industrial crisis, failed to regain their old jobs or to obtain new ones. The attempts to relieve suffering by state subsidies and by selling food below cost only contributed to unbalance the fiscal system still further.

Socialism profited by these circumstances. The Socialists from the beginning had denounced the war and had repeatedly prophesied ultimate disaster. Demobilized soldiers, contrasting their actual conditions with the extravagant promises made to them by politicians in the last months of the struggle, were profoundly disillusioned and offered a fertile field for Socialist propaganda. Disgusted and embittered at the sight of war profiteers "indulging in an orgy of extravagance and vulgar display," the proletariat went over to Socialism almost *en masse*. In the parliamentary elections of November, 1919, the Socialists practically doubled their numbers, winning 156 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, where they constituted a controlling force and helped to paralyze the government.

Meanwhile the emissaries of Bolshevism had been preaching strikes, the seizure of factories and the land, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Workmen and peasants, attracted by the Russian mirage, believed that revolution was at hand. During the winter of 1919–20, it is asserted, a good third of Italy was "Red." Thousands of the most flourishing communes were seized by extreme Socialists. Soon in Parliament itself Socialists were "singing 'The Red Flag,' giving cheers for Lenin, and hissing the King."

Influenced by the Russian Revolution, the extreme Socialists abandoned their pre-war law-abiding character and evolutionary methods and sought by revolution to transplant into Italy the soviet system, which was to solve all problems. Such a revolution they thought to accomplish by strikes. In consequence, strikes became frequent and occurred in such essential services as the railways, tramways, postal and telegraph systems, and even in the light and food supply systems of the large towns. Enterprises dependent

upon such services became demoralized. Nor were the strikes by any means limited to the industrial centers.

As early as August, 1919, agrarian disorders had broken out. Despite the fact that the Italian people are largely farmers, the number of landed proprietors is very small. During the war many, including even Mussolini, who was at that time editor of *Il Popolo d'Italia*, had advocated land for the peasants, and it was in an attempt to bring this about by direct action that land-raiding was begun. In some instances former service men sought to obtain plots of idle land for cultivation; in others tenants refused to pay rent to the owners; while in still others rural laborers sought to introduce the eight-hour day. In southern Italy and in Sicily illiterate peasants, often under the leadership of local priests, sought to seize small holdings at the expense of the owners of the great estates. Outrages were perpetrated—people were killed, houses were burned, cattle were slaughtered, harvests were destroyed. The government failed to do more than sanction the "temporary" occupation of landed estates and require the occupiers to indemnify the owners. Although the total amount of land seized was relatively small, the psychological effect on the property-owning classes was great.

In industry the revolutionary movement reached its peak in August and September, 1920. The employers had declared that they could not carry on business under the conditions demanded by the trade unions, and the workmen determined to prove that the workers could. As a result, more than 600 factories involving some 500,000 employees were suddenly seized by the workers. Throughout the country the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" was hourly expected. The government, paralyzed by divisions in Parliament and embarrassed by difficulties abroad, was powerless to intervene. But it was an impossible situation which confronted the workers. Even before the occupation of the factories an industrial crisis had been in full swing, and the men soon discovered that without expert management, raw materials, and foreign markets, seizure of the factories was useless.

Anarchists and Communists in the General Confederation of Labor and in the Socialist party sought to extend the scope of the

movement and to give it definitely revolutionary aims, but their proposal was vigorously opposed by the more moderate element and was finally voted down. The occupation ended as suddenly as it had begun. The factories were returned to their owners, the trade unions accepting the government's proposal to bring in a bill for the establishment of factory councils.

Following the collapse of the movement to seize the factories, the majority of the workers began to favor more moderate policies. In January, 1921, the Socialist party split, the moderates retaining the party name and the extremists calling themselves Communists. By the spring of the year the strike fever had begun to subside,[2] and this despite the fact that wages were being reduced. The Russian Revolution was losing its hold on the popular imagination; the Bolshevik threat to the State was disappearing.

Although the crisis passed, sporadic strikes continued and the fear which the short communist experiment had engendered remained. The proletariat had failed to carry through its program, in fact had abandoned its attempt; but it had succeeded in further demoralizing the already unstable commercial and industrial life of the country. Without permanently injuring the other classes, it had aroused their fear, hostility, and exasperation. Landlords and industrialists, who had looked in vain to the State for protection, denounced the supineness and inability of the government. All Italians who felt they had anything to lose by a communist revolution urgently desired a firm government, and were ready to support any movement which might promise to provide it. While the Socialists were splitting into factions, other classes were coming together in preparation for a counter stroke. The half-hearted attempt at a proletariat State had failed; a whole-hearted attempt to set up a strong national State followed.

Mussolini and the Rise of Fascism

The group which benefited most from this situation was the new organization which had been founded by Benito Mussolini. This

[2] Whereas nearly 19,000,000 days had been lost by strikes in industry in 1919 and over 16,000,000 in 1920, less than 8,000,000 were lost in 1921 and slightly more than 6,000,000 in the first ten months of 1922.

vigorous Italian was born in 1883, the son of a village blacksmith in northern Italy. His mother was a school teacher, and at the age of eighteen he himself became a teacher. Deciding that he needed further education, he later went to Switzerland, where he attended the Universities of Lausanne and Geneva, working to pay his expenses. While in Switzerland his innate organizing ability and his interest in socialism led him to participate in the founding of trade unions and the fomenting of strikes, activities for which he was ultimately expelled from the republic by the Swiss government.

Back in Italy he once more took up teaching. His continued interest in socialism, however, led him to become involved in agrarian disorders, and in 1908 he was arrested and temporarily imprisoned as a dangerous revolutionary. Later, after having been expelled from Trent by the Austrian government because of his irredentist propaganda, he drifted into journalism and in 1912 became editor of *Avanti*, the official organ of the Italian Socialist party.

Upon the outbreak of the World War Mussolini advocated Italian neutrality, urged the workers to resist being drawn into a "bourgeois" war, and preached preparation for a social revolution. Suddenly in October, 1914, he changed his views and began to urge Italian intervention in the war. The Socialists thereupon repudiated him and forced him to resign from *Avanti*. In the following month he established in Milan the daily paper, *Il Popolo d'Italia*, which under his editorship became an interventionist organ.

In September, 1915, when his class was called to the colors, Mussolini entered active service and served as a private on the Isonzo front. Early in 1917 he was wounded by the explosion of a trench mortar, and upon his recovery he procured exemption from further military service on the ground of being indispensable to the management of *Il Popolo d'Italia*. In the days following the Caporetto disaster its columns were used to combat the spirit of national depression.

At the conclusion of the war Mussolini, in March, 1919, issued a call for a meeting of former service men who "desire to express their attitude toward the country's post-war problems." A small group gathered about him—chiefly young men, mostly ex-Socialists

—and under his leadership was founded the *Fascio di Combattimento* (Union of Combat). Its program was extremely democratic, even revolutionary: (1) proportional representation, woman suffrage, abolition of the Senate, lowering of age limit for electors and deputies, a national constituent assembly; (2) a legal eight-hour day, minimum-wage laws, participation of workers in the control of industry, national occupational councils; (3) a national militia exclusively for defense, the nationalization of all factories for the manufacture of arms and explosives; (4) a heavy capital levy, the sequestration of the property of religious bodies, the abolition of episcopal revenues, the revision of war contracts and the sequestration of eighty-five per cent of all war profits; (5) a national foreign policy which should raise the position of Italy among the nations, and bring Fiume and all Dalmatia within the Italian frontiers.

At first Fascism made little headway. In the parliamentary elections of 1919 it put forward two candidates—Mussolini was one—but neither was successful, their total vote being less than 5,000. During the following year the Fascisti were still negligible; they had yet to become a national force. Their strength was somewhat increased when they entered into an alliance with D'Annunzio's Nationalists and approved the latter's spectacular seizure of Fiume in defiance of the Allies. Mussolini was in fact arrested by the government for his connection with the affair. Meanwhile through pamphlets, speeches, and patriotic demonstrations the Fascisti denounced the government for its weakness both at home and abroad.

During the occupation of the factories Mussolini took no sides, though in the previous year he had approved a similar step. Following the collapse of the occupation, however, he threw the weight of his organization into the drive against the Communists. In northern and central Italy Fascist branches were established by ex-officers of the army and agents of the industrial and landowning classes. While Mussolini aroused enthusiasm by articles in his newspaper, *squadristi* of young men—wearing black shirts—were sent out to combat Communism. Guns, clubs, and castor oil were their weapons. In the beginning the Giolitti government, wishing to destroy Communism, apparently connived with the Fascist forces. They were

quietly supplied with arms, given free transportation on the railways, and rarely punished for their misdeeds. In the words of Prezzolini, the Fascisti "had full liberty of action."

Early in 1921 many of D'Annunzio's Legionaries, forced out of Fiume, returned to Italy and joined the Fascist movement. They added a more pronounced military and nationalistic element to Fascism and contributed certain Roman terms, symbols, and war cries. The fighting groups of "Black Shirts" rapidly increased during the first half of this year. Punitive expeditions, with their beatings, attacks on Communist and trade-union headquarters, and destruction of printing establishments continued. The Communists countered with ambuscades and mass attacks. Much blood was shed on each side during the conflict.

Great numbers now welcomed the new organization. To the employers it meant the restoration of discipline among workmen and the reduction of wages; to landowners, possible protection against further peasant outbreaks; to helpless and terrified professional men, middle classes, and intelligentsia, the restoration of law and order; to patriots, the purification of the civil life and the strengthening of the State. From all these classes young men hastened to enroll in the *squadristi*. Tired of violence and factional fights, the majority of Italians began to look to Mussolini to bring in an era of social peace. But the "flood of new recruits fouled the parent stream." Fascism's original proletarian sympathies, its hostility to the bourgeoisie, were lost during the fight against Bolshevism.

The failure of the Communist experiment, the disruption of the Socialist party, the weakness of the government, the subsidies of the rich, the revival of the middle class, the spread of patriotism, and the longing for a strong government, all these—together with Fascist willingness to resort to violence to attain its ends—contributed to bring success. The Socialist rout began. In the elections of May, 1921, their representation in the Chamber of Deputies was reduced, while the Fascisti returned thirty-five members. By July Mussolini asserted, "Bolshevism is vanquished."

In November, 1921, the Fascist movement was transformed into the Fascist party. A new and more elaborate as well as less radical

program was drawn up.[3] The succeeding months were spent in strengthening the party and in winning public opinion. The idea was spread abroad that Fascism had been responsible for the defeat of Bolshevism, and that it alone stood between Italy and the return of that dread evil. The classes which had rallied to Fascism in order to rid the country of the threat of Communism now continued to support it for fear that the danger had not been permanently removed.

The government remained unstable, weak, and inefficient. Its services were overstaffed, its budget unbalanced. Tremendous fiscal deficits piled up, and further currency inflation followed. Disorders continued at home, and the path of empire in Asia Minor and northern Africa was beset with difficulties. Ministerial instability discredited parliamentary government. During the summer of 1922 Fascism began its conquest of political power by the ejection of executive officials in the outlying provinces. In September Mussolini rid himself of the suspicion of republicanism by openly declaring in favor of the monarchy. In the following month he asserted that, though democracy had been useful and efficient in the preceding century, "it is possible that the twentieth may see arise some other political force more powerful and better adapted to the needs of the country."

The "Fascistization" of the Government

During the fall of 1922 Mussolini repeatedly demanded that Facta, the premier who had succeeded Giolitti, either dissolve Parliament or resign in favor of a new cabinet which should include five Fascist ministers, but Facta refused to do either. In October the Fascisti held a congress in Naples which thousands from all parts of Italy attended. In the presence of this great gathering Mussolini delivered his ultimatum: "Either the Government will be given to us or we shall seize it by marching on Rome."

A ministerial crisis ensued. A tardy attempt was made to bring the Fascisti into the government by offering them certain positions. They declined. Instead they began their "march on Rome." In most

[3] Found in O. Por, *Fascism*, Appendix II.

of northern and central Italy they had already occupied the railroads, prefectures, electric power plants, and postal and telephone offices. Without serious opposition from any source they now advanced upon the capital. The Facta government proclaimed a state of siege, but the King refused to sign the decree. Instead he called upon Mussolini to form a new ministry. The government which the latter established on October 30 was a coalition in which the Fascisti were predominant.

Immediately upon assuming the premiership Mussolini demanded and received from Parliament what practically amounted to dictatorial powers until the end of 1923. Then followed the "Fascistization" of the administrative offices of the government. The legal organs were retained but into each department loyal members of the Fascist party were introduced. Italy is a centralized State, divided for administrative purposes into provinces under the control of prefects appointed by the national government. It was not long before the whole army of prefects and subprefects had become "Fascistized." Finally, in order to make a clean sweep, a law was enacted giving the government authority to dismiss any civil servant who held political views contrary to those of Mussolini.

Next came the "Fascistization" of Parliament. Before the expiration of Mussolini's period of dictatorial powers, an electoral reform bill was forced through Parliament. Under the provisions of the new act (the Acerbo Law) the party obtaining the largest vote in a parliamentary election would receive two-thirds of all the seats, the other third being distributed among the remaining parties in proportion to the number of votes each polled. This would result in a strong majority party in Parliament, and no one strong minority group. The law was designed to do away with the need for coalition governments by giving some one party control of the national legislature. In view of the conditions which usually surrounded Italian elections, the scheme was bound to react in favor of the party controlling the government. In April, 1924, the plan was tested in a general election. The Fascist party won over 60 per cent of the seats regardless of the provisions of the new electoral law, though the opposition declared that this was not accomplished without vio-

lence and intimidation. However that may be, Parliament was at any rate "Fascistized."

During 1925–26 popular control of local government was gradually abolished. There were more than 9,000 municipalities in Italy, governed in local affairs by elected town councils and mayors. In November, 1925, this local machinery of government was suppressed in all municipalities of less than 5,000 population, and these districts were placed under the control of podestas appointed by the government at Rome. In the following year all provincial, communal, and municipal elections were indefinitely suspended, and podestas took the place of popular government in all towns and cities except Rome. In the capital local government had already been suppressed in favor of a governor appointed by national authority.

Meanwhile Mussolini's position as premier had been transformed into that of a dictator. He was freed from dependence upon Parliament and made responsible to the King alone. He was given permanent control of the national military, naval, and air forces. No item might be placed on the order of the day in either house of Parliament without his consent. The authority to issue governmental decrees with the force of law was placed in his hands. Capital punishment was restored and an attack upon the premier was made punishable by death. In fact, it was decreed that whoever offended him by word or deed should be punished. His title was changed to "Head of the Government," and the members of the ministry were made definitely subordinate to him, his relation to the ministry coming to resemble that of the President of the United States to his cabinet. The King in a royal decree early in 1926 referred to Mussolini as "His Excellency, the Chevalier President Benito Mussolini, Head of the Government, Prime Minister, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, for War, for the Navy, and for Aviation." In the summer of 1927 Mussolini informed the Chamber of Deputies that he did not see that he could relinquish his present position for another ten or fifteen years.

All these changes were not accomplished without opposition, but wherever it appeared drastic steps were immediately taken to sup-

press it. Newspapers were subjected to such rigorous measures that nothing but a Fascist press finally remained. Political meetings were forbidden, and any society or group which did not meet the government's approval was disbanded. University and college professors were dismissed because their views did not coincide with the general political aims of the government. Military tribunals were established for the trial of those accused of plotting against the existing régime. Many were exiled for their political views, while many who desired to leave the country were prevented from going. Italians who were judged to be engaged in unpatriotic activities abroad were made liable to loss of citizenship and confiscation of personal property. In general, freedom of speech, of the press, and of association—the pillars of liberal government—were destroyed. Late in 1925 Mussolini, through *Il Popolo d'Italia*, declared: "There is no longer any room for many things which were excellent in other times . . . Today, among the things for which there is no room, must be included the Opposition."

In addition there was, especially in the early years, frequent resort to violence to suppress the opposition. Doubtless much of this was carried on by irresponsible elements in the party, for all sorts of men had been drawn into the movement from a variety of motives, and there existed what has been called the "lunatic fringe." On the other hand, on at least one occasion members of the party in high standing became involved.

In June, 1924, Giacomo Matteotti, a Socialist member of the Chamber of Deputies, was abducted and murdered in a manner highly suggestive of medieval Italian politics. He had published a book [4] in which he had enumerated a long list of Fascist murders and other excesses, and had announced that he was going to expose the corruption of the Fascist minister of the interior. The latter with others immediately carried through the plot which led to Matteotti's death. Although Mussolini, in an attempt to "purify" Fascism, at once removed from office all those known to be involved in the crime, they were later defended by high officers of the Fascist party and escaped with almost no punishment.

[4] G. Matteotti, *The Fascisti Exposed* (London, 1924).

The evil effects of the introduction of violence into Italian political life lingered long in the country districts, where actual power was wielded by the local Fascist chiefs. While for a time Mussolini seemed powerless to control this group, he eventually succeeded in rising above it. In 1926 Farinacci, a believer in violent Fascism, was forced out of the position of secretary-general of the party. In 1927 Mussolini took a more vigorous stand. "Squadrism" he denounced as anachronistic and illegal. Such action, he asserted, must stop, and in a message to the prefects of the country he ordered the regular police to use their arms against all illegalism of the "Black Shirts."

Immediately after the Matteotti murder, most of the non-Fascist deputies withdrew from the Chamber, declaring that they would not return so long as Fascism remained in power. In recollection of the various secessions of the Roman plebs and their withdrawal to the Aventine Hill in order to impose their demands on the patriciate, the seceding deputies came to be popularly referred to as the "Aventine Opposition." While they doubtless hoped by their withdrawal to discredit the rump Parliament and bring about its dissolution by the King, they failed. In 1926 they were definitely excluded from Parliament by Mussolini on the ground that they had forfeited their seats. During the years 1924–29, therefore, Parliament was for all general purposes practically a Fascist body. As early as April, 1923, the non-Fascist members of the government had begun to resign, the first to go being those of the Catholic Popular party. Soon the whole cabinet was composed of Fascisti, Mussolini himself gradually assuming control of various ministries until eventually he held eight different portfolios. On September 12, 1929, however, he suddenly relinquished seven of these cabinet posts to other members of the Fascist party, retaining for himself merely the premiership and the ministry of the interior.

Fascist Syndicalism and the Corporative State

In 1919, when Fascism was in its infancy and in need of support, while it was still under the influence of its first radical program, it contracted an alliance with the Italian syndicalists under

the leadership of Edmondo Rossoni. Fascist trade unions were organized in opposition to the existing Socialist unions, and in 1923 a general Federation of Fascist Syndical Corporations was created. By the middle of the latter year the Fascist syndicates had almost a half-million members. Their numbers gradually increased and in October, 1925, the Fascist syndicates were recognized by the Italian Industrial Employers' Federation as the sole representatives of their employees.

Late in that same year legislation was formulated which became the Legal Discipline of Collective Labor Relations Law [5] on April 3, 1926. Under the provisions of this law there are in Italy six national confederations of employers and seven of employees. Each confederation has subdivisions or syndicates for regions, provinces, and municipalities. Only one syndicate each of employees and employers is legally recognized in any given trade or profession, and then only if it enrolls one-tenth of the workers in the district or includes the employers of one-tenth of the workers. Only those may be members of the syndicates who are acceptable politically to the government. The president or secretary of each syndicate requires for the exercise of his office the approval of the government, and possesses in turn the authority to expel any member who becomes politically or morally unworthy. No syndicate is given legal recognition if it is affiliated with any international organization. The syndicates, therefore, are pretty thoroughly under the control of the government, and herein lies the chief difference between Fascist syndicalism and the syndicalism earlier advocated by Sorel.

These syndicates are given authority to enter into collective contracts regulating hours of labor, wages, apprenticeship, and the like. They have power over all workers and employers in a given industry and district regardless of whether the latter are members of the syndicates. The contracts which the syndicates make are binding upon all, and each syndicate has the right to exact an annual contribution to the common fund from all, whether members or not. Unions or associations other than the ones legally recognized

[5] See H. W. Schneider, "Italy's New Syndicalist Constitution," in *Political Science Quarterly*, XLII, pp. 161–202.

may exist in each trade and district, but they have no right to participate in the discussion and settlement of industrial disputes.

Over and above the separate syndicates of employees and employers are the "corporations," of which there are seven. In these, employees and employers in similar industries are brought together into an organization which constitutes an administrative department of the State under a minister of corporations, an office assumed by Mussolini. The function of the corporations is to adjust controversies between labor and capital, conduct employment bureaus, regulate apprenticeship, and in general promote production. Corporations exist in the metallurgical, the mechanical, the textile, and the chemical industries, and in agriculture, commerce, and the chemical trade. The presidents of these corporations are nominated and recalled by the minister of corporations.

Strikes and lockouts are illegal. When trouble arises between employer and employees, the syndicates to which they belong seek an amicable settlement. In case of failure, the corporation in which their industry is included attempts to bring about conciliation. Failure here is followed by an appeal to one of the sixteen Italian courts of appeal, each of which has a labor section. From its decision there is no appeal. The first case taken to the Labor Court was one in which a group of landowners in northern Italy attempted to force their agricultural laborers to accept a thirty per cent reduction in wages because of the revaluation of the lira in 1927. The workers refused to accept such a large reduction, but offered to take a slighter one. The court's decision was in favor of the laborers, and the landowners were ordered to pay arrears of wages on that basis.

In 1927 the government issued a "Charter of Labor" [6] which in thirty articles explained and amplified the principles of existing laws and laid the basis for legislation in the future. "The Italian Nation," declares Article I, "is an organism whose aim, whose life and whose means of action are superior to those of the single individuals occupying and forming it." Labor in all forms is a social duty, and the syndicalist machinery is designed to "guarantee the approximation of salaries to the exigencies of life, to the possibilities

[6] Found in *New York Times Current History*, XXVI, pp. 445–47.

of production, and to the actual output of labor." "The corporative State considers private initiative in the field of production as the most efficacious and most useful instrument in the interests of the nation." Nevertheless, capital must share equally with labor the effects of crises and hard times, official statistics being used in judgment.

The first third of the charter deals with the existing syndical machinery; the rest lays down general principles for the most part in the interests of labor. Night work is "payable at higher rates than day work," and payment for piecework should be determined so that the normal industrious laborer "will be able to earn a minimum above his basic pay." Employees have the right to a weekly rest on Sunday, and to an annual paid holiday. They have the right to an indemnity proportionate to years of service if discharged without cause, and the worker's family to an indemnity in case of his death. A labor contract is not canceled when a laborer is absent in military service or because of a short illness. The collective labor contract applies to home work and special rules will be issued by the State to assure cleanliness and hygienic conditions. The State proposes to accomplish the improvement of accident insurance, the betterment and extension of maternity insurance, the establishment of insurance against occupational illnesses, the elaboration of a system of general insurance against all illness, and the extension of unemployment insurance.

In 1928 the crowning feature of the syndicalist system was added when a new electoral reform law was passed. By this law the membership of the Chamber of Deputies was reduced from 560 to 400 and the right to nominate deputies was taken out of the hands of ordinary citizens and given to the syndicates of workers and employers. The thirteen national confederations, which represent most of the workers and producers of every kind, propose 800 candidates whose names are sent to the Fascist Grand Council.[7] The latter, which has full power to accept or reject any name or even to choose one outside those submitted, then draws up a list of 400 candidates. This list is finally submitted to a plebiscite of the voters

[7] See p. 435.

who, as a single national constituency, must vote "yes" or "no" on the list as a whole. In case the list fails to secure a majority of the votes cast, a second election follows in which all organizations with a membership of 5,000 or more may present lists of candidates.

The new plan, according to Mussolini, is an honest attempt to advance in constitutional legislation along lines best calculated to promote smooth collaboration of all classes of society for the good of the State. "Herein," he declared, "lies the Fascist revolution's greatest legislative novelty and herein lies its great originality." Power is now given to the "productive forces of the State" rather than to the mere representatives of territorial divisions. Each art, craft, trade, and profession will be represented in this, Europe's first legislative body to be based on full economic representation.

The new electoral scheme was given its first test early in 1929. On January 21 the existing Chamber of Deputies was dissolved by decree. During the next few weeks the various national confederations chose their preliminary lists of candidates for submission to the Fascist Grand Council. Each confederation named Mussolini as its first preference. The Fascist Grand Council then selected the final list of 400 candidates, placing Mussolini's name at the head of the list and arranging the other names in alphabetical order. An analysis of the nominations revealed representatives of both employees and employers in agriculture, industry, commerce, transportation, and banking; representatives of professional men and artists; and representatives of former combatants and disabled soldiers. According to an announcement, the selection was based partly upon seniority from the Fascist point of view and partly upon personal merit. About two hundred deputies of the dissolved Chamber were included in the final list.

The election or plebiscite, as it was called, was held on March 24. During the preceding two weeks a campaign in favor of the Fascist nominees was conducted by means of speeches, proclamations, and posters. In an address before the Grand Quinquennial Assembly of the Régime, composed of members of the government, the Fascist Grand Council, the Fascist senators, the official candidates for the new Chamber of Deputies, the prefects and podestas,

the federal Fascist secretaries, and others, Mussolini himself reviewed the achievements of the Fascist government. In succeeding days similar speeches were made throughout the country by the prefects, the candidates, and members of the Fascist Grand Council. Finally, even the Pope, who had become reconciled to the Italian government as a result of the settlement of the Roman question, advised all good Catholics to vote their approval of the Fascist régime. No opposition speeches were permitted.

The result was probably a foregone conclusion. The question which was put to the electorate on March 24 was: "Do you approve of the list of deputies chosen by the Fascist Grand Council?" Of the 9,460,727 male voters who comprised the electorate, 8,663,412 voted in favor of the Fascist list. Only 135,761 had the temerity to cast their votes against it.

Fascism Constitutionalized

The Fascist party is a centralized, hierarchical organization rising like a pyramid from some ten thousand local branches (*Fasci*) to the Grand Fascist Council presided over by Mussolini, *Il Duce* (The Leader). This council of approximately twenty members is the supreme Fascist organ, and includes the high officials of the party and many who hold important offices in the government. In addition, Mussolini has the right to add to the council at will any who have been of special service to Fascism or the nation, and is thus always able to hold a majority and to dominate the body.

The executive organ of Fascism is the National Directory, which consists of the secretary-general of the party and nine other members, all appointed by the Grand Fascist Council. It meets monthly under the presidency of Mussolini, and lays down the general lines of policy for the whole organization. In each province the *Fasci* are grouped into a federation which has a council and directory similar to those of the national organization. The provincial secretary has authority to appoint the secretary of each local *Fascio*.

Mussolini believed that what Italy and Fascism both needed was a well trained and disciplined youth. With this end in view Fascism

established two auxiliary organizations, the *Balilla* and the *Avanguardia*. The former is open to boys of eight to fourteen years; the latter to those from fourteen to eighteen. The purpose of these organizations is similar to that of the Boy Scouts, but instead of the Boy Scout manual they have a Fascist manual by means of which a knowledge of Fascism and its aims is inculcated. In 1928 the government ordered the suppression of all non-Fascist institutions for the physical, moral or spiritual training of Italian youth. Premilitary training is given to the members of the *Balilla* and *Avanguardia*, who in 1928 were said to number considerably more than a million. The ranks of Fascism were eventually closed (1926) except to "graduates" of the *Balilla* and *Avanguardia*. Upon graduation from the latter into the Fascist party, the young men swear "to execute the orders of *Il Duce* without discussion and to serve with all my force, if need be with my blood, the cause of the Fascist revolution."

The militant character of Fascism during the early years expressed itself through *Squadristi* of "Black Shirts." These were the armed forces of the movement in the years when it was fighting for existence and crushing opposition. It was the "Black Shirts" who conducted the "March on Rome." In 1923 the *Squadristi* were disbanded, and from them was recruited the Voluntary Militia for National Security, which was at first independent of the Italian army and under the personal authority of Mussolini. In the following year, however, the militia was regularized. Its members were required to take an oath of allegiance to the King and its officers were recruited from the national army, over which in turn Mussolini himself was given supreme authority.

The militia is now part of the armed forces of the State and subject to the army discipline code. It is open to all citizens from seventeen to fifty years of age who possess certain "physical, moral and political" qualifications. The permanent unit consists of only a small group of officers, the rest of the militia having returned to civil life, where they remain subject to call. The militia has been given charge of the premilitary training of the *Avanguardisti*, and from time to time it is mobilized for parade purposes.

Although, from 1923 on, the policies which were enacted into law by the Italian Parliament were in general formulated and enforced by the leaders of the Fascist party, the latter as such had no constitutional place in the Italian government. It was an extra-constitutional organization like the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States. Perhaps, in view of the suppression of all opposition parties in Italy, it might be more truly likened to the Russian Communist party, which, though unmentioned in the constitution of the U.S.S.R., shapes and carries out the policies of the Soviet Congress.[8]

In 1928, however, the Fascist party was written into the Italian Constitution. By the provisions of the Electoral Reform Act of that year, discussed above, the Grand Fascist Council, the supreme organ of the Fascist party, was given the legal right to draw up the list of candidates for the Chamber of Deputies to be voted upon by the Italian electorate. Later in the year its legally recognized duties were further enlarged. It was given the right to nominate candidates for the office of prime minister and for the other high government positions. It was thus made the King's chief advisory body in the matter of selecting ministers and undersecretaries of state.

At the same time it was made the chief advisory body of the government on all questions of a constitutional character. It was given the right to be heard regarding all proposed legislation affecting succession to the throne, the royal powers and prerogatives, the composition of the two houses of Parliament, the powers of the prime minister, and the relations between Church and State. International treaties which involve changes in the national territory became subject to its deliberation. To the members of the council was extended legal immunity from arrest and from police regulations, and no Fascist member of the council was to be subjected to any "disciplinary measure" without the consent of the council. The Grand Fascist Council was changed, therefore, from a mere organ of the Fascist party unofficially consulted by the prime minister into an openly recognized *de jure* part of the political machinery of the State.

[8] See p. 464.

The Settlement of the Roman Question

Fascism inherited from its predecessors the long-standing problem of Italy's relations with the Vatican. The Pope, once the temporal ruler of the States of the Church, which comprised a considerable portion of central Italy, was deprived of his last remaining territory when troops of the Italian government seized Rome in 1870. The former papal capital was made the capital of the Italian Kingdom, and in an effort to conciliate the Holy See the government in 1871 enacted the Law of Papal Guarantees to serve as the basis of relations between the Papacy and the Italian Kingdom.

By the provisions of that law the Pope and his successors were guaranteed possession of St. Peter's, the Vatican and its gardens, the Lateran Palace, and the Villa of Castel Gandolfo. The head of the Church was accorded sovereign rights within these possessions, including the inviolability of his own person and the authority to receive and send ambassadors. He was further granted free use of the Italian telegraph, railway, and postal systems, and guaranteed an annual subsidy from the State of approximately $645,000.

Pope Pius IX refused to recognize the Law of Papal Guarantees, however, because it was a simple legislative act of the Italian government, a unilateral arrangement rather than a concordat. He and his successors refused to accept the annual subsidy, declared that they had been deprived of sovereign territory and were unable to exercise their legitimate prerogatives as sovereigns, and proclaimed themselves "prisoners of a usurping Power" which they refused to recognize. At first the Holy See forbade Italian Catholics to participate in national elections, but later it removed this prohibition and a sort of *modus vivendi* was reached. The Roman question still remained, however, and Crispi once declared that the man who finally succeeded in ending the quarrel between the Vatican and the Quirinal would earn the title of "greatest Italian statesman." Mussolini was suspected of being eager to acquire this additional title.

Steps looking to the settlement of the Roman question were taken in October, 1926, when the Duce through an intermediary expressed to Pope Pius XI his strong desire to enter into negotiations for the purpose of eliminating the existing state of hostility between the Church and the State. The Pope was favorable to a settlement, and conversations were begun. Although the public was not informed of the negotiations which were in progress, various steps which were taken by the Fascist government were interpreted as efforts at conciliation.

As part of the Fascist educational reform, religious instruction was reintroduced into the public schools and the crucifix was restored in the elementary schools. Freemasonry, regarded as anticlerical, was attacked and then abolished. Chaplains were introduced into the army, and the salaries of the clergy were increased. Although, in an effort to bring the moral, spiritual, and physical training of all Italian youth under Fascist control, the Catholic Boy Scouts were forced to become part of the Fascist *Balilla* organization, Catholic priests were extended the right to give religious instruction for one hour a week to all *Balilla* units.

The delicate negotiations which were meanwhile being conducted eventually resulted in an agreement between the Papacy and the Italian government, and on February 11, 1929, a treaty, a concordat, and a financial convention were signed in the Lateran Palace by Cardinal Gasparri, papal secretary of state, and by Mussolini. The first of these documents was of international importance; the second was national in scope and concerned only the relations between the Vatican and the Italian Kingdom; the third provided for a financial settlement in recognition of the losses which the Papacy had sustained in consequence of being deprived of the States of the Church. On February 12 the pontifical banner and the flag of united Italy for the first time flew side by side on St. Peter's.

By the terms of the settlement Italy recognizes the State of the Vatican City under the sovereignty of the Pope, and all Italian laws to the contrary are abrogated. The Vatican City—the smallest of sovereign States, with an area of only slightly more than a hundred acres and with less than five hundred citizens—thus takes its

place among the States of the world. It is to have its own coinage system, postage stamps, wireless, and railroad station, and the right to send and receive ambassadors. Its territory is always to be considered neutral and inviolable; freedom of access to the Holy See is guaranteed for bishops from all parts of the world; and freedom of correspondence with all States, even with States which may be at war with Italy, is assured. Furthermore, the privilege of extra-territoriality is granted outside the Vatican City to certain churches and buildings used by the Holy See for its administration. Although assuming its place among the States of the world, the Vatican declared that it would "remain extraneous to temporal competitions between other States and from international congresses convened for the purpose, unless the parties in conflict appeal unanimously to its mission of peace."

Italy recognizes the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman religion as the only State religion in the country. The Italian government binds itself to enforce within its territory the canon law—that is to say, the laws relating to faith, morals, conduct, and discipline prescribed for Catholics by Church authority. Matrimony is recognized by the State as a sacrament regulated by canon law. Formerly a civil ceremony was required in order to establish the validity of a marriage in civil law; hereafter, if certain regulations regarding the banns and registration are observed, the State will recognize the legality of marriages performed by priests. The question of divorce for Catholics rests with the Church. For non-Catholics civil marriage will still be valid.

Religious instruction, formerly excluded from the secondary schools, now becomes compulsory in both elementary and secondary schools. It will be taught by instructors selected by the bishops and maintained by the State. There is to be, however, no ecclesiastical interference with the normal curriculum and no ecclesiastical surveillance of the schools. The election of bishops is also further regulated by the concordat. Formerly they were appointed by the Church subject to the approval of the State, which paid their salaries; hereafter the State's rôle will be restricted to the right of objecting to an appointee for political reasons.

Underwood & Underwood

THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ROMAN QUESTION

Cardinal Gasparri and Premier Mussolini signing the agreements which ended the long conflict between the Vatican and the Quirinal

Various other matters are agreed upon in the settlement. The person of the Pope is declared to be as sacred and inviolable as that of the King. Ordained priests are exempted from military obligations. An Italian ambassador is accredited to the Holy See, and an apostolic nuncio to the Italian government, the latter to be dean of the diplomatic body in Rome. The Pope accepts 750,000,000 lire ($39,375,000) in cash and 1,000,000,000 lire ($52,500,000) in five per cent government bonds "as a definite settlement of all its financial relations with Italy in consequence of the fall of temporal power." Finally, the "Holy See . . . declares the Roman question definitely and irrevocably settled and therefore eliminated, and recognizes the Kingdom of Italy under the Dynasty of the House of Savoy, with Rome as the capital of the Italian State."

On June 7 ratifications of the treaties comprising the settlement were exchanged in the Vatican by Cardinal Gasparri and Mussolini. Immediately after the ceremony Pope Pius XI sent a telegram to King Victor Emmanuel III imparting his apostolic benediction to the King, the Queen, the royal family, Italy, and the world. A papal nuncio was at once appointed to the Quirinal and an Italian ambassador to the Holy See. A few weeks later the Pope left the Vatican for the first time in almost two generations, thus recognizing the settlement of the Roman question, the most important event in Italian history since 1870.

Problems and Policies

Perhaps the most pressing problem which confronted Fascism immediately upon assuming control of the government was the threatening state of the national finances. The budget was tremendously out of balance, the national debt was rapidly increasing, and the inflated national currency stood at twenty-four (normally five) to the dollar. Bankruptcy faced the State unless remedial measures were taken. Fascism at once began an extensive reorganization and modernization of the fiscal system in the interest of efficiency. Expenditures were rigorously scrutinized and superfluous bureaucratic offices were abolished. The national railways, which had a deficit of over one billion lire in 1922, were made self-supporting and were

even able to turn over a surplus to the national treasury. Taxes were increased until, in proportion to national income, they became heavier than those of any other country.

The effects of these reforms became evident in the national balance sheet. Gradually the deficits decreased from 17,157,000,000 lire (1921–22) to 4,914,000,000 lire (1922–23), to 623,000,000 lire (1923–24). Beginning in 1924 the national budget showed a balance. The small foreign debts owed to Canada, Sweden, Holland, and Brazil were paid off, and advantageous debt settlements were arranged with the United States (November, 1925) and Great Britain (January, 1926). Finally, after heroic efforts in 1926–27, the national currency, which had declined to 31.6 to the dollar, was raised to 19 to the dollar, where it was legally stabilized on a gold basis in 1928. The stabilization of the lira at this figure brought the reduction of the effective national debt of Italy, which now amounts to less than the pre-war total in terms of the purchasing power of the lira in 1914.[9]

The additions of territory which Italy secured from the former Habsburg empire at the close of the war brought with them the problem of dealing with foreign nationalities—Germans and Jugoslavs. This is a new problem for Italy. Prior to the war Italy knew how it seemed to have an "irredenta" under foreign control; now she has within her own frontiers the "irredentas" of other nations. But in her treatment of her new subject nationalities she has adopted much the same policies which she deplored when they were used by the Habsburgs against her kinsmen in the Austrian Empire.

In spite of promises made at the peace conference, Fascism's extreme nationalism has sought by means of schools, legislation, and garrisons to Italianize the new regions. Much friction has resulted, especially in the Upper Adige, which is inhabited by some 250,000 German-speaking Tirolese. Italy's policy here has even disturbed her foreign relations, for the charge that Mussolini's government was prohibiting the use of the German language in public meetings and was sequestrating German property brought vigorous protests from German and Austrian officials. In the face of all foreign criti-

[9] 15,766,000,000 lire (1914); 13,280,000,000 lire (1926).

cism, however, Mussolini has steadily asserted his determination to bring about the assimilation of these new territories.

But undoubtedly the most difficult and at the same time the most fundamental problem with which Fascism has had to wrestle is Italy's general economic situation. The seriousness of the problem rests chiefly on two basic facts: (1) the denseness of Italy's population, and (2) her lack of those natural resources which are essential to the upbuilding of a great industrial country. The population of Italy has a density of 323 to the square mile in contrast with about 184 for France; the coal and iron which France has in abundance, Italy is obliged to import; even her agriculture fails to produce sufficient foodstuffs for her people. The pressure of Italian population against Italian resources, therefore, is great.

And this pressure is likely to increase. Italy's population continues to grow while the avenues of emigration have been partially closed. The United States Immigration Act (1924) practically shut the door which formerly admitted hundreds of thousands of Italians. Italy's post-war emigration has never reached the pre-war level. As a matter of fact, Fascism is opposed to the loss of Italian citizens by their emigration to other countries. The nationalist philosophy of Fascism demands a powerful Italy and this, it is believed, is largely dependent upon a populous Italy. Numerous measures have been taken to encourage large families. Mussolini's aim is a nation with 60,000,000 inhabitants by 1950; otherwise, he has proclaimed, "we cannot make an empire, we shall become a colony."

With so dense a population and such inadequate natural resources, it is not surprising that Italy is far from self-sufficient economically. She has long had a deficit in her foreign trade, a deficit amounting in 1926 to more than seven billion lire. Practically the only way to overcome this adverse trade balance is by the increase of exports. Efforts have been made by such measures as the "battle of the wheat"—the attempt to stimulate home production of cereals—and the expansion of hydroelectric projects to reduce Italy's dependence upon foreign raw materials, but the reduction has been slight. Italy's chance of increasing her agricultural products is small, and her total

potential hydroelectric power, which is estimated at about 1,620,000 horse power, would fall far short of freeing the country from the need of foreign coal. Italy must therefore increase her production and export of manufactured goods, expand her merchant marine, and attract tourist trade to meet the balance.

It was in these directions that Mussolini turned his efforts. Naturally the first need was to bring order and stability into Italy's demoralized economic life. This he accomplished by force, by the inculcation of ideas of authority and obedience, and by the suppression of industrial disturbances. The number of days lost by strikes was greatly lessened, and by his syndical system he largely fused the material forces of the nation into "a single dynamo of production" in which capital and labor are to be not antagonistic but complementary. As a result, Italy's industries have expanded, her exports have increased, and her trade deficit has been somewhat reduced.

In an attempt to produce income for the country by freeing it from the burden of foreign freight rates and by participating in the profits of the world's carrying-trade, Italy embarked upon an expansion of her merchant marine. Subsidies were offered to new lines, and in 1926 Italy ranked second in the world in shipbuilding. The Italian flag has come to dominate in the trade of the eastern Mediterranean, and new outlets for her commerce are gradually being opened. Fascism's restoration of economic and political stability together with its fiscal reform measures restored foreign investors' confidence in Italy, and much-needed foreign capital has been flowing into the country. In order to hold out further attractions, legislation has been enacted abolishing inheritance taxes and exempting foreign capital for a time from various other kinds of taxes.

But Italy's handicaps are great. Her industries must pay nearly fifty per cent more for coal than the industries of northern France and western Europe. They can compete with those of other countries only at the expense of smaller returns to Italian labor and capital. In spite of the very high cost of living in Italy, the wage level in that country is one of the lowest in Europe. Because of the relatively low return on Italian capital invested in industry

Italy can only slowly accumulate her own capital to free herself from foreign loans. On the other hand, continued borrowing of foreign capital results in a continued interest drain on the country which tends to offset any reduction of the trade deficit. The increase in tourist trade, which followed Fascism's restoration of order in the country, is partly neutralized by the decline in remittances from Italy's emigrants abroad. Altogether, Italy's economic situation is far from bright; "from an economic point of view her people are poorer, taken on an average, than they were before the war." [10]

Foreign Affairs

Upon becoming prime minister in October, 1922, Mussolini at once assumed the office of minister for foreign affairs. His immediate aims seemed to be to satisfy Italian nationalists by occasional resort to vigorous language and action, by the enhancement of Italy's prestige abroad, and by the recovery for Italy of some of the territories and concessions which had been lost through the "weakness" of preceding Italian governments.

The Italo-Greek Treaty of 1920, in which Italy agreed to surrender to Greece the Dodecanese Islands with the exception of Rhodes, had never been popular among Italian nationalists, who considered it a foolish sacrifice mistakenly made in a time of national weakness. Just before the Fascist *coup d'état*, the Italian government had denounced this agreement on the ground that the Treaty of Sèvres had lapsed and that the change in situation in Anatolia had released Italy from her pledge. Mussolini adopted the same attitude, and in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) Italy obtained legal recognition of her possession of the Dodecanese. The Islands themselves are of little intrinsic value, but they offer Italy important bases for the commercial penetration of Anatolia and for predominance in the eastern Mediterranean. A fortified naval base has since been constructed at Leros.

Later in the year 1923 Mussolini delighted Italian nationalists by his spectacular action at Corfu.[11] Although the island was peace-

[10] C. E. McGuire, *Italy's International Economic Position*, p. 103.
[11] See pp. 231–33.

ably surrendered following an adjustment of the crisis by the Allied Conference of Ambassadors, Italy's seeming defiance of the League of Nations and Greece's payment of 50,000,000 lire convinced Italian nationalists that the whole affair had been a distinct triumph for Mussolini. While the event probably strengthened Fascism's position at home, it is doubtful if it increased Mussolini's prestige abroad, where his action was viewed as hasty and ill advised, and as an unnecessary threat to international peace.

On no other occasion, however, has the Duce's conduct of Italy's foreign affairs been so open to criticism. His settlement of the Fiume question, while no less satisfactory to Italian nationalism, was much more skillfully and quietly accomplished. By the Treaty of Rapallo (1920) Fiume had been made an independent Free City. The arrangement was satisfactory neither to the Italians nor to the Jugoslavs, and it proved unworkable. The Jugoslavs, because of their dissatisfaction, closed the Zagreb-Fiume railroad. Fiume was forced into idleness while the Jugoslav hinterland became economically disorganized.

Within a month after assuming office Mussolini made suggestions regarding a new solution of the Fiume question, but to no avail. A year later he succeeded in opening negotiations with Jugoslavia which eventually resulted in the incorporation of his suggestions of 1922 in the Treaty of Rome, signed on January 27, 1924. By the provisions of this treaty the Free State of Fiume was divided between Italy and Jugoslavia. Fiume proper went to Italy. Port Baros, which had been originally constructed especially to handle the export trade of Croatia and which is separated from Fiume by only a small stream, went to Jugoslavia. In addition, Jugoslavia was given a fifty-year lease of one of the three basins of the main harbor of Fiume.

On March 16, 1924, final Italian annexation of the much-discussed city was officially celebrated at Fiume in the presence of King Victor Emmanuel. Another "catastrophic abandonment" of Italian interests was rectified. The annexation, however, seems to have been more a triumph for Italian nationalism than a gain for Italian commerce. In 1925 the port handled only about 700,000

tons of freight in contrast with the 2,250,000 tons which had passed through Fiume in 1913. It was largely to rehabilitate the city's commerce that Italy in 1927 concluded a treaty with Hungary giving the latter a free port in Fiume, which in pre-war days had been Hungary's outlet to the Adriatic.

The settlement of the Fiume question brought about an improvement in Italo-Jugoslav relations. On the same day on which the Treaty of Rome was signed, a five-year pact of friendship and coöperation was entered into between the two countries. They mutually agreed to support each other "in order to maintain the position established by the Treaties of Peace concluded at Trianon, Saint-Germain and Neuilly," and each pledged neutrality in case the other suffered an unprovoked attack from any power.

Friendly relations with Jugoslavia were considered by Mussolini as essential to Italy's pacific expansion toward the east, the only direction open to the country, for, he declared, "on the west there are national States which have taken definitive form and to which we can send nothing except our labor—though even our export of that may be prohibited or restricted any day." In July, 1925, a convention was signed in which Jugoslavia, in return for certain commercial advantages in Italy, recognized the right of Italians to buy land within thirty miles of the Jugoslav frontier, the right of Italian firms in Jugoslavia to import Italian labor, and certain regulations regarding the position of Italian minorities in Dalmatia. The convention was vigorously opposed by the Croatians and Dalmatians, who saw in its provisions the prelude of Italian penetration of Jugoslavia. Not until 1928 was it possible for the Jugoslav government to secure its ratification, and then only at a time when practically the whole opposition was absent from Parliament.

In accordance with this general policy of eastward orientation, Italy also signed treaties of friendship, conciliation, and arbitration with Czechoslovakia (1924), Rumania (1926), Hungary (1927), Turkey (1928), and Greece (1928). None of these had a particularly disturbing effect on Italy's relations with other powers. This was not true, however, of the Treaty of Tirana, signed between Italy and Albania on November 27, 1926. By this treaty Italy, in

return for economic concessions, guaranteed "the status quo, political, juridical and territorial of Albania." The latter agreed not to conclude with other powers political and military agreements prejudicial to Italian interests. To the Jugoslavs it appeared that Italy had at last secured the protectorate over Albania which Italian nationalists had been seeking ever since the outbreak of the World War. Excitement in Belgrade was intense.

During 1927 internal improvements were carried out in Albania under Italian supervision and with Italian loans, and the Albanian army was reorganized by Italian officers. Relations between Jugoslavia and Albania meanwhile became strained, and the former eventually availed herself of a frontier incident to sever diplomatic relations. Since at the close of the World War Jugoslavia had hoped to secure part of northern Albania, Italy now charged that she was contemplating an attack upon the small republic. This Jugoslavia denied, accusing Italy of seeking only an excuse to land her troops in Albania under the pretext of "protecting" the Albanian government according to the terms of the Treaty of Tirana.

Each country resorted to diplomatic counter moves. On November 11, 1927, Jugoslavia signed with France a treaty in which the two countries agreed to coöperate in international affairs. Eleven days later Italy signed a twenty-year defensive alliance with Albania in which each agreed that, "when all the means of conciliation have been exhausted," it would come to the aid of the other in case of unprovoked attack. Jugoslavia denied that the treaty with France was aimed at Italy, while the latter declared that her alliance with Albania was only in the interest of peace. Although a gradual Italo-Jugoslav *rapprochement* occurred in 1928, the earlier Pact of Friendship between the two countries expired in January, 1929, without renewal.

Meanwhile Fascism was seeking to assert Italy's position as a great power in the Mediterranean. In 1920 France, Great Britain, and Spain, ignoring Italy, had opened negotiations regarding a new international régime for Tangier, a port in Morocco near the Strait of Gibraltar. Negotiations were protracted, and after Mussolini came into power he requested that Italy be allowed to participate.

His request was denied, France asserting that by the Franco-Italian agreement of 1912 Italy had surrendered any claim to consideration in Moroccan affairs. A treaty was finally concluded by the other three powers in 1923, but Mussolini felt that Italy had been given an inferior status in the administration of the city and refused to accept it.

In 1926 Mussolini concluded a treaty of conciliation and neutrality with Spain, and many at once saw in this move a resort to the pre-war game of "checkerboard" diplomacy, Italy seeking to have on the opposite frontier of France a power friendly to herself. In October, 1927, on the eve of the opening of negotiations between France and Spain regarding the modification of the international régime in Tangier, three Italian warships made an ostentatious visit to that port. From Rome came the unofficial announcement that Italy as a Mediterranean power considered herself to be vitally concerned in the status of Tangier. While the display was considered as merely a "theatrical gesture typical of Mussolini," there were not lacking those who perceived in it a strange similarity to the action of William II in 1905.

Briand's policy of conciliation was in the ascendancy in Paris at this time, however, and Italy was invited to participate in the conference which opened in Paris on March 20, 1928. A new agreement concerning Tangier was reached on July 25, and by it Italy was given a larger share in the administrative machinery of that city, being assigned one representative each on the Committee of Control and the Mixed Court, and three representatives on the Municipal Council. The new régime was introduced early in 1929. On January 14 the Italian consul-general, attending the Committee of Control for the first time, was honored by being elected president. On the following day the three Italian representatives assumed their seats in the Tangier Municipal Council. Italy's position as a great power had been protected, and in Rome the outcome was looked upon as a great diplomatic triumph for Mussolini.

Despite his tendency to use overvigorous language and to resort to the spectacular, it is probably true that Mussolini has succeeded in strengthening Italy's hold on the Adriatic, in increasing her

prestige in the Mediterranean, and in extending her diplomatic and commercial influence in southeastern Europe. He has repeatedly proclaimed the "innate pacific character" of his foreign policy, and in this, despite his threatening talk about necessary additional outlets for Italian colonists, Italy's numerous treaties of conciliation and arbitration and her adhesion to the Locarno and the Paris pacts seem to bear him out.

CHAPTER XVII

THE SOVIET RÉGIME IN RUSSIA

THE Bolsheviks had signed the disastrous and humiliating Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March, 1918, with the hope that, by making peace with the Central Powers and by taking Russia out of the war, they would be free to inaugurate their sweeping political, economic, and social reforms undisturbed. But their hope was soon blasted, for both within and without the country numerous movements were at once begun for the purpose of driving the Bolsheviks from power. During the first three years following the November Revolution of 1917, therefore, the Bolsheviks were almost constantly engaged in a desperate struggle to retain the power which they had seized.

Failure to Dislodge the Bolsheviks

Many Russians believed that Bolshevism was but a passing phase in the Russian upheaval and hoped, by counter-revolutionary measures supported by the Allies, to be able to overthrow the Bolshevik régime. The Soviet government they would replace by one more in accord with their own ideals, though the great weakness of the counter-revolutionists lay in just this, that they were not agreed among themselves as to the type of government which should follow.

The Allies were at first not averse to intervention. Great stores of military supplies had been landed at Murmansk, Archangel, and Vladivostok for use against the Central Powers. Now, unless preventive measures were at once taken, it seemed likely that these might be seized by the Germans and turned against the Allies themselves. Nor was the desire for the collapse of the "traitorous" Soviet government wholly lacking in Allied circles. France particularly

was eager for the downfall of the political régime which had repudiated both the highly valued Franco-Russian Alliance and the previously gilt-edged government bonds in which billions of francs had been invested by the French people.

After Russia's signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, therefore, Allied expeditionary forces were dispatched to Murmansk, Archangel, and Vladivostok. In November, 1918, after the collapse of Turkey and the consequent opening of the Straits, French forces bombarded and seized Odessa in an effort to support anti-Bolshevik operations, while British forces occupied the various Transcaucasian republics. Each of the regions seized by the Allied armies served as a rallying ground for anti-Bolshevik Russians who were plotting to overthrow the Soviet government.

In the district about Murmansk and Archangel a "North Russian Provisional Government" was established which at once began recruiting an army for use against the Bolsheviks. In Siberia and eastern Russia anti-Bolshevik forces with the aid of Czechoslovak regiments soon succeeded in getting full control of the Trans-Siberian Railway. An anti-Bolshevik government was established with its seat at Omsk, at first under a directorate, later under the military dictatorship of Admiral Kolchak. In the south a "Government of the Volunteer Army" was set up by Generals Kornilov, Alexeiev, and Denikin. Within the Baltic republics General Yudenitch prepared for a counter-revolutionary advance against Petrograd. With "White" armies planning to advance from the east, from the south, and from the west, it was hoped in anti-Bolshevik circles that the year 1919 would see the final downfall of the Soviet government.

Menaced by innumerable revolutionary plots from within and threatened by Allied armies of intervention from abroad, the Bolshevik leaders depended for defense chiefly upon two agencies—the "Cheka" and the "Red Army." The "Cheka," or "Supreme Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution and Speculation," was organized by Dzerzhinsky immediately following the November Revolution to maintain order in the capital. Under his direction, however, it was gradually transformed into an agency of

terror which, in the face of foreign intervention and disaffection at home, was used as in the French Revolution to force the population into passivity or active support.

In order to purge Russia of all elements dangerous to the Revolution, the "Cheka" was empowered to arrest, try, and shoot all who were considered dangerous. Following Lenin's narrow escape from death by assassination in August, 1918, an organized Red Terror was begun which in the following years surpassed the bloody Reign of Terror in France. It has been estimated that at least 6,000 persons were shot in the concluding months of 1918 and thousands more were executed and scores of thousands imprisoned in the succeeding years. Though hundreds who were entirely guiltless of counter-revolutionary intrigue were undoubtedly put to death, the Bolsheviks were determined to run no risks. Lenin believed that no dictatorship of the proletariat was thinkable without terror and violence, while Trotsky asserted: "Terror, as the demonstration of the will and strength of the working class, is historically justified."

The tragic end of Nicholas II and his family came early in the period of violence aroused by counter-revolutionary movements. Following their arrest in March, 1917, they had been confined for some months at Tsarskoye Selo. In August, Kerensky had sent them for greater safety to the isolated town of Tobolsk. Early in 1918 the Bolshevik government, fearing counter-revolution in Siberia, had again moved them to Ekaterinburg, where the ex-Tsar, his wife, and five children were huddled together in a three-room apartment. Threatened by the advance of the "White" armies under Kolchak, the local soviet of Ekaterinburg apparently became excited and on July 16, 1918, ordered the whole family to be shot.

But while Red Terror might suppress internal opposition, it could not unaided defeat the advancing "White" armies, subsidized and equipped by foreign powers. For a short time, after the disintegration of the Tsarist armies, the Soviet government had almost no organized forces at its command. It was obliged to depend upon regiments of Communist workmen hastily assembled as "Red

Guards." These poorly trained and inefficient troops soon gave way to a new volunteer "Red Army" which, under Trotsky as commissar for war, was developed during 1918 into a well equipped, well trained force of more than 100,000 men, commanded for the most part by former Tsarist officers whose loyalty to Russia led them to fight against what they looked upon as foreign invasion.

In 1919 the simultaneous advance of the "White" armies began. Yudenitch's forces actually got within sight of Leningrad (the name given to Petrograd by the Soviet government on April 22, 1920), only to be defeated (October 21) and driven back into Esthonia. Kolchak's forces advanced into Russia, but the farther they went the faster they melted away. Soon they were in retreat. By November the "Red" armies had captured Omsk and forced the anti-Bolshevik government to transfer its seat to Irkutsk. In February of the following year Kolchak himself was captured and shot. Before his capture he had officially turned over his authority to General Denikin, who seemed to be making some headway in the south. But by the close of 1919 even Denikin was in retreat. He soon fled to Constantinople.

Perhaps the greatest single cause of the miserable failure of the "White" armies was the fact that the Russian people, especially the peasants, came to view them as the agents of reaction who were seeking to restore lands to the landlords and the old system of privileges to the aristocracy. The Russian peasants were not anxious to be "liberated" by armies of the landlords. They were not vitally concerned in the question of government, but they were concerned in the question of land. The advance of the "White" armies had been accompanied by looting, disorder, and a "White Terror" almost as ruthless as that of the "Reds"; and, as between Bolshevism and extreme military reaction, the Russian masses preferred the former temporarily as the less of two evils. And continually the Bolsheviks had denounced the counter-revolutionary armies as the agents of foreign powers, as "invaders," and they had appealed to Russian patriotism to support the "Red" armies which were "protecting" Russia.

The conduct of the counter-revolutionary armies and the bloody

repressive measures of the "White" leaders alienated popular sympathy in the Allied countries. The masses in every country had long been weary of war, and were now opposed to further military effort which seemed to have as its only object the supplanting of the Bolsheviks in Russia with reactionary extremists. By the close of 1919 all Allied forces had been withdrawn from European Russia, though the Japanese, who were eager to extend their influence in eastern Siberia, remained for a time in Vladivostok.

But the Soviet government was not yet freed from the need for military campaigns. The "White" forces of the south, after Denikin's flight, had come under the command of General Wrangel, who was actively supported by the French government. During the early months of 1920 "White" armies once more moved northward in the Ukraine. At the same time the Poles, recalling the medieval grandeur of their State and desiring to push their Russian frontier as far east as possible, began an invasion of Russia. In May they succeeded in occupying the city of Kiev.

Again the Russians, roused by foreign invasion, rallied to support the Soviet government which was struggling to prevent the despoilment of their country. The Poles were hurled back almost to Warsaw. Only the timely aid of French men and munitions prevented a debacle. In October the Treaty of Riga brought peace between the two countries and definite settlement of the boundary question. By this time the Soviet government had concluded similar treaties with Esthonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Finland, and was finally free to give its attention once more to the "White" armies in the south. In November General Wrangel's forces were driven out of the Crimea. By the close of the year 1920 European Russia was cleared of active counter-revolutionary armies.

The Political Structure of the R.S.F.S.R.

Meanwhile the Bolsheviks had profoundly altered the political life of Russia. In the summer of 1918 a new constitution, adopted by the fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, established the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). Russia became a federal State in which all power belongs to the workers "united in

urban and rural Soviets." The new republic was declared to be "a free Socialist society of the working people of Russia."

Under this constitution, which has since been amended from time to time, the right to participate in the government is given to citizens of both sexes who are eighteen years of age, provided they are productive workers, the housekeepers of productive workers, or soldiers or sailors. Numerous classes are deprived of the right to vote or be voted for: (1) persons who employ hired labor for their own profit; (2) persons who have an income from some other source than their own labor; (3) private merchants, trade and commercial brokers; (4) monks and clergy of all denominations; (5) employees and agents of the former Tsarist police, gendarmerie, or secret service; (6) members of the former reigning family; (7) criminals, lunatics, and those under guardianship. It has been estimated that approximately eight per cent of the adult population in the villages and a slightly higher percentage in the towns and cities is excluded from the franchise by these restrictions.

Local government is entrusted to rural and urban soviets. In villages the peasants, together with the home workers and local teachers and doctors, meet and elect the deputies of the local soviet, usually one deputy for every one hundred inhabitants. No peasant who hires more than two laborers for profit is permitted to vote. In cities deputies are elected to the urban soviet from the factories and shops according to the different types of industry. Representation is in general by vocation, people of different employments voting separately, the ironworkers in one group, the miners in another, the soldiers in another, and so on. Where factories are large, the workers of a single factory elect their own deputies. Smaller factories in the same industry are combined for purposes of voting, and other small occupational groups are united in a similar way. Housewives and independent handicraftsmen meet ordinarily by districts. Voting in these local elections is by show of hands rather than by secret written ballot. Urban soviets usually contain one deputy for every one thousand inhabitants.

All representation above the village and city soviets is indirect.[1]

[1] See diagram on p. 460.

Village (*selo*) soviets send delegates to district (*volost*) congresses of soviets; all the district congresses in a county send delegates to a county (*uyezd*) congress; and all the county congresses in a region send delegates to a regional (*oblast*) congress. All the district congresses in a province send delegates likewise to a provincial (*gubernia*) congress. The city soviets send delegates to sit with those from the rural districts in both the regional and provincial congresses. The latter correspond roughly to state legislatures in the United States.

Supreme power in the R.S.F.S.R. resides theoretically in the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, composed of representatives chosen directly by the urban soviets in the ratio of one for every 25,000 voters, and by the provincial congresses in the ratio of one for every 125,000 inhabitants. Under certain circumstances the delegates to represent the rural population may be chosen by county or regional congresses instead of provincial congresses, but the ratio remains the same. Obviously a discrepancy in regard to representation is made in favor of the urban centers, where Communism has its greatest strength. The All-Russian Congress was originally supposed to meet twice yearly, but since 1921 it has held only annual sessions. Its principal function is to elect the All-Russian Central Executive Committee which is in theory responsible to it.

This Central Executive Committee, however, is in fact "the supreme legislative, executive and controlling organ of the R.S.F.S.R." (Art. 31). It convokes the All-Russian Congress and appoints the Council of People's Commissars, which is "entrusted with the general management of the affairs of the R.S.F.S.R." (Art. 37). The Council of Commissars is a small group of about seventeen members which resembles the ministry in a parliamentary State. It has authority to issue decrees and to take the necessary measures to secure prompt and orderly administration, but its action is subject to annulment or approval by the Central Executive Committee.Though the latter meets only four times yearly, it has a presidium, or collegial presiding board, which has great power and which controls the commissars between sessions of the Executive Committee.

The Establishment of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics

For a time, after the November Revolution of 1917, it appeared that Russia might be reduced in size to a territory little larger than that ruled by Ivan the Terrible in the sixteenth century. By the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk she had been compelled to renounce her sovereignty over a great strip of territory in the west—Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland—and over the whole of the Ukraine in the south. In the Transcaucasus her rule had been repudiated by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, which had established themselves as independent States. In September, 1918, all Siberia had been organized under an anti-Bolshevik directorate at Omsk.

Nevertheless, with the exception of Poland and the new Baltic republics which the Soviet government definitively recognized as independent in 1920, all of these apparently lost territories were regained. The reintegration of the Ukraine and the Transcaucasus was achieved by bringing into existence in those States governments organized on the soviet model which, while nominally independent, entered into close relations with the R.S.F.S.R. and eventually united with it. Their political transformation was accomplished by Bolshevik propaganda, intrigue, and military assistance. After the collapse of the "White" movements of Denikin and Wrangel, a Ukrainian soviet republic was established (for the third time); and after the Polish defeat in 1920, a Russo-Ukrainian treaty defined relations between these two soviet republics. During 1920 Azerbaijan and Armenia transformed themselves into soviet republics. Early in the following year an uprising was instigated against the government of Georgia and Soviet troops entered the country to aid the revolutionists. The result was a Georgian soviet republic. In 1922 under the direction of Moscow the three soviet States—Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia—established the Transcaucasian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, which, though nominally independent, was in close alliance with the R.S.F.S.R.

Meanwhile, during 1919–20 the "Red" armies had succeeded in

capturing Omsk, Tomsk, and Irkutsk, and all the territory west of Lake Baikal was incorporated into the R.S.F.S.R. The region to the east of Lake Baikal, however, remained independent and in 1920 was established as the Far Eastern Republic with its capital at Chita. This State was at first not soviet in its political organization, but Bolshevik propaganda became active within its territory and after the evacuation of Japanese troops in 1922 Soviet influence grew strong. Finally in November of that year a constituent assembly of the Far Eastern Republic declared its absorption into the R.S.F.S.R. Russia's control once more extended to the Pacific.

During the years of civil war and reintegration, the constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. had been modified to meet expanding territory and new needs. Now, December, 1922, conditions were deemed propitious for taking a further step. The conglomeration of soviet States, hitherto held loosely together by treaty ties and otherwise, was transformed into a definite union. Upon the suggestion of the government of the R.S.F.S.R., the other nominally independent republics were led to propose such a move. Following their proposals, Stalin, general secretary of the Communist party, drew up a report on unification in which he pointed out the economic, diplomatic, and nationalistic advantages which would accrue to all the States from such a union.

On December 27, 1922, the tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in the R.S.F.S.R. declared in favor of a "Union of Socialist Soviet Republics" on the basis of the principle of equality and free consent. It accordingly appointed a delegation to collaborate with delegations from the other members of the proposed federation in the drafting of the terms of union. Three days later a declaration of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (U.S.S.R.) and a treaty of union [2] were signed in Moscow, the latter being in reality the Federal Constitution of the Union which it established. During the following months the treaty was ratified by the constituent States and became effective on July 6, 1923.

[2] Found in M. W. Graham, *New Governments of Eastern Europe*, pp. 608–14.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF U.S.S.R.



Political Structure of R.S.F.S.R.-Typical of Component Republics

The U.S.S.R. is a federation of seven republics—the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, the Transcaucasian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, the White Russian Socialist Soviet Republic, the Uzbekistan Socialist Soviet Republic, the Turkmenistan Socialist Soviet Republic and the Tadjikistan Socialist Soviet Republic—which vary in size and population from the first with its 97,000,000 inhabitants to the last with less than one million. Each of these component republics of the Union has a political structure which parallels that of the R.S.F.S.R.

The political machinery of the U.S.S.R. likewise resembles that of the R.S.F.S.R.[3] It has a Union Congress of Soviets, composed of representatives of urban soviets in the proportion of one delegate for every 25,000 electors, and of representatives of the provincial congresses of soviets on the basis of one delegate for every 125,000 inhabitants. The Union Congress numbers about 1,500 members, and meets for about a week once in two years to decide general policies. There is also a Union Central Executive Committee and a Union Council of Commissars. Meetings of the Union Congress and of the Central Executive Committee are held in rotation at the capitals of the various republics.

The Union Central Executive Committee is a bicameral body composed of a Soviet of the Union (about 400 members) representing the republics in proportion to population and a Soviet of Nationalities (about 130 members) representing some thirty or forty ethnic units of the Union on the basis of approximate equality. Members of each part of this Union Central Executive Committee are appointed or confirmed by the Union Congress, and they enjoy the same rights and privileges. They coöperate in the drafting of legislation and administrative ordinances, and in the exercise of political control in the Union; and they have a joint presidium of twenty-one members which, between sessions of the Union Congress or Central Executive Committee, acts as the supreme authority.

The Soviet of Nationalities was created to reflect the needs and consciousness of the innumerable ethnic units within the Union, each of which is encouraged to preserve its own language, culture,

[3] See diagram, p. 460.

and customs. It has been characterized as a "unique institutional creation of the soviet union," as "without question one of the most far-reaching experiments ever undertaken by any civilized government in attempting to solve the problem of the peaceful coexistence of many different cultural and ethnic groups." [4] It is so constructed that it may easily be expanded to include other and different ethnic groups which may later be sovietized. Part of the function of this body is to deal with the cultural status and treatment of the various nationalities of the Union, and it has established a special institute for the study of nationality problems.

The Union Council of Commissars consists of a president, a vice president, the chairman of the Supreme Economic Council; and the commissars for foreign affairs, war and marine, foreign trade, ways and communications, posts and telegraphs, workers' and peasants' inspection, labor, food, and finance. The first five commissars have sole jurisdiction throughout the Union, and similar commissariats in the constituent republics were abolished. The other commissars have to do with matters in which the Union and the constituent republics have concurrent jurisdiction. Since, however, the administrative ordinances of the Union usually prevail, the Union has practically a monopoly of political power except as to local government.

As a matter of fact the powers of the Union government are most extensive. They include the right to represent the Union abroad, to alter existing frontiers, to admit new members into the Union, to declare war and conclude peace, to float foreign loans, to ratify international treaties, to organize the armed forces, to control domestic and foreign trade, to regulate transport, posts, and telegraphs, and to enter into concessionary agreements. The elaboration of systems of taxation, of currency and credit, of weights and measures; legislation on emigration and settlement, labor, civil rights of foreigners, and general amnesty; the prescription of general principles of land distribution and of the exploitation of land, minerals, forests, and waterways; the establishment of fundamental labor legislation, of general principles of public in-

[4] M. W. Graham, *New Governments of Eastern Europe*, p. 159.

struction, of general measures for the protection of public health; all fall within its province.

Finally, the Union government has the right to abrogate any decisions of the congresses of soviets, of central executive committees, and of councils of the people's commissars in the constituent republics, which infringe the Treaty of Union. The latter is the supreme law of the land. The federal character of the Union, therefore, is extremely limited, one Russian scholar asserting that the component republics retain merely the right to legislate on social insurance, public health, education, minor courts, and agriculture except for land distribution.

The soviet system of government as found in the separate republics and in the Union has three distinguishing characteristics. For one thing, representation is on a vocational rather than a geographical basis. The Bolsheviks assert that the essential bond between men is not geographical propinquity but common economic interests. They are adherents to the economic interpretation of history, and believe that a person's occupation does and should control his attitude on questions of public policy. In this respect the soviet system resembles the corporative system introduced into Italy by Mussolini, but with this important contrast, that in Russia only the workers participate in the government while in Italy capital is also given a place.

A second characteristic of the soviet system is the extensive use of indirect representation and the great distance which separates the voters from the supreme seat of authority. In the United States the voters for all practical purposes elect directly the President and Congress. In Russia the peasants, who constitute perhaps eighty per cent of the people, are five steps removed from the Union Council of Commissars, and the urban proletariat are four. Thus, although in theory the workers control the government of Russia, actually the mechanics of the system operate to free the higher authorities almost entirely from popular control. In the third place, there is in the soviet system a complete lack of separation of powers. The same set of agencies is used to perform all the functions of government—legislative, executive, and administrative.

The Rôle of the Communist Party

Behind this formal machinery of the Soviet government and so interwoven into its fabric that it is not always easy to disentangle the two is the political organization of the Bolsheviks, the Communist party, which is the real power in Russia, although it is itself not mentioned in the constitution. "Without instructions from the Central Committee of our Party," once declared Lenin, "not one State institution in our Republic can decide a single question of importance as regards matters of policy and organization."

Higher offices in the government and in the party are largely interlocking, a situation which is made more easy of accomplishment by the pyramidal system of indirect representation which provides an opportunity for gradually sifting out the non-Communists. In the village soviets by far the majority of the members are non-Communists. But as the scale of governing bodies is ascended the proportion of Communist members progressively increases until, in the presidium and Council of Commissars, it becomes 100 per cent. This control of the higher offices is made possible largely because of the close organization of the Communist party and the political activity of its members.

The party membership is organized in the first place into some 38,000 local "cells" which exist in villages, factories, and sometimes in city districts. These "cells" send representatives to the annual congress of the party, which in turn elects a central committee of about sixty members. This committee, together with representatives of two other committees, constitutes a plenum which then elects a political bureau of nine to direct the policy of the party, an organizing bureau to control official appointments, and a control commission whose duty is to purify the party of undesirables. The plenum also selects the general secretary of the party, which is the highest position in the organization.

This high degree of centralization largely compensates for the relatively small number of active Communists. Out of a population of approximately 140,000,000 in the U.S.S.R., few more than a million are included in the Communist party. But these

members are subjected to a rigorous discipline. They are bound by the decisions of the party and may be expelled from the organization for failure to accept them. They are expected to be active in the trade unions and other organizations. In every soviet their aim must be to organize the Communist members into efficient, disciplined groups for the purpose of winning control by the election of Communist members to the higher positions. Candidates for membership are required to pass through a probationary period before admission. The Communist party, therefore, is "a carefully selected body of active workers with a definite goal, who are willing to make great sacrifices for its success and who are bound together by a centralized discipline."

Aside from the Communist party no others are permitted. Voters must declare themselves as either Communists or "non-party." As in Italy under Fascism, so in Russia under Communism all opposition is suppressed. Freedom of speech and of the press has been abolished. Even "movies" are subject to government censorship. Although the "Cheka" was formally abolished in 1922 a State political department was created to take its place. This new organization of espionage is usually referred to by its initials as the "G.P.U.," and according to some the only difference between it and the "Cheka" is in the change of letters. Opposition is still crushed from time to time by arbitrary imprisonment, exile to Siberia, or death.

Like Fascism, too, Communism has its youth organizations. For the purpose of perpetuating the enthusiasm and sacrificial quality of the older Communists who suffered exile or imprisonment for their principles, the "Pioneers" and the "League of Communist Youth" have been created. The former admits those from ten to sixteen years of age, the latter, those from sixteen to twenty-three. They are said to have over two million members.

Early Economic Experiments

Far more revolutionary than the changes introduced into the political system were those made in the economic life of Russia by the Bolsheviks during the first three years of their régime. The

fundamental concept of their economic thought—prevention of the exploitation of the workers by the capitalists and landlords—demanded the nationalization of all land, forests, and minerals, together with all means of production, transportation, trade, banking, and insurance. These would then belong to the State, and under the soviet system the workers constituted the State. All profits which formerly went to landlords and capitalists would accrue to the State—in other words, to the workers. The surplus products of both peasants and proletariat would be turned over to State agencies from which each would in return secure those commodities which he needed; that is to say, money and wages would be abolished, and the State would take all output and in turn reward each according to his needs. In greatly simplified form, this was the economic system envisaged by the Bolshevik leaders.

Immediately after the November Revolution the Soviet government proclaimed nationalization of the land, and as a preliminary step in industry decreed the establishment of "workers' control" over industrial production and distribution. This meant that factories and the like should hereafter be managed by committees elected by the workmen in the enterprises. Former proprietors and managers might be permitted to remain but they must hereafter follow the directions of the workers' committees. This many, of course, refused to do.

It had been the original intention of the Bolshevik leaders to nationalize only large industrial establishments at first, and then only after they had been concentrated in trusts. This plan for gradual and systematic nationalization broke down almost immediately. Instead, there began a haphazard and punitive nationalization of all sorts of industries. Sometimes they were nationalized because the management had closed down production and thrown the workers out of employment, at other times because the proprietors refused to submit to "workers' control." Sometimes the step was taken because some authority—municipal, provincial, or national—considered that a particular establishment was fit for nationalization. By June, 1918, approximately five hundred industrial enterprises had been added to the twenty-seven already

nationalized before the Revolution. Nearly half of those taken over were in the mining, metallurgical, metal, or chemical industries.

The effect of this procedure upon Russia's economic life, already profoundly shaken by the World War and the internal political upheaval, was disastrous. The workers were prepared neither by education nor by training to take over the responsibilities of management. The efficient conduct of the factories, the procuring of regular supplies of raw materials, and the distribution of the finished products were beyond their ability. Usually wages were increased and the working day shortened. There was little effort at coördination; each factory was run by its own committee independently of all others. Industrial chaos naturally ensued.

Because of the collapse of industry, an attempt was made in June, 1918, to escape further haphazard nationalization and to develop a system of industrial administration under centralized control. A decree was issued nationalizing all industry, excepting only very small establishments. The number of plants taken over was thus increased by the end of 1920 to 37,000. At the same time a supreme economic council was given the function of controlling and coördinating all industry. It was to see that all factories were supplied with necessary raw materials, fuel, and machinery, as well as the money and food needed for their workers. As might have been expected under the circumstances, the Economic Council proved altogether unable to accomplish so gigantic a task.

Industrial production fell off alarmingly. The Communist party appealed to all members to throw into industry the same energy they had concentrated upon the Revolution. The government itself took steps designed to increase output. The working day was lengthened; piecework was restored; premiums were offered for production above a minimum. In order to overcome the desertion of the workers, labor was even made compulsory through "militarization" —but all in vain. Production in 1920 as compared with that in 1913 was: oil, 47 per cent; coal, 30 per cent; pig iron, 6 per cent; steel, 4 per cent. The mining of metals practically ceased, declining to less than 2 per cent. In other industries it was much the same, production falling to 40 per cent in raw cotton, 25 per cent in

thread, 33 per cent in woolen yarn, 30 per cent in paper and pulp, 15 per cent in sugar. At the same time costs of production everywhere rose because of increased demands of the workers, scarcity of raw materials, and uneconomical management.

Nevertheless, the scope of nationalization was gradually extended. All agencies of trade, domestic and foreign, together with the merchant marine, were taken over. Banks were nationalized, and their total assets confiscated. Then followed the confiscation of all coins and banks notes, of platinum and gold in bulk or in bullion. Even precious stones and articles made of gold, silver, and platinum, above a certain low minimum per person, were seized by the authorities.

Still, despite such measures, the Soviet government was continually confronted with fiscal difficulties. The national currency had been somewhat inflated before the Bolsheviks came into power, but the inflation was as nothing compared with what followed. During the period of conflict with the "White" armies a large part of the national budget was covered by the issue of paper currency. Furthermore, the government was accused of deliberately ruining the currency in the hope of getting rid of both money and wages. The total amount in circulation by July, 1921, has been estimated at about 2,344 billion roubles. Obviously, as in Germany, such inflation of currency caused a rapid depreciation in its value so that the rouble, although it never went so low as the German mark, fell far enough to become practically worthless.

Meanwhile the government had become involved in a struggle with the peasants. In accordance with the Bolshevik economic plan, as briefly outlined above, the Soviet government in May, 1918, established a food dictatorship, and ordered every peasant to turn over to the State all grain above a certain minimum needed for seed and for the consumption of his family. This at once encountered the opposition of the peasants, who either failed to understand or refused to adopt the rôle which had been assigned to them in the Bolshevik economic scheme. The government's decree "nationalizing" the land had been interpreted by them to mean permission to seize and divide among themselves the great estates of the Crown,

the Church, and the landlords which they had so long coveted. This, through the agency of land committees, they had proceeded to do, with the result that 96.5 per cent of all land in Russia came into their possession. But that the decree could affect the land which they themselves held, that it could compel them to surrender all their surplus produce, they refused to admit.

Under certain circumstances they might have accepted the Bolshevik plan. If in return for the grain which they surrendered to the State they could have received an equivalent value in the manufactured goods which they needed for their farms and their homes, they might have acquiesced. But this was impossible, both because of the cutting-off of the import of manufactured goods from abroad and because of the demoralization of Russian industries at home. When at times the peasants did succeed in obtaining manufactured articles, they discovered that their cost was far out of proportion to the price at which the government reckoned their grain. In the great majority of cases, however, the peasants were required to accept in lieu of the goods which they needed paper currency which depreciated so rapidly as to be of little value. The peasants, therefore, refused to surrender their grain.

But the obtaining of grain was absolutely necessary for the Bolshevik scheme, for the Soviet government had adopted a system of rationing the urban population, and had assumed the obligation of feeding the industrial workers.[5] In order to facilitate the collection of grain, therefore, the government instituted in the villages committees of the poorer peasants to superintend the process, believing that this class would see that the richer peasants were forced to disgorge. This step caused a class struggle within the villages, but contributed very little to increase the amount of grain secured. The committees were abolished at the close of 1918.

The next step in the campaign to obtain grain was the organization of a "Food Army." Groups of town workers and soldiers, armed

[5] Under the Soviet rationing system the population was divided into classes, and rations differed according to the status of the individual. Those engaged in physical labor received more than the intellectual workers, and the latter in turn received more than those who did no useful work. Many of the last died of starvation during the cold winters.

with machine guns and rifles, marched on the villages to force the peasants to surrender their allotments. The government made efforts to assess the various districts according to statistical data, but too often the latter were ignored and the peasants despoiled even of the minimum which was supposed to be left them. By this method considerable quantities of grain were obtained, but the peasants were antagonized. Numerous peasant revolts occurred.

The most effective counter measure taken by the peasants was passive resistance. They determined to raise only enough grain for themselves. If their surplus was to be taken from them without compensation, there should be no surplus. The area under cultivation in 1920 decreased by about 29 per cent from what it had been in 1913. The smaller area sown, the decrease in available fertilizers and in effective agricultural tools, and an exceptionally dry season in 1920–21 combined to bring a tremendous reduction in available food supplies. The harvest in 1921 amounted to only 42 per cent of the average harvest in the four years preceding the war. A severe famine resulted.

Russia had experienced famines before, but since the introduction of the railway system the government had been able to transfer produce from those parts of Russia where there was plenty to those parts where there was need, and thus the famine-stricken areas had been relieved. But in 1921 the grain shortage was more general. Furthermore, the railway system had become demoralized as a result of the wear and tear of the World War and the civil war which followed and as a result of the industrial demoralization and the cutting-off of foreign trade which prevented the replacement of worn-out rails, engines, and cars. A great part of the normal trackage was almost entirely out of use. The movement of available grain was, therefore, very difficult, and the famine in some districts of the country was the most acute ever experienced in Russia. Appeals were made for foreign aid, and systems of relief were organized by some forty different foreign agencies. Naturally, in the circumstances, the government's system of rationing the urban workers broke down.

The first large-scale communist experiment in history was headed

for disaster. The industrial workers had failed to produce the manufactured goods needed by the peasants. The peasants, failing to obtain tangible goods in exchange for their grain, had curtailed their planting. This had contributed to produce a shortage of grain, and the government was now unable to provide adequate food supplies for the industrial proletariat. And unless the urban workers were supplied with food, they would certainly turn against the government, for hunger is ever a powerful provocative of revolution. Outbreaks had already begun to occur not only among the peasants but even among the proletariat, whose sympathy the government was beginning to lose. Cries of "Down with the Soviet Government!" began to be heard in workmen's meetings and demonstrations. In March, 1921, revolt occurred even in Kronstadt among the sailors who had long been regarded as "the makers and defenders of the Revolution." They now joined in the demand for free trade for the peasants. Pure communism was doomed.

The New Economic Policy

In the spring of 1921 the Bolsheviks thus faced the possibility of losing their political power as a consequence of having antagonized the great body of peasants. They had made practically no headway in their efforts to win this class to their economic scheme, and so were forced to conclude that it was "easier to change their policy than to change the peasants." Economic concessions would be made in order to avoid making political concessions. They decided that, while retaining complete control of the administration of the government, the means of transport, large-scale industry, and foreign trade, they would make a number of minor concessions in other phases of economic life. They began their economic retreat by inaugurating a "New Economic Policy" (Nep).

Perhaps the most important feature of this Nep was the abandonment of the system of requisitioning grain from the peasants, and the substitution of a fixed tax in kind which, after the introduction of a stabilized currency in 1924, gave way to a tax in money. The new tax was based theoretically on the peasant's ability to pay. The more he produced, the more he would pay in taxes,

but whatever he produced over and above the amount of his tax was his to retain or to dispose of freely in the open market. The incentive to increased production of grain, which had been destroyed by the communistic scheme, was thus restored and there at once followed a gradual increase in the area under cultivation. By 1926 the area sown to grain was practically the same as in 1913.

Existing conditions of land ownership were stabilized. Although the Soviet government continued to insist that the State was the sole owner of the land and that the peasants were merely tenants, actually it left the latter undisturbed so long as they personally used the land which was in their possession. The right of usage and the right to dispose of all products became so unrestricted that for all practical purposes the land belonged to the peasants. They now paid taxes in much the same way as American farmers, but because of the nominal nationalization of the land they were prevented from using it as security for borrowing and were thus likewise prevented from losing it by mortgage foreclosures.

In 1925 the Nep was extended to permit the renting of land for limited periods of time and the employment of a certain number of wage laborers. Some of the richer, more enterprising peasants (the "kulaks") at once benefited by renting land to increase their holdings and by farming intensively with hired labor. As the years passed, therefore, just as before the Revolution some peasants added to their wealth, while others became impoverished and sought employment once more as hired agricultural laborers. The growing divergence among the various classes of peasants was recognized by the Soviet government in 1928 when it fashioned its land tax system so that the poorest peasants (about 35 per cent) were released from all land taxes, the middle peasants (abut 53 per cent) were subjected to a lighter tax, while the amount exacted from the kulaks (about 12 per cent) was somewhat increased.

To compete with the kulaks the government encouraged the development of extensive coöperative farming among the poorer peasants. Over 45,000 such collective farms were established, embracing more than 500,000 individual peasant holdings. The government also began a program of socializing agriculture; that is, it

began to develop State-owned farms where with hired labor, expert management, and modern farm implements the raising of grain would be organized on the basis of large-scale production. The Soviet project called for the taking up of 12,500,000 acres for these farms. In 1928 plowing was begun on ten State farms with a total area of 380,000 acres, and plans were laid for adding 3,750,000 acres more in 1929. The government intended to expend $12,000-000,000 in agricultural development by 1933. To assist in the development of the project agricultural experts were brought in from abroad for consultation and large contracts for necessary farm machinery were given to foreign companies.

In industry the Nep brought the denationalization of small establishments. Factories and shops employing fifteen or fewer workers constituted two-thirds of the total number which had been nationalized but employed only six per cent of the workers. Their administration had been a constant source of embarrassment to the Soviet government. A decree of March, 1921, provided that all establishments employing fewer than twenty workers might be restored to private capital. Most of them were now taken over by former owners, coöperators, or syndicates of workmen; few remained on the government's hands. In 1926–27 the total output of small industrial plants was valued at 1,209,000,000 roubles; but of this amount, goods to the value of only 28,000,000 roubles were produced in State-owned establishments.

With the exception of small factories and shops, however, the State still reserved to itself the monopoly of industrial production, though it later introduced the principle of sweeping decentralization. Industries were organized into large independent units or "trusts," each with its board of managers acting as trustee of the State. These trusts were given freedom to dispose of their products and to obtain their raw materials and fuel in the open market, subject only to prices fixed by the State and to the obligation of preferred service to the State. By 1926–27 the State industries had practically reached the pre-war standards of output—in quantity, at least. In the fall of 1928 the Soviet government adopted a plan which called for the expenditure during the succeeding five years of $7,800,000,000 in

industrial development, $1,550,000,000 in electrification, and $4,800,000,000 in the development of transportation. Early in 1929 contracts calling for technical assistance were made with a number of foreign firms.

One great handicap to the industrial revival of Russia was the lack of liquid capital, and in order to overcome this, the Soviet government offered to foreign capitalists concessions for mining, manufacturing, transportation, trade, and agricultural activity. Such concessions rested upon contracts running for a limited time and really constituted exceptions to Soviet legislation. By them foreigners were permitted to do in Russia what was by law forbidden to private persons. Such contracts usually provided that the State had the first right to purchase the products of the concern, but that any surplus over and above the requirements of the State, might be exported.

Before the war more than 2,000,000,000 roubles of foreign capital had been invested in Russia's industries, all of which had been confiscated or "nationalized" by the Bolsheviks. In order to reassure foreign capitalists the government now stipulated that capital invested by a concessionaire would not be subject to nationalization, confiscation, or sequestration unless so provided in the contract. By the close of the year 1928 about a hundred foreign companies again held concessions in Russia. That the State still retained its control of large industries, however, is evident from the figures for the output of this type of establishment in 1926–27. Of goods valued at 6,652,000,000 roubles, only 9.3 per cent came from other than State-owned industries.

The need for foreign capital continued to be urgent and in September, 1928, the Soviet government announced that it would seek concessionaires for the mining of non-ferrous metals, for the development of the metal industry, for the paper, cellulose, and motor industries, for the manufacture of artificial silk, and for the production of tanning materials. It sought also concessionaires for the construction and operation of public utilities in some sixty of Russia's largest cities. Finally, in order to attract concessionaires to districts not yet industrially developed, it announced its readiness to grant especially favorable terms to "pioneering" works.

To summarize, then, the New Economic Policy continued production by the State in the large and middle-sized industrial plants, but restored agricultural and small industrial establishments to private enterprise, though subjecting them to a degree of State control.

The introduction of the Nep altered not only the status of industry but that of trade unions as well. During the early years of the Communist experiment the latter were looked upon as fundamental organs of the State, and their work was intended to strengthen the State. The interests of the Communist party and of the trade unions were said to be identical, and trade unions were called upon to adopt Communist policies. Workers were considered to have not the right but the duty to join a union. Trade-union membership dues were taken out of the wages of the workmen, and membership became practically compulsory, increasing from 693,278 in 1917 to 8,418,362 four years later. In the unions the Communists gradually gained a preponderance of power and controlled over 82 per cent of the delegates to the Fourth Congress of Trade Unions in January, 1921.

By the Revolution the bourgeoisie had been dispossessed, the means of production and distribution had become State property, and the workers had become their own employers. Strikes against the workers' State were therefore considered to be contradictory to common sense and rejected as a weapon of the trade unions. In fact, it came to be considered as a counter-revolutionary act to strike, for under the proletarian régime trade unions were considered not as instruments of destruction but as constructive bodies with a positive rôle in the framework of the State. In recognition of this fact they were given large government subsidies, for the revenue from members' contributions covered only a small fraction of trade-union expenditures.

In 1922, however, the Soviet government adopted a new policy for trade unions, the chief features of which were voluntary membership, individual payment of contributions, financial independence, decentralization, and administrative reorganization. Henceforth trade unions received no government subsidies, and had no further part in the management of industrial undertakings. Their chief

function was declared to be the protection of the workers' interests through collective agreements for the regulation of wages and conditions of labor. The unions became a party in joint conciliation boards which were established by law; and they like the employers had to submit to official arbitration organized by the commissariat of labor. Although strikes were henceforth recognized by the government, they might be declared only after recourse to arbitration. Most disputes came to be settled by the latter method. Although such disputes have usually resulted in compromise, frequently the demands of the workers have been refused. In 1927 there were twenty-three All-Russian unions [6] whose membership of approximately 10,000,000 included over 90 per cent of the workers of the U.S.S.R.

In the realm of commerce, foreign trade remained fundamentally a State monopoly while domestic trade was made theoretically free. Russia's foreign trade came to be carried on by the State through a number of organizations to which it gave the right to conduct export and import operations within prescribed limits under its own control. Thus foreign trade, while regulated by the commissar of trade, was intrusted so far as the actual business was concerned, to a number of organizations and societies. Domestic trade was opened to private capital but was subject to taxation and, as it revived, to more and more State regulation. Private trade developed so rapidly that the government, beginning in 1924, began to exert great pressure against it in favor of State and coöperative agencies, with the result that the "Nep-men" were to a large extent forced out of business.

The railroads, the arteries of trade, were gradually reconditioned and equipped with much new rolling stock. Regular service was introduced on the principal lines and some new lines were constructed. Since 1923–24, despite extensive increases in the wages of their 863,000 employees, the railroads have returned a profit to the State.

[6] The following branches of employment were covered: agriculture and forestry, paper, mines, wood, leather, metallurgy, printing, food and drink trades, sugar, building and public works, textiles, chemical industry, clothing, water transport, rail transport, local transport, postal and telegraphic service, fine arts, education, public health, soviet and commercial administrations, municipal employees, hotels and restaurants. International Labor Organization, *The Trade Union Movement in Soviet Russia*, p. 104.

One of the chief tasks of the Soviet government under the Nep was the organization of the State's finances and the stabilization of the national currency. The reëstablishment of banking and credit operations began with the opening of a State bank in November, 1921. This was followed after 1924 by the opening of other banks —municipal, agricultural, coöperative, savings—throughout the Union. On August 1, 1928, the State Bank, with some five hundred branches, had assets of more than four billion roubles. In October, 1921, insurance of private property was instituted as a State monopoly and in 1924 life insurance was restored. A new currency was introduced (the *chervonetz*), a gold reserve was accumulated, and in 1924 the new currency was stabilized on a gold basis.[7] Money wages were once more paid and the system of governmental rationing of the cities abandoned. A capitalistic system of taxation was inaugurated and eventually a balanced national budget obtained.

Russia's economic life, as a consequence of the introduction of the Nep, thus came to present a strange picture of intermingled State socialism, State capitalism, and private capitalism. Nevertheless, under it that economic life has come to be almost fully restored; some branches indeed have even risen above pre-war levels. Because of the decline in the amount of agricultural produce available for export, however, the foreign trade of the U.S.S.R. has not yet reached half of the pre-war total.[8]

[7] In the spring of 1929 Russian currency was being quoted considerably below par value on European exchanges.

[8] The gradual recovery of Russia's foreign trade after the introduction of the Nep is revealed by the following table which gives the figures in millions of roubles based on pre-war prices.

Year	*Exports*	*Imports*
1920	1.4	29.3
1921	20.2	210.0
1922	81.6	269.9
1923	205.8	144.0
1924	311.0	228.1
1924–25	370.8	421.8
1925–26	476.5	466.9
1926–27	566.5	505.5

Bank for Russian Trade Review (London), July, 1928, p. 7.

Despite the introduction of the Nep, however, the securing of an adequate supply of grain has constituted one of the gravest problems of the Soviet government in recent years. All peasants continued to suffer from the great discrepancy between the price of grain which was regulated by the government to conform with world conditions and the price of manufactured goods which was arbitrarily set by the government monopoly. Whereas the former in 1928 was only 50 per cent above the price in 1913, the latter was from 300 to 400 per cent higher. The kulaks, accordingly, were often inclined to hold back their grain in the hope of higher prices. In the spring of 1928 grain reports foreshadowed an economic crisis but, despite the government's resort to measures which were reminiscent of the days before the Nep, the attempt to extract adequate supplies of grain from the richer peasants failed. The year saw the reappearance of bread lines and ration cards in the larger cities, and the complete cessation of grain export. A campaign to increase the area of fall planting brought instead a 10 per cent decrease from the preceding year.

In December, 1928, the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. enacted a law to regulate the division and utilization of land and adopted a five year plan to raise agricultural productivity by 30 to 35 per cent. The new land regulations were expressly designed to deprive the kulaks of their economic power. The renting of land to kulaks was forbidden; all transactions—such as sale, mortgage, gift, or exchange—which conflicted with the principle of nationalization of the land were declared null and void, and made punishable by law; the division and utilization of the land were entrusted to the local soviets, from the election of which the kulaks were excluded; in the division of land priority was to be given to collective farms, to poor peasants, and to middle peasants in the order named; finally, State credit was to be extended to the poor and middle peasants for the purchase of machinery, seed, and fertilizer. Although great effort was made to increase the spring sowing of wheat, the area under cultivation in 1929 again fell below the pre-war acreage. At the same time Rykov, president of the Council of People's Commissars, stated that the new collective and

State farms could not add appreciably to the quantity of food available in the near future. The early months of 1929 saw the continued rationing of grain and the distribution of food cards in the larger cities.

Meanwhile, unrest and dissatisfaction began to spread among the peasants once more. According to the Communist newspaper *Pravda*, the peasants in June were demanding secret voting at soviet elections, the abolition of the discrepancy in favor of the urban workingmen in the matter of franchise, and the institution of proportional representation of the peasants in the soviets. In the economic sphere they were demanding a free grain market, the abolition of artificial grain prices, and the abandonment of the program of collective farming, which they regarded as a return to serfdom. Communist leaders admitted that the growing activity of the peasants again constituted a political danger to the Soviet government.

Education and Religion

Not unrelated to the economic life of Russia is the attitude of the Soviet government toward public education. Upon the schools the Bolsheviks are relying for two important achievements. By them must be prepared the well trained, skilled technicians who are expected to assume in the economic and administrative life of the Union the places left vacant by the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. In this sense there is in Russia a "race between education and catastrophe." Then, as Lenin pointed out, the Bolshevik economic scheme is not possible without "an intellectual revolution." From this point of view the Bolsheviks are looking to the schools to produce a generation which shall be thoroughly versed in and loyal to the Communist ideal.

Just how these aims shall be accomplished the Bolsheviks are not yet sure, so that today the Soviet Union constitutes a great laboratory for educational experiments. On one thing they are determined, however, that the illiteracy of the Tsarist period shall be wiped out, that no more generations of Russian children shall grow up in ignorance. It has been estimated that in the opening years of the present century the percentage of the population in school in Russia was only one-

eighth of that in the United States. This the Soviet government would alter. Under the old régime the higher schools and in many places the secondary schools were closed to the workers and peasants. This, too, the Soviet government would change. In the old days education was for the privileged classes only; henceforth it must be for the masses. Where discriminations have to be made they must favor the children of the proletariat and peasants rather than those of the bourgeoisie. Frequently the children of the latter have been excluded from the schools and universities because of the lack of necessary facilities for the education of all.

In general the Soviet educational system is as yet a program rather than a reality, a program which calls for free, obligatory, and universal education between the ages of three and sixteen, and for the right of every Russian citizen to a higher education. Financial bankruptcy, civil wars, famine, and economic disorganization all contributed to prevent much progress until after 1921. Only with the inauguration of the Nep was there a beginning of real constructive efforts. By 1925–26 elementary education had been extended about as widely as in 1914. Secondary, vocational, professional, and higher education had become much more widely extended. In comparison with 1914 general elementary and secondary enrollments showed an increase of 30 per cent, elementary and secondary vocational education an increase of more than 100 per cent, and universities and professional schools an increase of nearly 50 per cent. The school system had been secularized and "communized" to the extent that nothing contrary to Communist principles might be taught. An ambitious program for the rapid expansion of education during the next decade had been mapped out, with the purpose of wiping out illiteracy by 1933, but its realization must await the necessary funds to carry it through.

Control over education is localized in the republics which compose the U.S.S.R. somewhat as it is in the forty-eight states of the United States. Within each republic the programs and policies are drawn up by the central authority, while the securing of funds and the adapting of policies to local conditions is the concern of the local authorities. This results in great contrasts in educational facilities.

In one place there may be an experimental school so fine that there is nothing "comparable to it elsewhere in the world"; in another, a dilapidated building without blackboards or books, with worn-out benches and poorly paid teachers. It has been estimated that only about half of the children of school age can be accommodated in the existing schools.

Perhaps, relatively, greater strides have been made in educational work among the minority populations of Russia than in the Union as a whole. There are in the Union some forty different nationalities. Under the Tsarist régime most of them had no schools, and many of them no written language. Through the aid of anthropologists and linguistic scholars all the different languages have been reduced to written forms. The Soviet government has provided textbooks in these local languages and has introduced at least the beginnings of a school system in these scattered districts.

With the Communist party officially atheistic and believing that religion is an "opiate of the people," it is not surprising that the position of the Orthodox Church in Russia was profoundly altered by the Soviet government. All lands belonging to the Church or to monastic institutions were at once nationalized, and it was decreed that no ecclesiastical or religious association had the right to possess property. All Church buildings became the property of the State. Many were transformed into schools or clubrooms, and some of the most famous cathedrals were turned into national museums. In general, however, buildings needed specifically for purposes of worship were turned over to associations of twenty or more persons for use free of charge. As in France in 1905, the Soviet government refused to deal with the Church hierarchy.

The Church was separated from the State, and government subsidies which had formerly amounted to millions of roubles were abolished. The Church was forced to depend henceforth, as in the United States, upon the voluntary contributions of its adherents. Public religious processions were forbidden, and the old Church calendar—thirteen days behind that in use in the Western world—was abolished in favor of the latter. The Church was deprived of its control of marriage and divorce, registration of births and deaths,

and cemeteries. The control of all these was confided to the civil government.

The schools were separated from the Church, and it was originally decreed that Christian churches might not give organized religious instruction to minors under eighteen years of age. No religious instruction was permitted in any public or private school. The government later decreed, however, that children in groups of three or less might receive religious instruction, provided it was given outside the schools and churches. Although the influence of the government was thus thrown against religion, attendance at religious services was unrestricted and among the great mass of the people continued as before. In spite of government decrees, among the peasants the church still remained the center of village life, looking after the religious instruction of the children and carrying out marriage, christening, and burial services.

In the beginning the Soviet government proclaimed that "the liberty of religious as well as anti-religious propaganda is guaranteed to all citizens." Protestant churches were thus accorded greater freedom than they had had before the Revolution. Some of them—particularly the Baptists, Methodists, and Lutherans—took advantage of the new situation to extend their activities and entered upon programs of social and educational work among young people. According to estimates of Soviet officials 20,000,000 Russians were won over to Protestant churches by January, 1929. The Orthodox Church, stimulated by this vigorous competition, likewise embarked upon a program of social welfare work.

By 1929 Communist leaders, who desired to have a monopoly of the training of Russian youth, became alarmed. In April the Soviet government promulgated a new code for the regulation of religious institutions. Many features of the former code were continued but a number of new ones were added. Particularly significant was the clause which read: "Activity of all religious units shall be confined to the exercise of religion, and they shall not be permitted any economic or cultural function which exceeds the limits of their ministry to the spiritual needs of Soviet citizens." A later decree altered the constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. by deleting the phrases hitherto grant-

ing liberty of religious propaganda. Atheism was practically made a State dogma, for to the atheists was granted a monopoly of the right to teach their beliefs. Believers in religion might still hold any creed, but they were deprived of the right to propagate their views. In May the commissariat for education was instructed to organize a special inspectorate to superintend the enforcement of these new laws. In the following month Communist leaders, speaking at the congress of the Anti-God Society in Moscow, urged the necessity of intensifying the work of the society on the ground that the fight against religion was also a fight against counter-revolution.

Soviet Foreign Policy

For the sake of convenience and clarity the history of Soviet Russia's foreign policy will be discussed in relation to the four different aims which seem to have predominated in successive periods since 1917. In the first three years after the November Revolution, while Russia was an outlaw among the nations of the world, the dominant aim of the Soviet government was to bring about the overthrow of all capitalist governments. These were the years when the Bolsheviks were introducing Communism into Russia and at the same time struggling to defend themselves against the onslaughts of counter-revolutionists, "White" armies, and foreign intervention. During this period the Bolshevik leaders were far from confident of their ability to retain control in Russia. To them a world proletarian revolution which should everywhere supplant capitalism by a Communist régime seemed absolutely essential to their own continuance in power.

In these circumstances the Bolshevik authorities looked upon themselves as the leaders of the revolutionary hosts which were to emancipate the workers of the world through the destruction of the existing bourgeois régime. Russia was but their temporary base of operations, to be superseded as soon as possible by some more highly industrialized country. But for the time being and for their immediate purpose, it constituted an excellent base for introducing Communist propaganda into western Europe, the Middle East, India, and the Far East. The Soviet government's foreign policy during these early

years, therefore, may be characterized as primarily that of revolutionary propaganda.

During the first year of the Soviet régime, the Bolshevik leaders hoped that with their active propaganda and assistance the Communist group in other States might succeed in converting the existing Socialist and Labor parties of Europe into actual Communist organizations. If this were accomplished the Second International [9] would then become an agency for revolutionary activities. But when in one country after another the Communists proved not only too weak to encompass the downfall of capitalism but too weak even to gain control of the existing Socialist and Labor parties, the Bolshevik leaders determined to create a new International of their own.

In March, 1919, therefore, was founded under the leadership of Zinoviev, one of Lenin's associates in the November Revolution, the Third or Communist International (*Comintern*). This new organization was designed (1) to carry on an international propaganda of Bolshevik ideas, (2) to unite and strengthen the Communist parties in all countries, (3) to win the leadership of all labor and socialist movements, and (4) "to accelerate the development of events towards world revolution." Once the revolution had been accomplished, the Third International was to direct the future efforts of the working classes. For the present it constituted the "Headquarters for the world army of the proletariat," and was liberally subsidized by the Soviet government.

Sometimes through its own officials, but more often through the instrumentality of the Third International, the Soviet government during its first years attempted to launch anti-capitalist offensives in various countries of Europe. It played a part in the Communist uprisings in Germany in 1918 and 1919, in the establishment of the Bela Kun régime in Hungary (1919), in the communistic experiments in Italy (1920), and in spasmódic outbreaks in some of the

[9] The "First International," officially the "International Working Man's Association," was organized in 1864 under the influence of Karl Marx to advance the rights of labor in all countries. As a result of the reaction against Socialism in Europe a decade later, it fell to pieces about 1874. With the gradual revival of Socialism came in 1889 the founding of the "Second International," with which the various Socialist and Labor parties of the world soon became affiliated. The World War temporarily put a stop to its activities.

Baltic republics. Its efforts to establish strong connections with the workers of Great Britain, France, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, however, proved futile.

Meanwhile the Soviet government sought to win the good will and coöperation of the various peoples of Asia in the hope that under Russia's leadership they might be converted to Communism and a gigantic coalition created against Western capitalism. It at once announced that its relations with the Asiatic States were to be on the basis of perfect equality, and proceeded to take steps to surrender all privileges, capitulations, extraterritorial rights, and concessions. It denounced the Anglo-Russian agreements of 1907, by which Persia had been divided into spheres of influence; and recognized the sovereignty of Afghanistan, with which it opened diplomatic relations. Not long after the signing of the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, it signed with the Turkish government a treaty renouncing all rights under the capitulations as well as all claims for Turkish debts. A few months later it took a similar step in the Far East when it surrendered all special privileges in China, including even its right to receive payments on account of the Boxer Indemnity of 1900.

Nevertheless, despite all efforts of the Soviet government and of the Third International, the world proletarian revolution failed to materialize. On the contrary, the capitalist régime abroad seemed to become ever more "stabilized." At home, after three years of almost constant fighting against the forces of counter revolution, the Bolsheviks found themselves at last in complete control, but in control of a Russia which, because of their Communist experiments, was fast sinking into economic chaos. The New Economic Policy which Lenin thereupon decided to inaugurate has already been discussed.

This change in economic policy at home was accompained by a change in the Soviet government's policy abroad. In order to rescue Russia from its complete industrial and commercial collapse, there was need not only for the partial abandonment of Communism within the country but for the influx of capital, machinery, and experts from abroad. But these could hardly be obtained so long as

Russia remained isolated among the nations. Early in 1918 the diplomatic representatives of all the powers had been withdrawn because of Bolshevik policies, and little progress had since been made toward the reëstablishment of normal diplomatic relations. Until the opening of the year 1921 the only States which had recognized the Soviet government were the Baltic republics—Finland, Latvia, Esthonia, and Lithuania—which had signed treaties with the Soviet government defining their own frontiers. But obviously none of these could be of material assistance in the economic rehabilitation of Russia, and as a matter of fact no trade agreements had immediately resulted.

While not abandoning completely its purpose of undermining the capitalist governments by Communist propaganda, the predominant aim of the Soviet government now came to be the opening of trade relations with foreign countries as a means of hastening Russia's economic revival. At the same time it chanced that there was developing within the European countries, anxious to rebuild the world's commercial structure, a sentiment in favor of reviving trade relations with a country which in pre-war days had been such an essential factor in Europe's economic system.

The first country to enter into trade relations with Russia was Great Britain, which had been passing through a severe economic depression and hoped thus to hasten its own commercial and industrial revival. A provisional trade agreement between Russia and Great Britain was signed on March 16, 1921.[10] By the end of the year the Soviet government had succeeded in obtaining similar agreements with Germany, Norway, Austria, and Italy. And these carried with them recognition, at least *de facto*, of the Soviet government.

But one serious obstacle in the way of Russia's complete reestablishment of diplomatic and commercial relations with other countries was the Soviet government's repudiation of all Russia's foreign debts. With the introduction of the Nep in 1921, however, the Bolsheviks realized their great need of capital from abroad, and as one phase of their new policy they assumed a different atti-

[10] See pp. 379–80.

tude toward the repudiated debts. Late in October, 1921, Chicherin, Soviet commissar for foreign affairs, dispatched a note to the powers in which he asserted that, though the Soviet government was neither legally nor morally bound by the debts of the former régime, it was willing to consider what could be done toward meeting foreign claims. He proposed that an international congress should be held for the purpose of recognizing the Soviet government, devising some means of bringing about Russia's economic revival, and considering the problem of repudiated debts.

Although the proposal was rather coldly received, Lloyd George persuaded the Allied Supreme Council to invite Russia to a general European conference at Genoa. Apparently to prepare the way for its favorable reception at this conference the Soviet government in February, 1922, formally abolished the "Cheka," and in March dispatched a note to the British, French, and Italian governments attempting to prove that its recent legislation had altered conditions in Russia so that they now conformed with the essential requirements of trade on the Western basis of private enterprise.

In April, 1922, the Genoa Conference opened with representatives of thirty-four States in attendance, all of Russia's creditors being present except the United States. After a number of weeks of negotiation, however, the conference finally broke down because the demands and counter demands were so far apart as to prevent an agreement. The creditor powers insisted (1) that the Soviet government should recognize the debts which had been repudiated, (2) that it should compensate foreigners for property in Russia which had been nationalized, and (3) that it should establish a juridical system which would protect all contracts, commercial and otherwise. The Soviet representatives, on the other hand, demanded (1) complete cancellation of Russia's war debt, (2) the granting to the Soviet government of extensive credits, and (3) a moratorium on the payment of such foreign debts as it agreed to recognize. Although the negotiations were later resumed at The Hague, no agreement was reached, the only immediate gain for the Soviet government being the fact that it had at least won the *de facto* recognition of Europe.

During the negotiations at Genoa, however, Russia was able to conclude with Germany the Treaty of Rapallo,[11] which constituted the greatest diplomatic achievement of the Soviet government up to this time. It not only thus secured *de jure* recognition by a great power, but, in Germany's agreement to relinquish all claims for debts and damages, it likewise secured recognition of its general contention at Genoa. The Treaty of Rapallo was soon followed by an important commercial and industrial agreement with Germany, and other trade agreements were negotiated with Czechoslovakia and Denmark.

Nevertheless, Russia made little real progress toward regaining her former place in the States system of Europe. Six years after the November Revolution, she was still largely an outlaw nation. Her government was recognized *de jure* in Europe by only Poland, Germany, and the Baltic republics, and elsewhere in the world by only Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan. The Soviet government became increasingly anxious to remedy this situation.

By 1924 the dominant and openly declared aim of its foreign policy became *de jure* recognition. It let it be known that it was prepared to conclude a commercial treaty on especially favorable terms with the first great power to grant it such recognition. The Italian government decided to take advantage of this offer, and in January, 1924, negotiations were opened in Rome. Arrangements were made for formal recognition to be extended to the Soviet government on February 3. Meanwhile a political shift had occurred in Great Britain as a result of the parliamentary elections of December, 1923, and on February 1 Ramsay MacDonald, head of the new Labor government in that country, telegraphed unconditional *de jure* recognition of the Soviet government. Italian recognition came officially six days later.

These diplomatic successes of the Soviet government apparently induced a number of lesser States to follow the example of Great Britain and Italy. In the following months the U.S.S.R. received the *de jure* recognition of Norway (February 15), Austria (February 25), Greece (March 8), Sweden (March 15), Hedjaz (March

[11] See p. 340.

30), China (May 31), Denmark (June 18), Mexico (August 4), and Hungary (September 18).

Meanwhile, in France as in Great Britain a political shift had occurred as a result of which the government had come into control of the parties of the Left, which were favorable to recognition of the Soviet régime. On October 28, 1924, Herriot's government added France's name to the list of those which had granted *de jure* recognition. The French government took care, however, to safeguard both its own interests and those of the new republics which had been carved out of former Russian territory. It specifically declared that the Soviet government was recognized *de jure* only "as the Government of the territories of the old Russian Empire where its authority is accepted by the inhabitants, and in those territories as the successor of the former Russian Governments." At the close of the year Russia had been recognized by fifteen European States as compared with only six at its beginning, and every European great power had reëstablished diplomatic relations with it.

But the following year saw a temporary check in the success of the Soviet government's foreign policy. The commercial treaty which had been concluded with Great Britain in 1924 was never ratified by the Conservative government which came in under Stanley Baldwin. Nor was French recognition followed by a trade agreement with that country. Furthermore, the year saw the successful conclusion of the Locarno negotiations, which were looked upon in Moscow as a blow at Russia's international position. Apparently the great power with which Russia had been most intimately linked was being drawn away from her Eastern orientation into an all-Western bloc of capitalist powers which Russia suspected Great Britain of attempting to organize against her.

From the close of the year 1925 the chief aim of the Soviet government's foreign policy became the creation of a protective barrier of States which could not be drawn into any concerted action against Russia. As the first step in this new policy it signed with Turkey in December, 1925, a treaty in which each agreed not to attack the other and to remain neutral in the event of the other's being attacked by any third power or group of powers. Each agreed

further not to participate in any alliance or agreement—political, financial, or economic—directed against the other. This was the first of the treaties of nonaggression and neutrality which the Soviet government continued to conclude in the following years.

The Soviet government had hoped to influence Germany to reject the Locarno Treaties, but in this it was unsuccessful. It next sought to negotiate with Germany a treaty similar to that already concluded with Turkey. In April, 1926, such a treaty was finally signed in Berlin.[12] Each power agreed to remain neutral in case the other were attacked without provocation. Each agreed not to participate in an economic or financial boycott instituted against the other. Furthermore, the German government was led to interpret its duties under the League Covenant in such a way that it was free from obligation to participate in any move against Russia in case it did not agree that Russia was the aggressor. Other treaties of neutrality and nonaggression were concluded with Afghanistan in August and Lithuania in September of the same year.

Although not a member of the League of Nations, which the Soviet government professed to believe an organization of capitalist States conspiring against Russia, the latter in 1927 began to take a more friendly attitude toward the League. It accepted an invitation to participate in the International Economic Conference which met in Geneva in May, 1927, and took an active part in the meetings of the League's Preparatory Disarmament Conference in 1928 and 1929. In the former year it proposed the abolition of all armies, navies, and conscription. Later in 1928 the Soviet government accepted an invitation extended by France to adhere to the Paris Pact outlawing war. It thus became associated with most of the States of the world in a nonaggression pact which brought it into general agreement with the principles of Locarno and the League Covenant.

Nevertheless, from time to time after 1921 there still appeared evidences of the continued desire to bring about a world proletarian revolution and the downfall of the capitalist régime. In 1923 Communist revolts were encouraged in Germany and in Bulgaria, and extensive anti-British propaganda was carried on in Asia. In 1924

[12] See p. 345.

the political activity of the Soviet trade delegation in Berlin provoked a German police raid and led to the temporary suspension of Russo-German economic relations. In the same year Communist uprisings were instigated in Esthonia, while similar efforts in Latvia and Finland were frustrated only by the vigorous preventive measures of the governments of those States. In the following year the Communists of Bulgaria were again encouraged to revolt.

During the strike in Great Britain in 1926 large subsidies were offered the miners in the hope of converting the strike into a Communist movement; and in the same year the Soviet ambassador in Paris antagonized the French government by issuing a manifesto calling upon all workers to revolt against capitalist governments. During these years extensive assistance was given to the rising Nationalist movement in China in the hope not only that it might be successful in that country but that it might be won to Communism and turned against Western capitalism. Continued anti-British propaganda both in Asia and within the British Empire led in May, 1927, to the Arcos raid and Great Britain's subsequent severing of diplomatic relations. [13]

It would thus appear that during these years there were conflicts between those policies of the Soviet government which were dictated by the desire to advance Russia's national welfare and Bolshevik propaganda dedicated to the object of world revolution. Frequently the latter embarrassed the former, as in Great Britain in 1927. The cause of this apparent inconsistency in Russia's foreign policy is found in the division within the ranks of the Bolsheviks—some desiring to consider Russia's interests first, others seeking only to use Russia primarily as an agent for bringing about world revolution. The former, at the head of the Soviet government, have attempted to disclaim all responsibility for foreign propaganda and have placed the blame upon the Third International, which they have asserted is in no way connected with the Russian government. But, since behind both the Soviet government and the Third International there stands the Russian Communist party as the supreme authority, it would appear that the two are

[13] See p. 394.

not so distinctly separated as the Bolsheviks would have foreign governments believe.

A survey of the results of the Soviet foreign policy reveals that all efforts to provoke a world proletarian revolution failed, that even those Asiatic States which were willing to accept Russia's aid in the years of their national weakness rejected Communism once they were strengthened and victorious. On the other hand, those objects which were sought in conformity with the established policy and methods of the capitalist régime were partially secured. An extensive system of trade agreements was built up, the most conspicuous instances of failure being in the cases of Great Britain,[14] France, and the United States. *De jure* recognition was eventually obtained from most of the States of the world with the exception of the United States. The latter has remained the most implacable enemy of the Bolshevik régime, declaring that it would never recognize the Soviet government until the latter observed "the fundamental conditions of international intercourse" and abandoned "the persistent attempt to subvert the institution of democracy as maintained in this country and others."

Conflicts within the Communist Party

The apparent contradiction in the aims and purposes of Russia's foreign policy in recent years is symptomatic of the conflict which has been going on within the ranks of the Russian Communist party. So long as Lenin was able to take an active part in the direction of Russian affairs, this conflict was held in abeyance. As chairman of the Political Bureau of the party he was able to dictate the policies which should be adopted, and his prestige and influence were of such magnitude that his policies found ready acceptance among his followers. But after illness had removed him from active participation in Russian affairs early in 1922, and especially after his death in January, 1924, the differences between the two groups of Communists grew more pronounced, and became the basis of the

[14] In October, 1929, it appeared that the Labor government in Great Britain was about to make a new trade agreement with Russia.

struggle to determine who would assume Lenin's position as head of the Communist party.

Prominent among those who became involved in the struggle over policies and power were: Trotsky, the first commissar for foreign affairs and later organizer of the "Red" army, a brilliant revolutionary leader, orator, and writer, the one looked upon by most foreigners as the logical successor of Lenin; Zinoviev, the organizer and head of the Communist or Third International, enthusiastic in his plans to carry out the international propaganda of Bolshevik ideas in order to achieve the world proletarian revolution; Dzerzhinsky, a descendant of Polish-Lithuanian nobility, the organizer and head of the "Cheka," skilled agitator and organizer of strikes who had twice suffered exile to Siberia under the Tsarist régime; Stalin, the son of a Georgian peasant, a stalwart of the Bolshevik "Old Guard" who had frequently suffered imprisonment and exile for his beliefs, former editor of the Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda*, characterized by Lenin as "too cruel" and "too brutal" and as having concentrated too much power in his hands as general secretary of the Communist party; Rykov, who as a young man had early come under Lenin's influence and had repeatedly suffered imprisonment and exile in his service, Lenin's private secretary, at one time head of the Supreme Economic Council, the successor of Lenin as president of the Council of People's Commissars; Kamenev, a former law student under President Millerand in France, now vice president of the Union Council of People's Commissars and chairman of the Council for Labor and Defense, suspected by Lenin of not being 100 per cent Bolshevik; Bukharin, an ardent supporter of Lenin, characterized as "the evangelist of Bolshevism" who from the words of his master had created "the gospel of Communism," yet considered by Lenin as having "stuffed his head too full of books." Within this small group there developed a powerful triumvirate composed of Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, the political genius of the group being Stalin. From this inner circle Trotsky was excluded, for he had joined the party only in 1917 and was looked upon as a newcomer by the "Old Guard," who consistently sought to discredit him.

Lenin's death at once precipitated a conflict within the Communist party over policies. It has been said that Marx was the Communists' "Old Testament" and Lenin their "New Testament." The question which now became paramount was how to interpret and apply this "New Testament." The factions which developed within the party both claimed to be true disciples of "Leninism." In the struggle which ensued, it was the party congress which became the final arbiter in the matter of interpreting and applying the doctrines taught by Lenin.

Late in 1924 the conflict began with a clash in the party congress between a group led by the triumvirate, and another led by Trotsky. The latter was defeated. Early in 1925 he was dismissed as commissar for war and removed from the Council of Labor and Defense, and his active adherents were expelled from the army and navy. Following a temporary sojourn in the Caucasus "for his health," Trotsky returned to Moscow to assume a minor position in the Soviet government.

Meanwhile the members of the triumvirate began to quarrel among themselves. Stalin was alarmed by the continued unrest among the peasants and advocated further concessions to win their support. He favored an extension of the Nep which had been inaugurated in 1921, and advocated additional measures to attract foreign capital. Such concessions and measures were vigorously opposed by both Zinoviev and Kamenev. In the Communist party congress in 1925 Stalin, supported by Rykov, Dzerzhinsky, and Bukharin, succeeded in winning the support of the majority, and Zinoviev and Kamenev were ordered to discontinue their opposition. As they had humiliated Trotsky in the preceding year, so they themselves were now humiliated. Kamenev was demoted to the position of deputy member of the Political Bureau and was removed from office as vice president of the Council of People's Commissars and as chairman of the Council of Labor and Defense.

Nevertheless, during 1926 the opposition to Stalin continued. Trotsky joined forces with Zinoviev and Kamenev in an attempt to oust Stalin and his group from control of the Communist party. But again the Stalin group won out. In October the Trotsky-

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A joint meeting, on March 30, 1929, of the Union Council of People's Commissars, the All-Russian Council of People's Commissars, and the pesidiums of the Union Central Executive Committee and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, to honor M. I. Kalinin upon the completion of his ten years as president of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. (Kalinin is seated at the head of the table, to the reader's right.)

Zinoviev opposition was ordered to submit to the party discipline or withdraw from the organization. During the summer Kamenev had been ousted as commissar for trade and Zinoviev as head of the Political Bureau. Following the party congress, Trotsky and Kamenev were both removed from the Political Bureau, and Zinoviev was obliged to give way to Bukharin as head of the Third International.

In the following year the opposition once more began its attacks upon Stalin's policies, both foreign and domestic. For a time they were given a certain degree of toleration, being permitted to state their views in the official press. Then suddenly, to the accompaniment of widespread terrorist activities on the part of the G.P.U., the Stalin group took up the fight. Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and some fourscore of their associates were expelled from the Communist party. In January they were sent into exile. A few months later Zinoviev and Kamenev recanted and promised to give up their opposition. In June, 1928, they and a number of their followers were reinstated in the party.

Meanwhile Trotsky from his place of exile in Turkestan continued his opposition. The Soviet government seemed to be unable to bring about his complete isolation and through secret channels he was able to carry on his propaganda both at home and abroad. During the winter of 1928–29 his influence with the urban workers, whose cause he had championed as against the peasants, resulted in spasmodic agitation in the factories in his behalf. In January, 1929, wholesale arrests of members of the Trotsky faction were made in Moscow in an endeavor once more to crush the opposition. Finally, in February, on the ground that Trotsky was still carrying on illegal propaganda against the government in the factories and among the peasants, and on the ground that this action could "no longer be distinguished from the activities of the 'White Guards,' " the government decided to expel him from the Union. Had it not been for the danger of creating a martyr to Trotskyism, it is possible he might have been executed. In February he took up his residence in Turkey. In April the All-Union Conference of the Communist party once more approved Stalin's leadership.

The outcome of the struggle within the Russian Communist party is of far-reaching importance not only in respect to economic policies within the U.S.S.R. but in respect to Russia's relations with the other powers of the world. The Stalin group believes that the capitalist régime outside of Russia has become stabilized and that it is not likely to be overturned in the immediate future; the Trotsky opposition still clings to the hope of a world revolution "in our time." The former would cater to the interests of the peasants on the ground that their support is necessary for the success of the great Bolshevik economic experiment; the latter would emphasize the interests of the urban workers as being paramount in a proletarian State. The group in control maintains that Russia's welfare demands the assistance of foreign capital; the opposition denounces such a policy as treason to the Communist ideal. Briefly, the policies of the Stalin group are in the direction of stabilization; those of the opposition, in the direction of revolution. But more important things than these hang on the outcome of the struggle, for upon the unity and discipline of the Russian Communist party depends the continuance of the present Soviet régime in Russia.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE PROBLEMS OF RUSSIA'S BORDERLANDS

STRETCHING across Europe from the Arctic Ocean on the north to the Black Sea on the south, effectively cutting off the great Soviet republic from direct contact with the countries of the West, lie the six States which comprise Russia's borderlands.[1] These States resemble one another not only in their proximity to Russia but in the fact that the present territory of each was carved wholly or in part from pre-war Russia as a result of the Revolutions of 1917.

Five of the States were newly created at the beginning of the post-war period, and each consequently faced the problem of establishing its government and building up its national economic structure; the sixth, while not under the necessity of creating all things new, found its situation so altered by the vast enlargement of its territory that its political and economic tasks differed only in a matter of degree. Each of these States contained within its new frontiers the racial minorities of other nations to complicate its already difficult situation; each as an agricultural country was confronted with the problem of agrarian reform.

The Baltic Republics

The four States which constitute the northern half of Russia's borderlands and whose establishment deprived the Soviet republic of nearly all of its Baltic seacoast are Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—the Baltic republics. The northernmost, the largest, and probably the strongest of the four is Finland, a country nearly two-thirds the size of France, lying just east of the Scandinavian peninsula and extending from the Baltic to the Arctic Ocean.

[1] The term is used in this chapter to designate the European States bordering upon Russia.

When this region—a grand duchy—was taken from Sweden by Alexander I early in the nineteenth century, the Russian Tsar became its grand duke. Technically the union between Finland and Russia was purely personal. The Tsar at that time promised to preserve Finland's local government and rights, but after the accession of Nicholas II (1894) the promise was ignored or only in part carried out. During the twentieth century a deliberate attempt was made to "Russify" the Finnish people.

The latter, however, succeeded in preserving their own individuality, and reached a high level of literacy with a superior type of culture. They were thrifty and capable, and their educational and economic standards were far above those of the Russians. The Finns were therefore quick to seize upon the deposition of the Tsar in 1917 as an opportunity for severing their union with Russia, arguing that since Finland had no relation to the empire but only to the Tsar personally, the overthrow of the Romanov dynasty automatically liberated them. In December, 1917, Finland formally declared her independence, and within a few weeks received the recognition of Soviet Russia, Sweden, France, Germany, Norway, and Denmark.

For a time it appeared that Finland, like Russia, might become a soviet republic. A radical wing of the Finnish Social Democrats attempted to introduce the soviet régime and was actively assisted with Russian soldiers, arms, and munitions. Early in 1918 "Red Guards" gained control of Helsingfors, the capital, and all southern Finland. A class war ensued. The bourgeois and landowning classes took up arms to resist, and organized "White" armies under Baron Mannerheim, a Swedish Finn who had been a cavalry commander in the Russian army. Foreign aid was sought by these "Whites" and in April German troops landed, to be joyously acclaimed by the bourgeoisie as the "liberators" of their country. By the early part of May, 1918, the "Red Guards" had been defeated and expelled from the country.

Then followed a German attempt to bring Finland within the sphere of Teutonic influence. The Diet conferred almost dictatorial power upon a Germanophile senator, and the Senate offered the

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Finnish crown to a brother-in-law of the Kaiser. With the end of the World War, however, the monarchist movement immediately collapsed, and a reaction against things German began. In June, 1919, the Finnish Diet finally decided in favor of a republic and in the following month a republican constitution was adopted. In December, 1920, Finland was admitted to the League of Nations.

The peace treaty which was signed with Soviet Russia at Dorpat on October 14, 1920, ceded to Finland a narrow strip of territory between Murmansk and the eastern frontier of Norway so that the new republic might have an ice-free port at Pechenga. In the treaty negotiations Finland likewise sought the annexation of Eastern Karelia, a district lying outside the frontiers of the old grand duchy but inhabited by people ethnically affiliated with the Finns. The Soviet government refused to permit this enlargement of Finland's territory, however, because the possession of Eastern Karelia was essential to Russia's control of the recently constructed Petrograd-Murmansk railroad. Finland was forced to content herself with the Soviet government's promise to give political, economic, and cultural autonomy to the district.

In the summer of 1921 Finland complained to the Soviet government that it was not carrying out the stipulations of the Treaty of Dorpat regarding Eastern Karelia. A few months later a rebellion against Russia broke out in the district, but was suppressed. After having appealed in vain to the League of Nations, Finland finally asked to have the case referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Russia, however, refused to recognize the court's competence, and the case gave the court an opportunity to hand down an important ruling, namely, that it could not express an opinion in a dispute between a member of the League and a State not a member, without the consent of the latter. Finland therefore was unsuccessful in her efforts to reopen the Karelian question.[2] In the case of the Åland Islands dispute she fared better.[3]

Despite the political and social struggle which accompanied the acquisition of her independence, despite the early need to suppress

[2] Eastern Karelia was later organized into an autonomous socialist soviet republic within the R.S.F.S.R.

[3] See pp. 218–20.

both the Left group with its sovietism and social revolution and the Right group with its monarchical tendencies, Finland has apparently become economically and politically stabilized. The Right has evidently abandoned its desire for monarchy; the Left has given up its thought of Communism. The early breach between the social classes, occasioned by excesses of both "Reds" and "Whites," has been largely healed. Agrarian legislation has paved the way to still further economic progress, for about two-thirds of the population is engaged in agriculture and dairying.

To the south of Finland, along the east shore of the Baltic, lies a territory inhabited chiefly by Esthonians and Letts who, after having been dominated by Danes, Germans, Swedes, and Poles, came in the course of the eighteenth century under the rule of the Romanov dynasty. Until 1819 they were serfs, tilling the soil on the great estates of the German barons, or Balts, the successors of the medieval Teutonic Knights who had originally conquered the territory and established there an "upper crust of Germanic civilization." Although both Esthonians and Letts eventually rose from serfdom to the status of a free peasantry, the greater part of the land remained, until the World War, in the hands of the Balts, who constituted an insignificant fraction of the population. Both peoples were filled with a bitter hostility toward these foreign masters of their soil, as well as toward their political rulers, the Slavs, who sought to "Russify" them.

The Russian provisional government which came into power in March, 1917, immediately recognized the Esthonian desire for self-government. It extended the province of Esthonia to include that section of Livonia which was inhabited by Esthonians, and granted an extensive degree of autonomy. It sanctioned an Esthonian national council which in turn, after the Bolshevik *coup d'état* in Russia, proclaimed the political independence of Esthonia on November 28, 1917. This action led to a "Red" invasion from Russia which early in 1918 produced a bitter civil war among even the Esthonians themselves.

In February advancing German armies put the Bolsheviks to flight and subjected the country to German occupation. This was

highly satisfactory to the Baltic barons, who were as eager as were the Germans to bring this territory under Teutonic control. But all attempts to force an Esthonian representative assembly to elect a Hohenzollern duke were in vain. Finally the Balts, acting in the name of Esthonia, invited the Kaiser to be their ruler, and in April, 1918, William II, through his chancellor, accepted the invitation.

As in Finland, however, the defeat of the Central Powers brought the collapse of monarchical and pro-German plans. The withdrawal of German troops was in turn followed by a second Bolshevik invasion which swept over most of the little country. Two months of severe fighting eventually freed Esthonia of "Red" armies but the war dragged on until an armistice was signed with the Soviet government in December, 1919. This was transformed into the definitive Peace of Dorpat (Tartu) on February 2, 1920. By it Russia recognized the independence of Esthonia, while the latter in turn granted Russia free transit to Esthonian ports. On June 15, 1920, a permanent constitution was adopted establishing Esthonia as an independent "Republic in which the power of the State is in the hands of the people."

Meanwhile the Letts had fared in a somewhat similar way. From 1915 on, most of their territory was occupied by the Germans, who planned to bring it permanently under Teutonic rule. In this they incurred the determined opposition of the Letts and, as elsewhere in the Baltic regions, German influence and control were destroyed by the outcome of the war. On November 18, 1918, Latvian independence was proclaimed and a provisional government established.

The new government, however, was soon confronted with a formidable task, for the Bolshevik armies, repulsed and driven out of Esthonia, began an invasion of Latvia, forced the government to take refuge in Libau, and occupied most of the country. At the same time the Baltic barons seized the opportunity to intrigue with the remaining German forces to overturn the government in order to establish one favorable to their interests. But the Balts' attempts failed, and after a year's struggle the Bolsheviks were finally driven from the country in February, 1920. Six months later Russia by

the Treaty of Riga (August 11) recognized the independence of Latvia. A provisional constitution of June, 1920, gave way in February, 1922, to a permanent form of government which followed rather closely the Esthonian Constitution.

On January 26, 1921, Esthonia and Latvia received the *de jure* recognition of the principal Allied Powers, and in September of the same year both were admitted to the League of Nations. Both countries during their early years had to contend with Communist intrigues and uprisings fostered beyond their frontiers, and both in the end outlawed Communism. Because of the devastation wrought by German and Bolshevik forces and because of the cutting-off of the great Russian hinterland, the economic recovery of both countries was greatly handicapped. In order to hasten it and at the same time remove all need for Russia's plotting against them, both countries sought to foster the transit trade between their ports and Russian territory and provided every facility for Russian commerce.

The close relations between these two republics and the fears which were common to them resulted in their concluding (November 1, 1923) a treaty of defensive alliance. Under its terms the two States agreed to pursue a purely pacific policy toward all nations, to concert together and lend each other mutual political and diplomatic support in their respective international relations, and to give armed assistance to each other in case of unprovoked attack.

The fourth of the Baltic republics is Lithuania, a diminutive reminder and remnant of the once large and powerful grand duchy of the same name. Lithuania was twice "swallowed." In 1386 her grand duke married the Queen of Poland, thus uniting the two States in a personal union. During the seventeenth century the two States were merged under a common government and the Lithuanians to a considerable extent were "Polonized"—the smaller absorbing the larger. When Poland was partitioned at the close of the eighteenth century, that part of the kingdom which had earlier been Lithuania went to Russia, and the population was next subjected to an aggressive campaign of "Russification."

The Lithuanians were so long merged with the Poles that the

idea of their constituting a separate political entity was for a time forgotten. Gradually during the nineteenth century, however, the Lithuanians awoke to a consciousness of their separate nationality, and by 1905 they were demanding autonomy within a Russian federation. During the World War their national sentiment increased. A movement for independence was begun, and Lithuanians living in other lands gave their efforts to a campaign of propaganda to advance the cause. In 1917 Lithuanian representatives in the Russian Duma demanded independence, and in the region under German occupation a council of state in Vilna repeated the demand. National independence was finally and formally proclaimed on February 16, 1918. Powerful German influences, here as elsewhere, succeeded in directing the political current into monarchical channels, and in July a German prince accepted the Lithuanian crown.

The monarchy was but an ephemeral thing, however, and with the defeat of Germany it speedily disappeared. The Council of State chose a triumviral presidency in which Dr. Antanas Smetona was the real executive, and selected a cabinet headed by Professor Augustus Voldemaras. The new Lithuanian State faced a much more difficult situation than did the other Baltic republics. It had to contend not only with the Russian "Reds" to the east but with the aggressive Poles to the south. As elsewhere along the Baltic after the World War, Bolshevik armies were soon advancing into Lithuania, and the government was forced to retire from Vilna to Kovno. A few months of fighting eventually drove the Bolsheviks out of the country, but not until July 12, 1920, was peace actually obtained. In the Treaty of Moscow the Soviet government recognized the independence of Lithuania and defined its boundary with the latter, ceding to it the district of Vilna.

The struggle which immediately ensued with Poland over the possession of this capital of medieval Lithuania has already been discussed.[4] Although the Conference of Ambassadors in March, 1923, confirmed Poland's possession of Vilna, the Lithuanian government continued to claim it on the basis of the Treaty of Moscow. "The act of a sovereign State cannot be set aside by any Council of

[4] See pp. 220–23.

Ambassadors," declared Premier Voldemaras in June, 1928. The Vilna question remained a disturbing irritant constantly inflaming the Lithuanian body politic. It aroused an acute national spirit which manifested itself in a quasi-Fascist movement within the country. It was this movement which was largely responsible for the attack upon Memel in 1923.[5] It was this aroused nationalism which was chiefly responsible for the uncompromising, seemingly obstinate attitude of Lithuania's changing governments toward the Vilna question, for no party apparently dared to bring upon itself the odium of recognizing the definitive loss of that city.

The hold which this affair had on Lithuanian public opinion was revealed in 1926. In that year the Pope created a special diocese in Poland with Vilna as its ecclesiastical center, and in so doing appeared to the Lithuanians to recognize Vilna as legally Polish. The Lithuanian government at once protested and withdrew its representative from the Holy See. Despite the fact that the Lithuanians are strongly Catholic, the government in subsequent elections was supported by the voters. As late as 1928 a new constitution declared Vilna to be the capital of the Lithuanian Republic.

The strong nationalist sentiment in Lithuania resulted in a *coup d'état* in December, 1926. In the elections of the preceding May antipapal feeling because of the Vilna affair had resulted in a decided popular swing to the Left. Since at that time the Lithuanian President was elected by Parliament for the duration of a single Parliament, a new President and a new premier were chosen from the Left parties. During the succeeding months Lithuanian nationalists were disturbed by the new government's concessions to Polish minorities, by its introduction of the spoils system, and by the increasing Communist agitation in the country.

On the night of December 16–17 a group of nationalist army officers, professing to fear a Communist *coup d'état*, suddenly arrested the premier and the cabinet and took over the public buildings. The cabinet was forced to resign, and the President thereupon appointed as premier Professor Augustus Voldemaras, who immediately formed a cabinet from the conservative parties. The President

[5] See pp. 223–24.

himself next resigned and Parliament—with the Left parties absent—elected Dr. Antanas Smetona as his successor. Thus the two men who had been at the head of the government immediately after the armistice in 1918 were once more called to the helm.

During the ensuing months the Voldemaras-Smetona government took vigorous steps to crush Communism by arresting labor agitators, dissolving Socialist organizations, and preventing many public gatherings. Thousands of arrests and the suppression of all opposition were reported. In an attempt to strengthen the government, particularly the executive branch, a new constitution was proclaimed on May 26, 1928. The President, instead of being elected by Parliament for the duration of each Parliament, became elected for seven years by popular vote. The legal term of Parliament was extended from three to five years. Apparently in the interest of greater conservatism, the age for the exercise of the franchise was raised from twenty-one to twenty-four years, and the age of candidates for Parliament to thirty years.

Early in 1929 Lithuanian unrest under the Voldemaras régime became evident when a plot was hatched to force the resignation of the premier. It had the support of the chief of the general staff and even President Smetona himself was reported to have been involved in it. The conspirators desired an immediate settlement of the long-standing dispute with Poland, the repudiation of a recently signed trade treaty with Germany, which they declared made Lithuania almost a German colony, and the return to constitutional government. The plot was discovered, however, and resulted in the proclamation of martial law in the capital on January 31, and the subsequent arrest of the chief of the general staff. That there was still serious opposition to Voldemaras was indicated again on May 6 when an attempt to assassinate the premier resulted in the death of one and the wounding of three others. In September Voldemaras resigned from the premiership, and parliamentary elections were set for October 27.

The governments of the four Baltic republics are very similar. All have democratic republican systems, established under permanent constitutions originally drafted by constituent conventions during the

years 1919–22. All have unicameral legislatures which are elected by universal, direct, and equal suffrage. The legislatures of all are supreme in law-making, no permanent presidential veto being provided in any State, though some have provisions for initiative and referendum. In each republic the ministry is responsible to, and requires the approval of, the legislature. All the States have a multi-party system and therefore more or less ministerial instability.

Each State has a President. In Finland he is chosen by an electoral system similar to that in the United States, in Esthonia and Latvia by the legislature, and in Lithuania by popular vote. Prior to the constitution of 1928, the Lithuanian President also was chosen by the legislature. Esthonians, believing that there is no need for the extra expense incurred by having an impotent titular head, confer the Presidency upon the prime minister for the period of his office. In other words the President and prime minister are one and the same person.

Poland

History, which is frequently said to repeat itself, occasionally has a way of reversing itself. In the closing years of the eighteenth century Poland, partitioned by powerful Romanov, Hohenzollern, and Habsburg monarchs, disappeared as a State from the map of Europe. When in the early part of the twentieth century those same proud dynasties were hurled from their thrones, the three separated portions of the Polish people once more became united and their State again assumed an important position in the political system of Europe. Whether or not it would retain that position, however, depended to a large extent upon its ability to solve the many perplexing problems which confronted it at the close of the World War.

Among the requisites of a State is "a body of people occupying a definite territory and politically organized under one government." In November, 1918, the Polish people were not organized under one government, nor did they occupy a definite territory. How the heroic measures of Joseph Pilsudski and the harmonizing genius of Ignace Paderewski succeeded in bringing the disunited and at first discordant Polish factions together under one common government

has been told.[6] This was achieved by January, 1919, when a diet which was to serve both as a constituent assembly and as a provisional parliament was elected on a democratic suffrage without distinction of sex, language, religion, or race. "The Polish State died as a State of the nobility; it rose again as a State of the people."

But not so easily nor so soon was the question of Poland's territory settled. The "Fourteen Points" had promised the creation of a Poland which should include the territory indisputably inhabited by Poles. But in its previous existence Poland, except along the Carpathians, had unfortunately never been blessed with natural boundaries. Consequently its frontiers had continually shifted in accordance with the weakness or strength of itself or its neighbors, and in certain regions "twilight zones of nationality" had resulted. Most of the Poles in 1919 thought of their State not as a new creation to be limited to the area of ethnographic Poland, but rather as the revival of historic Poland as it existed before the first partition of 1772. Pilsudski and Paderewski, the two men who had succeeded in uniting the Poles under one government, were pertinent reminders of that historic Poland—the first having been born in Lithuania, the second in Ukrainia.

Probably no other post-war territorial settlement in Europe led to so much actual fighting or to such bitter and prolonged controversy as did the definition of Poland's boundaries. The difficulties in connection with the problem of Danzig and the Polish Corridor, the partition of Upper Silesia and Teschen, and the seizure of Vilna have been discussed.[7] The acquisition of eastern Galicia, like that of Vilna, resulted largely from the use of force. Although the inhabitants of western Galicia readily united in the establishment of the Polish Republic at the close of the World War, the Ruthenians who constitute the bulk of the population in eastern Galicia were opposed to such a step. Many desired to unite with their kinsmen in the Ukranian People's Republic, while others organized a national council in Lemberg and sought to establish an independent State.

[6] See pp. 137–138.
[7] See pp. 170–73, 224–26, 194, 220–23.

The Poles refused to recognize Ruthenian self-determination, immediately invaded the region, occupied Lemberg on November 5, 1918, and during 1919 completed their conquest of the province. The peace conference at first planned to give eastern Galicia the right of self-determination, but finally decided in December, 1919, that it should be granted autonomy for twenty-five years under a Polish protectorate, its status after that period to be determined by the League of Nations. Regardless of the peace conference, however, the Poles treated eastern Galicia as part of Poland and eventually in March, 1923, succeeded in having the Conference of Ambassadors settle the questions of Vilna and eastern Galicia by recognizing the *de facto* frontiers of the republic.

Between Russia and Poland the peace conference originally laid down a provisional frontier known as the "Curzon Line" which was in general accord with the ethnographic situation. This, however, was not satisfactory to the Poles, who, despite the Soviet government's desire for peace, undertook a military campaign to regain their frontier of 1772.[8] The treaty which was finally signed with Russia at Riga in March, 1921, gave Poland an eastern boundary, which, except for the territory which had become the new Republic of Lithuania, corresponded roughly with the one she had had just before the Partition of 1795.

The Peace of Riga and the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors to sanction the northern, eastern, and southeastern boundaries (1923) closed the period of acute controversy over Poland's frontiers, although her legal possession of Vilna was not conceded by Lithuania and continued to constitute a disturbing factor in the republic's foreign relations. The frontiers as finally stabilized include a territory four-fifths the size of Germany with nearly 29,000,000 inhabitants, many of whom, unfortunately, are of other nationalities. The frontiers were so drawn that in the first years of the republic, according to one Polish statesman, 75 per cent were "regarded as permanently menaced, 20 per cent insecure and only 5 per cent safe." This largely accounts for Poland's early determina-

[8] See p. 455.

tion to maintain a powerful, well organized military force as "the expression of her will to freedom and the most important means of defending this freedom."

Meanwhile Poland had begun the reorganization of her national life in the hope of establishing a stable and efficient régime. In her efforts she was handicapped, however, by the lack of political experience on the part of most of her leaders, by the diversity of administration in the three formerly separated parts of the country, by the tendency of German and Austrian Poles to consider themselves the superiors of the Russian Poles, and by the great multiplicity of petty political parties which immediately sprang into existence. The early years of the republic were so filled with boundary disputes, military campaigns, and attempts to solve the many economic and administrative problems which necessarily confront a new State that the work of drafting a permanent form of government was delayed. Not until March, 1921, was the Polish Constitution finally adopted. Possibly because of the strong political bond which existed between Poland and France, this constitution bore a strong resemblance to that of the latter country.

Despite the examples of her neighbors to the north, Poland chose to establish a bicameral legislature, both houses being elected directly by universal suffrage with an age requirement of thirty years for electors of the upper house (Senate). Real power in legislation was placed in the lower house (Sejm), which was empowered to pass any measure over the veto of the Senate by a bare eleven-twentieths majority of those voting. As in France, the President was to be elected for a seven-year term by a majority vote of the two legislative houses meeting together as a national assembly. The President was given no power over legislation and in general his authority was greatly limited. All his official acts required the countersignature of some member of the ministry, which in turn was made responsible to the legislature. Apparently out of fear of Pilsudski, the President was deprived of command of the armed forces of the nation in time of war. The Polish Constitution, like the French, might be amended simply by the action of the two houses meeting as a national assembly. Obviously Poland's framework of government was constructed on

a much more conservative basis than that of any of the Baltic republics.

The new constitution, however, was not immediately brought into operation, evidently because the Diet which had drafted it was loath to dissolve or to share its authority with a second house. Twenty months elapsed between the adoption of the constitution and the first parliamentary elections held under it in November, 1922. A score or more of political parties then presented candidates and at least fifteen of them succeeded in obtaining representation in the first Sejm. To Polish nationalists perhaps the most disturbing feature of the election was the fact that parties of various national minorities succeeded in winning 20 per cent of the seats in the lower house.

When, after the election of the Provisional Diet in 1919, Pilsudski had surrendered to it his dictatorial powers, that body had promptly legalized his position by retaining him as Chief of State and head of the army. Now, however, his election as Poland's first President, which to casual observers seemed the next logical move, did not follow. Pilsudski had temporarily forfeited some of his popularity earlier in the year by arbitrarily dismissing a prime minister because the latter's military and diplomatic policy toward Russia was not sufficiently energetic to satisfy him as Chief of State. His action had aroused hostility and suspicion both because it ignored the Diet and because it seemed likely to lead Poland into another disastrous military venture. Pilsudski, therefore, was eliminated as a candidate when, late in November, 1922, the new Parliament was summoned to elect Poland's first President. The Left group, aided by votes of the minorities parties, succeeded in electing their candidate, who, however, was almost immediately assassinated by a reactionary fanatic. His successor, elected on December 20, was Stanislas Wojciechowski, a member of the Populist party and a teacher in the Warsaw Commerce High School.

Poland was now urgently in need of a strong, efficient government to deal with her serious economic and political situation. No other country of Europe had suffered more severely from the war in proportion to its size. The land had been devastated and laid waste by both Germans and Russians, so that a tremendous amount

of material reconstruction needed to be accomplished. At the same time the republic's political, legal, and economic structure—inherited in three pieces—required welding together. The plight of the peasants called for some measure of agrarian reform. Financial reconstruction, budgetary equilibrium, and currency stabilization demanded enlightened and consistent policies. Much had been achieved; much still remained to be done.

But the first Sejm hindered rather than provided efficient and progressive government. The multiplicity of parties produced ministerial instability, for no majority could be found that would consistently support a ministry. Governments changed in personnel and policies at frequent intervals, six ministries following one another within three and a half years. The policy of restricted expenditures, increased taxation, and cessation of inflation for the sake of fiscal reform was for two years prevented because Parliament would not support it. Agrarian reform was sacrificed to the interests of the great landed proprietors, capitalists, and rich peasants.

National politics became a series of crises and personal and party struggles. Many became convinced of the incapacity of Parliament; many began to assert that it did not really represent the desires of the electorate. Demands for new elections were heard on many sides. But Poland's constitution made it impossible for the government to dissolve the legislature and hold new elections without the consent of the Senate, and the latter, reluctant to face a new election, withheld its consent. An obstructive legislature and an obstructive constitution seemed to stand in the way of a strong government, and there were not lacking those to point out that Poland's downfall in the eighteenth century had been due to causes of a similar type.

Meanwhile, the republic's warrior-statesman and "uncrowned king" was becoming restless in his position of retirement. Pilsudski's nature demanded greater activity and his national patriotism was alarmed by the weakness of the government of the State which he had done so much to create. He attempted to influence the course of politics, and was drawn into political and military intrigue. In November, 1925, his demand that the army be taken out of politics resulted in the elimination of many of his personal enemies from

military positions. Emboldened by this success he next requested that he himself be made inspector-general of the army. This the ministry refused to grant.

In the spring of 1926 Parliament, however, finally took hold of this question and passed a law providing for such an inspector-general who should be commander-in-chief of the army in time of war, subordinate to the minister of war, but his principal adviser. The passage of the bill was immediately followed by a shift in the government and the elevation to the premiership of Vincent Witos, a personal enemy of Pilsudski. This, of course, effectively blocked the possibility of Pilsudski's appointment to the recently created position.

Within twenty-four hours Pilsudski and his followers began a march on the capital somewhat in the manner of the Fascist march on Rome. They aimed by an armed demonstration to force the new prime minister from office, but the latter was not at once persuaded. A three days' siege of Warsaw was necessary to convince Witos of the necessity of resigning, but his resignation finally came and with it that of President Wojciechowski. On May 15 a new government was established with Charles Bartel as prime minister, Pilsudski as minister of war, and the other members chiefly professors and technical experts. Two weeks later the National Assembly elected Pilsudski President of Poland, but he declined to accept the office, suggesting instead that Professor Ignace Moszicki, an engineer of undoubted integrity, be elected.

In August the constitution was amended in order to strengthen the executive control of the budget, provide the President with authority to dissolve Parliament with the consent of his cabinet, and give him power within limits to issue ordinances with the force of law. By the use of such presidential decrees steps were at once taken to balance the budget, stabilize the currency, reorganize the Polish Bank, and improve the national credit. When in October, 1926, Bartel proved to be unable to command a parliamentary majority, Pilsudski himself assumed the office of premier, organized a ministry characterized as the "strongest in the history of the Republic," and threatened the Sejm with dissolution if it did not comply with his

wishes. On one occasion, a year later, he even locked the doors against the Sejm and adjourned it *sine die*. Finally, on November 3, 1927, he ordered its dissolution to prevent discussion of the budget.

Four months later elections were held for Poland's second Sejm. Pilsudski entered a government ticket—the "National Coöperative bloc"—and thirty-three other parties entered candidates as well. The premier's bloc won the largest number of seats but, with the great number of parties represented, no one controlled a majority. Pilsudski's inability to dominate the new Sejm became apparent almost at once when Bartel, his favorite for the presidency of the lower house, was defeated by the Socialist candidate. Three months later, after the adjournment of the Sejm, Pilsudski resigned the premiership to Bartel, himself retaining the positions of minister of war and inspector-general of the army. The state of his health and his disgust with the Sejm, which had failed to pass the budget without undesired modifications, were ascribed as the reasons for his action.

Early in February, 1929, the National Coöperative bloc submitted a project for further reform of the constitution with the aim of establishing in effect a presidential dictatorship with a docile legislature.[9] The existing Sejm proved to be not particularly docile, how-

[9] It proposed that the President should be elected by universal suffrage from two candidates, one nominated by the National Assembly, the other by the existing President. The President should be given the right to dissolve Parliament (but only once for the same cause), to veto legislation (but in case of a second vote by a two-thirds majority, he must accept the law or dissolve Parliament), and, during recesses of Parliament, to issue decrees with the force of law (except on matters of taxation and war). The ministry should be appointed by and responsible to the President, and a vote of no confidence should require the preliminary signature of one-sixth of the deputies, the presence of two-thirds, and a majority of three-fifths. In case the President disagreed, he might dissolve Parliament. It proposed that the age requirement of electors of the Sejm should be raised from twenty-one to twenty-four years and that of candidates to thirty years. The Senate should be reorganized. Two-thirds of the members should be elected by universal suffrage, the age requirement being thirty years for electors and forty for candidates. The other third should be appointed by the President. Finally, any deputy who would not fulfill his duty as deputy should be brought before the State Tribunal and deprived of his mandate. Obviously the reform if adopted would convert the Presidency into more or less of a dictatorship.

ever, and a majority drawn from both the Right and the Left vigorously opposed the project. It further asserted itself by impeaching the minister of finance for certain irregularities to which he had resorted in accordance with instructions from the cabinet. Discouraged by the parliamentary situation and by the fact that he had become little more than a messenger to carry back and forth Pilsudski's decisions, Prime Minister Bartel resigned on April 3. Pilsudski, though denouncing the Sejm in vitriolic language, declined to assume the premiership, which finally went to Major Casimir Switalski, a former aide-de-camp to Marshal Pilsudski and associated with a group of soldier-politicians (the "Colonels") who advocate weakening the legislature in favor of the President. Clearly, Poland's political life is still unstable and in a state of flux.

Meanwhile the financial condition of the republic had been greatly strengthened. The reorganization of the fiscal system, long delayed, began in 1924 when the first Sejm was persuaded to confer almost dictatorial powers upon Finance Minister Grabski. As a result, a new currency (*zloty*) was adopted and a Polish bank established. Temporarily the currency was stabilized and the budget balanced, but this success was wiped out in 1925 by a Polish-German tariff war. After Pilsudski's *coup d'état*, recommendations of an American financial commission were adopted which brought again currency stabilization, budget equilibrium, and national credit.

At the same time the general economic life of the country gradually recovered from war destruction and revolutionary disruption. The land was again put under cultivation, and farms were restocked to the pre-war level. Hundreds of thousands of new dwellings and farm buildings were constructed. The railroads, completely demoralized after the war, were rebuilt and greatly extended. Industry was slower in its recovery but in 1927 new post-war records were established in coal, pig-iron, crude steel, and zinc production. To free the republic from complete dependence upon Danzig the construction of a new port was begun in 1925 at Gdynia on Polish territory in the extreme western corner of the Bay of Danzig. By 1929 what had been an obscure fishing hamlet had become a city of 15,000

population with a port capable of handling 2,000,000 tons of freight yearly. Polish plans call for enlarging its capacity to 15,000,000 by 1932.

Rumania

The southernmost of Russia's borderlands, and the only one which existed as an independent political entity before the World War, is the Kingdom of Rumania. Although not strictly speaking a post-war creation like the others, nevertheless war devastation, tremendous territorial increases, sudden enfranchisement of the masses, widespread peasant unrest, bitter agitation among numerous minorities, and fear and uncertainty regarding Soviet Russia brought Rumania problems which differed from those of the other borderlands only in degree.

Rumania's acquisition of territory as a result of the World War surpassed the fondest expectations of her most extreme nationalists. That she might gain territory from either the Habsburgs or the Romanovs if she were fortunate in her choice of sides in the war, was readily conceivable; but that she might in the end gain from both these mighty empires the territory which each had offered her at the expense of the other, it seemed, was utterly foolish to expect. And yet this is precisely what happened. Rumania emerged from the war with her territory practically doubled in extent, her frontiers very nearly attaining those of the province of Dacia to which Trajan sent the Roman colonists from whom the Rumanians love to trace their lineage.

In view of Rumania's joining the Entente Powers in the war, the least expected territorial acquisition was Bessarabia, the district between the river Pruth, the river Dniester, and the Black Sea which Russia had taken from Turkey in 1812. The population was chiefly Rumanian (Moldavian) in 1812, and in spite of a policy of "Russification" the largest element in it—the peasantry—remained Rumanian in 1914. In May, 1917, after the Russian Revolution, a national Moldavian committee in Bessarabia demanded local autonomy within the Russian State and the use of the Rumanian language in the local schools. In August the Ukrainian government at Kiev

recognized Bessarabia as a separate unit. Two months later a supreme council was constituted in Bessarabia, and in December, 1917, this body proclaimed an independent Moldavian republic. In the same month the Rumanian government was requested to send troops into Bessarabia to preserve order and to provide protection against the Bolsheviks. The Rumanian army entered Kishinev in January, 1918.

Three months later, on April 8, the Supreme Council in Bessarabia voted for political union with Rumania with the understanding that the district should retain a large degree of local autonomy. The Soviet government, claiming that this council was not a truly representative body and that it was intimidated by the presence of Rumanian military forces, refused to recognize the legality of this action. In November, after the defeat of the Central Powers, the Supreme Council, with only about a third of its members present, passed a new motion which canceled the conditions regarding local autonomy laid down in April and merged Bessarabia into Greater Rumania. On the next day the council was permanently dissolved.

At the Paris Peace Conference Rumania included Bessarabia among her claims for territory, but the "Big Four" long delayed to take action. Their suggestion that a plebiscite be held to determine the fate of the district was apparently rejected by Bratianu, the Rumanian representative. Not until October 28, 1920, did the principal Allied Powers—France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan—sign a treaty recognizing Rumania's sovereignty over the district, and then they did so only in the face of Russia's protest and warning that she would not recognize the action. The treaty was not ratified by the British and French governments until 1924, and not by the Italian government until 1927.

Meanwhile several attempts had been made to remove the Bessarabian question from the realm of conflict. In 1923 the Soviet government offered to recognize Rumania's possession of the district, provided Rumania would accord *de jure* recognition to the Soviet government, sign a definitive peace, establish economic and political relations with Russia, and agree to the Soviet disarmament program. Rumania declined but on the other hand declared her willingness to surrender all claims for the return of Rumanian money and securities

sent to Moscow for safe-keeping in 1916, if Russia would recognize the cession of Bessarabia. In April, 1924, a conference was arranged in Vienna between representatives of the two governments, but it broke up almost immediately when the Soviet delegate insisted upon a plebiscite in Bessarabia. Six months later, just across the Dniester River from Bessarabia a "Moldavian Soviet Republic" was established—for propaganda purposes, the Rumanian government feared.

Rumania's acquisition of Transylvania, Bukowina, and part of the Banat of Temesvar by the Treaties of St. Germain and Trianon has already been mentioned. In these regions there lived perhaps twice as many Rumanians as in Bessarabia, and they brought to the kingdom a higher culture and a greater political self-consciousness than the latter. The assimilation of all these territories taxed the Rumanian administrative system to the limit and the succeeding years heard many complaints of inefficiency, corruption, and poor government, aggravated by dissatisfaction with economic conditions. In 1923 a new constitution was adopted, based upon the existing one but incorporating into it a recently adopted (1917) law for the election of the Chamber of Deputies by universal suffrage and admitting Jews to citizenship rights.

The addition of so much new territory and the extension of the franchise to some millions who had previously not voted, greatly complicated Rumania's political life. Before the war, under the restricted three-class system of voting then prevailing, fewer than 200,000 Rumanians were entitled to participate in elections. The two important political parties at that time were the Liberals and the Conservatives, and they were accustomed to alternating in control of the government.

This political situation was radically altered by Rumania's new circumstances. The Liberal party, the organ of the industrial, commercial, and banking interests, centralistic, and nationalistic in its opposition to the influx of foreign capital, continued under the domination of the the wealthy and clever John Bratianu. The previously pro-German Conservative party disappeared. Many of its former members were drawn into the new People's party, which was organized by General Averescu after the enactment of the new

franchise law of 1917. The latter's policies seemed to differ little from those of the Liberal party, with which it became accustomed to coöperate. The political power of the peasants and minor nationalities was at once reflected in the organization of many new parties—notably the National party with its strength in Transylvania, and the National Peasant and the Peasant parties with their strength in Bessarabia.

In the first elections held in Greater Rumania in October, 1919, the peasant groups won a large majority, and a coalition government was organized under a Transylvanian leader. The conservative elements of the country at once became alarmed because of proposed expropriation of land and the fear of Bolshevik propaganda. King Ferdinand, who maintained that he had the right to appoint and dismiss his ministers regardless of the parliamentary situation, now dismissed the peasant government and called General Averescu, leader of the People's party, to be prime minister. During the next eight years, despite the undoubted numerical superiority of the peasant electorate, the government was kept almost constantly in the hands of Averescu or Bratianu, leaders of the parties whose chief strength was in the territory of pre-war Rumania. The party in power made and usually won the elections. To make this doubly certain, Bratianu in 1926 forced through Parliament a new electoral law—somewhat on the order of Mussolini's—which conferred a large majority in Parliament on the party securing forty per cent of the votes cast, while depriving of any representation any party which received less than two per cent.

This law probably helped to bring about the fusion (October, 1926) of a number of parties, including the National and Peasant parties, into the National Peasant party under Dr. Julius Maniu, before the war a Transylvanian member of the Hungarian Parliament. This party rather than Bratianu's is really the "liberal" party of Rumania. It adopted a platform advocating such progressive measures as administrative and financial reforms, decentralism, free elections and reforms in franchise, aid to peasant farmers, further land reforms, protection of labor by legislation, development of natural resources, and more friendly relations with foreign capital.

Meanwhile the political situation had been made more complicated when in December, 1925, Crown Prince Carol renounced his right of succession to the Rumanian throne, choosing instead to keep his mistress, Mme. Lupescu. On January 4, 1926, the Rumanian Parliament enacted a law recognizing as Crown Prince five-year-old Prince Michael, Carol's son by his wife, the former Princess Helen of Greece. Provision was made for a council of regency in case Prince Michael became King during his minority. In July, 1927, the death of King Ferdinand brought the necessity of establishing the Regency. Four months later came the death of John Bratianu, long the dominant personality both in the Liberal party and in Rumanian politics. His place as prime minister was assumed by his brother, Vintila.

It was not a particularly easy position which Vintila Bratianu inherited. Popular discontent with his brother's government had been growing. For months the opposition had been attempting to force the premier's resignation and a dissolution of Parliament. Early in March, 1928, numerous mass meetings, parades, and demonstrations testified to the popular disapproval of Vintila Bratianu's government as well. On Sunday March 18, an army of 60,000 peasants camped in the capital, assembled ostensibly to voice their sentiments in regard to the land dispute between Budapest and Bucharest. But the anti-Hungarian sentiment was soon overshadowed by the anti-Bratianu attitude of the farmers. Other opposition groups joined the peasants and numerous resolutions were passed demanding Maniu's appointment as premier. The Council of Regency refused, however, to displace Bratianu. The peasant members withdrew from Parliament, but the demonstration subsided without bloodshed or civil war. Nevertheless the government, feeling itself on the defensive, tightened the press censorship.

On May 6 a peasant convention, held in Transylvania, was attended by some 200,000 members of the National Peasant party. Some had come equipped with arms, expecting that force would be employed, and the more spirited enthusiasts proposed a march on Bucharest. The government made no attempt to interfere with the demonstration, although 10,000 troops equipped with machine guns

and airplanes were deployed at strategic points outside the capital. Maniu wisely counseled moderation and, after resolutions demanding Bratianu's resignation were passed, directed his followers to return to their homes. During the succeeding weeks the situation grew more tense. The censorship became stricter, but the protests of the peasants were in no sense relaxed. Plans for a rival National Peasant parliament and for a republican movement in Transylvania seemed to endanger not only the existing government but the monarchy itself.

Suddenly, early in November, the situation took a new turn when the Regency Council, chiefly because of the government's failure to secure a foreign loan, requested the Bratianu ministry to resign. On November 4 the premier grudgingly laid down the reins of office and the long rule of the Bratianus was broken. The Regency vainly hoped to avoid Maniu as premier. The National Peasant leader at first demanded a cabinet composed wholly of his followers, but on the seventh he declared his willingness to head a coalition government, provided Parliament was dissolved and a general election at once held. Two days later Maniu became premier. Parliamentary elections on December 12 confirmed the peasants' victory by returning an overwhelming majority for the National Peasant party. It appeared that the half-century of almost continuous rule by aristocratic landed and capitalistic classes had come to an end, that Rumania's 14,000,000 peasants had at last come into their own.

In the meantime Maniu had announced the salient points of his policy: an unrestricted press, free and fair elections, removal of discriminations against the national minorities, decentralization of government with far-reaching local autonomy through elective district councils, equal privileges for foreign and domestic capital, and a consistent and pacific foreign policy. His aim, he declared, was "to place Rumania on the constitutional basis which has brought prosperity to Western States." The press censorship was at once removed, the reign of martial law was ended, the number of gendarmerie was reduced, and anti-Semitic student riots were suppressed.

Early in 1929 Rumania secured an international loan for use in

balancing her budget, stabilizing her currency on a gold basis, extending and reconditioning her railways, and constructing needed public works. Except for Jugoslavia, Rumania was the last of the World War belligerents to obtain currency stabilization. A former official of the Bank of France was appointed as technical adviser to supervise the expenditure of the loan, and another Frenchman, formerly of the Dawes Committee, was appointed to assist Rumanian railway experts in the reorganization of the railway system. These steps were said to typify the Rumanian government's change in attitude toward foreign capital, and to mark the inauguration of a new era in which the influx of capital would aid in the development of the country's resources and contribute to the kingdom's prosperity.

Agrarian Reform

In various respects Russia's borderlands were influenced by the proximity of the Soviet republic. Just as ideas of the French Revolution had a profound effect on the agrarian situation in western Europe, so the influence of the Russian Revolution was widely felt in the countries just to the west. The wave of agrarian reform which began in Russia and swept over eastern Europe produced some of the most significant social and political changes arising from the World War.

In Finland, where forest and moorland constitute about ninety per cent of the total land area, less than six per cent of the country was under cultivation before the war. Even before 1914 a scheme of land settlement had been begun. By means of land colonization new holdings were being established and small farms enlarged. In 1922 an agrarian reform law was passed to provide land for those able in no other way to secure it. Provision was made for the expropriation of portions of large estates with compensation to the owners. Over 43,000 small holdings were established by March, 1925. Other legislation was enacted to facilitate the transfer of tenancies into free ownership. Land reform in Finland, however, was not nearly so drastic nor so sweeping as in some of the other States. Expropriation was aimed especially at absentee owners, and in other cases only land

in excess of 500 acres was to be taken; in the case of estates of over 12,000 acres, not more than half the land was to be expropriated.

Esthonian and Latvian agrarian reform assumed the guise of a peasant revolt against the German Balt landlords. In the former the Balts owned about sixty per cent of the land although they themselves constituted a very small minority of the population, while the Esthonians did the work on the large estates. The movement in both of these States was thus racial and national as well as economic and social.

The Esthonian land law, passed in October, 1919, authorized the government to take over for the purpose of creating a land reserve all estates belonging to the Balts and, in general, all arable land except that owned by charitable institutions. Estates of less than about 400 acres, if owned by non-noble farmers, were exempted from expropriation. Compensation was fixed by a law of March, 1926. The "inventory"—animals, machinery, etc.—was paid for according to its value in roubles in 1914, but depreciation in currency and changes in purchasing power reduced the actual compensation to almost nothing.

By subsequent legislation in 1925 provision was made for restoring to the original owners 125 acres of land in usufruct. Altogether about 97 per cent of the area held in large estates before the war was expropriated. The land was parceled into farms small enough to be worked without extra help by an average family with two horses. According to official statistics 33,438 new farms comprising some 2,560,000 acres had been established by the close of 1926. The new holders were given a six-year trial, with the understanding that if their farming was satisfactory they would be permitted to retain the land indefinitely. Although theoretically the title remained with the State, for all practical purposes the peasants became the owners of the land.

The Latvian land law was passed in September, 1920. By it a State land reserve was created by adding to the existing State domains and forests areas expropriated from large estates, the owners being allowed to retain about 125 acres each. In this way a total State property was created amounting in 1924 to some 61 per cent of the

agricultural and forest land. The principle of compensation was adopted, except for land taken from the Balts who had supported German intrigues, but the passage of such a law was deferred for fiscal reasons. In practice therefore the estates were seized without compensation. From the State land reserve some 125,000 new holdings were created which the peasants were permitted either to lease or to purchase. The new farms were limited to not more than 55 acres of arable land, with the provision that plots suitable for gardening should not exceed 25 acres.

Before the war 36 per cent of the agricultural area of Lithuania had belonged to large landowners, chiefly Poles, most of whom held estates of more than 5,000 acres. Of the agricultural population, on the other hand, between 15 and 20 per cent was landless. By a law of February, 1922, lands in private estates in excess of 200 acres were expropriated, together with the Church lands and those belonging to the former Russian nobles' and peasants' agricultural banks. These were added to the existing State lands to form a land reserve from which small holdings were formed for some 300,000 new proprietors. Compensation was reckoned on the average prices of the years 1910–14, and owners of not more than 500 acres were to receive compensation for expropriated areas of less than 375 acres.

Like the Baltic States, Poland is primarily an agricultural country, 65 per cent of her inhabitants earning their living from the soil. As in them, too, a very large part of the land was before the war in the hands of a few owners, most of whom belonged to the nobility. Only one-third of the peasant farms were self-supporting, the peasants in most cases being obliged to work outside their own farms in order to earn a livelihood. This situation the peasants hoped to change under the republic, and they participated in the first general election with a view to effecting immediate and radical agrarian reform.

Although sweeping legislation was enacted in 1919 and in 1920, the opposition of the landlords, the lack of State funds, and the disturbed internal and external conditions of the republic prevented its execution. By the close of 1922 about 665,000 acres of land had been made available for purposes of agrarian reform, some 18,000 new farms had been established and 27,000 others enlarged, 3,200

workers' homesteads had been erected, and 360 special farms instituted. This was far from satisfying the peasant parties, which continued to press in Parliament for more radical measures.

In December, 1925, another agrarian reform act was passed. This provided for the distribution among the peasants of 50,000 acres yearly for a period of ten years. Maximum holdings were limited to 150 acres in industrial regions and near large cities, 750 acres in the eastern border provinces, and 450 acres elsewhere. Compensation was to be based upon present value, 25 to 50 per cent being paid in cash and the rest in government bonds. It was understood, however, that so long as the national financial stringency obtained, the provision for assessment in real value and payment in cash must remain in abeyance.

In Rumania, despite the fact that the government had several times parceled out Church and State lands among the peasants, nearly one-half of the total agricultural area before the war was still in the hands of large landowners, who numbered scarcely more than one-half of one per cent of the total number of agriculturists. During the war, in July, 1917, legislation was enacted providing for the expropriation of large estates to the extent of 5,000,000 acres. The original proprietors were to be permitted to retain 1,200 acres, and were to be compensated in State bonds for the land taken from them. A scheme for communal holding of the expropriated land was proposed but was rejected in favor of individual tenure.

Meanwhile the establishment of the Moldavian Republic in Bessarabia resulted in a solution of the agrarian problem there in a manner similar to that in Soviet Russia. The principle of expropriation of all large estates in the interest of peasant proprietors was made one of the fundamentals of the new constitution, the intention being to take the great estates completely and without compensation. When Bessarabia became part of the Rumanian Kingdom, therefore, the wide difference in the programs of agrarian reform required adjustment. Pressure from the Rumanian government eventually brought a modification of the Bessarabian law to provide for the proprietor's retention of 250 acres and even for compensation for the land he had lost. Subsequent codifying legislation in 1920–21

introduced minor changes in both the Bessarabian and the Rumanian laws.

The expropriations in the "Old Kingdom" were to leave in large holdings only 14 per cent of the total cultivable area. Before the reform very large estates were fairly common, some exceeding 40,000 acres; but in 1924 the largest farm was 1,235 acres, and the average size of the estates remaining in the hands of the former large landowners was only about 500 acres. The situation in Transylvania and Bukowina was similar, but in Bessarabia large estates ceased to exist. Former landowners were compensated for their lands on the basis of their pre-war values when the Rumanian leu was worth a gold franc. The greatly depreciated value of the leu after the war, however, made the compensation quite illusory, so that almost the entire burden fell upon the dispossessed landlords.

In the "Old Kingdom" each peasant was to have 12.5 acres of cultivable land, inclusive of what he already owned. In the Dobrudja, where land was more abundant, the new holdings were to be of 20, 25, and 62.5 acres. In Bessarabia the original intention was that peasant properties should run from 15 to 20 acres, but because of the lack of available land, many holdings are smaller. In Bukowina the allotments were to be 10 acres in the lowlands and 20 in the mountain regions, while in Transylvania 10 acres was to be the norm. Colonization zones were created in various parts of the country and in these the size of allotments was somewhat larger than the usual standard.

Thus throughout the great stretch of territory which comprises Russia's borderlands a fundamental change in the method of land tenure was introduced after the war—undoubtedly hastened by the war. The old régime, weakened by the struggle and a prey to revolutionary movements, was everywhere forced to make concessions to satisfy the millions of land-hungry peasants. Although executed in an unsettled period after a great war, these agrarian reform schemes were based on the sound principle of creating a free and self-respecting peasantry—an agricultural middle class—which should form the solid basis for truly democratic government.

The Problem of Minorities

All of Russia's borderlands have national minorities within their frontiers to complicate their domestic affairs and to disturb their foreign relations. Poland has the largest minorities population [10] of any country in Europe, although in proportion to her population Rumania ranks first.[11] The Baltic republics [12] all contain minorities, though on a somewhat smaller scale. In Lithuania they constitute about sixteen per cent of the population, in Latvia about nineteen per cent, and in Esthonia and Finland about ten per cent each. Of these minorities, some belong to races of high culture and civilization and now find themselves under the rule of people whose standards are not so high. In some cases, the return of territory formerly held by right of conquest has converted the pre-war dominant race into a minority among the people whom it previously ruled.

The steps taken by the peace conference to protect the rights of national minorities and to remove from the peace of Europe so far as possible the menace of active irredentas, have been discussed.[13] Both Rumania and Poland were obliged to sign treaties in which they promised to extend to their minorities all rights of citizenship, including linguistic, educational, and religious privileges. Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia were later compelled by the League of Nations to assume similar obligations. Finland, however, because of her own constitutional provisions for safeguarding the rights of minorities, was excused from signing such a treaty. With the exception of Finland, therefore, all of the borderlands have undertaken definite obligations toward their minorities and have admitted the right of the latter to appeal to the League of Nations in case of unfavorable treatment.

Nevertheless, with the liberated peoples eager to utilize their new freedom and imbued with patriotic enthusiasm, with the tables sud-

[10] Chiefly Russians, Jews, and Germans.

[11] Chiefly Russians, Magyars, Germans, Jews, Bulgars, and Serbs.

[12] Chiefly Jews, Poles, and Russians in Lithuania; Russians, Jews, Germans, and Poles in Latvia; Russians, Germans, Swedes, and Jews in Esthonia; Swedes and Russians in Finland.

[13] See pp. 197–98.

denly turned on what had too often formerly been oppressor and oppressed, it was almost inconceivable that friction should fail to develop, especially with sweeping agrarian reform movements everywhere to complicate the situation. And, as before the war, discontented minorities turned inevitably for sympathy and relief to their kinsmen across the frontier. In consequence, the international relations of the borderlands have repeatedly been disturbed by the question of the treatment of minorities. At best, all that can be done here is to suggest the nature of the problems which have resulted from the existence of these racial minorities.

The ill will which already existed between Poland and Lithuania because of the Vilna coup, was further deepened by the treatment of their respective minorities. In 1924 Poland complained to the League that Lithuania had closed Polish schools, confiscated Polish property, and passed laws discriminating against Poles in Lithuania. The latter, in consequence of recommendations of the League Council, was led to modify some of the practices which had called for the Polish complaints. Three years later Poland closed some forty Lithuanian schools in the district about Vilna, justifying the action by asserting that Polish teachers in Lithuania were being mistreated. This time Lithuania complained to the Council of the League, which succeeded in persuading the prime ministers of the two countries to agree to a conference with a view to settling all differences between them. During 1928 conferences between representatives of the two republics were held, but no final settlement was achieved.

Between Poland and Germany friction has been occasioned by the former's treatment of Germans within her territory. Poland was eager to regain as much as possible of the land which had passed from Polish into German hands while Posen was in the German Empire, and in 1920 decided to cancel all contracts of tenants who held land from the former German government unless they could show clear legal titles. Germany appealed to the League and the question went finally to the World Court, which decided that Poland must respect private rights. Poland eventually agreed to compensate the German colonists who had been evicted. Germany's continued dissatisfaction with Poland's treatment of her German minority was back of Foreign

Minister Stresemann's attempts in 1928 and 1929 to alter the procedure of the League of Nations in respect to minorities.[14]

The Soviet government likewise complained regarding the treatment of its nationals in Poland. In 1922 autonomy had been granted in eastern Galicia, but it was too restricted to satisfy the Ruthenians of that district. Russia alleged that, despite treaty obligations, Poland was engaged in an attempt to denationalize the Ruthenians and the White Russians in its eastern territories—in fact, was attempting to "Polonize" them; and that she was also discriminating against them in respect to land distribution, schools, and religion. In reply the Polish government in May, 1924, went so far as to assert that the rights of racial minorities were a domestic matter, not regulated by treaty obligations.

Apparently to ward off further complaints, however, as well as to introduce some degree of law and order into these eastern districts, legislation dealing with the language question was enacted within a few weeks. In government administration, courts, and schools, along with the official Polish language, the use of Lithuanian, White Russian, and Ruthenian was permitted in regions where these languages were spoken. Administrative communications were required to be made both in Polish and in the language of the citizens concerned. Teaching in private schools might be conducted in any of these three languages, and, on the request of the parents of forty children, instruction in public schools would be given in any one of these languages wherever a non-Polish minority constituted twenty-five per cent of the population.

This legislation, however, did not cover the needs of the Jews, who numbered about 3,000,000 in the republic. Unlike the other minorities, they were not segregated in one area, but comprised a large percentage of the population in all towns and cities. The Jews controlled the greater part of the commercial and banking activities of the country, occupying a place in Poland somewhat analogous to that of the bourgeoisie in Western countries. They desired separate schools for their children, together with other rights and privileges.

In 1925 the government negotiated with representatives of the

[14] See p. 250.

Jews an agreement which became known as the "Declaration of Warsaw." In consequence of the Jews' recognition of their duties to the republic, measures were later introduced giving them the same linguistic privileges as had been granted to the border peoples, legalizing their observance of Jewish religious holidays, and recognizing their schools. The agreement went far toward removing the causes of friction between the government and one of the republic's most numerous minorities.

In the case of Rumania, the chief international friction arising from the problem of minorities developed out of the sweeping agrarian reform movement in that country. Nearly all of the land in Transylvania was held by a small group of Magyars, who naturally objected to having it expropriated with little compensation. Furthermore, many large estates in that region were Church lands, so that agrarian reform was looked upon as religious persecution. Numerous protests and petitions were presented to the League Council by the Hungarian government, asserting that there was discrimination against the Magyars.

The Rumanian government consistently maintained that the treatment of the Magyars was the same as that of all large landholders, and that they could not expect to receive privileged treatment even though they were Hungarian optants. Many of the government's activities, it was asserted, were merely in an attempt to undo the "Magyarization" which had been carried on prior to the war by the Hungarian government. The new policy of "Rumanization" gave rise to numerous complaints on behalf of the minorities regarding their treatment in the matter of schools, churches, and languages.

Obviously the existence of these racial minorities is a disturbing factor in the foreign relations of Russia's borderlands. It constitutes also a profound weakness within the States themselves, for before any real unity can be developed, the sense of division must be wiped out. This, however, cannot be done in a moment. Pre-war hatreds and prejudices are still too deeply ingrained. Deliberate attempts to force it defeat their own purpose. Only as mutual toleration and respect gradually develop in the course of generations will the problem of racial minorities disappear.

Security Negotiations

Meanwhile, in view of the fact that Russia's borderlands were created in whole or in part out of territory of the former Romanov Empire; that Riga, Libau, Windau, and Reval—ports now controlled by the Baltic republics—were before the war the outlets for the greater part of the seagoing trade of northern Russia; that the Russo-Polish boundary, forced from the Soviet government in a moment of military weakness, tore from Russia millions of her own kinsmen; that the annexation of Bessarabia by Rumania, though sanctioned by the principal Allied Powers, was not recognized as legal by the Soviet government—in view of all these facts, it was not surprising that a number of attempts were made to arrive at some plan for mutual assistance.

Rumania, the power which had the most reason to fear an attack from Russia, took the first step in 1920 when she proposed a great alliance to include all the borderlands together with Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia. The last two, however, were unwilling to enter into any definite alliance directed against Russia, so that this rather grandiose scheme fell to the ground. Poland, however, was very ready to accept such a proposal and in March, 1921, a Polish-Rumanian defensive alliance resulted. By the terms of this treaty an unprovoked attack on the eastern frontier of either power would require the other power to enter the war to assist the one attacked. The eastern frontier of Rumania was defined as that recognized by the principal Allied Powers in 1920, namely, the river Dniester; while Poland's was defined as that laid down by the Russo-Polish Treaty of 1921. Obviously Poland committed herself to a greater risk than did Rumania, for Russia had at least formally recognized Poland's boundary but had resolutely refused to do the same for Rumania.

Poland, from her geographical position, seemed naturally the power which should expand the Polish-Rumanian alliance into a system to include the Baltic States as well. This she failed to do, however, largely because she had alienated her neighbor, Lithuania, by her arbitrary and unauthorized seizure of Vilna. Although these two States, carved in each case from former German and Russian

territory, had need of a common policy toward the two greater powers, the Vilna dispute drove a wedge between them.

In the attempt to bring the Baltic States into an agreement on their policy toward Russia, not Poland but Finland took the initiative. The latter summoned a conference in July, 1921, which was attended by Esthonia, Latvia, and Poland. The only result, however, was a protocol providing that the foreign ministers of the four States should meet for regular periodic conferences, and thus to some extent coördinate their policy toward Russia. Poland now took the lead and called a conference which met in Warsaw in March, 1922, and was attended by representatives of the same four powers, Lithuania consistently holding aloof. A treaty resulted in which the powers agreed: (1) to recognize reciprocally the treaties of peace which each had made with Russia, (2) to conclude no pact which might place one of the four at a disadvantage, (3) to settle all disputes between the signatories by purely peaceful methods, (4) to adopt a benevolent attitude toward any one of the four powers in case of an unprovoked attack upon it, and to agree at once upon their course of action.

Finland, however, principally because she feared to become involved in Poland's aggressive policies, refused to ratify the treaty, which accordingly never became effective. Finland's cultural affiliations inclined her toward coöperation with the Scandinavian countries and in 1924 she entered this group, attending a conference of the governments of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden at Stockholm. On the other hand, her long Russian frontier and her "unredeemed" kinsmen in Eastern Karelia gave her a common bond with the other borderlands of Russia. In the end, Finland joined neither set of powers in a fixed alliance but wisely contented herself with comprehensive arbitral agreements with both. Lithuania's unwillingness to unite in any common undertaking to which Poland was a party, and the general fear of the other Baltic States that in such a union Poland might come to dominate, effectively prevented anything like a common alliance for security, although numerous conferences for coöperation have been held.

In the next stage of the security negotiations regarding Russia's borderlands, the Soviet government itself took the initiative. In June,

1922, Maxim Litvinov, assistant commissar for foreign affairs in the Soviet government, invited the Polish, Finnish, Esthonian, and Latvian governments to a conference at Moscow to discuss the question of mutual disarmament and nonaggression. A little later he attempted to secure the representation of the Rumanian government, but the latter stated that it could participate only on condition that Moscow recognized the Bessarabian frontier as fixed and not open to debate. This the Soviet government refused to do. At the last minute Lithuania also was invited to attend. On December 2 the conference opened at Moscow with representatives of Russia, Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland in attendance.

The conference formally adopted a pact of nonaggression which was in its essentials almost identical with the later Paris Pact of 1928. The Soviet government proposed that this pact of nonaggression should be formally signed in a plenary session of the conference simultaneously with an agreement relating to disarmament. The representatives of the other governments, however, opposed this procedure, and an impasse resulted. On December 12 the conference broke up without tangible achievement.

In 1924 the Soviet government proposed a bilateral pact of nonaggression between Moscow and Warsaw, but the Polish government declared that it would enter into negotiations only if the other borderlands were admitted to the discussion. Similar proposals by Russia in 1925 were again declined. Instead of entering into closer relations with Russia, Poland on March 26, 1926, renewed her alliance with Rumania, enlarging it to cover not only the eastern frontiers of the two States but all foreign aggressions. The "Spirit of Locarno" which was gradually spreading over Europe was revealed in the provision of the new treaty that all disputes arising between the two powers which might be found impossible of settlement through ordinary diplomatic means were to be submitted to conciliation or to arbitration.

Meanwhile, the Soviet government, having failed to obtain a pact of nonaggression with Poland, turned next to the Baltic States, addressing a note to them in March, 1926, suggesting treaties of neutrality and nonaggression. The Finnish, Esthonian, and Latvian

governments proposed the appointment of a commission of representatives of Russia and the Baltic States to work out such a treaty, but Russia rejected this suggestion. The three States then accepted Russia's proposals for separate pacts. Poland also joined in the movement, agreeing to receive a draft of a Russo-Polish nonaggression pact.

On September 28, 1926, the first of Russia's nonaggression and neutrality agreements with a Baltic State was signed at Moscow between Russia and Lithuania. The treaty provided that neither would attack the other, and that each would remain neutral if the other were attacked without provocation. In addition, the Soviet government formally recognized once more the Russo-Lithuanian boundary as laid down in the treaty of July 12, 1920, and explained that it would "not allow the infringement of the Lithuanian frontier which took place against the will of the people, to influence the attitude of the U.S.S.R. with reference to the question of Lithuanian territorial sovereignty." The signing of this treaty was the chief cause of the fall of Bartel's ministry in Poland and Pilsudski's assumption of the premiership.

The signing of the Pact of Paris in 1928 committed Russia and her borderlands to a common agreement to outlaw war. The provision that this pact was to become effective only after the ratifications of the fifteen original signatory powers had been deposited in Washington created some uncertainty as to that date. Early in 1929 the Soviet government proposed that Poland and Lithuania join it in an anticipatory protocol putting the Paris Pact into immediate effect among themselves. Poland wished Rumania, Esthonia, and Latvia also to be included, and Latvia suggested that all should sign at the same time. This solidarity was prevented by Lithuania's enmity toward Poland. Rather than have it appear that the latter had secured some kind of hegemony over the Baltic States, the Lithuanian government decided to sign the protocol at a later date. Representatives of the other States—Russia, Esthonia, Latvia, Poland, and Rumania—signed the anticipatory protocol in Moscow on February 9. The document had little real meaning in itself, but it marked

a definite improvement in the diplomatic situation, notably between Rumania and Russia. Questions of dispute—for instance, the Bessarabian question—still remained, but Russia and her borderlands had finally agreed to settle them only by pacific means.

CHAPTER XIX

THE SUCCESSION STATES OF CENTRAL EUROPE

THE disruption of the once powerful Habsburg Empire and the distribution of its territory and people among seven different States was one of the most spectacular of the many results of the World War.[1] Of the three great empires which had existed in Europe in 1914, the German was reduced in size and transformed into a democratic republic, the Russian was likewise diminished in territory and still more profoundly altered in political and social structure, but the Austro-Hungarian was completely obliterated from the map.

The New Central Europe

Obviously, therefore, post-war central Europe differs radically from what it was before the war. Although the former Habsburg Empire had long been a political anachronism, yet, stretching from the plains of the Vistula to the shores of the Adriatic and from the heart of the Alps to the bounds of Rumania, it had constituted a strong economic unit. Within its confines had been found grain fields, pasture-lands, and forests; oil wells and coal mines; iron, copper, lead, silver, and gold ores; breweries, distilleries, and sugar refineries; steel mills and textile factories; glassworks and potteries. All had been included within a common tariff union. This relatively balanced and unified economic organism was utterly disrupted by the nationalistic upheaval which followed the war. Most of the periphery of what had been Europe's second largest country was absorbed into surrounding States—Italy, Jugoslavia, Rumania, and re-created Poland; the center fell to Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

[1] For the disintegration of the former Habsburg Empire, see Chapter V.

Austria,[2] now essentially a financial and industrial country, was left with inadequate food supplies for her population and insufficient raw materials for her industrial enterprises. On the other hand, she inherited the populous capital of a former empire of more than 51,000,000 inhabitants, a city which contained thousands of officials, soldiers, and tradesmen, drawn there by former imperial institutions. Hungary [3] was reduced to little more than an agricultural plain, her former mountainous border being assigned to adjacent countries. She possessed almost no wood and very little water power, and was cut off from manufacturing centers, natural markets, and much-needed raw materials. Czechoslovakia [4] was more fortunate, for she obtained from 85 to 90 per cent of the soft coal, about 60 per cent of the iron ore, and nearly 80 per cent of the industries of the former empire. Furthermore, she had extensive agricultural districts. She, therefore, possessed the food, mineral wealth, and manufacturing establishments necessary for a somewhat balanced economic life.

These three States had numerous reasons for economic coöperation. Austria needed to import food supplies and raw materials; Hungary needed to import manufactured goods and to export surplus foodstuffs; Czechoslovakia needed markets for her manufactured products. Nevertheless, this free exchange of goods was prevented when each country, actuated by an excessive nationalism, at once erected tariff barriers against all its neighbors. The economic ills which resulted further embittered their political relations.

The new boundaries of central Europe cut almost recklessly across railways, rivers, canals, and highways, seriously interfering with the accustomed trends of commerce. The former empire had held two important seaports on the Adriatic, but each of these new States was landlocked. In an attempt to overcome this handicap, the peace conference internationalized the Oder from Czechoslovakia to the Baltic, the Moldau from Prague to the Elbe, and the latter to the North Sea. Hamburg on the Elbe and Stettin on the Oder were made

[2] About 6,500,000 inhabitants in an area of 32,369 square miles.
[3] About 8,000,000 inhabitants in an area of 35,875 square miles.
[4] About 14,000,000 inhabitants in an area of 54,207 square miles.

free ports for Czechoslovakia. The Danube was internationalized from Ulm to its mouth and thus provided all three States with a water route to the Black Sea. Austria and Hungary, furthermore, were accorded free access to the Adriatic. This included the right to transport goods over the territories and in the ports severed from the former Habsburg Empire, and to receive in them the same treatment as nationals of the States to which the territories belong. To provide Czechoslovakia, also, with an outlet to the south she was given the right to send her trains over certain Austrian railroads toward the Adriatic.

The new boundaries not only cut across railway lines but cut across racial lines as well. Despite the fact that post-war central Europe presents a much nearer approximation to the ideal coincidence of political and racial boundaries than did the former polyglot Dual Monarchy, all of the heirs to Habsburg territory—except little Austria—still contain national minorities. For strategic, historic, or economic reasons, varying numbers of Magyars and Germans were included in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Jugoslavia. Some of the new irredentas thus comprised the former dominant races, groups of high intelligence and great initiative, not accustomed to submission.

The people who most deeply resented the dismemberment of their kingdom were the spirited and aggressive Magyars, who deplored their loss of territory and the inclusion of some 2,000,000 of their kinsmen within the frontiers of other States. In post-war Hungary a strong and active irredentist movement at once developed. Denunciation of the Treaty of Trianon was vigorous, especially among the aristocratic and great landowning classes who had lost wealth and position because of Hungary's dismemberment. The determination to overthrow the settlement established by the treaty was openly proclaimed, and nationalist organizations like the "Awakening Magyars" were established with such aims.

Just as the Germans and Magyars, the ruling groups in the former empire, had bent all their efforts toward maintaining their predominance at the expense of the less fortunate nationalities, so now the liberated groups, particularly the Czechoslovaks, the Jugoslavs, and the Rumanians, directed their efforts toward protecting themselves

against the vanquished. To check the outward thrust of Hungary's irredentism the surrounding States resorted to centripetal counter-alliances. In this defensive movement the initiative was taken by Edward Benesh, Czechoslovak foreign minister, who made his first objective an understanding between Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Rumania.

Negotiations looking toward an alliance between Prague and Belgrade were opened by Benesh in Paris on December 30, 1919, when he broached the subject to Ante Trumbitch, one of Jugoslavia's delegates to the peace conference. The conclusion of an understanding was doubtless hastened by persistent rumors, in July, 1920, of a Franco-Hungarian agreement under the terms of which Hungary was to give military aid to Poland against Russia and in return was to secure territory at the expense of Rumania, Jugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. On August 14, 1920, a convention between Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia was signed in Belgrade.

The purpose of this convention, according to the preamble, was the maintenance of the Treaty of Trianon which Hungary had been obliged to sign. Each State agreed to assist the other in case of an unprovoked attack by Hungary, and neither State was to conclude an alliance with a third party without first giving notice to the other. Soon after the signing of the above convention, it was agreed between Benesh and Take Jonescu, Rumanian foreign minister, that Czechoslovakia and Rumania would likewise assist each other in case of unprovoked attack by Hungary pending the formal conclusion of a similar convention.

On April 23, 1921, this understanding between Rumania and Czechoslovakia was transformed into a definite and binding alliance by the signing of a convention whose terms were practically identical with those of the Czechoslovak-Jugoslav agreement of August, 1920. A Rumanian-Jugoslav convention of June 7, 1921, finally completed the so-called "Little Entente." This last agreement, while similar to the others in its general purport, contained one additional item. Rumania and Jugoslavia had a common interest in Bulgaria's acceptance of the peace settlement, and the purpose of their treaty was stated to be the maintenance of both the Treaty of

Trianon and the Treaty of Neuilly. Each State undertook to assist the other in case of an unprovoked attack by either Hungary or Bulgaria. So far as central Europe was concerned, however, the Little Entente was designed to preserve the status quo against attacks from the small but militant and reactionary Hungary.

Hungary

When, on November 16, 1918, the Hungarian People's Republic was proclaimed in Budapest, it appeared that Hungary was to join Czechoslovakia and Austria in the ranks of the new democratic republics of post-war Europe. The former aristocratic Table of Magnates and the unrepresentative Chamber of Deputies were abolished. The future constitution of Hungary, the National Council of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils announced, was to be drafted by a constituent assembly, elected on the basis of universal, equal, secret, and direct suffrage.

The government in power was headed by Count Michael Karolyi, who believed that concessions to the subject nationalities and a friendly attitude toward the Allied Powers might preserve the Hungarian State from disruption. His ministry was composed of personal followers in the former Chamber of Deputies together with representatives of the Social Democrats and Radicals. With feverish haste long overdue reforms were initiated. Democratic federation, universal suffrage, secret ballot, proportional representation, freedom of speech and of the press, trial by jury, separation of Church from State, genuine liberal education, expropriation of the large estates—all these were included in the aims of the new government.

But Karolyi's program, liberal though it was, failed to win the support of the people. The concessions came too late. No longer would the subject races be content with federation within a Hungarian republic. They now demanded complete independence or union with their kinsmen in neighboring States. Meanwhile the program encountered opposition from both the Right and the Left. Large numbers of Karolyi's moderately progressive followers took affront at the announced agrarian reforms and withdrew their sup-

port from the government. At the same time, circumstances favored the increase of radicalism on the Left. The continuance of the Allied blockade threatened starvation, while returning soldiers swelled the ranks of the unemployed and stimulated the growth of Bolshevism with ideas gathered on the Russian front.

On January 11, 1919, the National Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils, apparently in an endeavor to shelve Karolyi and his moderate policies, elected him Provisional President of the republic. A new and more radical government took the place of Karolyi's ministry. Hoping to protect the republic against a swing to the extreme Left, Karolyi now sought the support of the peasants by a far-reaching land reform measure enacted in February. But the great landowners regarded the law as confiscatory, the Socialists opposed it as preventing the initiation of a purely socialistic scheme, and the peasants themselves considered the measure inopportune. Most of the Radicals withdrew from the government and threw their support to the Social Democrats, who had announced their determination to seize complete control of the State.

The downfall of Karolyi came as the immediate result of the failure of his policy of friendship with the Allies. The latter decided to permit the partition of the former Hungarian Kingdom into national States, and on March 20 ordered Hungarian troops to withdraw from Transylvania. Both Karolyi and the National Council refused to accept the new Rumanian frontier, and Karolyi resigned from the Presidency. The Socialists and Communists decided to act in concert, and the "International Revolutionary Hungarian Socialist Party" took over the direction of the State. By evening of the twenty-first the streets of Budapest were in the control of armed Communists. A soviet government was at once established under the nominal Presidency of a bricklayer named Garbai, but with the real power in the hands of the commissar for foreign affairs, Bela Kun.

This young middle-class Jew had been an active Socialist ever since his graduation from the Transylvanian University of Kolozsvár. During the war he had been an officer in the Austro-Hungarian army on the Galician front, where he had been taken captive in

1915. He was in Russia during the Revolution of 1917 and became an ardent admirer of Bolshevism. Supplied with money from Russia, Bela Kun had returned to Hungary with the avowed object of overthrowing the People's Republic and of establishing soviet rule in its place.

All branches of the government now came into the hands of soviet officials who assumed practically dictatorial powers. The immediate nationalization of large industrial establishments, railroads, banks, and mines was ordered. A drastic land reform scheme was adopted which nationalized the large estates without compensation but left undisturbed the small proprietors, whom the Communists could ill afford to alienate. An elective soviet system was introduced, with the franchise limited to productive workers. Education was separated from Church control and reorganized on a strictly proletarian basis.

The Communists, comprising only a very small minority of the population, resorted to terror in order to maintain themselves in power. Revolutionary tribunals replaced the existing judicial system, and a "Red" army was created. The press was muzzled, the right of public meeting was denied to all except Communists, hundreds were imprisoned, and political murders became frequent. But even "Red Terror" could not maintain the Communists in power against the rising tide of opposition.

The peasants refused to sell their produce for Bolshevik currency, and eventually declined to sell at all. The situation of the capital, blockaded by the Allies and boycotted by the peasants, became daily more and more desperate. The majority of the trade unionists, not extreme Communists at heart, turned against the new régime. The Allied Powers demanded the resignation of the soviet government to make way for one elected by the people. A counter-revolutionary movement was inaugurated and at Szegedin, in the French zone of occupation, an opposition government was set up. Nicholas Horthy, rear admiral in the former Habsburg navy, was chosen to lead the counter-revolutionary troops.

Hoping by an appeal to patriotism to win popular support for his tottering régime, Bela Kun late in July, 1919, began a military offensive against Rumanian troops in eastern Hungary. His "Red" army

was easily defeated and he himself fled to Vienna.[5] Early in August, in defiance of the orders of the Allied Supreme Council, Rumanian troops occupied Budapest. During the succeeding three months, in retaliation for the spoliation of their own country during Mackensen's invasion and occupation in 1916–17, the Rumanian forces systematically looted Hungarian towns, villages, and large estates—trainloads of goods being sent back to Rumania. On November 11, after repeated demands of the Supreme Council, the Rumanian occupation finally came to an end.

Three days later Horthy entered Budapest at the head of a small national army. Early in 1920 elections were held for a national assembly to decide upon the future constitution of the country and to make peace with the Allies. The reaction from experiences of the preceding months, together with the vigorous measures of the Horthy government, resulted in the election of a reactionary assembly. Sentiment for a monarchy was once more strong, and the first law enacted by the assembly restored the former monarchical constitution. Although Charles IV had never legally abdicated the throne, his return was temporarily prevented by the attitude of the Allies. Consequently, on March 1 the National Assembly elected Admiral Horthy to act as Regent during the enforced absence of the King. Three weeks later (March 23) an executive order formally declared Hungary a monarchy.

Reactionary legislation followed, and a "White Terror," inaugurated with the triumph of counter-revolution, continued for many months to punish those in any way connected with the soviet régime. According to the Hungarian government's own figures, more than three hundred persons were put to death. So severe did the Terror become, especially in its persecution of the Jews, that Hungary was for a time boycotted by international labor organizations.

Influenced by the hope that the strong monarchical reaction in Hungary presaged an enthusiastic welcome to his return and by the belief that a *fait accompli* would receive no more than a formal protest from the Allied Powers, King Charles suddenly returned to

[5] After a year in Vienna, he returned to Russia and was made governor of the Crimea.

Hungary in 1921 and on Easter Sunday (March 21) demanded back his throne. The result was most disappointing and disillusioning to Charles. There was no outburst of popular acclaim; Horthy declined to surrender his power until ordered to do so by the National Assembly; the Little Entente powers and the principal Allies vigorously protested.

Czechoslovakia notified the Hungarian government that unless Charles left the country immediately, diplomatic relations would be broken off, a blockade instituted, and a military demonstration made in accordance with the Czechoslovak-Jugoslav Convention. The Hungarian National Assembly joined Horthy in urging Charles to leave the country immediately. A few days later Czechoslovakia definitely threatened military action in an ultimatum demanding the expulsion of the former monarch by the evening of the seventh. Confronted by great opposition and accorded little support, Charles withdrew from the country, the chief result of his venture being the definite addition of Rumania to the Little Entente.

But Charles was neither convinced nor contented. On October 20, 1921, in breach of a promise given to the Swiss government, he escaped from Switzerland by airplane and made his second return to Hungary. There he placed himself at the head of a band of armed royalists and marched on the capital. Two days later Benesh announced that the return of Charles constituted a *casus belli*, that preparations for mobilization were going forward, that energetic measures would be taken in concert with the other Little Entente powers, and that military force would be used, if necessary, "to obtain the final settlement of the Habsburg question in Hungary." Both the Little Entente powers and the principal Allies demanded that Charles be removed from the country. On October 23 mobilization was decreed in Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia.

Hungarian troops were dispatched against Charles, who was defeated and taken prisoner. Horthy's government then demanded that Charles abdicate, but he resolutely refused to comply. Upon representations from the Allies, the ex-monarch and his wife were eventually delivered on board a British monitor in the Danube for removal

to a definitive place of residence.[6] The Allies demanded the deposition of Charles, but the Little Entente powers went further and demanded the permanent exclusion from the throne of the whole Habsburg dynasty. The Hungarian National Assembly was obliged to pass a law carrying these demands into effect, and the government agreed to permit no election to the throne without previously coming to an understanding with the principal Allies. Hungary thus remained a monarchy, but with the election to the throne indefinitely adjourned. The outcome was a real victory for Foreign Minister Benesh and the Little Entente.

Early in 1922 the National Assembly came to an end after just two years of life, its only notable achievement having been the conclusion of a most unsatisfactory peace. No new constitution had been drafted; no method had been provided for electing a second assembly. An executive decree, however, soon restored one of the pillars of the old régime by practically abolishing universal suffrage and replacing the secret ballot by open voting in most districts. New elections under these circumstances brought a decisive victory for the government of Count Stephen Bethlen, who had become prime minister in April, 1921. Bethlen, though of the conservative aristocracy, fortunately recognized that the old pre-war order in Hungary could not be fully restored.

The extreme reactionaries were overwhelmingly defeated in the elections. Driven from power, they gave their support to numerous secret societies which professed to resemble in their aims the Fascists of Italy and the monarchist organizations of Germany. Prince Otto was formally recognized by them as King of Hungary and so menacing did their schemes become that in the fall of 1922 a Defense of the Realm Act was passed to protect the government against its most ardent supporters!

Meanwhile the country had begun its descent into fiscal chaos, from which it was rescued through the efforts of the League of Nations, into which it had been admitted in 1922. The rehabilitation of

[6] Charles was taken to Madeira, where he died of pneumonia on April 1, 1922, leaving his young son Otto as claimant to the throne.

the nation's finances under the direction of the League began in 1924 and by June, 1926, Hungary was again possessed of a sound financial system.[7]

In November of that year the unicameral National Assembly passed a law creating an upper chamber to take the place of the former Table of Magnates. The new chamber, not a popularly elected body, contains six categories of members: (1) those elected from and by the nobility; (2) those elected by county and municipal councils; (3) the heads of the various religious communities; (4) certain high dignitaries such as the commander-in-chief of the army and the head of the National Bank; (5) members elected by chambers of commerce, chambers of agriculture, scientific institutions, and the like; (6) a maximum of forty life members appointed by the head of the government upon the recommendation of the ministry. This upper chamber was given no power over the budget, however, and only a suspensive veto on other legislation.

Later in the year parliamentary elections were held for the third time since the war. Count Bethlen's Union party, which represented the interests of the landowners, well-to-do peasants, and some of the Catholic clergy, and which was in a sense a middle group between the Socialist Left and the reactionary Right, was returned with a decisive majority. The National Independence party, which was Fascist and anti-Semitic and aims to restore the pre-war frontiers, and the Legitimist party, which advocate the immediate coronation of Prince Otto, won only five seats between them. It would appear that Hungary had finally rejected further extreme reaction in favor of a policy of constructive conservatism.

Although Regent Horthy has been more in the limelight and has usually been considered the "strong man" of Hungary, the statesman who has really directed the policies of the monarchy during the past eight years is Count Bethlen, who has held his position longer than any other premier in post-war Europe. It was his policies which brought political stability and economic rehabilitation to Hungary. Early in 1927 he announced that the government had abandoned its former saber-rattling, which "did us no good and only kept the

[7] See pp. 240–41.

suspicions of our neighbors aroused," and was determined to follow a policy of peace. In 1928 he publicly pledged that Hungary's king, when he came, should not assume the throne as the result of a *Putsch* but only with the consent of Parliament. On the eighth anniversary of the election of Regent Horthy (March 1, 1928), all political prisoners, sentenced for not more than five years, were liberated by a general amnesty. The country thus seems gradually to be returning to its normal life after its hectic experiences of the early post-war years.

Despite Karolyi's and Bela Kun's proclamations, laws, and decrees regarding the land situation, little has actually been done to improve the condition of the peasants, who in pre-war days were held in subjection under a system of tenure more medieval than that in any other European country. In 1920 nearly three-fourths of the peasant population of Hungary consisted of landless agricultural laborers or those whose tiny holdings placed them in practically the same category, while nearly forty per cent of the land was included in estates exceeding 1,400 acres each. Measures were taken by Bethlen's government to remedy this situation, but they were far less sweeping in their application than those of other countries where agrarian reform occurred. In general, Hungary is relatively little changed politically or socially from its pre-war status.

Austria

Austria escaped Hungary's violent swing to the Left, despite the fact that in the early months of 1919 attempts were made to bring her into the ranks of the soviet republics alongside her former partner in the Dual Monarchy. In the midst of acute food shortage and widespread unemployment, emissaries from Soviet Hungary and Soviet Russia preached Communism in the streets of Vienna. Disciples of Lenin invaded workmen's councils and waged a mighty struggle for control. But, thanks to the efforts of moderate Socialists like Otto Bauer and Victor Adler, there was in Austria no bitter Communist conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The issue was settled within the ranks of the workers. The forces of moderation won out; Bolshevism was rejected.

Nor did Austria suffer anything like Hungary's reactionary swing to the Right. The Austrians had always been more democratic than the Magyars, and the experiences of the World War had converted most of them to republicanism. Elections in February, 1919, gave the Social Democrats the largest representation in the National Constituent Assembly, and half-hearted bourgeois suggestions that Austria should affirm her allegiance to constitutional monarchy were drowned out by the Socialists. The first act of the newly elected assembly was the solemn reiteration that Austria was a democratic republic. Later legislation banished all Habsburgs from the country and confiscated all possessions of the dynasty.

Included in the first act of the assembly, also, was a renewed proclamation of Austria's union with the German Republic, a union for which Germany's provisional constitution of the preceding month had likewise provided. On racial and economic grounds the consolidation of the two German republics seemed a logical step, and the much-lauded principle of national self-determination seemed to open the way. But vigorous protests were raised against the *Anschluss*, especially in France and Czechoslovakia. The peace conference forbade the union,[8] and in the Treaty of St. Germain which Austria was obliged to sign in September, 1919, she agreed not to alienate her sovereignty without the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, and to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly compromise her independence.

Pending possible union with Germany, the drafting of a permanent constitution had been held in abeyance. But with this possibility definitely removed, at least for the present, the question of Austria's future government came to the fore. The peasants and clericals of the provinces feared the dominance of socialist Vienna, and their party—the Christian Socialist—at once put forward plans for a federal structure, borrowing heavily from the Swiss. In its general outlines, the Austrian Constitution, as finally adopted on October 1, 1920, followed their draft.

Austria is therefore a federal republic with nine provinces, each with its own local diet. The national government has a bicameral

[8] See p. 192.

legislature consisting of the Federal Council, elected by the diets and the National Council elected by popular vote. The two houses, acting as a federal assembly, choose the President. Real executive power, however, resides in a ministry responsible to the National Council, which, furthermore, has authority to enact legislation over the veto of the upper house. The whole political structure rests on proportional representation and universal suffrage.

The first elections under the new constitution (October 17, 1920) gave no party a majority but caused a substantial shift in the National Council from the Social Democrats to the Christian Socialists. As a result, the former withdrew from the ministry and became the opposition, a position which they have since held. Control of the government has subsequently remained in the hands of the Christian Socialists, supported by a small Pan-German group. On December 9 Dr. Michael Hainisch, a liberal bourgeois, was elected first President of the republic, which, in the same month, was admitted to membership in the League of Nations.

The federalization of this diminutive State was caused largely by economic and social differences in the country. The republic comprises roughly two districts which are nearly equal in population though not in area. The eastern end, including Vienna, the plain between the capital and Wiener-Neustadt, and the ore-bearing districts of Styria, constitutes a great industrial region. The rest of the republic is agricultural and, except for Church lands and State forests, is in the hands of peasant proprietors.

As a consequence of these differences there at once developed in post-war Austria a fairly clear-cut antagonism between the socialism of the factory and the individualism of the farm, between the skepticism of the city and clericalism of the province, more specifically, between the "Reds" of Vienna and the "Blacks" of the countryside. As late as July, 1927, a proletarian uprising and strike in the capital provoked vigorous armed demonstrations in the provinces, where the threat was made of a march against "Red" Vienna. Common hatred of militarism led the two groups to coöperate during the early days of the Revolution, but militarism as a menace was succeeded, in the eyes of the peasants and clericals, by socialism. Decentralization of

the State and extensive autonomy for the provinces were demanded by the rural classes as a means of protection against the radicalism of the capital.

Although the Social Democrats originally favored the unity of the State, federalism eventually worked to their great advantage in at least one respect. Vienna, a city of nearly 2,000,000 inhabitants, was detached from Lower Austria and established as a separate province. The Municipal Council became at the same time the Provincial Diet and received all the legislative and administrative powers which were extended to the provinces. The Social Democrats, strongly intrenched in the capital, gave the city a new charter, introduced the ministerial system into local government, and replaced the former bureaucracy with a thoroughgoing democracy. Though it lost control of the republic as a whole, the proletariat continued to rule the capital, which comprises nearly three-tenths of the Austrian people. As a separate province the municipality is wealthy, for one-half of the taxes raised in each province goes to the local government. Under Social Democratic control the capital has raised and spent money freely on social welfare, public health, education, and city improvements. Large sums have been devoted by the municipality to the construction of cottages and model tenements for the proletariat.

Growing alarm at the increasingly socialistic character of the Vienna government, coupled with the hope of circumventing the Allied prohibition on union with Germany, led in 1921 to an outbreak of active separatism in the provinces. The peace treaty forbade Austria to unite with Germany but, it was argued, no restraint had been placed upon the individual provinces. In April, 1921, the province of Tirol held a plebiscite and voted overwhelmingly for union with the German Republic. In May Salzburg did the same, and in June Styria was preparing for similar action when vigorous protests were entered by the Allies.

A crisis in the Austrian government ensued. The new chancellor repudiated the plebiscite movement, and the Christian Socialist party in a national convention did the same. Secession was thus defeated, the provinces learning that serious obstacles stood in the way of Austria's dismemberment. Particularism likewise suffered a setback

when it dawned upon the provinces that every right which they forced from the federal government for their own benefit became also a privilege of the detested Socialist government of Vienna. This realization went far toward bringing the provinces into loyal coöperation with the central government. The plebiscite movement was the last great revolt of the provinces against the State.

By the close of 1921, too, Germany had begun to lose, temporarily, some of that attractiveness which, during the first three years after the armistice, it had had for the Austrians. From their economic distress they had then looked upon union with Germany as the panacea for all their ills, the means by which they might secure supplies of coal and raw materials, open markets for manufactured goods, sound currency, and efficient government. But in 1922 German currency began to show alarming signs of weakness which in 1923 was followed by complete collapse and general economic demoralization. On the other hand, Austria had taken her economic troubles to the League of Nations,[9] and with the latter's assistance had obtained a stable currency and an economic situation in which some ray of hope could be seen. The *Anschluss* movement fell for a time into the background.

But the desire for union of the two republics was never completely crushed, and with the return of stabilization in Germany under the Dawes Plan came a revival of agitation in favor of the project. A number of steps, official and unofficial, were taken to bind the two peoples closer together both in spirit and in fact. Government officials and university professors exchanged visits. Austro-German cartels were established in various branches of production. A close customs union was created except for certain agricultural products. In many fields legislation and codes were made uniform. Thus a sort of "progressive assimilation" took place. Whether actual political union will ever be achieved, or whether the Austrian Republic, after a period of independence, will develop a national spirit of its own, must remain for the future to unfold. Wilhelm Miklas, elected President of the republic in 1928, was considered to be an opponent of the *Anschluss*. On the other hand, six of the nine ministers in the cabinet

[9] For the economic rehabilitation of Austria by the League, see pp. 235–40.

which assumed office in May, 1929, were pledged to support the *Anschluss* by any means within their power.

Czechoslovakia

The third of the succession States of central Europe, the one which has enjoyed the most ordered and prosperous national development, largely escaping the "infant diseases of nationhood," is Czechoslovakia. The relative stability of this republic came chiefly from its advantageous economic situation, from the western outlook of its dominant races, and from the great ability, wisdom, and moderation of its leading statesmen. No other of the new States of post-war Europe enjoyed during its first decade of existence the continuous guidance of two such capable national leaders as Thomas Garrigue Masaryk and Edward Benesh. The former, rising above political and racial groups, steadily pointed the way toward coöperation and unity within the republic; the latter won and held for Czechoslovakia a prominent place in the councils of Europe.

On February 29, 1920, before the boundaries of the new State had yet been definitely established, the Czechoslovak National Assembly approved a constitution, providing for a democratic, parliamentary régime. Under this constitution the National Assembly consists of a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate, both elected by universal, equal, secret, and compulsory suffrage, the former for six years and the latter for eight. Real power in the government rests in the Chamber of Deputies, which has both the right to enact legislation over the veto of the Senate and the right to compel the resignation of the ministry by a vote of no confidence. A legislative commission may pass temporary laws between sessions of the National Assembly in case of urgent need, and a constitutional court decides upon the constitutionality of laws after the manner of the Supreme Court of the United States. The President of the Republic is elected for a seven-year term by the National Assembly. On May 27, 1920, Professor Masaryk was elected President.

Next to the revolution itself the greatest accomplishment of the republic, according to President Masaryk, was the land reform, which, in his words, constituted the "crowning work and the genuine realiza-

tion" of the revolution. Before the reform, two per cent of the landowners of Bohemia owned more than twenty-five per cent of the land; less than one per cent of the landowners of Moravia owned nearly a third of the land; and in Slovakia about a thousand persons owned nearly half of the land. Most of these great estates owned by Germans had belonged to Czechs before the Bohemian Protestants were dispossessed by Emperor Ferdinand back in 1620. Land reform, therefore, had the double object of improving the lot of the peasants and righting a great historic wrong.

In April, 1919, a law providing for expropriation was passed, stipulating that the owner of an estate might not alienate, lease, mortgage, or divide his land without the consent of the State, and that when called upon to do so he must surrender it to the government. The maximum above which land might be expropriated was fixed at 375 acres for arable land and at 625 acres for other types. In January of the following year another law provided for the distribution of the land, its chief object being to create or enlarge individual holdings. Peasant holdings were fixed at from 15 to 25 acres, with 37.5 acres in case the quality and situation of the land made it necessary. Peasants might either lease or buy the land, but in the latter case they might not resell it within ten years without the consent of the State. The thinly settled sections of Slovakia presented a suitable field for colonization and a number of colonies were planted in that province.

Three months later a law providing for compensation was passed. All expropriated estates, except those belonging to the former royal family, were to be paid for at a rate based upon the average market price during the years 1913–15, with a reduction from this price for estates of more than 2,500 acres. The depreciated Czech crown was to be considered as the equivalent of the pre-war Austro-Hungarian crown in compensating the landowners. Peasants were required to pay in cash only one-tenth of the purchase price, the State extending credit for the rest. By 1926 the land reform was practically completed. One-third of the arable and meadow land originally subject to expropriation still remained in the hands of the large landowners, 200,000 acres were still in the form of tenancy, but over

2,000,000 acres had been divided into small holdings. In place of a few hundred large agrarians, more than half a million peasants had become owners of land.

The land reform movement inevitably affected the great ecclesiastical estates and brought friction between the Church and the State. This was accentuated by a strong nationalist reaction which occurred against the Roman Catholic Church, long used by the Habsburgs to assist them in the control of their subject nationalities. Under the former monarchs Church prelates in Bohemia had been German, not Czech, and German had been used by the Church in those parts of the service not conducted in Latin. In January, 1920, a Czechoslovak National Church split off from the Roman Catholic Church, differing from the latter in its independence of the Pope, its abolition of celibacy for the clergy, its use of the Czech language in church services and in its more democratic administration. In 1921 this National Church had about 525,000 adherents, and these had increased, it was asserted, to more than a million by 1924.

During the early years of the republic education was secularized, religious instruction in the schools being made voluntary. This step was deeply resented by the Slovak clericals, especially when it was followed by the establishment of hundreds of new schools in Slovakia where the clericals had long monopolized education in the interests of the Magyars. Another cause of friction arose out of the government's demand that all church dioceses in Czechoslovakia should conform with the frontiers of the new republic and should be under the jurisdiction of Czechoslovak prelates. Among Socialists and Nationalists there was even a strong movement for complete separation of Church and State.

In 1925 relations between Czechoslovakia and the Holy See were strained to the breaking point when the government designated as a national holiday July 6—the anniversary of the burning of John Huss for his Protestant views. The Vatican declared the celebration an affront to the Catholic Church and recalled the papal nuncio from Prague. The Czechoslovak minister was thereupon withdrawn from the Vatican, and for nearly three years normal diplomatic relations were severed. The Socialists seized the occasion to renew their

agitation for complete separation of Church and State. A political crisis was precipitated and Parliament, which had been elected only six months earlier, was dissolved. In the election which followed, one group demanded complete separation; the other, a definite concordat with the Pope. The outcome was indecisive. There was no separation of Church and State; neither was there a formal concordat.

During the succeeding two years negotiations were carried on between the government and the Holy See, and late in 1927 a *modus vivendi* was finally agreed upon. No diocese in Czechoslovakia was to be under the jurisdiction of a foreign prelate; all bishops in the country must be Czechoslovak citizens and take the oath of the republic; the State was to continue its payment of the salaries of the clergy. Early in 1928 the *modus vivendi* was approved, and in May normal diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and the Vatican were resumed.

Undoubtedly the most difficult domestic problem of the republic arose from the great number of its racial minorities, about a third of the total population being Germans, Magyars, Ruthenians, Jews, or Poles. The political and racial heterogeneity of parts of the country was well illustrated by elections for the Chamber of Deputies in March, 1924. In the province of Ruthenia thirteen different parties contested the eight seats, five of them succeeded in electing candidates, and the oath of office was taken in Ruthenian by four, in Magyar by two, and in Slovak and in Czech by one each.[10]

The rights of these minorities are protected by a minorities treaty signed by Czechoslovakia and by specific provisions of the Czechoslovak Constitution which guarantee the rights of all citizens without regard to language, race, or religion. Special schools for the minorities are provided,[11] and official business may be transacted in a minority language in districts where twenty per cent of the population belongs to that minority.

One of the most difficult phases of the minorities problem arose

[10] The printed matter on Czechoslovak bank notes is in three languages.

[11] In 1925, of the 13,984 elementary schools, 3,288 were German, 806 Magyar, 475 Ruthenian, 87 Polish; of the 1,702 higher grade schools, 430 were German, 18 Magyar, 11 Ruthenian, 9 Polish.

in Ruthenia, a province about the size of the state of Connecticut, lying at the eastern tip of the republic. This province, which provides Czechoslovakia and Rumania with the direct connections which were considered essential to complete the territorial ring about Hungary, was assigned to Czechoslovakia by the peace conference with the provision that it should be granted extensive local autonomy. The population is composed largely of Ruthenians who in 1919 were for the most part illiterate as a consequence of pre-war Magyar oppression. The Czechoslovak government feared that a Ruthenian diet, if established at once, would be dominated by the well-organized Magyars and Jews rather than by the Ruthenians, and therefore delayed establishing it.

In the meantime the government began the rapid introduction of an educational system and instituted throughout the province special courses of instruction in the Ruthenian language for government officials. The first governor appointed was an American of Ruthenian extraction, but in 1923 a native Ruthenian succeeded to the office. Although in the beginning most of the State officials of the district were not Ruthenians, by 1922 more than half were natives of the district. Nevertheless the government's delay in granting full autonomy to Ruthenia caused bitter complaints. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of Czechoslovak independence (October, 1928), the Ruthenians protested that the pledge guaranteeing Ruthenia complete autonomy had not been carried out, but that the territory was still ruled by Czech officials who did not speak the Ruthenian language and who were ignorant of local traditions.

The Czechs and Slovaks are officially regarded as forming one Czechoslovak nationality, and as such constitute the racial majority in the republic. Nevertheless the differences between them are marked. The Czechs have a very high degree of literacy and are inclined to be both socialistic in politics and agnostic in religion. The Slovaks, on the other hand, had in 1918 a high degree of illiteracy and as a conservative peasantry are for the most part loyal and pious Roman Catholics. It is perhaps not surprising therefore that friction de-

veloped between them. In the early years of the republic the Slovaks complained that the Czechs were monopolizing the administrative offices. The Slovak Popular party (Catholic) began to demand semi-autonomy for the province, and in 1924 went even so far as to hold meetings calling for a boycott on everything of Czech origin until the demand should be granted.

Meanwhile, the aim of the government, under the direction of Masaryk and Benesh, was not only fair treatment of the minorities but such a union of all groups of the population that distinctions of majority and minority would not be felt. In general that policy seems to have succeeded. Although at first the parliamentary representatives of the minorities remained in opposition, refusing to associate themselves with the government, their attitude gradually changed. During 1926, German and Magyar groups supported the ministry in a number of measures. In October of that year two Germans became members of the government, and three months later they were joined by two representatives of the Slovak Popular party.

Other evidences of racial reconciliation appeared. In 1927 German trade unions were admitted into the Czech National Trade Union Center, and German and Czech Social Democrats held a congress to plan for a future united policy. In the same year President Masaryk's reëlection showed three-quarters of the German deputies voting for him, whereas in 1920 all had been in opposition. On the tenth anniversary of the republic the Supreme Synod of Jewish Communities announced its decision to translate the Jewish Bible into the Czech language. Benesh's desire that the minorities should identify themselves with the interests of the State and feel it to be their own seems to be in a fair way to realization. On January 1, 1929, a new local autonomy law went into effect under which the country—except for Ruthenia, which now has an elective diet—is divided for administrative purposes into three districts. Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, and Slovakia were given three local councils which are partly elected and partly nominated. This step toward decentralization should go far toward removing the last causes of dissatisfaction.

The Little Entente

When in October, 1921, the Little Entente succeeded in preventing the return of Charles IV and in excluding the Habsburg dynasty from the throne of Hungary, one of its chief *raisons d'être* was removed. When Hungary, upon admission to membership in the League of Nations in September, 1922, made a declaration of her intention to observe her international obligations in accordance with the treaties which she had signed, another cause for fear in the ranks of the Little Entente was diminished. So long as there was no Habsburg menace, so long as the Treaty of Trianon was not threatened, there was little need for activity on the part of this alliance.

Nevertheless the Little Entente was continued, and in a general way came to take the place in European international relations formerly held by the Habsburg Empire. After the settlement of frontier difficulties between Poland and Czechoslovakia, the former was drawn into coöperation with the Little Entente although never formally becoming a member of the alliance. In the Genoa Conference (1922), the Little Entente and Poland as a bloc were given the status of a great power. In 1923, when the question of the financial reconstruction of Hungary was under consideration, the Little Entente took the initiative in bringing the matter before the League. It not only laid down certain conditions to be observed, but received representation on the League Council during the discussion of the problem.

The conciliatory attitude toward Hungary assumed by the Little Entente during 1923–24 did much to improve the general feeling in central Europe. Toward Austria, conciliatory advances had already been made by Benesh some years before. In December, 1921, Czechoslovakia and Austria had signed a convention pledging themselves (1) to execute fully the Treaties of St. Germain and Trianon, (2) to observe neutrality in case of an attack on either by a third power, (3) to suppress all movements in their respective territories which were directed against the other, (4) to coöperate to prevent a restoration of the old régime, and (5) to settle by peaceful means all

disputes which might arise between them. The treaty was renewed in 1926.

From 1924 on, the position of the Little Entente was somewhat altered. Although the three powers continued to hold periodic conferences, the need for concerted action for a time disappeared. Each tended to go its own way, while refraining from doing anything which might injure the interests of the other members. Gradually all three countries were drawn into the orbit of the great powers, particularly France and Italy, both of which were eager to extend their influence in central Europe. In the course of the following years these States signed treaties with each of the members of the Little Entente, pledging themselves to the maintenance of the status quo established by the peace treaties.[12] Italy went even further, however, and in 1927 signed a treaty of friendship and arbitration with the Hungarian government.

During the years 1927–28, revival of agitation both in favor of the *Anschluss* and in favor of the revision of the Hungarian frontiers as laid down by the Treaty of Trianon reawakened the Little Entente's fears. The alliance was suddenly galvanized into action when, in January, 1928, five railway cars of arms marked "sewing-machine parts" were discovered at a frontier station between Austria and Hungary. Although the shipment was addressed to a Czech town, it was generally believed that its real destination was Hungary, which by the Treaty of Trianon was strictly forbidden to import arms, munitions, and war material. The arms came from the Italian city of Verona.

The Little Entente at once denounced the affair as a violation of the Treaty of Trianon, and appealed to the League of Nations to make an investigation. Hungary asserted that the actual destination of the shipment was Poland, and furthermore denied the right of the League to intervene in the affair. The League Council asserted its competence, however, and proceeded to make an investigation. In June the Council decided that it was impossible to determine the final destination of the shipment, reasserted its own right to in-

[12] For the French treaties, see pp. 366, 371–72; for the Italian, see p. 447.

vestigate such affairs, carefully restated Hungary's obligations under the Treaty of Trianon, and let Hungary off with a mild rebuke for having destroyed the shipment contrary to the League's order. The Little Entente, however, continues as the watchdog of the status quo in central Europe, and any attempt to alter the situation created by the peace settlement will doubtless encounter its vigorous opposition.

CHAPTER XX

THE TURBULENT BALKANS

THAT the Balkans constituted before the war the storm center of Europe, and that the crisis which precipitated the world conflict had its beginning in that quarter of the Continent, are notorious. Local nationalist aspirations and conflicting imperialist intrigues of the great powers for years kept the Balkans in an unsettled and chaotic state. When the World War ended with the elimination of the long-standing Austro-Russian rivalry, when the victory of the Allies brought the final attainment of Jugoslav union, it was optimistically hoped that the Balkans might at last settle down to an orderly and peaceful existence. But repeated *coups d'état*, revolutions, dictatorships, border clashes, assassinations, and executions during the past decade have given constant evidence of continued unrest in the turbulent Balkans.

Greece

For repeated and spectacular reversals of political life, no Balkan State better exemplifies these unsettled conditions than Greece. The conflict between King Constantine and Venizelos during the war sharply divided the Greeks into two hostile groups, and after the King's forced abdication in 1917 [1] Greek politics became subject to sudden and unexpected shifts. For the most part the issues were in some way related to the outstanding Greek statesman of the period, Eleutherios Venizelos, and eventually all Greeks became either Venizelists or anti-Venizelists.

In 1919–20 Venizelos' prestige was great as a result of the Allied victory and the territorial gains which were apparently to come to Greece. He was a prominent figure at the peace conference, and outsiders looked upon him as one of the world's great statesmen. But dur-

[1] See p. 101.

ing his prolonged absence in Paris in the interests of Greece, his numerous opponents at home were busily undermining his position. The royalists declared that his place at the head of the government was the result of Allied intervention, not popular choice, and accused him of resorting to dictatorial methods in order to maintain himself in power. The masses, who had already been called upon by Venizelos to wage three wars in the period since 1912, were restless at the prospect of still a fourth in Asia Minor, and gave a ready ear to the charge that their long martyrdom was in the interest of an ambitious politician and for the benefit of Great Britain and France.

Popular discontent was given an opportunity to express itself in the parliamentary elections of November 14, 1920—the first in more than five years. The unexpected death of King Alexander in the preceding month injected into the campaign the question of Constantine's return, and made the elections a test of the immediate relative popularity of the premier and the ex-monarch. In such a contest Venizelos was handicapped, for he lacked the ability of the giant Constantine to inspire personal affection among the masses. The premier's Liberal party was decisively defeated, and Venizelos withdrew from Greece. In December a plebiscite was held on the return of Constantine and, despite the announced opposition of the Allies, it proved to be almost unanimously in favor of the deposed monarch, who entered Athens midst great popular enthusiasm on December 19, 1920. The Allies refused to recognize the restored ruler and immediately ceased their subsidies to the Greek government.

Unfortunately for Constantine, he inherited a difficult military campaign in Asia Minor, a campaign undertaken on the assumption of Allied assistance which was now no longer forthcoming. His presence on the throne came to be connected in the public mind with the appalling Greek military disaster of 1922.[2] Disappointment at the loss of Smyrna, alarm over the threatened loss of Thrace, belief that the army had been betrayed by the government and that Constantine was the obstacle in the way of close relations with the Allies, all reacted against the King, whose abdication was at once demanded

[2] See pp. 203–4.

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by the military chiefs. On September 27, 1922, Constantine surrendered his throne for the second time in a little over five years. In despair, the Greeks turned to Venizelos, feeling that without his influence they were lost. The earlier repudiated statesman was recalled to the service of his country and sent to salvage all that was possible for Greece at the Conference of Lausanne.[3]

Meanwhile Constantine's eldest son had succeeded to the throne as King George II. The real government, a military dictatorship, proceeded to execute one general and five members of previous ministries for their alleged part in bringing about the military disaster of 1922. Although popular government was suppressed and elections indefinitely postponed, the populace continued to discuss politics and gradually crystallized into three groups: the anti-Venizelist Royalists, the Venizelist Liberal Monarchists, and the Venizelist Republicans. Parliamentary elections, eventually held in December, 1923, resulted in a great majority for the Venizelists. The King and Queen were immediately requested to withdraw from the country until Parliament had reached some decision regarding the future government. George II thereupon went to Rumania "on a leave of absence," and Admiral Kountouriotes was appointed Regent.

Again the Greeks turned to Venizelos, inviting him to come to Athens to advise Parliament on the proper course to pursue. After some hesitation, the ex-premier agreed to return as a "provisional adviser," and in January, 1924, the distinguished exile once more took a hand in Greek domestic affairs. He was immediately chosen president of Parliament and finally in spite of ill health was even persuaded to assume the premiership. During the next two months he attempted to bring some order out of the chaos.

Venizelos opposed Parliament's desire to depose the King and advocated instead a popular plebiscite. A strong element in Parliament, however, insisted upon deposing the dynasty, and the resultant conflict, combined with his ill health, led Venizelos to resign from the premiership early in March. The great hopes based upon his return had not been realized. Two weeks after Venizelos left the country, Parliament passed a resolution overthrowing the Glücksburg dynasty,

[3] See pp. 204–6.

and a popular plebiscite on April 13, 1924, approved the establishment of a republic. On the following day, Admiral Kountouriotes was elected Provisional President of Greece.

The absence of a strong Royalist opposition from Parliament, together with the lack of an outstanding and dominant leader among themselves, resulted in internal dissension among the Republicans and a rapid succession of Republican cabinets. The drafting of a new constitution was meanwhile unnecessarily delayed. Suddenly, in June, 1925, the existing government was overturned by General Pangalos, an extreme nationalist Republican who opposed the government's conciliatory policy toward the Royalists at home and toward neighboring countries abroad. He dissolved Parliament and in January proclaimed himself a temporary dictator, whereupon Admiral Kountouriotes resigned the empty office of Provisional President.

Pangalos now made a feeble attempt to emulate Mussolini, declaring that parliamentary government was too weak, that what was needed to restore the ancient prestige of Greece and to exalt the Greek name was a strong government and a powerful army. In April, 1926, having practically eliminated all other candidates, he was elected President of Greece. But his new career was short-lived; in August he in turn was overthrown by a *coup d'état*, and Kountouriotes was recalled to assume the Provisional Presidency. New elections under a proportional system of representation resulted in a majority for no party, and under pressure from the commercial classes, a coalition government was organized in December, 1926. During the next eighteen months three different coalition governments held office.

Meanwhile, in 1927 Venizelos returned to his native land, having during his absence translated into modern Greek Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*. He disclaimed any intention of reentering public life but in May, 1928, disturbed by rumors of an intended Royalist revolt, he suddenly precipitated a political crisis by announcing his change of mind. Venizelos served notice that he would again lead the Liberal party, and finally in July once more became prime minister. He immediately dissolved Parliament, arbitrarily changed the scheme of representation from the propor-

tional to the majority system and held a new election on August 19. His Liberal party won an overwhelming victory at the polls, securing about ninety per cent of the seats in Parliament. Apparently the electorate, weary of the endless succession of weak and shifting governments, had again turned in despair to the country's only dominant personality.

Numerous problems of reconstruction confronted the veteran statesman. The new republican régime was not yet constitutionally established, the budget was becoming unbalanced, and the country's exports were insufficient to cover imports. Even more serious than these, in the eyes of Venizelos, was the fact that the preceding political vacillation of the government had brought Greece into comparative isolation among the European powers. Before domestic problems could be satisfactorily solved, the experienced diplomat declared, the republic's international position must be strengthened.

This the new premier at once set out to accomplish. During the fall of 1928 Venizelos visited Rome, Paris, London, and Belgrade, endeavoring to restore the ties of friendship with the former Allies which had been weakened by his overthrow in 1920. A treaty of friendship and understanding was at once signed with the Italian government, and in the following March a similar treaty was signed in Belgrade with the Jugoslav government. By the terms of the latter, all judicial questions which might arise between Greece and Jugoslavia were to be settled by the World Court. Other questions in dispute were to be referred to a permanent court of five members, and, if this court failed to settle them, they were to be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations. Earlier in the same month a serious cause of friction between Greece and Jugoslavia was removed when protocols were signed with Jugoslavia regulating the Jugoslav Free Zone in Saloniki.[4]

Meanwhile financial and constitutional problems of the republic were being solved. In May, 1929, an advantageous debt settlement with the United States was concluded, the debt being funded over a period of sixty-two years. In the same month a loan was floated in the United States for Greek improvement operations, especially in the

[4] See pp. 585–86.

region of Saloniki. Greece also made a payment of approximately $1,000,000 to Bulgaria as the first installment due to Bulgarian Macedonians whose property had been abandoned in Greece at the time of their migration to Bulgaria at the close of the war.[5] At the same time, the first half of 1929 saw the republican régime in Greece finally established. The upper house of Parliament, the Senate, was elected, and on June 3, 1929, the Senate and Chamber voting together chose Admiral Kountouriotes as the first constitutional President of the Greek Republic.

Along with the problem of securing political stability, Greece after the close of 1922 was compelled to wrestle with the necessity of assimilating some 1,200,000 refugees who came to her chiefly from Asia Minor and eastern Thrace as a consequence of the Greek military disaster of 1922 and the resultant treaties with Turkey in the following year.[6] The exigency which arose when the population of the country was thus suddenly increased by one-quarter, forced the republic to appeal to the League of Nations for assistance,[7] but in the course of succeeding years, the refugees were accommodated.

Despite the misery and suffering which this forced migration brought to those involved, the ultimate result for Greece was undoubtedly beneficial. Most of the naturally industrious Greeks from Asia Minor were settled in Greek Macedonia and western Thrace, to whose long-neglected regions they brought benefits somewhat analogous to those brought to the sandy wastes of Brandenburg by French Huguenots in the days of the Great Elector. New territories were put under cultivation, new crops were introduced, new industries were established, and the economic center of gravity in the republic was shifted in the direction of Saloniki. In this city a great international fair was inaugurated in 1927, in the hope that an annual gathering of merchants from Greece, Bulgaria, and southern Jugoslavia might make Saloniki the chief center of trade for this whole region.

But the effect of the influx of Greek refugees was not alone eco-

[5] See pp. 580–81.
[6] See pp. 205–6.
[7] See pp. 241–42.

nomic. It conferred a predominantly Greek character upon the republic's territory in Macedonia and western Thrace and thus removed from the agenda of international disputes the question of the racial composition of the districts. In this way it probably increased the stability of the political frontiers in that region of Greece, where for economic reasons both Bulgaria and Jugoslavia have long desired to establish themselves. Furthermore, the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations ended, for the immediate future at least, the century-long Greco-Turkish territorial conflict.

Jugoslavia

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—for brevity usually called Jugoslavia—comprises principally the descendants of three Slavic tribes which pushed their way into the Danube valley and into the northwestern part of the Balkan Peninsula in the seventh century. Despite their proximity and their kinship in race and language, the three peoples never before 1918 constituted parts of the same State. Furthermore, with the Serbs looking eastward to Constantinople, and the Croats and Slovenes looking westward and northward to Rome, Vienna, and Budapest, the three groups in the course of centuries developed many differences in customs, culture, and religion.

Nevertheless, a common racial heritage as Jugoslavs, a common hatred of the ruling Habsburgs, and a vigorous nationalist propaganda emanating from Serbia gradually brought the three groups to believe in a common nationality, and to envisage their future in a common Jugoslav State. Existing differences were recognized, and the Corfu Manifesto of 1917, the so-called "birth-certificate of Jugoslavia," seemed to take them all into consideration when it proclaimed to the world that the three peoples constituted a single nation; that their future State would be called "The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes"; that it would be "a constitutional, democratic, and parliamentary monarchy" under the ruling house of Serbia; that the new State would have a flag of its own and the three constituent members would in addition have their own flags which would "rank equally" and might "be freely hoisted on all occasions"; that the two

alphabets and the three religions prevalent among the Jugoslavs would likewise be of an equal rank; that suffrage in the new State would be universal, equal, direct, and secret; and that the future constitution would be framed by a special constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage.

But the spirit of conciliation and coöperation which the Corfu Manifesto so happily seemed to promise, failed to materialize. One question that famous document left to be decided, and the inability to settle it to the satisfaction of all caused continuous political unrest and occasional crises in the kingdom. Should Jugoslavia be a unitary or a federal State? Immediately after the collapse of the Central Powers and the disappearance of the Habsburg menace, the Jugoslavs split into two groups: those advocating a centralized State which should be in a general way an expansion of the former Serbian Kingdom, and those demanding a federal State with a considerable degree of local autonomy. The leader of the former was Nikolas Pashitch, the "Grand Old Man of Serbia"; of the latter, Stefan Raditch, the "Uncrowned King of Croatia."

The advocates of a unitary State argued that the Banat, Voivodina, and other former Hungarian territories were hopelessly backward politically, and that to create autonomous States of such districts would be most unwise. They pointed out that as a matter of fact Jugoslavia could not well be a federation of equals and that even in a federal system Serbian hegemony would inevitably result.They declared that the difficult and pressing task of national reconstruction and unification required the utmost use of all the forces at the disposal of the State, and asserted that these could be best marshaled under a strong central régime. But to all of these arguments the Croats, who had had self-government within the Habsburg Empire, replied that the marked differences between the various territories composing the new State made a federal system the only possible solution.

For a time the question remained largely in the realm of the academic, since Alexander, Prince Regent of Jugoslavia, refused to convoke a constituent assembly or to set a date for elections until the frontiers of the kingdom were definitely settled. For two years after the proclamation of the Jugoslav State, therefore, the government at

Belgrade ruled the whole kingdom through a provisional national assembly whose members obtained their seats in various ways. Since Raditch would not recognize the existence of a united Jugoslavia, his Croatian Peasant party refused the seats offered to it, and the majority in this national assembly was controlled by the Serbian Radical party, most bitter opponent of federalization, and the Jugoslav Democratic party, which took a middle stand, calling for centralization in legislation but decentralization in administration.

After the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo with Italy had apparently settled the question of Jugoslavia's Adriatic territory, elections for a constituent assembly were held on November 28, 1920. Raditch's Croatian Peasant party succeeded in electing fifty deputies but, as in the case of the provisional assembly, they refused to take their seats, so that Pashitch was able to create a working majority. The Serbian statesman was determined to secure the adoption of a centralist constitution, and he succeeded in carrying through his program.

The Jugoslav Constitution of June 28, 1921, therefore, provided for a centralized government which should apply equally to all parts of the country in order eventually to do away with localism and obliterate regional differences. Old historic frontiers were erased and provincial diets were supplanted by one national Parliament (*Skupshtina*) in Belgrade. Local officials were to be chosen directly by the people, but in the conduct of their offices they were to be subject to national supervision exercised by the minister of finance and by prefects appointed by him. According to Professor Seton-Watson, who did much to bring about the formation of Jugoslavia at the close of the war, the constitution "placed undue power in the hands of an incompetent clique in Belgrade, and speedily produced deterioration in all branches of the administration—especially in the former Austro-Hungarian provinces."

Nevertheless, local autonomous civil government on an elective basis was provided for departments, districts, communes, and cities. Each department was to have a departmental assembly and an executive committee chosen from it. These local authorities were to be charged with the management of departmental finances; the admin-

istration of public property; the care of public health, social welfare, humane institutions, and education; the upkeep of means of communication; the oversight of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and hunting; and the establishment and maintenance of seed stations, touring clubs, and mutual loan and insurance institutions. Departmental regulations enacted by the departmental assembly on these matters were to have the force of law, and to be applied by the executive committee. District assemblies were likewise stipulated, but, apparently in view of the varied conditions in the kingdom, local governmental agencies in the communes and cities were left to be determined by law.

The constitution was bitterly opposed in the Constituent Assembly. Trumbitch, joint signer with Pashitch of the Corfu Manifesto, voted against it, as did Protitch, formerly Pashitch's most intimate friend. But the constitution was finally adopted despite the fact that 158 members of the Assembly refused to approve it on the final roll call. On June 28, 1921, the Prince Regent took the oath to the new constitution, and from that day "Revisionism" became the chief political issue in the kingdom, an issue which at times arbitrarily cut across all party lines. Within the Radical party both Trumbitch and Protitch championed "Revisionism" while in the Democratic party Davidovitch did the same.

The first elections to Parliament were held in March, 1923, and resulted in large gains for the parties of the two opponents, Pashitch and Raditch. The former attempted to come to some agreement with the Croatian peasant leader, but his efforts were unavailing. Raditch again refused to allow the Croatian Peasant deputies to take their seats, and Pashitch was thus once more enabled to form a ministry. After another year of boycott, Raditch apparently came to the conclusion that the only result of his party's abstention was to perpetuate Pashitch in power. Accordingly, the deputies of the Croatian party returned to Parliament and caused Pashitch's resignation in March, 1924.

During the following months government in Jugoslavia came nearly to a standstill as ministry followed ministry. All attempts to conciliate Raditch were fruitless. At last in despair, King Alexander

turned once more to the octogenarian leader, Pashitch. Parliament was at once dissolved, Raditch was imprisoned on the charge of high treason and conspiracy, and during the succeeding electoral campaign strong-arm methods were used by the government in an attempt to crush the opposition. Despite these measures, however, in February, 1925, the Croatian Peasant party elected practically the same number of deputies as before.

In the next month Raditch suddenly changed his tactics. Although still in prison himself, he announced through his nephew that the Croatian Peasant party had decided to recognize the monarchy, the dynasty, and even the Constitution of 1921. Apparently Raditch had come to the conclusion that only through parliamentary action could the Croats improve their condition. The Peasant leader was released from prison, members of his party were given portfolios in the government, and in November, 1925, Raditch himself entered the cabinet as minister of education. His inability to refrain from attacks on his colleagues, however, brought the end of the coalition in April, 1926.

The continued intransigence of the Croatian Peasant leader made parliamentary government difficult during the next two years, especially after the country was deprived of its most experienced statesman by the death of Pashitch in December, 1926. Further elections did not alter materially the complexion of Parliament, each racial group usually controlling about the same number of seats. In the spring of 1928 the breach between the Croatian Peasants and the Serbs appeared to be wider than ever. The Croats declared that the efforts to create a united kingdom out of the three groups had failed because of the Serb leaders' selfish desire for power, and went so far as to suggest a dictatorship with an army officer at the head of the government.

Affairs came to a crisis on June 20 when Raditch attacked the government for its proposal to ratify the Nettuno Convention [8] with Italy, which Croatians declared was inimical to their interests. Angered by the speech, a supporter of the government fired upon leaders and members of the Croatian Peasant party, killing two and

[8] See p. 447.

wounding several others. Among the latter was Raditch himself, who died from the effects of his wound on August 8. The Croatian deputies withdrew from Parliament and set up a rival body at Zagreb, where they passed resolutions refusing to recognize laws enacted by the "Rump" Parliament at Belgrade. On October 1 delegates representing Croatia and Dalmatia met at Zagreb and decided to establish a close union to work independently of the Belgrade government and to boycott Serbia.

In November the government declared its willingness to accept any basis of agreement that would be in the interest of Jugoslavia as a whole, and even suggested that it would be willing, subject to popular approval, to make changes in the constitution in order to give wide autonomy to Croatia, Dalmatia, and the other discontented provinces. The Croatian leaders, however, refused to deal with the government, and declared that only if overtures were made by the King himself would they discuss the situation. On December 1, 1928, Croatia refused to participate in the national celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Jugoslav State.

Five weeks later King Alexander decided to resort to drastic measures. Declaring that the nation's confidence in Parliament had been undermined by recent events, that parliamentarism, instead of developing and strengthening the feeling of national union, had begun to provoke moral disorganization and national disunion, the King on January 5, 1929, dissolved Parliament, abrogated the Constitution of 1921, and called upon General Zhivkovitch, commander of the guard division stationed in Belgrade, to head a new government. The new ministry, which was to govern the country by decree pending the complete reform of the constitution, was composed of representatives from Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, and Dalmatia.

Jugoslavia was temporarily transformed into an absolute monarchy, the King assuming complete and sole authority over every officer of State. The department and district councils were dissolved in favor of royal commissioners. Severe restrictions were placed upon the press, penalties were established for criticizing or resisting measures of the dictatorship, the carrying of arms was forbidden, and all political gatherings were prohibited unless authorized by the police. A gov-

ernment decree provided for the institution of a legislative advisory commission—to be appointed by the prime minister on the proposal of the minister of justice—which was to take the place of Parliament. "Unfortunately," wrote Seton-Watson, "the statesmen who controlled Jugoslavia's destinies in the post-war period were less worthy of the occasion than the soldiers who had endured to victory or than the peasant masses who made victory possible."

Albania

To the west of Jugoslavia and Greece lies Albania, the smallest and weakest of the Balkan States, with an area equal to that of Denmark but with only a quarter of the latter's population. The country, which gained its independence in 1913, was at that time a most backward and primitive region, having no railways and very few roads. Schools and newspapers were exceedingly scarce, and illiteracy was general. The population was for the most part agricultural or pastoral, organized on an almost feudal basis, and largely lacking in national sentiment.

In fact the question was raised then, and has subsequently been repeatedly raised, as to whether there should be an independent Albania. In 1913 Serbia and Russia, on the one hand, and Austria and Italy, on the other, nearly came to blows on this point.[9] Albania's independent existence, therefore, resulted principally from the jealousies of her neighbors. Had it not been for the opposition of Italy and Austria, her territory might have been divided between Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro at the time of the Balkan wars.

During the World War the dismemberment of Albania was contemplated, but at the peace conference President Wilson steadily opposed its partition. Italy sought a mandate for the region, most of which she had occupied in the course of the war, but the military opposition of the Albanians led the Italians to recognize their independence and to withdraw from the country in the fall of 1920.[10] At that time the status and territorial extent of Albania were still uncertain, though the existing Albanian government controlled

[9] See pp. 11–12.
[10] See p. 47.

most of the region which had been assigned to the State in 1913.

Despite the desire of Greece and Jugoslavia to partition the country, Albania's independence was recognized by her admission to membership in the League of Nations in December, 1920. During the following year, while the question of boundaries was still unsettled, repeated incursions into Albania were made by bands from Jugoslavia, and disruptive revolutionary movements were encouraged and assisted with money, arms, and ammunition sent in from Jugoslavia. This menacing situation was eventually ended by action of the League of Nations.[11]

Meanwhile, within Albania the question of future government was being settled. A monarchical régime had been originally set up with a German prince as ruler, but he had been forced to leave the country soon after the outbreak of the World War. Early in 1920 a temporary regency council of notables was elected in place of the monarch, but real power resided in a ministry. A struggle for control immediately ensued, the chief figures being Ahmed Zogu, a young tribal chieftain who from the age of sixteen had been fighting in the cause of the Albanian mountaineers, and Bishop Fan Noli, a former Harvard student who had worked in the United States in the cause of Albanian independence.

After frequent changes in the government during a period of three years, Ahmed Zogu at length ousted Fan Noli by military force in December, 1924. Early in the following year a national assembly was convoked, a republic proclaimed, and Zogu elected President for a seven-year term. The constitution, subsequently adopted, provided for a bicameral legislature but placed the chief power in the hands of the President, who had an absolute veto on legislation, the sole right to initiate changes in the constitution, authority to dissolve Parliament at will, and the right to apply the previous year's budget in case of Parliament's failure to vote a new one. In fact, Zogu differed little from a dictator.

The President's task was to create a modern State. Government, law, and police; roads, bridges, and railways; grammar, syntax, dictionaries, and education—all these were required. To secure the

[11] See p. 227.

capital which he so much needed, he entered into close relations with Italy. To secure an entering wedge for the economic domination of this weak State on the opposite shore of the Strait of Otranto, Italy gladly advanced the necessary funds. The Treaty of Tirana which resulted (1926) [12] placed a strain not only upon Jugoslav-Albanian relations but upon Jugoslav-Italian relations as well.

Zogu was soon suspected of the desire to don a royal robe, and in September, 1928, the National Assembly formally proclaimed him King. Of all the States of Europe which became republics following the war, Albania has the distinction of being the only one which later elected a King.

Bulgaria

The political history of Bulgaria since the war, although not so kaleidoscopic as that of Greece nor so long in an unsettled state as that of Jugoslavia, has been far from calm and uneventful. The military defeat of Bulgaria brought the immediate abdication and flight of King Ferdinand, who had been largely responsible for the country's joining the Central Powers, and the elevation to the throne of his young son, Boris III, who in succeeding years proved to be as democratic as his father before him had been autocratic.

Military defeat likewise brought the downfall of the existing government and eventually (October, 1919) the elevation to the premiership of the leader of the Agrarian party, Alexander Stambolisky, who had dared to oppose the royal proposal to join the Central Powers in 1915 and had at once been imprisoned for his temerity. The collapse of the Bulgarian front in the fall of 1918 had been followed by Stambolisky's release from prison, and his return to active leadership of the peasants. Under his guidance the Agrarian party won a decisive victory in the parliamentary elections of March, 1920, in consequence of which a homogeneous Agrarian ministry was established.

Then followed a three-year period of Agrarian rule in which the rôle of Stambolisky differed not materially from that of dictator. The reaction against those responsible for Bulgaria's entry into the war continued and caused the arrest of the ministers who had been in

[12] See p. 447.

power in 1915 and their trial on the charge of declaring war without the sanction of Parliament. Although Radoslovoff, the premier in 1915, escaped to Germany before the trial, he and five others were sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor. Others were given prison terms of from five to ten years, and the fines which were imposed amounted to about $160,000,000.

Bulgaria is essentially a land of petty peasant proprietors, and there was no great need of land reform. Nevertheless, the Agrarian government sought to bring about a more equitable distribution of land between small and middle-sized farms, on the theory that no person should possess more land than he could work. In May, 1921, Church lands, Crown lands, and private estates in excess of seventy-five acres were expropriated. Owners who were not themselves cultivators were limited to from six to twenty-five acres. By the close of 1923 about 4,750 acres had been assigned to 780 persons.

The great weakness of Stambolisky's régime was its devotion to the interests of practically one class, to the exclusion of the so-called upper classes. In 1923 the premier declared that the Agrarian party would "keep at the head of national affairs until the country is rid of the old and pernicious parties, until the peasantry and the working-classes get rid of their parasites, the lawyers, bankers, profiteers, idle politicians and mischievous doctrinaires, and the people in general of its frenzied partisans." The Agrarian leaders became ever more overbearing and intolerant. Freedom of the press was abolished, leaders of bourgeois parties were imprisoned, universities were closed, the Church was defied.

Inevitably the neglected and oppressed classes drew together. The bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, and the military discovered a common bond in their hatred of the Agrarian régime. A conspiracy was entered into and plans were laid for the overthrow of Stambolisky's government. On June 9, 1923, all the ministers were suddenly arrested except Stambolisky, who was absent from the capital. A new government representing all opposition parties but the Communists was formed with Alexander Tsankoff, a professor in the University of Sofia, as premier. Stambolisky himself was later captured and shot, and his Parliament, on the ground that it had been elected in

the preceding April by fraud and violence, was at once dissolved.

The new middle-class government, comprising professors, lawyers, jurists, and generals, was called upon during succeeding months to deal with the unrest of the masses, who were being subjected to the propaganda of the Communists. The latter, in September, 1923, finally instigated a revolt in an attempt to replace the monarchy with a soviet republic, and thousands of peasants, bereft of their former leader, gave it their support. Although the uprising became so serious that at one time Sofia was practically surrounded and King Boris offered to resign, it was in the end successfully suppressed.

In April, 1925, came a second Communist attempt when a bomb was exploded in the Cathedral of St. Nedelia in Sofia at a time when it was crowded for the funeral of a recently assassinated general. Most of the members of the government were in attendance. More than a hundred persons were killed and several hundred were injured, including prime minister Tsankoff and some of his associates. The attempt to stir up a widespread simultaneous uprising in the provinces failed. A counter terrorism was at once inaugurated by the government; martial law was proclaimed; thousands were arrested; many were put to death. So severe did the measures of the government become that even King Boris himself was led to remonstrate.

For the work of reconciliation and pacification which the country now needed, the Tsankoff government, identified as it was with the *coup d'état* of 1923 and the severe repressive measures of 1925, came to be considered unfit. Early in January, 1926, Tsankoff was succeeded as prime minister by Andre Liaptcheff, one of the leaders of the Democratic party, a man of more moderation. In the following month an amnesty was proclaimed liberating over six thousand political prisoners, though still leaving several hundred others in jail. Parliamentary elections in May, 1927, gave Liaptcheff a large majority, but this would seem to indicate little, for every election in Bulgaria since the war has returned a majority in favor of the government in power at the time. Even under the more moderate Liaptcheff, however, Communist plots continued, and as late as February, 1929, over one hundred Communists were arrested as a result of the discovery of a plan to overthrow the government.

The Macedonian Question

Probably the most serious menace to international peace in the Balkans is the continued unrest in what is called Macedonia, a district which has not constituted a separate political unit for centuries and whose boundaries in consequence are somewhat difficult to define. In general, it includes the valleys of the Vardar and Struma rivers and the peninsula of Saloniki. It extends from Thrace on the east to Albania and Epirus on the west, and in the north it merges into the Sanjak of Novibazar.

For more than a generation there has been a "Macedonian question." As early as 1893, while the district was still included within the Ottoman Empire, agitation for autonomy was begun by a Macedonian revolutionary committee. At the same time Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece all laid claim to the district on historic grounds, and the first two also on linguistic grounds. But since the Serbs and Bulgars are themselves kindred nationalities, speaking similar languages, it is difficult to determine to which of them the intermediary dialects belong.[13]

The Bulgarians at one time actually had Macedonia within their grasp when Russia by the Treaty of San Stefano (1878) obtained it for them. The great powers intervened, however, and the Congress of Berlin immediately restored it to Turkey. In 1912 Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia united to oust the Turk from Europe, and at the close of the war Macedonia was divided between them, the larger part going to Bulgaria. But the latter considered her share insufficient, and fought the Second Balkan War to increase it. Instead, being disastrously defeated, she was deprived of all Macedonia except the small northeastern corner. Again during the World War the Bulgarians made an attempt to win the coveted region and for a time

[13] "It [the Macedonian question] presents, on the one hand, such a medley of jarring races, long-standing animosities, and ever-recurring atrocities, and, on the other hand, such a jumble of ethnographic riddles, philological controversies, psychological uncertainties, unreliable statistics, assertions and counter-assertions flatly contradictory on every point, that one almost despairs of an idea as to how it ought to be settled, or of the hope of ever seeing it settled at all."—C. H. Haskins and R. H. Lord, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*, pp. 267–68.

again held it, but the peace conference in 1919 restored it to Greece and Serbia in accordance with the pre-war situation.

The Macedonians themselves have never been consulted regarding the fate of their district. By the time of the Balkan Wars part of them had come to support the Bulgarian cause, and another somewhat smaller portion the Serbian cause, but the great majority were apparently inert and undecided. Agitation for an autonomous Macedonia meanwhile continued, and eventually won the sympathy of the Bulgarians, who dreamed of a modern Macedonia which should be dependent upon Bulgaria for the defense of its territorial integrity, and be bound to her by ties of close kinship. The post-war years have seen in divided Macedonia a strong movement for independence, championed by bands of *comitadjis*, and directed by the Macedonian Revolutionary Committee.

The Treaty of Neuilly provided for a voluntary reciprocal emigration of Greeks and Bulgarians, and the tremendous influx of Greeks from Turkey after 1922 completely altered the racial character of Greek Macedonia. Whereas the Greeks had formerly comprised only about forty-three per cent, they now constitute ninety per cent of the population of the district. The racial question in Greek Macedonia was thus largely solved, though not, the Bulgarians declare, without the forcible expulsion of many of their kinsmen. In Serbian Macedonia, however, despite the fact that the Jugoslav government constantly maintains that no such people as Macedonians or Bulgarians exist within their frontiers, the discontent of the Macedonian population, which is being subjected to "Serbization," has continued to make itself felt at frequent intervals.

After the World War over two hundred thousand refugees and exiles from Greek and Serbian Macedonia flocked into Bulgaria, where they formed a well organized and well armed group. These homeless masses constituted a grave domestic problem for Bulgaria, embarrassing the government's foreign policy by their constant demands for the redemption of their Bulgarian "irredenta," complicating the political situation by providing a fertile field for Communist propaganda, and frequently disturbing the ordered existence of the country by their brigandage. They repeatedly made life miserable

for Bulgarian statesmen, who probably wished at times that Jugoslavia had the Macedonians along with Macedonia. After 1926 the League of Nations assisted Bulgaria in the handling of her Macedonian problem by approving an international loan for the settlement of the refugees.[14]

But these refugees have further been largely responsible for preventing more cordial relations among the Balkan States. In that district of Bulgaria which is located near the convergence of the frontiers of Greece, Jugoslavia, and Bulgaria, the Macedonian *comitadjis* established a base of operations for guerrilla warfare, and their revolutionary activities repeatedly excited alarms and protests on the part of neighboring States. A vicious circle was created, the perpetual suspicion and ill will between the Balkan States militating against any measures to improve the situation, and the situation in turn engendering more ill will.

Clashes along the Greco-Bulgarian and Jugoslav-Bulgarian frontiers have continued throughout the post-war period. In June, 1922, Jugoslavia, Greece, and Rumania addressed a joint note to Bulgaria complaining of repeated incursions from the latter's territory. Two years later Greece protested against the ill treatment of Greeks in the Bulgarian village of Voden. In the following month the Greek mayor of that village was murdered, and almost simultaneously on the Greek side of the line in the village of Tarlis, seventeen Bulgarians were massacred by order of a Greek officer. In 1925 came the serious Greco-Bulgarian border clash at Petritch which was prevented from developing into war only by the energetic action of the League of Nations.[15]

In the summer of 1926 an attack on a Jugoslav village by a band of *comitadjis* provoked another joint note of protest from Jugoslavia, Greece, and Rumania. The Bulgarian government did what it could to restore order on the frontiers, affirmed its sincere desire to keep the peace, pointed out the difficulties under which it labored, and invited the coöperation of its neighbors. The great numbers of unsettled refugees in Bulgaria who looked forward either to returning

[14] See p. 242.
[15] See pp. 233–35.

to their former homes across the border or to avenging themselves on those who had driven them out, made the situation extremely difficult for Bulgaria to control.

This was especially true because of the activities of the Macedonian Revolutionary Committee, which openly announced:

> There will be true peace, a lasting peace, in the Balkans, when each historic community, Macedonia included, governs itself. . . . This country is one and indivisible both by the laws of nature and by the wish of its inhabitants; nevertheless it is divided into three parts. And the constant crisis in the Balkans is due to foreign rule established in Macedonia. . . . The Central Committee of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization . . . will continue the struggle until it achieves Macedonia's autonomy. . . . The means by which this struggle will be pursued . . . depend on those who govern Macedonia.

For a time after 1926 the revolutionary activities of the organization decreased, and it adopted a policy of constitutional agitation for an autonomous Macedonia within a federal Jugoslavia. But its demands were received in Belgrade with even less sympathy than those of the Croatians, and in the fall of 1927 renewed *comitadji* activities culminated in the assassination of a famous Serbian general. Jugoslavia thereupon closed its frontier against Bulgarians. Raids and assassinations continued throughout 1928, but suggestions of a conference of representatives of the Jugoslav, Greek, and Bulgarian governments were futile.

Finally, in February, 1929, after the establishment of the dictatorship in Jugoslavia, the Belgrade government took a conciliatory step by reopening the Bulgarian frontier. The new government's desire for better relations with its neighbor and for some joint means of combating the *comitadji* evil was reciprocated by Bulgaria, and late in February negotiations between the two governments were begun at Pirot which led to a protocol for the regulation of the frontier.

The Question of Outlets to the Ægean

Another question which has disturbed the international relations of the Balkan States is that of adequate outlets to the Ægean for

Bulgarian and Jugoslav trade. As a result of the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 Bulgaria gained an outlet upon the Ægean by the annexation of western Thrace. This territory she lost, however, by the Treaty of Neuilly, but in that treaty the Allied Powers undertook to insure her economic outlets to the Ægean. In the treaty which later (August, 1920) gave western Thrace to Greece, the Allies stipulated that Bulgaria was to have freedom of transit over the territories and in the ports involved, and that in the port of Dedeagach she was to be granted a lease in perpetuity.

These provisions failed to satisfy Bulgaria, and at the Conference of Lausanne (1923) when the Near Eastern settlement was being revised, Stambolisky presented the Bulgarian case. He declared that it was impossible and inadmissible that Bulgaria's outlet to the Ægean should be across either Turkish or Greek territory, and demanded that western Thrace be transformed into a neutral zone which Bulgaria's railway system might cross and in which she might construct her ports. He definitely rejected the Allied proposal that a free port for all nations be constructed at Dedeagach and that the port and the railway connecting it with Bulgaria be administered by an international commission, asserting:

> It is only by direct possession of the territory in the neighborhood of the railway and port, or by placing that territory under a completely autonomous régime, economically tied to Bulgaria by special stipulations, that the port of Dedeagach can be constructed, controlled and developed in accordance with the economic interests of Bulgaria.

He likewise refused to accept the Greek proposal of a Bulgarian free zone in Saloniki similar to that being arranged for Jugoslavia.

The Allies declared that at Lausanne they had done their best to carry out their obligations under the Treaty of Neuilly, and that their failure had been because of Bulgaria's attitude. They thereafter left the solution of the question to direct negotiations between Greece and Bulgaria. At Lausanne Venizelos had stated that Greece fully recognized Bulgaria's need for free access to the Ægean, and two years later (October, 1925) the Greek government voluntarily established a free zone in Saloniki for the use of all Balkan States, including, of course, Bulgaria. But the latter still maintained

that its requirements had not been met, and continues to fret at the thin strip of Greek territory that shuts her off from the near-by Ægean.

Greek territory likewise cuts Jugoslavia off from her most natural and convenient access to the sea, which is at Saloniki. In 1906, when that port was still in Turkish territory, the Ottoman government granted Serbia a lease on part of the harbor, and conceded her the right of free entry and export. After the Balkan Wars, Greece—which then controlled Saloniki—signed a treaty providing for a Serbian free zone, but the World War intervened before either State had ratified the agreement. Not until November, 1922, was the treaty finally approved by the Greek government, but Jugoslavia by this time was dissatisfied with its provisions and refused to ratify it.

Fresh negotiations were undertaken and resulted on May 10, 1923, in the signing of a new convention which provided that an area of 94,000 square meters in the port of Saloniki should be under Jugoslav customs administration (but under Greek law and police supervision), and that goods passing between the free zone and the Jugoslav frontier should be exempt from Greek taxes. A year later ratifications of the convention were exchanged and on March 6, 1925, Jugoslav authorities assumed actual control of the zone.

But the Jugoslavs were still dissatisfied. They declared that the zone was too small for their needs, that such exports as cattle, horses, lumber, cement, and grain required more room for efficient handling. They complained that the disastrously slow and inefficient service on the forty-eight-mile section of the railway between Saloniki and Gevgeli on the Jugoslav frontier was detrimental to their export of such perishable goods as poultry, meat, cheese, and eggs. Furthermore, the traffic rates on goods shipped over this short Greek section of the railway were four times as high as those on the Jugoslav section. But Jugoslavia's attempts to secure the removal of these handicaps to her foreign trade through Saloniki received little attention from Greece.

Within six months of the ratification of the Saloniki Free Zone Convention, Jugoslavia, in order to bring pressure upon Greece,

stated that, although she was willing to conclude a new defensive agreement to take the place of the Greco-Serb Treaty of Alliance which had been denounced in 1915, several questions including that of the free zone must first be adjusted. The Greek government's desire to smooth the way for negotiations became evident when it announced early in 1925 that freight rates on the Gevgeli-Saloniki line would be reduced to the approximate level of those in Jugoslavia and that various improvements in that section of the railway were contemplated. In the negotiations which opened on April 27, Jugoslavia demanded the enlargement of the free zone and her practical ownership of both the zone and the railway leading to it. These demands, together with her demand for a special minorities agreement, were opposed by Greece, and negotiations finally broke down on June 1.

During the special session of the League of Nations Assembly in March, 1926, however, the foreign ministers of Greece and Jugoslavia reopened negotiations and ultimately reached an agreement in principle on the provisions of a new convention. Subsequent negotiations resulted in the signing at Athens on August 17 of a treaty of friendship and conciliation and of a series of technical conventions. By these agreements the Jugoslav Free Zone was to be extended by about 10,000 square meters, and a Jugoslav representative was to collaborate with the Greek administration of the Gevgeli-Saloniki railway. Disputes which arose over the administration of the railway were to be settled by a French arbitrator. Unfortunately for the settlement, within five days after the signature of the agreement, the Pangalos government was overthrown by a *coup d'état*. The new government insisted that Pangalos had gone too far in his concessions, and the treaty and conventions were at length unanimously rejected by the Greek Parliament in August, 1927.

With the return to power in Greece of the statesman who had originally brought about close relations between that country and Serbia in the years preceding the Balkan Wars, relations between the two States rapidly improved. Venizelos visited Belgrade soon after becoming premier and paved the way for the renewal of negotiations which were formally begun early in 1929. Six protocols regarding the Jugoslav Free Zone in Saloniki and the administration of

the Gevgeli-Saloniki railway were eventually signed in Geneva on March 18. All points at issue between the two States were settled, though quite apparently Jugoslavia surrendered some of her demands of 1926. The free zone is to remain restricted to the area stipulated in 1923 and Jugoslavia is to have no share in the administration of the Gevgeli-Saloniki railway. The rights acquired by Jugoslav capitalists in this railway are ceded to the Greek government in return for a payment of 20,000,000 gold francs. On the other hand every facility is to be provided for Jugoslav commerce. Special direct trains are to run regularly between the Jugoslav frontier and the free zone. Disputes which may arise are to be settled by a jointly appointed arbitrator or, in case of nonagreement, by the League of Nations.

CHAPTER XXI

THE NEW EUROPE

PROFOUND and sweeping changes have occurred in Europe in the years since 1914. Long-established national frontiers have been obliterated, widely accepted political institutions overturned, the course and conduct of international relations modified, new and perplexing economic problems introduced, and the ranks of various social classes altered and in some cases transformed. So far-reaching have been the effects of war and post-war experiences that it has become almost the custom to speak of "The New Europe."

Political Tendencies

Probably the most obvious change which has occurred during the period under discussion is in Europe's political geography. Thousands of miles of new frontiers have been established, and the total number of countries has risen from twenty-one to twenty-seven. Five States —Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, and Russia—decreased in territory, while three others—the Dual Monarchy, Montenegro, and Serbia—disappeared. Six States—Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy and Rumania—received additions of territory, while eight entirely new States appeared: Czechoslovakia, Esthonia, Finland, the Irish Free State, Jugoslavia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. In the latter group, the task of creating a sentiment of genuine national solidarity and of uniting and reconciling the interests of peoples who were in some instances unaccustomed to living in the same State, proved occasionally to be exceedingly difficult and frequently precipitated political crises of one kind or another.

The new States and the territorial additions to old States were carved almost entirely from lands of the former Habsburg, Romanov, and Hohenzollern empires. This arose chiefly from the Allied victory in the World War and from the fact that these empires had

constituted before 1914 the most flagrant examples of the transgression of the principle of nationality. During the war, nationalism and self-determination as the deciding factors in the location of political frontiers were loudly proclaimed, and the peace conference made a real effort to draw the new boundaries in conformity thereto. As a consequence, the period witnessed a great advance toward nationalism, and the Continent is today more nearly organized into national States than ever before in the course of its history.

The States themselves, not only the new but some of the old as well, have shown a marked tendency toward the republican form of government. Whereas in 1914 there were only three republics in Europe, today they number twelve. Of the six great European powers before the war, only France was a republic; of the five great powers today, only two—Italy and Great Britain—still remain monarchies. Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Romanov dynasties have all disappeared, and today by far a large majority of the people of Europe live in republican States. And in most of the monarchies which still remain, the period has seen so wide an extension of the franchise that they have become, for all practical purposes, democracies with honorary presiding monarchs.

Nor has the extension of the franchise continued to be limited as in pre-war days to the male population. A widespread tendency toward granting women the same political rights as men has appeared in Europe, and the change since 1914 is most pronounced. In the latter year Norway alone, among the independent States, had extended the parliamentary franchise to women, though Finland allowed women to vote for members of her local diet. None of the great powers had as yet seriously contemplated woman suffrage. Today at least nineteen States have conferred the ballot upon women, and included in the number are the three great powers, Germany, Great Britain, and Russia. In France the question has been raised, but apparently fear of clerical control of the government has so far prevented the step.

Political organization of Europe in general accordance with nationality, decline of monarchy, spread of republicanism, expansion

of the suffrage, extensive admission of women to political rights,[1] and general adoption of progressive political machinery for registering the will of the people—these are the entries of the period on the credit side of the ledger of liberalism. But on the debit side must be entered the post-war tendency toward the breakdown of parliamentary democracy, for the reconstruction of Europe has been accompanied by at least a dozen *coups d'état*, and in eleven different States, at one time or another, régimes have been established which have been generally characterized as dictatorships.

The rule of the proletariat in Russia, the Horthy-Bethlen régime in Hungary, the rôle of Mussolini in Italy, the Stambolisky and Tsankoff dictatorships in Bulgaria, the brief Pangalos episode in Greece, the rule of Ahmed Zogu in Albania, the ascendancy of Pilsudski in Poland and of Voldemaras in Lithuania, and the most recent resort to dictatorial methods in Jugoslavia, have already been discussed. But these were not all.

In Spain in September, 1923, military reverses in Morocco, ministerial instability in the government, mismanagement and corruption of professional politicians, and industrial unrest among the workers finally culminated in a *coup d'état* by General Primo de Rivera. Although Alfonso XIII continued as King, the actual government became a military dictatorship. Parliament was set aside, and De Rivera was appointed president of a military directorate which, late in 1925, was transformed into a civilian cabinet under his control. In September, 1926, a plebiscite was held on the convocation of a national assembly, and late in the following year the assembly was inaugurated, but the constitution which it drafted in 1928 has not yet been put into operation. Attempted military revolts in 1926 and in 1929 and occasional rioting of students and workers have failed to alter materially De Rivera's autocratic régime.

In Portugal, where the government has been unstable ever since the proclamation of the republic in 1910, General Antonio Carmona by a *coup d'état* in July, 1926, overthrew the existing régime, and became prime minister and minister of war. Parliament was indefinitely suspended and a few months later Carmona assumed the

[1] In June, 1929, a woman was appointed a member of the British Cabinet.

Presidency of the republic. In March, 1928, after having eliminated all other candidates, he was officially elected President in a popular election.

Quite apparently the term "dictatorship" has been loosely employed during the post-war period, for there are profound differences in such régimes as those existing in Russia, Italy, Poland, and Spain. In general the term has been almost indiscriminately used to characterize any government ushered in by a *coup d'état*, especially if the latter resulted in the exaltation of the power of the executive at the expense of the popularly elected legislative branch. As a usual thing dictatorships resulted from the breakdown of constitutional government under the strain of post-war reconstruction, and occurred most often in those countries where democracy was a relatively recent acquisition, where the government was paralyzed by a multi-party system, where a high degree of illiteracy existed among masses who were already somewhat accustomed to arbitrary domination by the authorities. In those States where the bulk of the people had actually participated in democratic parliamentary government before the war, democracy stood the post-war test.

Despite funeral orations over the passing of democracy, despite solemn pronouncements of the permanent introduction of some new antidemocratic régime, the completion of national reconstruction and the return of economic prosperity will doubtless see a reversion to democratic government, though the machinery for expressing the popular will may experience some alteration.

Economic Problems

Europe in the years since 1914 not only has undergone an extensive reorganization of its political life, but has been forced to undertake a far-reaching economic reconstruction as well. Excluding Russia, Europe has an area about two-thirds that of the United States, but in this area live more than three times as many people as in the latter country. In pre-war days this relatively dense population was made possible by Europe's stable and highly developed mechanism for international trade and finance. Russia and various non-European parts of the world were drawn upon for foodstuffs, the cost

of which was met by the export of manufactured goods of various kinds and by the income from foreign investments and the shipping trade.

In the period since 1914 the population of Europe has noticeably increased despite the millions killed in the war, and despite the temporary decline in the birth rate. The war interrupted the accustomed oversea movement from Europe, which had mounted by 1913 to nearly 1,500,000; and after the war non-European countries showed an increasing tendency to limit immigration. The highest post-war figure for emigration from Europe, reached in 1923, was less than 900,000. As a result, the population of western Europe rose from 350,000,000 in 1913 to 364,000,000 in 1925, necessarily placing a heavier burden upon Europe's economic system, whose carefully balanced organization was at the same time greatly disturbed by the war and its aftermath.

Furthermore, the billions of dollars spent by Europe in waging the war placed another burden on the productive forces of the Continent. A great part of the expenditure went for the production of war materials which were deliberately destroyed in the course of their utilization or became largely useless after the conclusion of hostilities. Nevertheless, the debts remained to constitute a heavy drain on the budgets of most European States, the largest items in the national expenditures of Europe today being "Debt Service" and "Pensions." If to these is added the present cost of defense, the total mounts to 71.90 per cent (1926–27) in Great Britain, 74.24 per cent (1927) in France, 60.95 per cent in Italy, and 50.13 per cent (1927–28) in Germany.[2] In most European countries, except those where total repudiation occurred, the burden of debt service is much greater than before the war. The most startling example is that of Great Britain where on March 31, 1926, the national debt, reduced to the pre-war price level, was 750.7 per cent of that in 1914, and the burden of debt service (interest only) was more than ten times that in 1913–14.

[2] The figure for Germany includes reparation payments and other war charges, the lower percentage arising from Germany's restricted military and naval establishment and from the practical repudiation of her domestic debt by inflation.

In addition, the destruction of accumulated capital by the war was tremendous, experts estimating the property loss at nearly thirty billion dollars. The physical replacement of this capital has in most parts of Europe been largely accomplished, but it has been achieved principally by means of loans which still remain to be repaid. In many countries of Europe reconstruction, although completed, must for many years entail taxes of unprecedented size, taken for the most part from the small income of the average man. From 17 to 22 per cent of the national income, it is estimated, is paid to the tax collectors in France, Italy, and Great Britain.

But Europe's recovery has been further handicapped by the fact that the war and its aftermath largely wrecked her pre-war stable and highly developed mechanism for international trade. During the conflict, billions of productive assets in the form of organization and good will were wiped out by the disruption of industry and trade, by the necessary alteration of customers' buying habits, and by the decline in customers' purchasing power. And in the wake of the war came the fluctuation and collapse of numerous national currencies and the consequent destruction for a time of the ordinary processes of credit and international finance so essential to modern trade. Finally, in the immediate post-war years the former easy interchange of goods was interrupted, impeded, and in some cases prevented. Thousands of miles of new customs lines with new protective tariffs appeared to harass the former trend of commerce and to hinder the process of reknitting snapped threads of international trade.

The war also saw the substantial displacement of European manufactured products in the markets of the world by those of the United States and other non-European countries. Inability to secure goods from Europe during the conflict stimulated local industrial development, and various countries began themselves to manufacture goods which they had formerly bought from Europe. At the same time, Europe as a whole became a debtor rather than a creditor continent, ceasing, on balance, to invest abroad, while the United States began to do so on a large scale. Europe's consequent inability to enter as actively as formerly into the financing of the world's economic life

further handicapped her campaign to regain commerce, for the spending of the proceeds of loans in general occurs in the country which offers the loan.

It is perhaps not surprising therefore that, although by 1925 the total volume of world trade had risen 4.5 per cent above the 1913 figure, Europe's total trade (excluding Russia) was still 6.3 per cent less than in 1913. While the exports of the United States and Canada in 1925 totaled 35.4 per cent more than in 1913, those of Europe were 10.9 per cent less than in the earlier year. In fact, Europe's international trade not only fell below that of 1913, but in percentage of the total world's trade it showed a distinct decline. Whereas Europe's exports in 1913 were 51 per cent of the world's exports, in 1925 they constituted only 43.7 per cent. In the same period, the exports of the United States and Canada rose from 15.8 to 20.6 per cent of the world's exports. Although, therefore, the population of Europe is greater than before the war, her export trade is materially less.

In view of the economic situation in Europe during and immediately following the war, most of the countries proved to be unable to meet their national financial obligations by means of ordinary taxation. The tremendous immediate cost of the war was met in three ways—by taxes, by loans, and by the issuing of paper currency. Great Britain was the only country which paid any appreciable part (about twenty per cent) of the cost of the war by taxation during the conflict. In Germany only six per cent of the total cost was met in this way, while in France the entire cost was met by loans or by increases in the floating debt. In most of the belligerent countries, therefore, the war period witnessed a considerable inflation and resultant depreciation of national currencies.

In all cases, however, the period of readjustment and reorganization following the war saw much greater inflation than had occurred during the period of the conflict itself. Revolutionary governments, unfavorable trade balances, widespread unemployment, unbalanced national budgets, fiscal systems unadjusted to depreciating currencies, lack of foreign credit—all these conspired for a time to force con-

tinued currency inflation and further depreciation. For several years after 1918, therefore, Europe suffered from unstable and sinking national currencies. Those of Austria, Hungary, Germany, Russia, and Poland became practically worthless, while others fell to a mere fraction of their pre-war exchange value.

Not until five years after the armistice were any successful steps taken to bring currency stabilization, but in the years after 1923 stabilization was gradually secured in practically every country of Europe. Of the former belligerents, Great Britain alone succeeded in restoring her original currency to its pre-war exchange value. In Germany, Russia, Poland, Austria, and Hungary the earlier currencies were practically repudiated and were succeeded by new currencies which were maintained at some fixed level. In the other belligerent countries national currencies were eventually stabilized at a figure from four to twenty-five per cent of their pre-war value. In 1929 practically all Europe was once more back on the gold standard.

Although currency depreciation brought grave economic and social ills to Europe it enabled the governments eventually to escape from a large part of their domestic debt obligations. As a result of inflation, Germany's national debt in 1926–27 amounted to only about $575,000,000, and although the French domestic debt rose from 32,976,000,000 francs (1913) to 287,699,800,000 francs (March 31, 1926), thanks to currency depreciation the latter figure really represented an increase of only 38 per cent at the pre-war price level. In Italy the situation became even more favorable for the government. The national debt rose from 15,766,000,000 lire in 1914 to 94,038,000,000 lire in 1926, but in the latter year the debt, when allowance is made for the depreciated currency, was actually less than in 1914, and the per capita debt service was raised less than six per cent. Inflation, therefore, was only a terrifically intensified form of taxation for debt retirement, imposed on the holders of government obligations within a brief period of time instead of on the taxpayers at large over a much longer period. But its effects were not felt by the creditors of the governments alone.

Social Changes

Even in ordinary times there occurs a gradual but continuous transposition in the ranks of the social classes, though in Europe with its long-inherited and closely drawn distinctions the movement in pre-war days was not so perceptible as in the United States and other more recently settled countries. During the years since 1914, however, social changes in Europe have probably been more widespread and more pronounced than in any other part of the world, for they have been greatly accelerated by two post-war phenomena—currency inflation and agrarian reform.

The social effects of inflation in Germany have already been discussed in some detail.[3] Similar changes occurred in Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia, and the effects were different only in degree in all the other countries which suffered from depreciated currencies. The great body of small capitalists, holders of government bonds, mortgages, and other forms of conservative and safe investment, became impoverished. Savings, insurance, and annuities were either entirely swept away or reduced to an insignificant fraction of their former worth. Creditors were universally sacrificed to debtors. Hundreds of thousands who had previously supplemented their earnings with income from small investments which they had made or inherited, were forced to lower their standard of living. Tens of thousands who had formerly possessed sufficient wealth to live in comfort without toil, lost their private fortunes and were forced to join the ranks of the working class. Currency inflation everywhere caused disintegration and decay in Europe's pre-war middle and lower middle classes.

Although obviously the bourgeois class has not altogether disappeared in Europe, there has been a marked transposition within its ranks. While many of the upper bourgeoisie fell into the lower ranks of the middle class, and many of the latter were forced to join the working class, a new bourgeoisie was created. The war and post-war years saw a new rich appear in Europe, made up of war profiteers, fortunate speculators in currency exchange, and those who were wise

[3] See pp. 326–28.

enough to turn depreciating currency into tangible goods. In general, however, Europe's middle class today is neither so large nor so strong as before the war.

Just as inflation weakened particularly the petty bourgeoisie, so the great wave of agrarian reform struck down the landed aristocracy. The formerly influential class of squire landlords largely disappeared when the great landed estates were seized and divided among the peasants of eastern and central Europe. In Russia, the Baltic republics, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser degree in Poland, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Hungary, the great landowning class gave way to peasant proprietors. Estates were expropriated in Russia without compensation, and in the other countries compensation was usually in an illusory depreciated currency, so that in general former nobility and well-to-do landlords became an impoverished class.

Even in England during this period there occurred so great a change in land tenure that it has been characterized as perhaps the most important since the days of the Norman Conquest. The change in England was effected not by expropriation as in eastern Europe but by a system of heavy direct taxation. Many of the great estates were not self-supporting and were held because of their social value. But the heavy burden of post-war taxes, the fall in real income from other securities, and the increase in the price of all estate necessities gradually drove many landlords to dispose of parts or all of their estates. Sometimes the land passed into the hands of war profiteers who were seeking to strengthen their social position; sometimes it went to former tenant farmers or corporate bodies. Between 1910 and 1924 the number of occupying owners of farms in England rose from 55,433 to 94,236, and the area thus occupied increased by over 3,000,000 acres.

In countries where land was already in the possession of peasants, the latter benefited in the post-war years by the currency inflation which caused high prices for farm products, temporarily reduced interest on mortgages to the vanishing point, and enabled many peasants to pay off mortgages as they fell due with an almost worthless currency. In eastern and parts of central Europe, while the landed aris-

tocracy practically disappeared, the peasants retained their vitality to a far greater extent than any other class.

Finally, it must be emphasized that the World War carried to destruction one-seventh of the strongest and ablest men of Europe, the most effective human instruments of production. This loss of life inevitably had not only economic but profound social effects as well. In France, for example, it has been estimated that approximately one family out of every six lost its principal means of support, and certainly the experience of the other belligerent countries was not greatly different. The numbers of war dead were nearly duplicated by the numbers of women who were suddenly left widows or compelled to face the prospect of remaining unmarried for life. The loss of wage-earners caused thousands of families to contract their budgets and drove millions of women and boys and old men to try to do the work of the strong. There is little doubt that for Europe as a whole the standard of living has been materially lowered by events since 1914.

The Outlawry of War

For the welfare of the great mass of the people of the world, perhaps the most important feature of the New Europe is the change which has been introduced in the spirit and conduct of international relations. In place of international anarchy there is rapidly developing an effective system of international coöperation. In place of war as the ultimate arbiter of differences between nations, there has been established adequate machinery for settling disputes without recourse to arms, and there is developing a world-wide tendency to repudiate war as an instrument of national policy.

The essential basis of the new international régime is the League of Nations with its solid foundation and adequate machinery for international coöperation and for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. In place of diplomacy by spasmodic and intermittent conferences as it existed before the war, the League has substituted diplomacy by regular periodic conferences of the statesmen of the world. In place of conferences of ambassadors meeting after catastrophes in order to settle their consequences, there now occur regu-

larly conferences of the foreign ministers of the chief countries of the world for the purpose of averting such controversies. No longer must a particular excuse be assigned for such conferences; they occur at regular stated intervals and before them may be brought any matter affecting the peace of the world.

Between conferences there is one center—the Secretariat at Geneva —where several hundred men and women, drawn from some two-score different countries, are constantly engaged in gathering information, studying problems, exchanging national views, and drafting programs for international conferences, all in the interests not of any one State but of the world as a whole. Almost continuously from one to three international conferences on innumerable different international questions are in session in the *Palais des Nations*. Thus the League of Nations not only provides the chief means whereby Europe's statesmen become personally acquainted, learn one another's minds, develop mutual understanding, and become accustomed to real coöperation; it is gradually and noticeably creating what may be called an international mind which is affecting even the most nationalistic of statesmen.

In addition to The Hague Court of Arbitration which was created only a few years before the war, there is now the Permanent Court of International Justice, or World Court, established in pursuance of Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and functioning since September, 1921. The latter, as its name signifies, is a permanent court, holding regular sessions and empowered "to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it." It represents a great advance over The Hague Court, which is in no sense a permanent body but only a list of the names of jurists from which disputing States may select arbitrators.

The new spirit which the League is assisting to inculcate in the international relations of Europe and the world received striking proof of its gradual dissemination in October, 1925, when the Locarno Pacts were signed. In these agreements Germany and France mutually undertook not to attack, invade, or resort to war against each other, and to settle by peaceful means *all* questions which might

arise between them. And by a network of arbitration agreements signed at the same time, Germany on the one hand and Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Poland severally on the other likewise promised to do the same.

In succeeding years the "Locarno Spirit," which is at bottom the "League Spirit," has continued to spread until the States of Europe have become largely linked together by treaties of neutrality, non-aggression, and arbitration, that is, by agreements not to attack one another, and to submit all disputes which may arise to peaceful adjustment through the World Court, the Council of the League, or otherwise. Finally in 1928 most of the nations of the world—including both the United States and Russia, neither of which is in the League—signed the Pact of Paris definitely renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. Although the pact added little to existing obligations, except in the case of the United States and Russia, it presented still further evidence of the widening influence of the "League Spirit" of outlawing war.

Probably no other feature of the present era is so uniquely characteristic of "The New Europe" as the League of Nations. The post-war period finds Europe grouped more nearly into national States than ever before, and the rule of the people more nearly approached throughout the length and breadth of the Continent than at any previous time; yet both of these developments were clearly foreshadowed by the events of the nineteenth century. It required no clairvoyant to perceive that the trend of Europe was in these directions; the war and its aftermath merely hastened the natural course of historical development. But he would have been a bold prophet who in 1914 would have proclaimed that within a single decade not only most of Europe, but most of the world, would outlaw war and unite in one great international association, with permanent headquarters and with carefully constructed machinery functioning with regularity "to promote international coöperation and to achieve international peace and security."

APPENDIX I

Casualties in the World War

	Mobilized	*Killed or Died*	*Wounded*
Russia	12,000,000	1,700,000	4,950,000
Germany	11,000,000	1,773,000	4,216,058
British Empire	8,904,467	908,371	2,090,212
France	8,410,000	1,257,800	4,216,058
Austria-Hungary	7,800,000	1,200,000	3,620,000
Italy	5,615,000	650,000	947,000
United States	4,800,000	50,280	205,690
Turkey	2,850,000	325,000	400,000
Bulgaria	1,200,000	87,500	152,390
Rumania	750,000	335,706	120,000
Serbia	707,343	45,000	133,148
Belgium	267,000	13,716	44,686
Greece	230,000	5,000	21,000
Portugal	100,000	7,222	13,751
Montenegro	50,000	3,000	10,000
Totals	64,683,810	8,361,595	21,139,993

Based on tables of Rex F. Harlow in *New York Times Current History*, June, 1925, pp. 355–57.

Loss of Life in Nineteenth Century Wars

	Days of Duration	*Dead*
Napoleonic, 1790–1815	9,000	2,100,000
Crimean, 1854–56	730	785,000
Prussian–Danish, 1864	135	3,500
Prussian–Austrian, 1866	40	45,000
American Civil, 1861–65	1,350	700,000
Franco–Prussian, 1870–71	210	184,000
English-Boer, 1899–1902	995	9,800
Russian–Japanese, 1904–5	548	160,000
Balkan, 1912–13	238	462,000
		4,449,300

From E. L. Bogart, *Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War*, p. 270.

NET DIRECT COST OF THE WAR TO THE PRINCIPAL BELLIGERENTS

United States	$22,625,252,843
Great Britain	35,334,000,000
Rest of British Empire	4,493,813,072
France	24,312,782,800
Russia	22,593,950,000
Italy	12,413,998,000
Other Entente Allies	3,963,867,914
Total	$125,737,664,629
Germany	37,775,000,000
Austria-Hungary	20,622,960,600
Turkey and Bulgaria	2,245,200,000
Total	$60,643,160,600
Grand total	$186,380,825,229

From E. L. Bogart, *Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War*, p. 267.

PROPERTY LOSS DUE TO THE WORLD WAR

Belgium	$ 7,000,000,000
France	10,000,000,000
Russia	1,250,000,000
Poland	1,500,000,000
Serbia, Albania, Montenegro	2,000,000,000
East Prussia, Austria, Ukrainia	1,000,000,000
Italy	2,710,000,000
Rumania	1,000,000,000
British Empire	1,750,000,000
Germany	1,750,000,000
Total	$29,960,000,000

From E. L. Bogart, *Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War*, p. 287.

Total Direct and Indirect Cost of the World War

Total net direct cost		$186,380,825,229
Indirect cost		
Capitalized value of human life		
Soldiers	$33,551,276,280	
Civilians	33,551,276,280	
Property loss		
On land	29,960,000,000	
Shipping and cargo	6,800,000,000	
Loss of production	45,000,000,000	
War relief	1,000,000,000	
Loss to neutrals	1,750,000,000	
Total indirect cost		151,612,552,560
Grand total		$337,993,377,789

From E. L. Bogart, *Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War*, p. 299.

Increased per Capita Debts of the Principal Countries Due to the World War

	1913	*1920*	
United States	$ 11	$ 225	
Great Britain	78	850	
France	160	1,150	
Italy	83	365	
Germany	18	800	
Russia	27	125	(in 1917)
Austria	63	525	(in 1918)
Hungary	70	387	(in 1918)
Australia	18	318	
Canada	70	159	

From *The Economic World*, July 3, 1920, p. 19.

APPENDIX II

THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The High Contracting Parties,

In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security

by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,

by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations,

by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments,

and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another,

Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

Article 1.

1. The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other Members of the League.

2. Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments.

3. Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.

Article 2.

The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat.

Article 3.

1. The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the Members of the League.

2. The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require at the Seat of the League or at such other place as may be decided upon.

3. The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

4. At meetings of the Assembly, each Member of the League shall have one vote, and may have not more than three Representatives.

Article 4.

1. The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers,[1] together with Representatives of four other Members of the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by the Assembly, Representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain and Greece shall be members of the Council.

2. With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name additional Members of the League whose Representatives shall always be Members of the Council; [2] the Council with like approval may increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the council.[3]

[1] The Principal Allied and Associated Powers are the following: The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan (see Preamble of the Treaty of Peace with Germany).

[2] In virtue of this paragraph of the Covenant, Germany was nominated as a permanent Member of the Council on September 8th, 1926.

[3] The number of Members of the Council selected by the Assembly was increased to six instead of four by virtue of a resolution adopted at the third ordinary meeting of the Assembly on September 25th, 1922. By a resolution taken by the Assembly on September 8th, 1926, the number of Members of the Council selected by the Assembly was increased to nine.

2 *bis.*[4] *The Assembly shall fix by a two-thirds majority the rules dealing with the election of the non-permanent Members of the Council, and particularly such regulations as relate to their term of office and the conditions of re-eligibility.*

3. The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon.

4. The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

5. Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that Member of the League.

6. At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on the Council shall have one vote, and may not have more than one Representative.

Article 5.

1. Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

2. All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may be decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

3. The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.

Article 6.

1. The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such secretaries and staff as may be required.

2. The first Secretary-General shall be the person named in the Annex; thereafter the Secretary-General shall be appointed by the Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly.

[4] This Amendment came into force on July 29th, 1926, in accordance with Article 26 of the Covenant.

3. The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Council.

4. The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Assembly and of the Council.

5.[5] *The expenses of the League shall be borne by the Members of the League in the proportion decided by the Assembly.*

Article 7.

1. The Seat of the League is established at Geneva.

2. The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the League shall be established elsewhere.

3. All positions under or in connection with the League, including the Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women.

4. Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

5. The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable.

Article 8.

1. The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

2. The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

3. Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

4. After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

5. The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manu-

[5] This Amendment came into force on August 13th, 1924, in accordance with Article 26 of the Covenant and replaces the following text:

"5. The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the Members of the League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union."

facture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

6. The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes.

Article 9.

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, naval and air questions generally.

Article 10.

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Article 11.

1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

2. It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

Article 12.[6]

1. The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the

[6] The Amendments printed in italics relating to these Articles came into

matter either to arbitration *or judicial settlement* or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators *or the judicial decision* or the report by the Council.

2. In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators *or the judicial decision* shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

Article 13.[7]

1. The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration *or judicial settlement*, and which cannot be satisfactorily

force on September 26th, 1924, in accordance with Article 26 of the Covenant and replace the following texts:

Article 12.

"The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council.

"In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute."

Article 13.

"The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration.

"Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration.

"For the consideration of any such dispute, the court of arbitration to which the case is referred shall be the court agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.

"The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award that may be rendered and that they will not resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto."

[7] See note beginning on page 609.

settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration *or judicial settlement.*

2. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration *or judicial settlement.*

3. *For the consideration of any such dispute, the court to which the case is referred shall be the Permanent Court of International Justice, established in accordance with Article* 14, *or any tribunal agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.*

4. The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award *or decision* that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award *or decision,* the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.

Article 14.

The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.

Article 15.

1.[8] If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute

[8] The Amendment to the first paragraph of this Article came into force on September 26th, 1924, in accordance with Article 26 of the Covenant, and replaces the following text:

Article 15.

"If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof."

likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration *or judicial settlement* in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof.

2. For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary-General as promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.

3. The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.

4. If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.

5. Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same.

6. If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report.

7. If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the Members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.

8. If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

9. The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.

10. In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of

those Members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute.

Article 16.

1. Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

3. The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.

4. Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.

Article 17.

1. In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to

16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council.

2. Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute an enquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

3. If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.

4. If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

Article 18.

Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.

Article 19.

The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.

Article 20.

1. The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof.

2. In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

Article 21.

Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of

international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.

Article 22.

1. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

2. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

3. The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

4. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

5. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.

6. There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the

Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

7. In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

8. The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

Article 23.

Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League:

(*a*) will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organizations;

(*b*) undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control;

(*c*) will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs;

(*d*) will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest;

(*e*) will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914–18 shall be borne in mind;

(*f*) will endeavour to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease.

Article 24.

1. There shall be placed under the direction of the League all international bureaux already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaux and all commis-

sions for the regulation of matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League.

2. In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general conventions but which are not placed under the control of international bureaux or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, collect and distribute all relevant information and shall render any other assistance which may be necessary or desirable.

3. The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the League.

Article 25.

The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establishment and co-operation of duly authorised voluntary national Red Cross organizations having as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world.

Article 26.

1. Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by a majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Assembly.

2. No such amendments shall bind any Member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League.

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CHAPTER I

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Lasswell, H. *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (1928). An attempt to show how international antipathies and attractions were controlled during the war.
Lehmann, Capt. E. A. and Mingos, H. *The Zeppelins* (1928).
Liddell Hart, Capt. B. H. *Reputations Ten Years After* (1928). A post-war criticism of the military leaders of the war.
Marcosson, J. F. *The Business of War* (1918).
Martin, W. *Statesmen of the War in Retrospect, 1918–1928* (1928). Studies of the personalities and motives of twenty-three prominent statesmen of the war.
Nicholson, J. S. *War Finance* (1918).
Remarque, E. M. *All Quiet on the Western Front* (1929). Trench life vividly described in an autobiographical novel by a German.
Sherriff, R. C. *Journey's End* (1929). An excellent war play depicting life among the officers on the western front.
Thomas, L. *Raiders of the Deep* (1928). Submarine warfare.
Turner, C. C. *The Struggle in the Air, 1914–1918* (1919).

CHAPTER III

The Russian Revolutions of 1917

Buchanan, Sir G. *My Mission to Russia,* II (1923), 55–248. By the British ambassador to Russia in 1917.
Denikin, A. J. *The Russian Turmoil* (1922). Memoirs of the anti-Bolshevik leader.
Fülöp-Miller, R. *Rasputin: The Holy Devil* (1928). The latest and most thorough study of the personality and rôle of Rasputin.

Golder, F. A. (ed.) *Documents of Russian History, 1914–1917* (1927). Extracts from diaries and letters.

Graham, M. W. *New Governments of Eastern Europe* (1927), 36–96. A good brief account.

Gronsky, P. P. and Astrov, N. J. *The War and the Russian Government* (1929). Helps to clarify the story of the Russian collapse and revolution.

Hindus, M. G. *The Russian Peasant and the Revolution* (1920). An excellent discussion of the economic and social life of the peasants.

Kerensky, A. F. *The Prelude to Bolshevism* (1919). A discussion of the Kornilov revolt.

Kerensky, A. F. *The Catastrophe* (1927). An important document for the study of the Russian revolutions, written by one who played a leading rôle.

Korf, S. A. *Autocracy and Revolution in Russia* (1923), 80–155. A brief Russian interpretation of the revolutions of 1917.

Laidler, H. W. *A History of Socialist Thought* (1927), 441–467. Excellent.

Landau-Aldanov, M. A. *Lenin* (1922).

Lawton, L. *The Russian Revolution, 1917–1926* (1927), 1–53.

Lenin, N. *Preparing for Revolt* (1929). By the leader of the Bolsheviks.

Lenin, V. I. *The Revolution of 1917* (1929).

Levine, I. D. *The Man Lenin* (1924).

Lévy, R. Trotzky (1920).

Makeev, N. and O'Hara, V. *Russia* (1925), 111–219. A journalistic interpretation of the revolution by well-informed observers.

Marcu, V. *Lenin: Thirty Years of Russia* (1928).

Mavor, J. *The Russian Revolution* (1928). Perhaps the best single-volume account in English.

Miliukov, P. *History of the Second Russian Revolution* (1920). By the foreign minister in the first provisional government.

Petrunkevitch, A. *et al. The Russian Revolution* (1918), 3–78.

Radziwill, C. *Rasputin and the Russian Revolution* (1918).

Rappoport, Dr. A. S. *Pioneers of the Russian Revolution* (1918). A volume of sketches.

Rodzianko, M. V. *The Reign of Rasputin: An Empire's Collapse* (1927). Memoirs of the president of the last Russian duma.

Ross, E. A. *Russia in Upheaval* (1919), 101–349. By a prominent American sociologist.

Ross, E. A. *The Russian Bolshevik Revolution* (1921).

Sack, A. J. *Birth of the Russian Democracy* (1918), 227–527. By the director of the Russian Information Bureau in the United States.

Telberg, G. G. and Wilton, R. *The Last Days of the Romanovs* (1920). An account of the murder of the Tsar and his family, based upon skillful investigations.

Trotzky, L. *From October to Brest-Litovsk* (1919). By one who played a leading rôle in the events.

Trotzky, L. *The Lessons of October 1917* (1925).

Trotzky, L. *Lenin* (1925). Deals chiefly with the years 1900–1903 and 1917–1918.

Vandervelde, E. *Three Aspects of the Russian Revolution* (1918). By a prominent Belgian Socialist.

Vulliamy, C. E. (ed.) *The Letters of the Tsar to the Tsaritsa, 1914–1917* (1929). From the official edition of the Romanov correspondence.

Walsh, E. A. *The Fall of the Russian Empire. The Story of the Last Romanovs and the Coming of the Bolsheviki* (1928). A vivid account of the major events of the revolution.

Williams, A. R. *Lenin, The Man and His Work* (1919).

Williams, A. R. *Through the Russian Revolution* (1921).

CHAPTER IV

The Triumph of the Allies

In addition to the references for Chapter II, above, the following are suggested:

The United States and the War

Ayres, L. P. *The War with Germany, a Statistical Summary* (1920). A very interesting study by the chief of statistics of the United States general staff.

Bassett, J. S. *Our War with Germany* (1919). By an eminent American historian.

Bernstorff, J. von *My Three Years in America* (1920). By the German ambassador to the United States.

Chambrun, Col. de and Marenches, Capt. de *The American Army in the European Conflict* (1919).

Clarkson, G. B. *Industrial America in the World War* (1923).

Davison, H. P. *The American Red Cross in the Great War* (1919).

Frothingham, T. *The Naval History of the World War,* III (1926). An account of the United States in the war, based on data provided by the historical section of the U. S. Navy.

Frothingham, T. *American Reinforcement in the World War* (1927).
Gerard, J. W. *My Four Years in Germany* (1917). By the American ambassador to Germany.
McMaster, J. B. *The United States in the World War*, 2 vols. (1918–19).
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914. Supplement: The World War (1928).
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915. Supplement: The World War (1928).
Scott, J. B. *A Survey of International Relations between the United States and Germany, 1914–1917* (1917).
Seymour, C. *Woodrow Wilson and the World War* (1921).
Sims, W. S. *The American Navy in the War* (1920). By the commander of the United States naval forces operating in European waters during the war.
Sims, W. S. *The Victory at Sea* (1920).
Van Every, D. *The A. E. F. in Battle* (1928).

General

Bogart, E. L. *Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great War* (1919).
Bugnet, Major C. *Marshal Foch* (1929).
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. *Preliminary History of the Armistice* (1924). Official documents published by the German government.
Charteris, Brig.-Gen. J. *Field Marshal Earl Haig* (1929). A competent and thorough study.
Cosmetatos, S. P. P. *The Tragedy of Greece* (1928). An account of Allied intrigue and intervention in Greece.
Dickinson, G. L. (ed.) *Documents and Statements Relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims, 1916–1918* (1919). Valuable source material.
Folks, H. *Human Costs of the War* (1920).
Lawrence, T. E. *Revolt in the Desert* (1927). By the young Englishman who won the confidence of the Arabs during the war.
Lecomte, G. C. *Georges Clemenceau—The Tiger of France* (1919).
Manteneyer, G. de (ed.) *Austria's Peace Offer, 1916–1917* (1921).
Maximilian, Prinz von Baden *The Memoirs of Prince Max of Baden*, 2 vols. (1928). Illuminating insights into German conditions in the closing months of the war.
Recouly, R. *Foch, the Winner of the War* (1920).
Thomas, L. J. *With Lawrence in Arabia* (1924).

CHAPTER V

THE DISINTEGRATION OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Baerlein, H. *The Birth of Yugo-Slavia*, 2 vols. (1922). Pro-Jugoslav.

Baerlein, H. *The March of the Seventy Thousand* (1926). An excellent account of the exploits of the Czech legions in Siberia.

Bagger, E. S. *Eminent Europeans* (1922), 125–142 (Masaryk), 163–210 (Karolyi), 237–254 (Benesh), 255–283 (Horthy). Interesting character studies.

Bauer, Dr. O. *The Austrian Revolution* (1925), 25–76. By a member of the provisional government.

Beneš, Dr. E. *My War Memories* (1928). By the Czechoslovak foreign minister.

Burian, Count S. *Austria in Dissolution* (1925), 78–112, 342–425. The author was Austro-Hungarian foreign minister during the war.

Capek, T., Jr. *Origins of the Czechoslovak State* (1926).

Dyboski, R. *Outlines of Polish History* (1925), 254–275. An excellent brief survey of the Polish revolution.

Graham, M. W. *The New Governments of Central Europe* (1924), 123–156, 201–217, 268–291, 333–360.

Huddleston, S. *Those Europeans* (1924), 34–48. A character study of Masaryk.

Jászi, O. *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary* (1924), 1–38. An interesting account by one of Karolyi's ministers.

Jászi, O. *The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy* (1929).

Karolyi, Count M. *Fighting the World: The Struggle for Peace* (1924). An account of conditions in Hungary during the war and at the outbreak of the revolution, by the head of the provisional government.

Kerner, R. J. *The Jugo-Slav Movement* (1918), 81–105. Contains the Corfu Manifesto.

Macartney, C. A. *The Social Revolution in Austria* (1926), 56–83.

Masaryk, T. G. *The Making of a State* (1927). An account of the Czech efforts during 1914–18, by the first president of Czechoslovakia.

Nosek, V. *Independent Bohemia, An Account of the Czecho-Slovak Struggle for Liberty* (1918).

Nowak, K. F. *The Collapse of Central Europe* (1924). A well-written and interesting survey of events in Austria-Hungary from December, 1917, to October, 1918.

Opočenský, J. *The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Rise of the Czechoslovak State* (1928). A detailed narrative of events, September-December, 1918.

Papoušek, J. *The Czechoslovak Nation's Struggle for Independence* (1928). With interesting maps showing the journeys of the Czech leaders and the march of the legions.

Pember, Mrs. D. *Poland Reborn* (1922), 25–71.

Pergler, C. *America in the Struggle for Czechoslovak Independence* (1926). A summary of the policy of the United States during the war.

Skryzynski, A. *Poland and Peace* (1923), 5–50. By a former prime minister of the republic.

Steed, W. *Through Thirty Years* (1924). By one intimately connected with the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy.

Street, C. J. C. *Hungary and Democracy* (1923), 92–110.

Tormay, C. *An Outlaw's Diary* (1923). Experiences during the Hungarian revolution of 1918.

Yugoslav Committee, *The Southern Slav Programme* (1915).

CHAPTER VI

The German Revolution

Bevan, E. *German Social Democracy during the War* (1919). Thorough, dispassionate, interesting.

Bouton, S. M. *And the Kaiser Abdicates: The German Revolution, November 1918–August 1919* (1921). By the first enemy correspondent to enter Germany after the armistice.

Brown, P. *Germany in Dissolution* (1920).

Daniels, H. G. *The Rise of the German Republic* (1928), 1–47. A sane and objective account of the revolution, by the Berlin correspondent of the London *Times*.

Gooch, G. P. *Germany* (1925), 161–189. One of the best books on recent German history.

Graham, M. W. *The New Governments of Central Europe* (1924), 1–23.

Lutz, R. H. *The German Revolution of 1918–19* (1922). An authoritative account.

Maximilian, Prinz von Baden. *The Memoirs of Prince Max of Baden*, 2 vols. (1928). Illuminating insights into German conditions on the eve of the revolution, by the last imperial chancellor.

Price, M. P. *Germany in Transition* (1922) 3–62.

Scheidemann, P. *The Making of New Germany: The Memoirs of Philipp Scheidemann* (1929). A valuable contribution by one of the leaders of the Social Democrats.

Stroebel, H. *The German Revolution and After* (1923), 7–67. By a prominent German Independent Socialist.
Young, G. *The New Germany* (1920), 1–25.

CHAPTER VII

The Paris Peace Conference

General

Baker, R. S. *What Wilson Did at Paris* (1920).
Baker, R. S. *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement*, 3 vols. (1922–23). One of the most complete accounts of the peace negotiations, written from President Wilson's unpublished and personal material.
Baruch, B. M. *The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty* (1920). By the economic adviser to the American Peace Commission.
Churchill, W. S. *The Aftermath* (1929), 98–239.
Dillon, E. J. *The Inside Story of the Peace Conference* (1920). By a well-informed journalist.
Foley, H. (ed.) *Woodrow Wilson's Case for the League of Nations* (1923). A collection of President Wilson's speeches in behalf of the League.
Haskins, C. H. and Lord, R. H. *Some Problems of the Peace Conference* (1920). By two professors who were advisers to the American Peace Commission.
House, E. M. and Seymour, C. (eds.) *What Really Happened at Paris: the Story of the Peace Conference, 1918–1919, by American Delegates* (1921). A series of eighteen lectures delivered by members of the American delegation.
Huddleston, S. *Peace-Making at Paris* (1919). The author was a newspaper correspondent in Paris during the peace conference.
Lansing, R. *The Big Four and Others of the Peace Conference* (1921). By the American secretary of state and delegate to the peace conference.
Lansing, R. *The Peace Negotiations, A Personal Narrative* (1921).
Miller, D. H. *The Drafting of the Covenant* (1928). The author, with Sir Cecil Hurst, drew up the final draft of the Covenant.
Miller, D. H. *My Diary at the Conference of Paris*, 21 vols. (1928). By a legal adviser to the American Peace Commission. The last twenty volumes consist of documents and maps.
Nowak, K. F. *Versailles* (1929). A study of the making of the treaty.

Valuable for the light it throws on the acceptance of the treaty by Germany.

Seymour, C. (ed.) *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, 4 vols. (1926–28). Valuable material from the papers of one of the American delegates to the peace conference.

Tardieu, A. *The Truth about the Treaty* (1921). By a member of the French Peace Commission.

Thompson, C. T. *The Peace Conference Day by Day* (1920). By an Associated Press correspondent. Journalistic but good.

Temperley, H. W. V. (ed.) *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, 6 vols. (1920–24). The most scholarly and complete history of the peace conference.

Woodhouse, E. J. and Woodhouse, C. G. *Italy and the Jugoslavs* (1920).

CHAPTER VIII

The Treaties Arising from the War

In addition to the references for Chapter VII, above, the following are suggested:

Abbott, G. F. *Greece and the Allies, 1914–1922* (1922). Valuable for an understanding of the Greek failure in Asia Minor.

Bass, J. F. *The Peace Tangle* (1920). Discusses the effects of the treaties on European countries.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *The Treaties of Peace, 1919–1923*, 2 vols. (1924). The texts with maps.

Churchill, W. S. *The Aftermath* (1929), 373–465. Deals with the situation in the Near East.

Cosmetatos, S. P. P. *The Tragedy of Greece* (1928).

Donald, Sir R. *The Tragedy of Trianon* (1928). An indictment of the Treaty of Trianon.

Ebray, A. *A Frenchman Looks at the Peace* (1927), 1–136. An indictment of the Treaty of Versailles.

Huddleston, S. *Those Europeans* (1924), 253–264. A character sketch of Mustapha Kemal.

Hungarian Peace Delegation, *The Hungarian Peace Negotiations*, 4 vols. (1921).

Keynes, J. M. *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1920). One of the earliest arguments for a revision of the Treaty of Versailles. By a British economist.

Mowat, R. B. *A History of European Diplomacy, 1914–1925* (1927), 155–178, 287–309.

Ostorog, Count L. *The Angora Reform* (1928). Three excellent lectures

reviewing the rise of Turkish nationalism resulting from the Treaty of Sèvres.

Price, C. *The Rebirth of Turkey* (1923). A survey of the development of the new régime in Turkey.

Scott, A. P. *An Introduction to the Peace Treaties* (1920). Chiefly an analysis of the Treaty of Versailles.

Stegeman, H. *The Mirage of Versailles* (1928). Describes the Versailles settlement and explains the significance of the treaty. A valuable discussion.

Toynbee, A. J. *The World After the Peace Conference* (1925). An attempt to compare the world of 1920 with that of 1914.

Toynbee, A. J. and Kirkwood, K. P. *Turkey* (1926). A valuable but pro-Turkish account of events, chiefly since the nationalist revival.

CHAPTER IX

The Problem of Reparation

Allen, H. T. *The Rhineland Occupation* (1927).

Angas, Z. Z. B. *Germany and Her Debts* (1923).

Auld, G. P. *The Dawes Plan and the New Economics* (1928). An excellent discussion by a former accountant-general of the Reparation Commission.

Bass, J. F. and Moulton, H. G. *America and the Balance Sheet of Europe* (1922), 155–297. An objective study of the economic situation in Europe with special reference to the problem of reparation.

Bergmann, C. *The History of Reparations* (1927). An authoritative presentation from the German point of view.

D'Abernon, Baron *Versailles to Rapallo* (1929). A study of the post-war conferences.

Dawes, R. C. *The Dawes Plan in the Making* (1925). An authoritative account.

Ebray, A. *A Frenchman Looks at the Peace* (1927), 137–189, 217–227.

Greer, G. *The Ruhr-Lorraine Industrial Problem* (1925). A discussion of the effects of the Franco-German iron and coal problem on the reparation question.

Kessler, Count Harry. *Germany and Europe* (1923), 42–106. German point of view.

Keynes, J. M. *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1920), 113–225, 252–298.

Keynes, J. M. *A Revision of the Treaty* (1922).

Lichtenberger, H. *The Ruhr Conflict* (1923). By a French professor.

Long, R. E. C. *The Mythology of Reparations* (1928).

MacDonald, W. *Reconstruction in France* (1922), 172–187, 237–256. Shows the need for reparation payments.
Moulton, H. G. and McGuire, C. E. *Germany's Capacity to Pay* (1923).
Moulton, H. G. *The Reparation Plan* (1924). A favorable analysis of the Dawes Plan.
Moulton, H. G. and Pasvolsky, L. *World War Debt Settlements* (1926). A valuable handbook on reparation and inter-allied debts.
Mowat, R. B. *A History of European Diplomacy, 1914–1925* (1927), 200–226, 243–278.
Sering, M. *Germany under the Dawes Plan* (1929). By a German professor.
Toynbee, A. J. *Survey of International Affairs, 1924* (1926), 266–399.
World Peace Foundation, *The Dawes Report* (1923). Official text together with pertinent documents.

CHAPTER X

The League of Nations

General

Baker, P. J. N. *The League of Nations at Work* (1926). A competent popular presentation.
Barnes, G. N. *History of the International Labour Office* (1926). A good brief survey by an official of the office.
Bassett, J. S. *The League of Nations. A Chapter in World Politics* (1928). A detached and dispassionate work by an American historian.
Bradfield, B. *A Little Book of the League of Nations, 1920–1927* (1927). An admirable brief survey.
Bustamente, A. S. de *The World Court* (1925). A standard work by a justice of the court.
Fachiri, A. P. *The Permanent Court of International Justice* (1925). A substantial account of the organization and working of the court.
Hudson, M. O. *The Permanent Court of International Justice* (1925). A series of valuable articles by an American professor.
Johnston, G. A. *International Social Progress* (1924). A description of the achievements of the International Labor Organization.
League of Nations, *The Health Organization of the League of Nations* (1923). A pamphlet.
League of Nations, *The League of Nations and Intellectual Coöperation* (1923). A pamphlet.
League of Nations, *Social and Humanitarian Work* (1924). A pamphlet.
League of Nations, *Communications and Transit* (1924). A pamphlet.

League of Nations, *The League of Nations. A Survey* (1927). Covers the period from January, 1920, to December, 1926.

League of Nations, *Books on the Work of the League of Nations Catalogued in the Library of the Secretariat* (1928). Contains nearly three thousand items.

National Industrial Conference Board, *The Work of the International Labor Organization* (1928).

Oliver, E. M. *The World's Industrial Parliament* (1925). An excellent short popular account of the International Labor Organization.

Perigord, P. *The International Labor Organization* (1926). A conventional and detailed account.

Potter, P. B. *An Introduction to the Study of International Organization* (1928), 287–445.

Quigley, H. S. *From Versailles to Locarno* (1927). A popular outline discussing the organization of the League of Nations and World Court.

Toynbee, A. J. *Survey of International Affairs, 1926* (1928), 1–80. Discusses the admission of Germany to the League.

Wheeler-Bennett, J. W. *Information on the Permanent Court of International Justice* (1925). A compact manual containing all the important documents.

Yearbooks of the League of Nations. The first four were edited by C. H. Levermore; from 1924 they have been published by the World Peace Foundation.

Political Questions

Firich, C. T. *Polish Character of Upper Silesia According to Official Prussian Sources and the Results of the Plebiscite* (1921).

Kellor, F. A. and Hatvany, A. *Security Against War*, 2 vols. (1924).

Lithuanian Information Bureau, *The Vilna Problem* (1922).

Lithuanian Information Bureau, *The Lithuanian-Polish Dispute*, 3 vols. (1921–1923).

Lithuanian Information Bureau, *The Question of Memel* (1924).

Lowell, A. L. and Hudson, M. O. *The Corfu Crisis* (World Peace Foundation *Pamphlet*, VI, No. 3, 1923).

Macartney, C. A. *et al. Survey of International Affairs, 1925*, II (1928), 299–309. The Greco-Bulgar crisis.

Osborne, S. (ed.) *The Problem of Upper Silesia* (1921).

Romer, E. *Economical Conditions of Upper Silesia and the Policy of the German State* (1921).

Rose, A. *Germans and Poles in Upper Silesia* (1919).

Sederholm, J. J. *The Åland Question from a Swedish Finlander's Point of View* (1920).

Stickney, E. P. *Southern Albania in European Affairs, 1912–1923* (1926). A scholarly treatment.

Toynbee, A. J. *Survey of International Affairs, 1920–1923* (1925), 234–238 (Åland Islands), 250–256 (Vilna), 256–261 (Memel), 348–356 (Corfu).

Wierzbieki, *The Truth About Upper Silesia* (1921).

Financial Reconstruction

League of Nations, *The Financial Reconstruction of Austria* (1923). A pamphlet.

League of Nations, *The Financial Reconstruction of Austria* (1926). A general survey, with the principal documents.

League of Nations, *The Financial Reconstruction of Hungary* (1926). A general survey, with the principal documents.

League of Nations, *Greek Refugee Settlement* (1926).

Toynbee, A. J. *Survey of International Affairs, 1920–1923* (1925), 311–328. Austria.

Toynbee, A. J. *Survey of International Affairs, 1924* (1926), 423–437. Hungary.

Toynbee, A. J. *Survey of International Affairs, 1926* (1928), 191–209. Austria and Hungary.

The Saar and Danzig

Askenazy, S. *Dantzig and Poland* (1921). The Polish case for union.

Bisschop, W. R. *The Saar Controversy* (1924). A good historical analysis.

Donald, Sir R. *A Danger Spot in Europe and Its Government by the League of Nations* (1925). An anti-French account.

League of Nations, *Saar Basin and Free City of Danzig* (1924). A pamphlet.

McBain, H. L. and Rogers, L. *The New Constitutions of Europe* (1922), 426–451. Danzig.

Osborne, S. *The Saar Question. A Disease Spot in Europe* (1923).

Russell, F. M. *International Government of the Saar* (1926). An excellent historical account, beginning with the peace conference.

Slawski, S. *Poland's Access to the Sea and the Claims of East Prussia* (1925). Poland's case set forth by a member of the Danzig Harbor Board.

Mandates and Minorities

Batsell, W. R. *Summary of the Work of the Sessions of the Permanent*

Mandates Commission (International Conciliation *Pamphlet*, No. 213, 301–315. October, 1925).

Buell, R. L. *International Relations* (1925), 172–192 (Minorities), 328–352 (Mandates).

Buxton, N. and Conwil-Evans, T. P. *Oppressed Peoples and the League of Nations* (1922).

League of Nations, *The League of Nations and Minorities* (1923). A pamphlet.

League of Nations, *The League of Nations and Mandates* (1924). A pamphlet.

Maanen-Helmer, E. van *The Mandates System* (1929). With special reference to the B and C mandates.

Mair, L. D. *The Protection of Minorities* (1928). Discusses the cases which have come before the League.

White, F. *Mandates* (1926). A popular, up-to-date presentation.

Wright, Q. *Mandates Under the League of Nations* (1929). An excellent discussion of the structure and methods of the mandatory system.

Official Publications

International Labor Office, *Monthly Summary of the International Labor Organization.*

League of Nations, *Official Journal.* Contains the complete minutes of the sessions of the Council, the texts of the reports and resolutions adopted by the Council, together with the principal official documents received or dispatched by the Secretariat of the League.

League of Nations, *Records of the Assembly.* Contains the text of the debates in the plenary meetings of the Assembly together with the minutes of the meetings of the Assembly committees.

League of Nations, *Treaty Series.* Contains the treaties and international engagements registered with the Secretariat of the League.

League of Nations, *Monthly Summary of the League of Nations.*

CHAPTER XI

The East in Revolt

General

Chirol, Sir V. *The Occident and the Orient* (1924). By one of the most competent authorities on the Near and Middle East.

Dutcher, G. M. *The Political Awakening of the East* (1925). A stimu-

lating study of the influence of Western political ideas on the nations of the East.

Hunt, F. *The Rising Temper of the East* (1922). A vivid but impressionistic sketch of the rise of democratic and nationalist sentiment in the Far East.

O'Leary, D. L. *Islam at the Crossroads* (1923). A suggestive analysis of the newer tendencies in the Moslem world.

Spender, J. A. *The Changing East* (1926). A well-balanced survey, dealing chiefly with India and Egypt.

Toynbee, A. J. *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: a Study in the Contact of Civilisations* (1922). Emphasizes the growing Oriental impatience with Western interference.

Toynbee, A. J. *Survey of International Affairs, 1925*. Part I. *The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement* (1927). An admirable survey of events in the Islamic world.

The Mediterranean World

Elgood, P. E. *Egypt and the Army* (1924). Traces the development of the Egyptian movement for independence during the World War.

Harris, M. *Egypt under the Egyptians* (1925). A thoughtful and instructive study.

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Manthey-Zorn, O. *Germany in Travail* (1922).
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Barnes, G. N. *From Workshop to War Cabinet* (1924). By a prominent Laborite.

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Guest, L. H. *The Labour Party and the Empire* (1926). Discussed by a Laborite.

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Beasley, P. *Michael Collins and the Making of New Ireland* (1926). By a Sinn Feiner.
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Regan, J. M. *What Made Ireland Sinn Fein* (1921).

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The Fascist Régime in Italy

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Gay, H. N. *Strenuous Italy* (1927). A record of the material progress made under Mussolini, written by one of his admirers.

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McGuire, C. E. *Italy's International Economic Position* (1926). An illuminating study.
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Robertson, A. *Mussolini and the New Italy* (1928). Favorable.
Salvemini, G. *The Fascist Dictatorship in Italy*, I (1927). The classic formulation of the case against Fascism, written by an uncompromising opponent.
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The Bolshevik Régime in Russia

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Dobb, M. and Stevens, H. C. *Russian Economic Development Since the Revolution* (1928). The best general treatment; scholarly and authentic.

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CHAPTER XVIII

The Problems of Russia's Borderlands

The Baltic Republics

Bihlmans, A. *Latvia in the Making* (1925).
Butler, R. *The New Eastern Europe* (1919), 7–68.
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Fox, F. *Finland Today* (1926). An excellent history and general survey.
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Rutter, O. *The New Baltic States and Their Future* (1925). Written primarily from the geographical standpoint.
Söderhjelm, H. *The Red Insurrection in Finland, 1918* (1920). Based on documentary evidence.
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Walters, M. *Lettland* (1924). A thorough history of Latvia.

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Bagger, E. S. *Eminent Europeans* (1922), 211–236. A character sketch of Paderewski.

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